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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Revival Plans Still Need Trump-like Tariffs

04 Monday Jan 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Buy American, carbon tariff, carbon tax, Dan Breznitz, David Adler, health security, infrastructure, Joe Biden, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, research and development, supply chains, tariffs, taxes, technology, The New York Times, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I was thrilled to see today’s op-ed piece on U.S. manufacturing in The New York Times, and not just because co-author David Adler is a good friend. I was also thrilled to see it because a careful reading reenforces the essential notion that all the worthy proposals made by policy analysts and politicians lately (including apparent President-elect Joe Biden) on reviving industry will either come to naught or greatly underperform without steep, and indeed Trump-like, tariffs to shut a critical mass of imports out of the economy.

Those domestically-focused manufacturing revival measures have included more federal funding for research and developments, greater federal efforts to help smaller manufacturers in particular learn about and access research breakthroughs in academia and existing government labs, measures to help these smaller industrial firms access capital more easily, tax breaks to foster production and innovation in the United States, and more ambitious and better enforced Buy American requirement for federal purchases of manufactured products. In general, I’m strongly supportive, and have even criticized the Trump administration for giving them short shrift (even on the tax front, where the big 2017 cuts should have come with more investing and hiring strings).

From knowing David, I feel sure that he backs these intiatives, too; indeed, the article concentrates tightly on the Buy American slice of this agenda. And the piece gratifingly (but probably unknowingly) endorses an idea that I’ve made for many years, but that has gotten zero traction: requiring “all manufacturing industries to disclose how much of their sourcing and critical production takes place in the United States.” After all, how can Washington make the right manufacturing policy decisions when it relies so heavily for such crucial information from crumbs self-servingly cherry-picked by offshoring-happy companies themselves?

Yet as also suggested by David and co-author Dan Breznitz – who studies innovation policies at the University of Toronto – except for the Buy American proposals, the standard raft of manufacturing revival plans could work to  stimulate more production and supply, but pays inadequate attention to ensuring that all that supply is actually bought – which would eventually make companies think twice about producing more.

The authors place much stock in government’s ability to soak up this output, and so does Biden – who on top of making sure that more of what government currently purchases is American-made, has pledged to spend “$400 billion in his first term in additional federal purchases of products made by American workers, with transparent, targeted investments that unleash new demand for domestic goods and services and create American jobs.”

The former Vice President correctly contends that these measures will “provide a strong, stable source of demand for products made by American workers and supply chains composed of American small businesses.” The history of U.S. industrial policy also shows that early guaranteed government purchases helped new industries demonstrate the usefulness of innovative products that eventually interested the private sector and produced enormous new markets for their products on top of federal contracts. (Think “computers” and all the hardware and software used pervasively now not only in technology sectors but in virtually the entire economy.)

But U.S.-based manufacturers turned out just over $2.35 trillion worth of goods in 2019 (the last full pre-CCP Virus year). And the manufacturing trade deficit that year was $1.03 trillion. So unless it’s supposed that that 2019 level of domestic manufacturing production is remotely adequate (and clearly, the manufacturing policy reform supporters don’t), or unless they believe that government should buy much more of the output than the $400 billion Biden proposes over not one but four years (to sit in warehouses?), generating more private demand for industry’s output will be essential as well.

As indicated above, David and Dan Breznitz argue that more detailed, accurate labeling will help by enabling more consumers and private businesses to act effectively on their naturally strong preferences for Made in the USA goods – not only out of patriotism, but because of reasonable convictions that their quality and safety are superior. I remain all in favor, but the immense popularity of imports among both classes of customers (made clear by the huge and chronic manufacturing trade deficits) despite numerous news accounts over the years of shoddy, outright dangerous foreign-made products (especially from China), demonstrates that much more will need to be done to spur demand for U.S.-produced manufactures.

RealityChek regulars will not be the slightest bit surprised that I’m ruling out overseas demand as a promising net new source of customers for American domestic manufacturers. Unfortunately, the persistence of the huge manufacturing trade deficits is also evidence that most of America’s international trade partners are far too devoted to the health of their own industrial bases to permit major U.S. inroads. In fact, if anything, they’re likely to step up their own efforts to strengthen their own domestic industries by further curbing U.S. and other foreign competition. And that’s where the tariffs come in.

Not that David and Dan Bernitz, or Biden, overlook the need for U.S. market protection entirely. The former, for example, call for “Stopping predatory pricing by foreign manufacturers” – which entails slapping tariffs on these usually government-subsidized artificially cheap goods. The latter makes similar points, and has also mentioned a carbon tariff on products from countries that base their competitiveness on ignoring “their climate and environmental obligations.” (At the same time, Biden could use a similar levy to punish domestic companies that don’t measure up in his administration’s eyes climate-wise, leaving the net benefit to U.S.-based manufacturing minimal.)

