(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Mainstream U.S. Trade Policy’s Main Rationale Has Just Been Blown Up

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Bill Clinton, BRICS, China, emerging markets, EMs, Financial Times, globalization, Jim O'Neill, multinational companies, offshoring, Project-Syndicate.org, Sherrod Brown, The Race to the Bottom, Trade, trade agreements, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I’m always struck by how often in the news media or policy writing (e.g., in journals like Foreign Affairs), genuinely game-changing points are made in passing, and for folks with any interest in the trade and globalization issues raised to such prominence by President Trump. And two such instances dealing with this subject just came in the Financial Times newspaper and the website Project-Syndicate.org.

The observation they both made with mind-boggling offhandedness – economic growth in countries dubbed “emerging markets” (EMs) is slowing to rates no faster than those of the rest of the world, and thus rendering them incapable as far as the eye can see of replacing the United States as a global growth engine.

This claim matters decisively for trade policy because these EMs have dominated America’s approach in this field for more than two decades. First identified in the early 1990s, they consist of economies in the developing world that not only boasted enormous populations. But largely because communism and a heavy state role in economic policy had been so thoroughly discredited due to the end of the Cold War, they were steadily transitioning to more free market approaches, and thus were seen to have huge growth potential. China and Mexico were the leading examples, but various definitions of the main emerging markets also included India, Brazil, Russia, Turkey, South Africa, and others.

According to trade enthusiasts, this combination of characteristics was going to make the EMs so important that accessing their vast current consumer markets and even greater consuming and importing potential needed to be Washington’s top trade priority. Their significance was portrayed as all the more important given America’s status as a “maturing” economy whose growth was bound to continue slowing. (Former President Bill Clinton used exactly this term while advocating for an emerging markets push in a document that’s not on-line but that’s cited in my book on globalization, The Race to the Bottom. The document was the 1995 Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program and it was published by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative at the start of 1996.)    

Yet however impressive and promising they seemed, the idea was a crock from the beginning – at least in terms of its importance in driving American trade policy for the foreseeable future. EM cheerleading suffered two fatal flaws. First, despite rapid growth and immense growth potential, the emerging markets were starting from such low bases – especially in terms of their populations’ consuming power – that they wouldn’t become significant markets in absolute terms for many years at best. Second, precisely because they remained so poor and under-developed, their governments invariably realized that their own best growth opportunities came from exporting to much wealthier countries like the United States – where the needed consumption power already existed.

So why the EMs euphoria? As documented exhaustively in The Race to the Bottom, the multinational corporations that dominated American trade policy-making never saw the emerging markets as final consumption markets. They viewed them as super low-cost production bases from which they could supply the U.S. market much more profitably than possible from their domestic factories. Which is exactly why, starting with the pursuit of trade expansion with Mexico at the onset of the 1990s, American trade policy almost exclusively targeted the emerging markets and other very low-income countries (like Vietnam and the countries of Central America) for negotiating new trade deals.

Ohio Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown (a possible 2020 Democratic presidential contender) described the multinationals sales pitch to leading EM China somewhat too charitably when he said in 2015, “while walking the halls of Congress, [lobbyists for the multinationals] talked about they wanted access to 1 billion Chinese customers. What they didn’t say is they also wanted access to 1 billion potential Chinese workers.”

As The Race to the Bottom also made clear, EM touting was star-crossed from the start – even embarrassingly so. As it peaked, in the mid-1990s, many of these same countries started experiencing problems that led to major financial crises even before the decade ended. That is, their markets became evaporating, not emerging, and in numerous cases they kept afloat only by cheapening their currencies, limiting their own consumption and importing still further, and making them more powerful exporters than ever.

Yet the multinationals’ power and influence remained so decisive throughout America’s political (and media) establishment that emerging markets hucksterism continued to justify trade agreements with such countries. Hence the continued repetition of wholly misleading contentions like “95 percent of the world’s consumers live outside the United States” (which I debunked here).

So that’s why I was so interested to see the following in a Financial Times blog post – and by no less than a former senior official at the International Monetary Fund and another leading international economic institution:  

“EM growth has slowed to about 4.5 per cent at present….In the long run, according to the OECD, the potential growth rate of the Briics (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa — accounting for most of EM GDP) is expected to slow further, converging to mature market trend growth of 2 per cent. In other words, the growth advantage of more than 4 percentage points that EMs enjoyed over mature markets in the 2000-2010 period has narrowed to about 2 percentage points and will probably disappear in the long run.”

And guess what? Unlike in the United States, in particular, even much of this EM growth will rely on maximizing exports and minimizing imports. So their importance as markets for American-made goods and services will be even less impressive than this impeccably mainstream analyst suggests.

Equally startling: This Project-Syndicate column by Jim O’Neill. O’Neill, for the unitiated, was perhaps the highest profile EM cheerleader, and coined a popular acronym for those economies that described those he believed most promising: BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa).

The former Goldman Sachs banker has remained a believer in China, and has actually added some countries to his list of economies he believes will loom much larger in this century. But in the column, he also argued that, if China falters in what he (wrongly, in my view) considers its role as a global growth engine, and the American consumer gets tapped out, none of the other emerging economies “is in a position to match the growth of Chinese consumption today, or even over the course of the next decade.” And by extension, the likelihood of these countries replacing the United States is even more infinitesimal.

Former French leader Charles de Gaulle once famously said that “Brazil is the country of the future…and always will be.” The two examples above show that the same solidly grounded skepticism is also finally seeping into the ranks of globalization cheerleaders. How long will it take before the American political, business, academic, and media establishments finally start paying attention?

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Post’s (Unwitting) Case for Tariffs

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competition, foreign direct investment, free trade, Jobs, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, Ronald Reagan, tariffs automotive, The Race to the Bottom, Trade, transplants, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

On the surface, this was just another thoroughly predictable Washington Post editorial attack on President Trump’s trade policies and defense of the freest possible global commerce – a conclusion I think fair-minded people would support even if they oppose its proximate target, the possibility of new U.S. auto tariffs. But the distinctive nature of American and global automotive production and trade patterns on the one hand rendered one of these predictable trade arguments puzzling at best and downright bizarre at worst for anyone caring to think about it even momentarily: the claim that such tariffs would spur a “fall off” of the automotive quality enjoyed by American consumers because existing U.S.-based producers would face “less healthy competition.”

Let’s assume that the Post – and supporters of the longstanding trade policy status quo – are right in arguing that the least-fettered trade generally forces businesses to offer better and cheaper products in order to maintain and increase sales and profits. Does this maxim really apply to the automotive industry any more?

As widely noted, this industry is one of the world’s most globalized, and nowhere is this truer than in the United States. The Post recognized this reality as well – but in a way that casts major doubt on the relationship at least in this case between trade and the benefits of cross-border competition.

In the editorial’s words, “No doubt U.S. manufacturers, both U.S.-headquartered and Asian and German ‘transplants,’ and their workers would reap a windfall” from Trump-ian tariffs. By my recollection, this is the first time a commentary on trade policy has acknowledged that foreign-owned companies producing in the United States would benefit from American trade barriers as surely as their domestically owned counterparts.

More important, this observation leads logically to a game-changing conclusion: Trade barriers – in at least such instances – can generate a win-win outcome for Americans. The benefits of foreign competition (like better quality and lower prices) can be preserved for American consumers – since the foreign-owned firms producing domestically inevitably bring to their U.S. operations their distinctive management approaches and other strengths.

Yet because these operations have been transplanted to U.S. soil, the employment-related gains will flow mainly to American workers. The broader manufacturing-related gains (i.e., high production multipliers, strong productivity growth – at least for much of the nation’s recent history – and robust innovation activity), can mainly remain inside the U.S. economy.

Even more revealing: These foreign auto transplants initially set up shop in America partly because of trade curbs imposed by the Reagan administration. And American trade barriers in that era played a role in drawing foreign steel-makers to the United States as well. (The desire to hedge against exchange-rate risks also figured prominently in such investment decisions, along with the gains from producing abroad versus exporting predicted by the product cycle theory.)

Nor is there any reason to believe that tariffs and quotas won’t achieve similar successes today – unless you want to argue that America’s gargantuan market doesn’t give its leaders equally gargantuan leverage. In fact, as my book The Race to the Bottom reported in 2000, such restrictions have been so successful even for much smaller economies (along with China) that they’ve become standard operating procedure around the world. Here’s just one recent example of their effectiveness.

Since not all industries are the same, tariffs surely are no panacea for solving America’s intertwined problems in trade and manufacturing. (For those doubting their existence and relationship, consider that domestic manufacturing production is still down in real terms since the late-2007 outbreak of the last recession, and that this year’s U.S. manufacturing trade deficit is on course to top $1 trillion.) But the Post’s unwitting insight unmistakably reveals how and why trade curbs can help make major contributions to the American domestic economy. Time for the Trump administration to start thinking more carefully and strategically about how to accomplish these goals. And for free trade ideologues in the American chattering class to start opening their eyes.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Some Rare Big Media Realism on Globalization

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globalization, Immigration, Jobs, Labor Department, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, Pankaj Mishra, Sarah Chaney, strikes, The New York Times Magazine, The Race to the Bottom, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, unions, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Every now and then, the Mainstream Media and the establishment conventional wisdom it parrots show some signs of approaching an understanding of how trade liberalization and globalization really work. Happily, this past week was one of those weeks.

The first of these two signs came in The New York Times Magazine, in the form of an article by Pankaj Mishra, who weirdly isn’t identified in the on-line version of the piece, but who appears to be a prominent Indian writer. Its theme: The world’s leading economies – including the United States in the first two-thirds of its history and now China – have nearly all experienced their greatest rises to prosperity and power based on policies that rejected orthodox free trade principles.

To anyone who has seriously followed the trade and globalization debate over the last quarter century, the case for this claim is anything but new. It’s been made by numerous leading scholars and other analysts. What is new is for this argument to be showcased in such a high profile media outlet. On the one hand, if this kind of information was presented to readers remotely as often as the trade and globalization conventional wisdom, American policies today might be vastly different – and the economy much sounder.

On the other, because of Donald Trump’s political success, the chances of moving U.S. trade policy onto a more realistic foundation seem higher than at any time since the 1930s. So if Mishra and The Times Magazine wind up speeding up that process to any extent, and aiding the adoption by Washington, D.C. of policies that factor in this reality, more power to them.