Moreover, to ensure adequate domestic supplies of the healthcare goods needed to fight the next pandemic, simple stockpiling of products by government will be necessary. And since practically everything wears out over time, or becomes outmoded, lots of re-stockpiling will be necessary. Meanwhile, it should go without saying that many of the government purchases of manufactures will be used for critical national purposes – like repairing and building all kinds of traditional and technology infrastructure systems, and producing whatever new military equipment or refurbishing of old equipment the new Congress and the likely new administration wind up supporting.

But these are of course public purposes, and since the United States is still a strongly private sector-driven economy, that’s what’s inevitably going to determine the success of most manufacturing revival efforts. So unless manufacturing revivalists want government to play a veritably dominant role in production and consumption decisions, their strategy will employ tariffs – but not in a targeted, sector-specific, and reactive way, much less as an afterthought to domestic initiatives. Instead, they’ll be proactive, come in a flat-rate form, and stand high enough to encourage plenty of new market entrants that it makes sense to join established enterprises in vigorous, overwhelmingly domestic competition for America’s immense pool of customers.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden Multilateralism Looks Ever More Muddled

27 Friday Nov 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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alliances, Antony Blinken, Biden transition, China, decoupling, globalism, international institutions, Jake Sullivan, Joe Biden, multilateralism, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, technology

Attention to anyone in touch with the Biden foreign policy transition folks – I’m offering a deal.

I’ll stop charging that its top members (and especially Cabinet and similar nominees) keep spouting patently and dangerously vapid globalist foreign policy ideas if they provide some evidence that something other than patently and dangerously vapid globalist foreign policy ideas are going to shape their upcoming stewardship of American strategy and diplomacy.

So far, however, the evidence keeps showing that they have a long way to go, starting with Secretary of State nominee Antony Blinken. In his remarks accepting the position (subject to Senate confirmation of course), this quintessential Clinton and Obama administration retread spoke movingly about his family’s Holocaust roots, but committed one of the cardinal sins of not only diplomacy but any policymaking or politicking: He advertised weakness.

On top of failing either to mention or – more likely – recognize that the international cooperation and multilateralism that’s he’s elevated from a foreign policy tactic to a goal in and of itself will inevitably have content, and that therefore America will often need to play hardball in order to ensure favorable outcomes, Blinken emphasized that “as the President-elect said, we can’t solve all the world’s problems alone. We need to be working with other countries. We need their cooperation. We need their partnership.”

It was nothing less than an open invitation for U.S. friends, foes, and neutrals alike to assume that such problem solving efforts matter more to the United States to them, and that they can therefore repeatedly roll Washington by playing hard to get, and often simply stonewalling until the United States caves in to their stances.

And if you think that America’s wealthy, powerful, and influential allies, whose agreement will be rucial to the success of any international cooperative efforts, would never sink to these tactics, you need to learn some Cold War history. Even when the free world faced a Soviet threat that all of its members viewed as existential, countries like (then) West Germany and South Korea, which literally lived on the front lines, successfully free-rode for decades on Washington’s defense guarantees because U.S. leaders continually spoke and acted as if they’d maintain these military (including nuclear) umbrellas at all costs because they were vital to America itself.

To make matters even weirder, shortly before the election, Blinken – the fetishizer of international cooperation and multilateralism — justified these globalist priorities with an argument drawn straight from the very foundation of America First-ism, at least as I’ve defined it.

I’ve written that America First is the foreign policy approach most suited to the United States is one understanding that, although the United States is not strong, rich, and or smart enough to create a benign global environment or meet truly global challenges all by itself, it is plenty strong, rich, and smart enough to remain safe and prosperous in a world sure to stay anything but benign.

So imagine how surprised I was to see this Blinken statement at a foreign policy conference in October, when he was firmly established as a leading Biden spokesman: A new administration’s approach to world affairs would include “humility, because most of the world’s problems are not about us, even though they affect us.”

Now there’s nothing inherently wrong with addressing overseas situations that “affect us,” as opposed to representing mortal threats. If opportunities arise for the United State to better its lot, it’s of course reasonable to pursue them. But they shouldn’t be pursued until U.S. leaders ask themselves whether the best way to achieve such goals is by joining international cooperative efforts, or relying on any foreign policy approaches at all, rather than trying to build up its own capabilities and reducing its own vulnerabilities. As I’ve also written, in many instances, the latter, America First-y approach will be the superior or more promising, if only because the nation will always be able to influence its own affairs much more effectively than the affairs of others.

Finally, even when Biden aides do display some awareness that U.S. foreign policy needs to be something more than a content-free quest for cooperation, regardless of the stakes for Americans, they haven’t made much progress on figuring out what this content should be – or sharing the results with the public.