The second sign came in a Wall Street Journal story on findings I’d spotlighted on Friday – a Labor Department study on the virtual disappearance of major labor actions like strikes from the national economic scene. In her own report on the Labor study, Journal correspondent Sarah Chaney quoted a scholar of labor relations as noting that (in her words) “one major impediment to work stoppages…is globalization.”

To which my immediate reaction was “bingo!” – along with a sense of vindication. Way back in the late-1990s, when I was researching my book The Race to the Bottom, it became clear as can be to me that most efforts to measure globalization’s impact on the U.S. economy were missing a key point: A job doesn’t have to be either eliminated by foreign competition (whether predatory or not) or offshored for American trade policies to have affected employment or wage levels. The mere prospect of offshoring in particular, and its increased likelihood as a result of trade agreements aimed at encouraging it, would also matter, and often decisively.

Wages would be the principal victim, since workers aware that their jobs could easily be sent overseas, to lower cost locations like Mexico (via NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement) or China (through numerous trade liberalization decisions taken since the early 1990s) would hardly be aggressive in pressing for better pay either by striking or taking any similar actions.

And in the book, I cited some evidence for this proposition: A 1992 survey by The Wall Street Journal finding that “one-fourth of almost 500 American corporate executives polled admitted they were ‘very likely’ or ‘somewhat likely’ to use NAFTA as a bargaining chip to hold down wages”; and a 1996 report commissioned by NAFTA’s own Labor Secretariat finding that “more than half the firms…surveyed used threats to shut down U.S. operations as weapons to fight union-organizing drives.”

Moreover, it should be just as obvious that mass immigration creates the same kind of wage-depressing force.

The next step for the establishment and its media messengers to take is to recognize that the very national economic openness for which they have pushed means that terms like “the American labor market,” at least used conventionally, have become largely meaningless. In addition, supposed mysteries like continued wage stagnation during a long economic recovery featuring near-historic lows in the headline jobless rate aren’t so mysterious at all.

In fact, that supposed national labor market has for decades consisted both of American workers inside the country’s borders and all the other workers around the world that have been made available to employers by trade and immigration policies. So if you want a labor market truly capable to pushing wage growth back up to historical norms, no measures are more important than turning that labor market more genuinely national once again.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Laughable NAFTA Defenses from the New York Fed

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Canada, competitiveness, Federal Reserve, intermediate goods, intra-industry trade, Mexico, NAFTA, New York Fed, North America, North American Free Trade Agreement, rules of origin, supply chains, tariffs, The Race to the Bottom, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although the Federal Reserve Bank of New York says that posts on its Liberty Street Economics blog “do not necessarily reflect the position” of either this branch of the federal reserve system or the system itself, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that the bank has gone to war against President Trump’s announced plans to renegotiate NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement). Why else would it have run items critical of these plans on consecutive days last week?

Even more important, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that these posts aren’t vetted seriously for basic knowledge of America’s international trade situation, or even common sense. Key examples from each of these posts should suffice to establish the New York Fed’s combination of bias and ineptitude here.

The first post, by a New York Fed official and an economist from the offshoring interests-funded Institute for International Economics, purported to show that “An underappreciated benefit of … (NAFTA) is the protection it offers U.S. exporters from extreme tariff uncertainty in Mexico….Without NAFTA, there is a risk that tariffs on U.S. exports to Mexico could reach their bound rates, which average 35 percent. In contrast, U.S. bound rates average only 4 percent. At the very least, U.S. exporters would be subject to a higher level of policy uncertainty without the trade agreement.”

But it quickly becomes clear that even the authors are skeptical about this outcome. Their main stated reason hints at one main reason: “”Given the large and well-documented benefits from low trade barriers, particularly those stemming from access to a wider variety of imported intermediate inputs and lower prices of intermediate inputs, it would not be in Mexico’s interest to raise all of its MFN tariffs to their bound rates.”

This argument is only a hint, however, because it jaw-droppingly softpedals some of the main characteristics of U.S.-Mexico trade – specifically, the hugely outsized role played in this commerce by intra-industry trade. As I first described at length in The Race to the Bottom, a large share of U.S.-Mexico trade has little to do with the exchange of finished goods that dominates the textbook models. Instead, it consists of parts and components and other inputs of finished goods that travel through international production chains until they’re turned into final products.

And because there’s so little consumer purchasing power in Mexico, and so much in the United States, the lion’s share of this bilateral intra-industry trade in turn consists of intermediates being sent from U.S. factories to Mexican facilities, where they’re assembled into final products for export back to America.

Sure, in principle, a U.S. scrapping of NAFTA (which of course is not the Trump administration’s stated intention) could enable Mexico to substitute non-U.S. parts and components etc for the American-made intermediates that current make up so many of its exports. But without NAFTA, Mexico would also lose much and probably most of its current, unconditional access to the U.S. market. And since that market currently buys nearly 80 percent of Mexico’s exports, and since Mexico’s economy relies so heavily on those exports, it should quickly becomes obvious how self-defeating such a Mexican effort at hardball playing would be.

How bizarre that neither the article’s authors, nor anyone else involved in producing Liberty Street Economics, recognized these longstanding realities. Even weirder: The importance of this intra-industry trade in U.S.-Mexico trade was the major theme of another post from the same authors (plus a third) on this same blog that appeared the very next day.