More than a year ago, the apparent President-elect’s choice for White House national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, wrote in the leading journal Foreign Affairs, that the central task of U.S. China policy must be to find a way to establish a modus vivendi with Beijing recognizing that the People’s Republic is here to stay as a great power. He stated that “Such coexistence would involve elements of competition and cooperation,” which sounds like yet another glib formula for emphasizing means over end. But Sullivan did specify that America’s policies must identify and seek outcomes favorable to U.S. interests and values.”

On broader matters, Sullivan even contended that “Going forward, Washington should avoid becoming an eager suitor on transnational challenges. Eagerness can actually limit the scope for cooperation by making it a bargaining chip.” Hopefully, he’ll communicate this “Don’t advertise weakness” to Blinken and the rest of a Biden administration.

So that’s progress. But in the year that’s passed since this piece came out, we’ve heard little from Sullivan or anyone else connected with Biden on what will be acceptable to a new adminstration and what won’t be, and less in the way of plausible tactics for achieving these goals or creating these conditions.

For example, Sullivan’s description in his article of ways to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan – or other targets in Asia – demonstrates no awareness that Beijing’s ability to hit the U.S. homeland with large numbers of nuclear weapons looks formidable enough to inhibit conventional American military responses strong enough to threaten Chinese gambits with defeat.

Sullivan allows that Washington will need to use “some enhanced restrictions on the flow of technology investment and trade in both directions,” in order to “safeguard its technological advantages in the face of China’s intellectual property theft, targeted industrial policies, and commingling of its economic and security sectors.”

But because Sullivan’s overarching goal appears to be avoiding the “Balkanization” of “the global technology ecosystem by impeding flows of knowledge and talent,” he’d place limitations on these curbs that would result in a piecemeal response to a systemic threat. And even individual restrictions that are approved would surely be watered down to the point of ineffectiveness thanks to Sullivan’s insistence that they be “undertaken in consultation with industry and other governments” – two groups that have displayed not the slightest inclination significantly to disrupt business with China that they’ve each found tremendously lucrative.

And in fact, Sullivan ends up ignoring his own sage advice about the limits of international cooperation and multilateralism for their own sakes by declaring a faith in their capabilities that looks stubbornly blind. Why else would he end his article with these declarations?

“Establishing clear-eyed coexistence with China will be challenging under any conditions, but it will be virtually impossible without help. If the United States is to strengthen deterrence, establish a fairer and more reciprocal trading system, defend universal values, and solve global challenges, it simply cannot go it alone. It is remarkable that it must be said, but so it must: to be effective, any strategy of the United States must start with its allies.”

Which sounds like we’re back to Blinken-ism. With my offer still firmly on the table.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Are Businesses Closet Techno-Nationalists?

22 Sunday Nov 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, General Electric, globalization, innovation, nationalism, tech, technology, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Even if these poll findings are as off as many of the surveys of the 2020 election vote were, they’d still be pretty astounding. After years of multinational companies all over the world (including and perhaps especially in the United States), proclaiming that promoting innovation requires ever greater cooperation with partners across borders, General Electric’s (GE) latest annual survey of business views on the subject turned up strong support for what it calls a protectionist perspective.

It’s definitely something to keep in mind the next time you hear the China-coddling corporate Offshoring Lobby insist that a major U.S. economic decoupling from the People’s Republic would cut America off from an increasingly important source of technological progress, or the Open Borders-friendly Cheap Labor Lobby claim that restricting the inflow of foreign technology workers would deny them and the national economy as a whole access to many of the world’s best talent.

GE has been conducting these studies since 2011, and this year has looked at the subject twice – in January and September. In toto, the views of corporate innovation executives from 22 countries ranging from Kenya to the United States were sampled. (The January poll reported results from 22 countries and the September follow up from ten.)

Among the most startling results:

>This past January, fully 66 percent of the U.S. executives who responded considered that the country is “self-sufficient, and does not need to rely on other countries to innovate.” By September, this figure had climbed to 78 percent.

>In China, the comparable figures were 56 percent and 52 percent, respectively – meaning that, at least according to this GE study, China’s confidence in its technological autonomy has declined.

>Going global, in September, 69 percent of respondents reporting that their national governments had become more techno-protectionist in the last six months said that these policies had “a positive impact on innovation.” Viewed from the opposite end of the policy spectrum, only 41 percent of respondents reporting that their national governments had become less protectionist during this period considered this shift to have benefited innovation.

>In September, nearly all (94 percent) of the respondents from that month’s smaller sample agreed that “a protectionist stance is important to help address the major economic problems in this country created by the pandemic” and an equal percentage believed that such policies are “important to help the domestic economy recover.”