Yet the NAFTA-related follies of the authors and of Liberty Street Economics hardly end there. In that second post, readers are warned that stricter rules of origin (ROO) for NAFTA could “disrupt supply chains” and in particular backfire on U.S.-based businesses by increasing the costs of their imported inputs and undermining the competitiveness of their exports outside North America.

To which someone who actually knows something current U.S. NAFTA renegotiating plans can only reply, “Seriously?”

For what the authors and the rest of the Liberty Street crowd seem to miss is that the only ROO revamping that would make any sense from a U.S. standpoint is also precisely the kind of revamping that the Trump administration seems to be considering: not only tightening the ROO (to confine duty-free treatment for goods traded inside the NAFTA zone to goods with higher levels of content produced inside the zone), but increasing the tariff penalties imposed on goods with relatively low levels of non-North American content.

In other words, the North American supply chains created by NAFTA wouldn’t be weakened. They’d be strengthened and greatly expanded.

Now the authors could still be right in arguing that such measures would raise the prices of goods made inside North America and thereby undermine their competitiveness outside North America. But they completely neglect two counter-arguments.

First, because the (U.S.-dominated) North American market is already so vast, and because intermediate goods industries in the three NAFTA countries are already so enormous, external tariffs that encourage North American businesses to use even more North American content could well bring gains inside the NAFTA zone that exceed whatever non-NAFTA losses are incurred.

Second, NAFTA as it currently exists was touted as a major boost to U.S. and North American global competitiveness, but there’s no evidence that this goal was achieved. Quite the contrary, at least according to World Trade Organization data.

They show that in 1993, the year before NAFTA went into effect, North America’s share of global goods exports was 17.9 percent. By 2015, it had shrunk to 14.4 percent. The U.S. share during this period fell from 12.6 percent to 9.4 percent, and the Canadian share decreased even faster – from 3.9 percent to 2.6 percent (no doubt, however, largely due to falling prices for the oil it exports so abundantly).

Mexico’s share of global exports did increase – from 1.4 percent to 2.4 percent. But surely that improvement stemmed mainly from selling to the United States, not to any non-North American customers.

The North American share of world merchandise imports did decrease during this period as well. But the decline was much smaller, and one quick look at the U.S. trend makes clear that the lion’s share of this improvement has resulted from the recent, dramatic turnaround in American energy trade patterns – which have nothing to do with NAFTA or any other supply chains.

The Federal Reserve system, and especially its crucially important New York branch, have long been renowned for employing premier economists and sponsoring first-rate economic analysis. But these Liberty Street Economics posts indicate that, at least when it comes to NAFTA, the New York Fed is better described as the Gang that Can’t Shoot Straight.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Tariffs Can Reverse Offshoring’s Damage

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China, emerging markets, export platforms, foreign investment, free trade agreements, GE, globalization, intermediate goods, Jeffrey Immelt, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing output, Mexico, multinational companies, offshoring, product life cycle theory, reshoring, Richard Baldwin, tariffs, The Great Convergence, The Race to the Bottom, Trade, trade law, World Trade Organization, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s definitely weird to be writing a post in response to a recent tweet-storm. But this was no ordinary tweeter. This was someone who’s getting attention from the Washington economic policy establishment as a new oracle on trade and globalization. That’s evidently because his work conveniently sums up many of the leading myths about the world economy and America’s approach to it that have been propagated by this group of interests. So his burst of social media activism provides a valuable opportunity to set the record straight.

The tweeter extraordinaire was Richard Baldwin. He’s not only an international economics professor at the University of Geneva in Switzerland, but the founder of the informative Voxeu.org economics research portal and president of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London (not to be confused with the Center for Economic Policy and Research in Washington, D.C.). And he’s just come out with a book titled The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization.

According to Baldwin, I have been guilty of a “Classic misthinking of globalisation” by supporting an overhauled U.S. trade policy featuring much more aggressive use of tariffs and other protectionist measures. But from the rest of his tweet-storm, a summary presentation he’s touting, and some other statements, it’s should be obvious that his own description of recent international economic trends and their main causes is way wide of the mark.

His fundamental mistake lies in neglecting the crucial role played in fostering today’s flows of goods, services, and capital by trade agreements and by the dramatically differing reductions in trade barriers from both a quantitative and, more important, a qualitative, standpoint. In particular, Baldwin ignores how various bilateral trade deals and decisions, and the multilateral pact that created the World Trade Organization gave multinational companies the essential condition they needed to justify the increasingly sophisticated production and job offshoring that has characterized globalization – guaranteed access to developed country, and especially the U.S. – market.

For the record, here’s the full string of tweets. (Some repeat previous tweets in the sequence.)

Classic misthinking of globalisation by @AlanTonelson

Recent globalisation driven by knowledge offshoring not freer trade

Tariffs don’t address the driving force

Could foster reshoring of some production but also more offshoring

The main problem is domestic: Protect workers, not jobs.

Jobs for U.S.-based robots

Trump tariffs raise cost of industrial import only in US (not Germany, Japan, China, Mexico, Canada)

Knowledge offshore drove 21^st century globalisation

Tariffs don’t address globalisation’s driving force

US tariffs foster some reshoring and some more offshoring

So what is the right way to deal with angry middle class?