One reason for this support of techno-protectionism might be the widespread belief that it’s increasingly become the way of the world. Fully half of the September respondents told GE that “their government has taken a more protectionist stance during the COVID-19 pandemic” with only 13 percent reporting movement in the opposite direction and 34 percent perceiving no change.

At the same time, the GE poll revealed a deep ambivalence in business ranks about the virtues of tech self-sufficiency. Notably, 86 percent of the September respondents agreed that “More partnerships across countries will help drive progress on innovation.” And half worried that “Restrictions on movement of people/goods/services” were “a major cause for concern regarding innovation progress.”

One possible reason for the continued belief in the value of international collaboration: seemingly strong confidence that techno-nationalism (at least in their home market) will be a flash in the pan. Only 22 percent believed that such protectionism would last more than three years.

These results hardly exhaust the list of unexpected findings from the GE report. In fact, you’ll be seeing some more of them on RealityChek this week. But the discrepancy between them and the almost unamimous endorsement for the free movement of technological knowledge across borders from the corporate community deserves much more attention, and represents evidence that many of the globalist public positions taken by these executives’ companies and businesses stem from concern not for for the national interest, but for their own already healthy bottom lines.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: China Advice that Biden (Unfortunately) Could Take

19 Thursday Nov 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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America First, Barack Obama, Biden administration, China, decoupling, globalism, Joe Biden, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, technology, Trump, University of California at San Diego

Since due to Election 2020’s results, the United States may be at a turning point in China policy, a new report from a bunch of supposed experts assembled by the University of California at San Diego that would ordinarily deserve obscurity merits some coverage. Not that any of the analyses or policy recommendations in this blueprint for a post-Trump approach make much sense, or even hang together coherently.

Instead, Meeting the China Challenge is most noteworthy for unwittingly showcasing key reasons why America’s strategy for the People’s Republic failed so dangerously for so many decades until an America First-y President won the White House – and why its recipe for renewed blundering previews much of a likely Biden administration approach.

Right off the bat it needs mentioning that Meeting flunks the important test of accountability. The “Working Group on Science and Technology in U.S.-China Relations” that wrote it is filled with Obama administration veterans and other backers of the pre-Trump strategy. Further, the University’s 21st Century China Center that’s one of two co-sponsors (along with the corporate funded Asia Society) declares that its mission is “enhancing U.S.-China relations.” That’s an appealing goal in the abstract, of course. But in practice, even in the best of circumstances, it’s represented the kind of gauzy globalist hopium that tends to give short shrift to specific, concrete uniquely American interests.

And since this strategy’s long-time pursuit created circumstances not remotely qualifying as “best,” an intellectually honest team of authors would have asked itself why its previous recommendations turned out so badly, what lessons it’s learned, and how they can be applied to the U.S.-China policy landscape today. Since the report addresses none of these questions, readers are fully entitled to ask why this group’s advice should be taken seriously now.

Substance-wise, Meeting the China Challenge sets the stage for permitting it actually to worsen by foundering on one of the biggest policy rocks that have undercut other leading criticisms of the Trump approach.

Specifically, although the report does a surprisingly good job of portraying the China challenge as systemic and genuinely menacing, it generally calls for responses that are piecemeal and subordinate to that overarching objective of “enhancing the relationship” – including preserving opportunities to cooperate on “shared interests in such global issues as economic growth and stability, climate change, and public health.” In fact, the Working Group is convinced that “Permeating every facet of the U.S.-China relationship will be crucial capabilities in science and technology that will feature both intense rivalry and necessary cooperation.”

I’d be the last one to rule out categorically any overlap between U.S. and Chinese interests, or the possibility of threading the above policy needles. But as yesterday’s post explained, international cooperation has content, and if Washington wants to make sure that it unfolds on terms acceptable to Americans, it will need the relative power to wield the needed leverage and drive the necessary bargains.

More fundamentally, though, Meeting the China Challenge‘s optimism on cooperation assumes maintaining a degree of policy compartmentalization that even the authors seem to doubt ultimately can be maintained – as indicated by the following passage:

“We recognize that the United States faces real and growing security threats from China. While we hope that radical decoupling will never be necessary, and understand that such a step would have dire consequences for the global and American innovation systems, we would be foolish to ignore the possibility that it may become unavoidable. Unless and until such a decision is made, the role of the scientific and tech community [and presumably the U.S. government] should be to pursue worldwide collaboration in accordance with practices that mitigate the risks from openness.”

The big and obvious problems are that (1) maintaining a (pre-Trump) business-as-usual posture on “worldwide collaboration” risks permitting further Chinese catch up with the United States and (2) even if Washington wakes up to the need for decoupling before it’s too late, does anyone truly believe that American strategy can shift quickly enough to preserve an adequate edge?