Protect individual workers, not individual jobs.

So what is the right way to deal with angry middle class?

Are you familiar with the concept of factor substitutability ? Changing relative prices changes decisions.

But think of it this way. Offshoring, especially the kind focused on by Baldwin, to developing countries, can serve 3 main purposes. It can help companies better supply overseas markets. It can help them better supply their home country market. Or it can seek both objectives.

The great expansion of U.S. trade, primarily with developing countries, that Baldwin rightly notes began around 1990 (with the end of the Cold War and the great strengthening of free market reforms in gigantic developing countries), was justified with many and varied arguments. The paramount rationale, however, was serving the huge, ballooning populations of the world’s Chinas, Indias, Mexicos, and Brazils.

Yet as documented exhaustively in my 2002 book, The Race to the Bottom (and of course many other studies), incomes in these so-called Big Emerging Markets were simply too low to enable their final consumption to rise much – at least compared with their production and productive capacity. No one was more aware of this situation than the emerging market countries themselves – unless it was the global corporations considering pouring investment into them.

That’s why the smartest of these countries understood that they could not possibly grow and develop adequately by supplying their own populations alone, however rapid their income gains. Their only real hope for satisfactory progress was serving markets “where the money is.” America’s relatively open market and consumption-led national economic structure was their best bet by far.

And that’s why the multinationals as well were so determined for Washington to negotiate free trade agreements with these countries. – not to lower foreign trade barriers and permit American businesses their workers to reach the third world’s billions of new actual and potential consumers, but to lock in lower or eliminated barriers to the U.S. market. See the end notes to this recent study for references to just some of the scholarly evidence.

Accomplishing this aim would ensure that their plan to supply well heeled American customers from super low-cost and virtually unregulated third world supply bases would actually make money. Alternatively put, if Washington were legally able to curb or cut off access to the United States for Corporate America’s third world factories, these new facilities would lose much of their value.

Bringing the United States into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was also instrumental in this scheme. Its new rules and especially its unprecedented enforcement authority have greatly weakened America’s legal scope to use its trade law system to turn back goods (including those from the multinationals’ factories) that have been dumped, illegally subsidized, or benefited from other predatory trade policies – including currency undervaluation. In this vein, securing Chinese membership was vital, too. It secured near-invulnerability to U.S. trade law for the multinationals’ favorite export platform.

So the crucial importance of tariffs should be obvious to all. Yes, the technological advances cited by Baldwin (and so many others) have facilitated offshoring – and made the offshoring of even sophisticated production possible from the standpoint of logistics and administration and quality control and numerous similar considerations. But much and possibly most of it couldn’t pass the bottom-line test without the U.S. market access that can be made or broken by tariffs. That is, technology was a necessary condition of offshoring. But it was hardly sufficient.

Consistent with the product life cycle model, it’s unmistakably true that a growing share of multinational investment in developing countries is serving those markets. But compelling evidence abounds that the export platform strategy remains crucial – both to the countries and to the companies. Among the strongest, as I’ve recently written: the howls of protest from the corporate Offshoring Lobby and from export platform countries sparked by President-elect Trump’s talk of tariffs on the output they plan to sell to the United States. If America wasn’t such an important destination, and if so much of the offshored production was sold locally, why would they be so concerned?

Two other key items of evidence for the importance of tariffs:

a. The recent acknowledgment by GE CEO Jeffrey Immelt that trade barriers and other localization moves were mushrooming around the world, and that his company would have no choice but to say “How high” when ever more protectionist governments say “Jump!” Immelt’s statement makes clear that economies much smaller and weaker than America’s will be able to lure his company’s production and jobs either through relatively simple restrictions of access to their market, or through various performance standards imposed on inbound foreign investment that will be enforced through tariffs.

b. The prevalence of these practices and their success in influencing corporate location decisions. Indeed, the only major power that abjures these measures is the United States. Obviously, if smaller and weaker economies can wield tariffs and other trade restrictions successfully, America’s inaction stems from inadequate will, not inadequate wallet.

Yet as Baldwin’s tweet-storm shows, he is also offering three related objections to tariffs that have nothing intrinsically to do with the advent and growth of what he calls “knowledge offshoring.” He argues that tariffs would disastrously raise the cost to domestic U.S. manufacturers of all the imported inputs they use in their final products. As a result, he adds, these American manufacturers would lose competitiveness to any number of foreign rivals. Finally, he repeats the widespread argument that even if significant production was reshored with tariffs, the job impact would be minimal because of soaring, labor-saving productivity advances in manufacturing.

But Baldwin seems unaware that intermediate goods, including of course capital equipment, make up a huge share of domestic U.S. manufacturing. Because output data is too general (in particular lumping together such intermediates with finished goods in many super-categories), the exact figure is difficult to calculate. But other statistics leave no doubt as to the scale.

As I’ve previously shown, what the Census Bureau calls “industrial supplies” and “capital goods” have comprised fully 62.5 percent of America’s total merchandise exports for the first ten months of this year. And as with the output figures, these statistics leave out products such as auto parts (which are included, but not broken out, under a separate heading).