The weaknesses of Meeting the China Challenge hardly stop here. The authors, for example – just like ostensible President-elect Biden – also put way too much stock in mobilizing allied support and working through international institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) to manage the China risks it perceived – even though the lucrative economic ties many of these allies have created with Beijing (often at the United States’ expense) will surely keep them firmly on the fence for the foreseeable future. And precisely because they’re so compromised, the international institutions these countries numerically dominate will keep resisting in effect outlawing Chinese transgressions.

Other recommendations are much better – e.g., bolstering “U.S. innovation capabilities through meaures ranging from increased funding for fundamental research to selective upgrading of our production system.” But these are anything but distinctive nowadays.  (See, e.g., the bipartisan support described here for reviving domestic semiconductor manufacturing prowess.)  

But the most insightful observation made by Meeting the China Challenge underscores a challenge that continues to defy the authors themselves and other globalists: the “expert community has serious homework to do if it is to get right…foundational issues for the bilateral relationship….”

Making News: New Article on Why I Voted for Trump

01 Sunday Nov 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

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Big Tech, Black Lives Matter, censorship, China, Conservative Populism, conservatives, Democrats, economic nationalism, election 2020, entertainment, environment, freedom of expression, freedom of speech, George Floyd, Hollywood, Hunter Biden, Immigration, industrial policy, Joe Biden, Josh Hawley, journalism, Mainstream Media, Making News, Marco Rubio, police killings, regulation, Republicans, Robert Reich, Russia-Gate, sanctions, Silicon Valley, social media, supply chains, tariffs, taxes, technology, The National Interest, Trade, trade war, Trump, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Ukraine, Wall Street, wokeness

I’m pleased to announce that The National Interest journal has just published a modified version of my recent RealityChek post explaining my support for President Trump’s reelection. Here’s the link.

The main differences? The new item is somewhat shorter, it abandons the first-person voice and, perhaps most important, adds some points to the conclusion.

Of course, keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Im-Politic: Why I Voted for Trump

28 Wednesday Oct 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

≈ 6 Comments

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Big Tech, Black Lives Matter, censorship, China, Conservative Populism, conservatives, Democrats, economic nationalism, election 2020, entertainment, environment, free expression, freedom of speech, George Floyd, Hollywood, Hunter Biden, Immigration, impeachment, industrial policy, Joe Biden, Josh Hawley, journalism, Mainstream Media, Marco Rubio, police killings, Populism, progressives, regulations, Republicans, Robert Reich, Russia-Gate, sanctions, Silicon Valley, social media, supply chains, tariffs, taxes, technology, Trade, trade war, Trump, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Ukraine Scandal, Wall Street, wokeness

Given what 2020 has been like for most of the world (although I personally have little cause for complaint), and especially Washington Post coverage of endless early voting lines throughout the Maryland surburbs of the District of Columbia, I was expecting to wait for hours in bad weather to cast my ballot for President Trump. Still, I was certain that Election Day circumstances would be a complete mess, so hitting the polling place this week seemed the least bad option.

Hence my amazement that the worst case didn’t pan out – and that in fact, I was able to kill two birds with one stone. My plan was to check out the situation, including parking, at the University of Maryland site closest to my home on my way to the supermarket. But the scene was so quiet that I seized the day, masked up, and was able to feed my paper ballot into the recording machine within about ten minutes.

My Trump vote won’t be surprising to any RealityChek regulars or others who have been in touch with on or off social media in recent years. Still, it seems appropriate to explain why, especially since I haven’t yet spelled out some of the most important reasons.

Of course, the President’s positions on trade (including a China challenge that extends to technology and national security) and immigration have loomed large in my thinking, as has Mr. Trump’s America First-oriented (however unevenly) approach to foreign policy. (For newbies, see all the posts here under “[What’s Left of] Our Economy,” and “Our So-Called Foreign Policy,” and various freelance articles that are easily found on-line.). The Biden nomination has only strengthened my convictions on all these fronts, and not solely or mainly because of charges that the former Vice President has been on Beijing’s payroll, via his family, for years.

As I’ve reported, for decades he’s been a strong supporter of bipartisan policies that have greatly enriched and therefore strengthened this increasingly aggressive thug-ocracy. It’s true that he’s proposed to bring back stateside supply chains for critical products, like healthcare and defense-related goods, and has danced around the issue of lifting the Trump tariffs. But the Silicon Valley and Wall Street tycoons who have opened their wallets so wide for him are staunchly opposed to anything remotely resembling a decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies and especially technology bases

Therefore, I can easily imagine Biden soon starting to ease up on sanctions against Chinese tech companies – largely in response to tech industry executives who are happy to clamor for subsidies to bolster national competitiveness, but who fear losing markets and the huge sunk costs of their investments in China. I can just as easily imagine a Biden administration freeing up bilateral trade again for numerous reasons: in exchange for an empty promise by Beijing to get serious about fighting climate change; for a deal that would help keep progressive Democrats in line; or for an equally empty pledge to dial back its aggression in East Asia; or as an incentive to China to launch a new round of comprehensive negotiations aimed at reductions or elimination of Chinese trade barriers that can’t possibly be adequately verified. And a major reversion to dangerous pre-Trump China-coddling can by no means be ruled out.