These industries are also gigantic employers. My own tally of Bureau of Labor Statistics data reveals that their workers number 5.764 million. That’s slightly over 47 percent of all manufacturing employees. Moreover, just over 28 percent of the workers in these sectors are white-collar workers – meaning in turn that many of them are in research, engineering, and other STEM fields. These numbers, moreover, indicate that even if I’m whoppingly wrong, we’re still talking about lots of valuable production and workers. 

So tariffs would create enormous new opportunities for this immense sector of manufacturing – and comparable new demand for the kinds of folks nearly everyone wants to become bigger and bigger percentages of the American labor market.

In addition, Baldwin’s case against tariffs seems to assume that they’ll be geographically circumscribed – hence his claim about the competitiveness-harming impact of barriers against these intermediate goods. But this assumption is puzzling, to say the least. Of course tariffs limited to, say, China or Mexico would open new opportunities in the U.S. market or third country markets for other manufacturing powers. Yet this is precisely why the trade proposals being floated by the administration-in-waiting increasingly include world-wide restrictions.

Finally, although labor-saving productivity gains are surely responsible for much manufacturing job loss in recent decades, the benefits of reshoring manufacturing output shouldn’t be underestimated. Industry’s very productivity performance is clearly one big reason – how can a national economy not profit from regaining many of its most productive sectors?

The importance of existing industry for fostering new industries and related economic benefits and opportunities is another big reason. This new paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research presents findings indicating just how much technological advance is generated by incumbent companies (and presumably industries) rather than through the “creative destruction” emphasized by much of the economics profession. So a focus on manufacturing output means a focus on much of the economy’s capacity to continue creating genuine wealth – and sustainable prosperity.

Further, for all of its competitiveness issues, manufacturing still dominates American export flows. If free-trade-oriented analysts are right, and main purpose of exporting is earning the income to buy imports, how can sufficient income keep getting created if domestic manufacturing production keeps stagnating or shrinking – which has clearly been the case in real terms since the last recession began?

As indicated by some of the preceding paragraphs, however, much uncertainty – in my view, way too much – is still left by the official data analysts are forced to use to study the vital Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How Much issues raised by globalization. Nor does the information reported sporadically in the business press or reported (often partially and self-servingly) by the companies themselves add more than fragments to the existing picture.

Many of these uncertainties could be cleared up if offshoring companies were required by Washington to disclose much more information than at present about how their domestic and foreign operations compare, and how these comparisons have changed over time. After all, knowing the crucial details is critical to their success. And if the disclosure mandate was universal, no individual firm would gain competitive advantage from this new flood of proprietary facts and figures.

So I hope Baldwin – and others sharing his views – will join me in demanding such disclosure. We have nothing to lose but our (relative) ignorance.

Following Up: Where Trump on Trade Falls Short

Tags

2016 election, advanced manufacturing, apparel, Donald Trump, Follwing Up, Hillary Clinton, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, multinational corporations, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, offshoring lobby, recovery, regulation, Rust Belt, steel, subsidies, taxes, The Race to the Bottom, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade law, World Trade Organization, WTO

Donald Trump has just given a deadly serious, detailed, and common-sensical speech about the need for overhauling American trade policy, and the establishment media has decided to respond largely by dredging up the fatuous observation that the presumptive Republican presidential nominee himself produces his name-brand apparel overseas.

Before dealing with some of the genuine – though anything but fatal – shortcomings of Trump’s trade speech, let me (again) dispose of this ignorance-based cheap shot: The very trade policies that Trump has been attacking have practically destroyed the domestic U.S. apparel industry. When Trump claims that it’s nearly impossible to make garments in this country profitably anymore, he’s absolutely right. Indeed, the Federal Reserve’s industrial production data show that, since the North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect in January, 1994, and launched the current, offshoring-focused stage of U.S. trade policy, domestic garment output is down nearly 83 percent in real terms. That’s a bloodbath.

Yes, that means that some companies still produce clothing in the United States. But it also means that the biggest money in the industry has taken the hint that opening the American market to competition from penny-wage developing countries with no meaningful environmental or worker safety regulation has been an invitation to shut down or join the party and offshore. Any journalist who fails to mention these facts is either clueless or trying to sell you a bill of goods.

At the same time, since most of the public isn’t well informed about trade and manufacturing specifics, either. And since a torrent of such slanted coverage – which has been echoed by Trump’s presumptive November rival, Hillary Clinton – can definitely affect voter judgment, Trump needs to make it as difficult as possible for opponents to portray him as a know-nothing or a hypocrite on what he clearly sees as a core issue. This is where his Tuesday speech – which overall, I liked – fell somewhat short. Here are some important examples:

>Trump deserves a lot of credit for pointing out that misguided policies have killed not only employment – especially in trade-sensitive manufacturing – but growth throughout the economy. But he left off the table eye-opening figures on just how great the trade toll has been. As I’ve documented, during this feeble economic recovery alone, the growth of that portion of the trade deficit directly influenced by trade policy (what I call the Made in Washington trade deficit) has so far slowed this already feeble expansion by some 20 percent. That’s more than $400 billion after inflation, and he should have defied anyone to insist that huge numbers of jobs haven’t been destroyed as a result.