Today, however, I’d like to focus on three subjects I haven’t dealt with as much that have reinforced my political choice.

First, and related to my views on trade and immigration, it’s occurred to me for several years now that between the Trump measures in these fields, and his tax and regulatory cuts, that the President has hit upon a combination of policies that could both ensure improved national economic and technological competitiveness, and build the bipartisan political support needed to achieve these goals.

No one has been more surprised than me about this possibility – which may be why I’ve-hesitated to write about it. For years before the Trump Era, I viewed more realistic trade policies in particular as the key to ensuring that U.S.-based businesses – and manufacturers in particular – could contribute the needed growth and jobs to the economy overall even under stringent (but necessary) regulatory regimes for the environment, workplace safety, and the like by removing the need for these companies to compete with imports from countries that ignored all these concerns (including imports coming from U.S.-owned factories in cheap labor pollution havens like China and Mexico).

I still think that this approach would work. Moreover, it contains lots for folks on the Left to like. But the Trump administration has chosen a different economic policy mix – high tariffs, tax and regulatory relief for business, and immigration restrictions that have tightened the labor market. And the strength of the pre-CCP Virus economy – including low unemployment and wage growth for lower-income workers and minorities – attests to its success.

A Trump victory, as I see it, would result in a continuation of this approach. Even better, the President’s renewed political strength, buoyed by support from more economically forward-looking Republicans and conservatives like Senators Marco Rubio of Florida and Josh Hawley of Missouri, could bring needed additions to this approach – notably, more family-friendly tax and regulatory policies (including childcare expense breaks and more generous mandatory family leave), and more ambitious industrial policies that would work in tandem with tariffs and sanctions to beat back the China technology and national security threat.

Moreover, a big obstacle to this type of right-of-center (or centrist) conservative populism and economic nationalism would be removed – the President’s need throughout the last four years to support the stances of the conventional conservatives that are still numerous in Congress in order to ensure their support against impeachment efforts.

My second generally undisclosed (here) reason for voting Trump has to do with Democrats and other Trump opponents (although I’ve made this point repeatedly on Facebook to Never Trumper friends and others). Since Mr. Trump first announced his candidacy for the White House back in 2015, I’ve argued that Americans seeking to defeat him for whatever reason needed to come up with viable responses to the economic and social grievances that gave him a platform and a huge political base. Once he won the presidency, it became even more important for his adversaries to learn the right lessons.

Nothing could be clearer, however, than their refusal to get with a fundamentally new substantive program with nationally unifying appeal. As just indicated, conventional Republicans and conservatives capitalized on their role in impeachment politics to push their longstanding but ever more obsolete (given the President’s overwhelming popularity among Republican voters) quasi-libertarian agenda, at least on domestic policy.

As for Democrats and liberals, in conjunction with the outgoing Obama administration, the countless haters in the intelligence community and elsewhere in the permanent bureaucracy, and the establishment conservatives Mr. Trump needed to staff much of his administration, they concentrated on ousting an elected President they considered illegitimate, and wasted more than three precious years of the nation’s time. And when they weren’t pushing a series of charges that deserve the titles “Russia Hoax” and “Ukraine Hoax,” the Democrats and liberals were embracing ever more extreme Left stances as scornful of working class priorities as their defeated 2016 candidate’s description of many Trump voters as “deplorables.”

I see no reason to expect any of these factions to change if they defeat the President this time around. And this forecast leads me to my third and perhaps most important reason for voting Trump. As has been painfully obvious especially since George Floyd’s unacceptable death at the hands of Minneapolis police officers, the type of arrogance, sanctimony and – more crucially – intolerance that has come to permeate Democratic, liberal, and progressive ranks has now spread widely into Wall Street and the Big Business Sector.

To all Americans genuinely devoted to representative and accountable government, and to the individual liberties and vigorous competition of ideas and that’s their fundamental foundation, the results have been (or should be) nothing less than terrifying. Along with higher education, the Mainstream Media, Big Tech, and the entertainment and sports industries, the nation’s corporate establishment now lines up squarely behind the idea that pushing particular political, economic, social, and cultural ideas and suppressing others has become so paramount that schooling should turn into propaganda, that news reporting should abandon even the goal of objectivity, that companies should enforce party lines in the workplace and agitate for them in advertising and sponsorship practices, and that free expression itself needed a major rethink.