>The likely GOP standard bearer also rightly blasted American political and business elites for pushing these damaging policies. But explaining exactly why will not only educate the public – it will further infuriate voters. As I’ve written repeatedly, and most comprehensively in my book, The Race to the Bottom, the offshoring focus that has dominated U.S. trade policy since the early 1990s resulted from American multinational corporations realizing that expanding commerce with low-income countries would enable them to improve their own (though not the nation’s) competitiveness and boost profits by supplying the high-price American economy from super-low cost and largely unregulated production sites.

In other words, for all the talk about gigantic, rapidly growing third world markets, post-NAFTA trade deals weren’t mainly about expanding American exports – and therefore growth, employment, and wages. They were mainly about expanding U.S. imports from the multinationals’ new foreign production sites. That is, big American business wanted Americans to keep playing their roles as consumers of the products they made. They just didn’t want them to keep playing their roles as producers of these products. You don’t think a critical mass of voters would be outraged to hear this?

>Trump’s vow to file suits in the World Trade Organization to open foreign markets to U.S.-origin goods and services and halt predatory foreign trade practices is completely inadequate. As I’ve also written, the WTO is far from a U.S.-like trade court where objective magistrates render impartial justice. It’s an anti-American kangaroo court numerically dominated by foreign trade powers whose overwhelming interest lies in keeping the U.S. market much more open to their goods and services than their markets are to U.S. exports. That’s largely why even when the United States does win WTO cases, the process takes so long that American interests have been dealt decisive setbacks.

In fact, that’s also why the Offshoring Lobby pushed so hard back in the 1990s for U.S. Entry into the WTO. They knew that it would give predatory foreign trade powers substantial legal immunity from American efforts to deal with illegal subsidization, dumping, currency manipulation, and the like – and that the factories they moved and built abroad would benefit from these market-distorting practices at the expense of domestic American producers and their workers.

In other words, Trump shouldn’t be arguing for working through the WTO. He should be promising to seek an American withdrawal.

>Trump’s related promise to file more suits against predatory foreign traders in the U.S. trade law system is sorely inadequate for three main reasons. First, as suggested above, the WTO nullifies most of America’s legal authority to use such unilateral mechanisms. Second, the domestic trade law system is almost as slow-moving as the WTO. And third, this legalistic set of procedures is by definition piecemeal and reactive. If Trump thinks that American trade law can help make the U.S. economy great again in his lifetime, he’s dreaming.

>I recognize that the steel industry has acquired iconic status in American culture and politics. It also remains incredibly important economically. But Trump’s exclusive reliance on steel’s recent woes to illustrate what’s wrong with American trade policy unfortunately reinforces the wrongheaded conventional wisdom that trade policy critics are naively obsessed with reviving so-called Rust Belt industries.

What Trump should have added is that manufacturing sectors running sizable trade deficits also include semiconductors, electro-medical devices, all categories of machine tools, farm machinery, construction equipment, ball bearings, telecommunications equipment (not including smartphones), and pharmaceuticals. Believe me, I could go on. And that’s not your classic Rust Belt stuff. Are all these domestic producers hopelessly uncompetitive, Trump should ask? Or are global trade markets unmistakably rigged even against American-made products falling into any knowledgeable definition of advanced manufacturing?

>Trump clearly felt the need to throw some red meat to traditional Republicans and conservatives by also promising to boost the productive sectors of the American economy by getting rid of “wasteful rules and regulations” and cutting taxes in order to “make America the best place in the world to start a business, hire workers, and open a factory.”

Of course, there’s an important, legitimate debate about the proper scope of regulations and the proper level of taxation for both corporations and individuals. Think though, of the outreach potential to independent and even many Democratic voters had Trump added something along these lines:

“But we also have to remember that many of our regulations also serve the vital purpose of protecting us from dangers like polluted air, water, and land; and unsafe food and workplaces. By freeing America’s domestic companies of the need to compete against rivals free to ignore these goals, we preserve regulations reflecting values we should be proud of, and ensure that we remain a genuine first world country.”

And let’s not forget arguments made in Trump’s tax plan (though in a form that’s surely vastly overstated) but neglected in this speech: All else equal, the faster the economy’s real (as opposed to bubble-ized) growth, the stronger its ability to generate the tax revenues that are both politically acceptable and needed to finance true national needs and popular national desires in a responsible way.

Again, I really do believe that this Trump speech was the best Americans have heard on trade in decades. But that bar has been abysmally low. If Trump wants to make America “Greater Than Ever Before” ensuring that his trade positions fit this description will help a lot.

Im-Politic: Meet the Real Trade and Jobs Know-Nothings

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2016 election, Bernie Sanders, Clyde V. Prestowitz, Donald Trump, Im-Politic, Jr., manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, Morris Chang, Ronald Reagan, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, The Race to the Bottom, Trade, transplants

Nothing during this wildly unconventional presidential campaign has anchored the economic conventional wisdom more strongly than the claim that only know-nothings like presidential candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders could possibly think that better U.S. trade policies can bring back lots of high-paying manufacturing jobs from countries like China to the United States. And nothing during this same campaign has revealed more Establishment ignorance than this attack on these White House hopefuls.

An excellent recent op-ed in USA Today by former U.S. trade negotiator Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr. explains why. As Prestowitz (with whom I worked in the early 1990s at the Economic Strategy Institute think tank he founded) writes, anyone thinking that free market forces have turned China, for example, into a major producer of advanced manufactured goods needs to get a clue. China’s natural manufacturing advantage lies in labor-intensive products like apparel and toys, because its workforce is so gargantuan and its technological development still has a long way to go.