And oh yes: Bring on a government-run “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” to investigate – and maybe prosecute – crimes and other instances of “wrongdoing” by the President, by (any?) officials in his administration. For good measure, add every “politician, executive, and media mogul whose greed and cowardice enabled” the Trump “catastrophe,” as former Clinton administration Labor Secretary Robert Reich has demanded. Along with a Scarlet Letter, or worse, for everyone who’s expressed any contrary opinion in the conventional or new media? Or in conversation with vigilant friends or family?

That Truth Commission idea is still pretty fringe-y. So far. But not too long ago, many of the developments described above were, too. And my chief worry is that if Mr. Trump loses, there will be no major national institution with any inclination or power to resist this authoritarian tide.

It’s reasonable to suppose that more traditional beliefs about free expression are so deeply ingrained in the national character that eventually they’ll reassert themselves. Pure self-interest will probably help, too. In this vein, it was interesting to note that Walmart, which has not only proclaimed its belief that “Black Lives Matter,” but promised to spend $100 million on a “center for racial equality” just saw one of its Philadelphia stores ransacked by looters during the unrest that has followed a controversial police shooting.

But at best, tremendous damage can be done between now and “eventually.” At worst, the active backing of or acquiescence in this Woke agenda by America’s wealthiest, most influential forces for any significant timespan could produce lasting harm to the nation’s life.

As I’ve often said, if you asked me in 2015, “Of all the 300-plus million Americans, who would you like to become President?” my first answer wouldn’t have been “Donald J. Trump.” But no other national politician at that point displayed the gut-level awareness that nothing less than policy disruption was needed on many fronts, combined with the willingness to enter the arena and the ability to inspire mass support.

Nowadays, and possibly more important, he’s the only national leader willing and able to generate the kind of countervailing force needed not only to push back against Woke-ism, but to provide some semblance of the political pluralism – indeed, diversity – required by representative, accountable government. And so although much about the President’s personality led me to mentally held my nose at the polling place, I darkened the little circle next to his name on the ballot with no hesitation. And the case for Mr. Trump I just made of course means that I hope many of you either have done or will do the same.

Making News: New Article Spotlights America’s Second-Rate Semiconductor Manufacturing

19 Monday Oct 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Asia-Pacific, China, globalism, innovation, Intel, Making News, manufacturing, offshoring, semiconductors, Taiwan, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, technology, The National Interest

I’m pleased to report that a new article of mine has just been published in the November-December, 2020 issue of The National Interest. The focus: America’s loss of its longtime global lead in manufacturing semiconductors. Given the central role played by microchips to the constantly acclerating information technology revolution, this setback threatens both the nation’s prosperity and its security — especially since the world’s most advanced semiconductors are now produced a grand total of 100 miles from China.

Click here to read.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: On CNBC Today on the U.S.-China Tech War

07 Friday Aug 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

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Tags

China, CNBC, Making News, national security, privacy, social media, technology, TikTok, Trump, WeChat

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to appear on CNBC this afternoon EST to talk about the intensifying technology conflict between the United States and China.  The segment, slated to start at 2 PM EST, will key off President Trump’s announcement last night that the Chinese social media apps TikTok and WeChat will be banned from the American market.

You can watch the segment live on the network, and if you can’t catch it, I’ll post a link to the video recording as soon as it’s available.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The U.S. and its Universities Remain Asleep at the Switch on the China Tech Threat

31 Friday Jul 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

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Argonne National Laboratory, China, higher education, Hoover Institution, John Pomfret, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, science, technology, technology transfer, universities

The word “blockbuster” has been so overused and misused by the national media during the Trump era that it’s impact has been watered down. Yet a new report by the California-based Hoover Institution definitely deserves that description – for it details the shocking and dangerous extent to which the U.S. government’s science and technology research arms, along with many of America’s top universities, have in recent years been merrily working, and no doubt sharing crucial defense-related technology, with individuals tightly connected with China’s military.

You can read an excellent summary of the report here by John Pomfret, a former longtime Washington Post China correspondent who’s turned into a full-time scholar of U.S. relations with the People’s Republic. But there are six points that I think deserve special attention.

First,even anyone who didn’t know that the Chinese institutions from which the Chinese researchers have come are called by China’s regime itself “Seven Sons of National Defense,” two of the names alone should be kind of a giveaway: Beiing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Unless anyone at any of the American universities involved doesn’t know that any activity in China with an aerospace component isn’t largely military in nature?

Second, the research projects themselves being conducted by teams of scientists from these U.S. and Chinese institutions haven’t been given names with obvious military implications. But any American authorities with a tech background should be aware of this dimension. Take “Effect of gallium addition on the microstructure and micromechanical properties of constituents in Nb-Si based alloys.” Gallium is a metal used mainly in micro-electronics manufacturing. Among its properties: It can “produce laser light directly from electricity….” Nothing military to see there! Ditto for the role played by gallium arsenide its role in making semiconductors for pressure sensors for touch switches.

“Nb” is niobium, another metal, is useful for making “superalloys for heat resistant equipment” – and therefore is handy for producing items like jet engines. And of course “Si”, or silicon, is a core building block of semiconductors themselves.

Nor is that work the only research that should have raised eyebrows. In 2018, an entity called the China-US International Cooperation Project (about which a Google search turned up squadoosh) and the Harbin Institute of Technology jointly funded a Master’s thesis on the “Modeling and Analysis of Energy Characteristics and Equivalent Carbon Emissions of CNC Centerless Grinding Machine.”

These types of machine tools are critical for defense manufacturing – including in aerospace – because they can make sure that metal surfaces of parts and components of complex manufactured devices have smooth enough surfaces to operate friction-free – an especially important goal to achieve when producing weapons that need to be highly reliable even in the most challenging situations. Indeed, when these grinders get advanced enough, their overseas sale is regulated for national security reasons by the U.S. government. Why on earth would that same government be helping the Chinese find out anything new about them?

Possibly most obvious – and therefore possibly most maddening – of all: Why did a researcher at the University of Virginia co-author with three colleagues affiliated with Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics a 2018 article titled “Research Progress of Adaptive Control for Hyper-Sonic Vehicle in Near Space”? Did he and the University of Virginia think we’ve arrived already at the United Federation of Planets phase of human history?

Third, as indicated above, the list of American universities involved in these potentially dangerous activities is as long as the inividual schools are highly regarded. It includes Virginia, MIT, Stanford, Columbia, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Michigan, the University of Texas, the University of North Carolina, Purdue University, Arizona State University, the University of Minnesota, George Washington University, the University of California-Irvine, and Georgia Tech.

Fourth, the list of U.S. government agencies involved is impressive, too. It includes the National Institutes of Health, the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the National Science Foundation.

Fifth, U.S. universities aren’t close to getting a handle on making sure that the research they sponsor in various ways doesn’t strengthen the Chinese military – and therefore undermine U.S. national security. As the Hoover authors point out:

“Only now is the US research community awakening to the intensity and scope of [the China challenge] and its military or dual-use dimensions. However, in the absence of external regulatory or policy mandates, US research institutions have been slow to adapt their due diligence and risk management frameworks. Weak institutional reporting mechanisms and compliance cultures have permitted some collaborations to go unknown, unreported, or underreported. Even among vetted collaborations, conflicts of commitment, unreported or misreported elements, or other activities that undermine the integrity of US scientific research and exceed the scope of collaboration agreements occur. In short, prevailing due diligence and risk management practices for screening and tracking potential collaborations with PRC entities fall far short of what circumstances require.”

Sixth, as must be obvious, the U.S. government isn’t doing much better. Specifically, according to the Hoover study, official U.S. responses (as with those of universities) focus too tightly on whether current laws and regulations aimed dealing with these threats are being violated, without considering whether these restrictions are still adequate. Moreover, Washington seems to view its processes of granting visas as the predominant way to fend off the Chinese threat. As noted by the Hoover authors, however, “collaborations with US partners may move online or to sites outside of the United States.”

So although the Trump administration is far more keenly aware of this problem than its predecessors, clearly is still has a very long way to go.

The Hoover authors are very careful to say that they’re not urging a complete ban on U.S. scientific and technological cooperation with China, and fully acknowledge that the nation has enjoyed major benefits from its academic and research-related openness. Indeed, they lay out a strategy for the research community to avoid handing China many of the keys to America’s scientific and technological kingdoms – in hopes that a heavier government hand can be avoided. Unfortunately, they make such a strong case that both the public and private research communities have been so far behind the eight ball in this respect, that it’s hard to see how anything short of sweeping official measures can deal adequately with the kind of systemic threat posed by China.

Making News: Podcast On-Line of National Radio Interview on U.S.-China Relations & the Biden Manufacturing Plan

15 Wednesday Jul 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Biden, China, election 2020, Europe, European Union, innovation, Joe Biden, Making News, manufacturing, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, offshoring, technology, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that a podcast is now on-line of an interview I did yesterday on Moe Ansari’s nationally syndicated radio show.  Click here and then scroll down a bit to the segment with my name on it to listen to a timely, informative session on the CCP Virus’ impact on U.S.-based manufacturing; on U.S.-China relations and President Trump’s trade war (which could include Europe), and on presumptive Democratic Presidential nominee Joe Biden’s plan for reviving American industry. The segment comes on at about the 23:50 mark.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

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Protecting U.S. Workers

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