But Beijing wasn’t content to keep making such low-value products an instant longer than necessary. So it’s used a raft of active policy carrots and sticks to lure even information technology manufacturing to its shores. My book on globalization, The Race to the Bottom, has exhaustively documented how these policies have long been standard operating procedure for governments all over the world – except America’s. And the supposedly all-powerful multinational companies they’ve mainly targeted? Instead of standing on their high horses, and refusing to jump, they’ve simply asked “How high?”

If you still doubt any of this, forget about what Prestowitz and I have reported. Listen to Morris Chang. He started up and still chairs the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which is the world’s largest contract manufacturer of computer chips, and in fact, pioneered the “foundry” model for the industry.

Chang’s company just announced that it’s building a $3 billion semiconductor fab in China, where it will produce advanced (if not leading-edge) semiconductors. How come? There’s no question that part of the reason is that so many of TSMC’s customers – in the information technology products industry – now manufacture so many of their goods in China. But as Chang also admitted, “We say that with some degree of assurance from the authorities, some degree of assurance that building a plant there will indeed enhance our access to the Chinese market. And reversely, not building a plant there will not enhance.”

That is, China’s policy is “Pay to play” – because it wants to develop its own semiconductor sector, regardless of what economic theory says it should be doing. And Chang doesn’t think he can afford to Just Say No.

Revealingly, no one is more aware than the Chinese that the United States is capable of playing this game effectively, too. As a Chinese company told Bloomberg last year, it chose Alabama as the site of a new factory both “to bring it closer to clients in the South and avoid anti-dumping tariffs on copper products.”

Also revealingly, American leaders haven’t always been brain-dead on this score. In 1981, for example, President Ronald Reagan successfully pressed Japan’s auto makers to curb their exports to the United States “voluntarily.” The following year, Honda began assembling cars in Ohio. By 1990, all the major Japanese auto makers had gone the transplant route.

Can using America’s market power bring back all production and jobs lost to trade? Of course not. Can it bring back or create lots? Of course it can, especially in high-value sectors where a technologically advanced country with well developed capital markets like the United States should be fully competitive. The actual trade know-nothings are those unfamiliar with the historic record and current global realities. Assuming of course that any of them really want to know.

Im-Politic: Will Trump-Bashers Start Blaming the Economy’s Victims?

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2016 election, college premium, debt, Donald Trump, Economic Policy Institute, education, Financial Crisis, Im-Politic, incomes, Mainstream Media, manufacturing, Marketwatch.com, offshoring, real wages, recession, The Race to the Bottom, Tim Mullaney, Trade, wages

I guess it was only a matter of time before the Mainstream Media’s hostility to Donald Trump’s presidential candidacy showed signs of moving into its next phase. Its mainstays have blasted the Republican front-runners’ own views and business record and character. They’ve warned that at least some of his supporters are outright racists and other forms of unquestionably bigoted extremists.

Now at least one writer has decided to dump on that large (and perhaps overwhelming) share of Trump-Nation motivated by sagging and even falling incomes. According to Marketwatch.com columnist Tim Mullaney, not only do the downwardly mobile (presumably) whites deserve no sympathy for their plight. They’re the ones who are overwhelmingly responsible.

In Mullaney’s words: “[I]f you’re 45-plus and thinking life passed you by because you didn’t understand the necessity of an education any time after 1975, you were too hormone-addled at 18 to grasp something that had long been obvious.

“When Trump’s base was coming of age, John Naisbitt’s ‘Megatrends’ was a best-seller for a full two years. You couldn’t read it or even hear about it much (and it spawned dozens of books and too many articles and TV segments to count) without understanding factories were closing and not coming back, and people who grew up wanting that life needed a Plan B. The 1982 recession, which launched Barack Obama’s career as a community organizer in neighborhoods hit by steel-mill closings, made it pretty obvious too.”

Mullaney says his background has innoculated him against “liberal elitist” charges, so let’s focus on something that’s more important. This indictment is factually wrong and analytically shortsighted.

As I’ve reminded Mullaney on Twitter, Trump’s support among the college-educated is anything but negligible. And one big reason is that in recent decades the oft-touted wage premium received by college grads over their less-educated counterparts hasn’t prevented their own wages from stagnating and even worse. In other words, more education is a great bet for ensuring that incomes will escape the massive hit taken by the less educated. But that’s not because graduates’ wages have been killing it. It’s because they’ve been declining less than the wages for those lacking a Bachelor’s degree – as this stunning chart shows:

 

Year	Less than high school	High school	Some college	College	Advanced degree
2007	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
2008	-1.1%	-0.6%	-1.3%	-0.4%	0.5%
2009	0.5%	1.7%	0.0%	0.4%	4.2%
2010	-2.9%	-0.1%	-1.3%	0.5%	3.3%
2011	-4.1%	-2.1%	-4.0%	-2.3%	0.3%
2012	-4.7%	-2.9%	-5.6%	-1.3%	2.8%
2013	-5.7%	-3.7%	-5.8%	-0.7%	2.2%
2014	-5.2%	-3.7%	-5.9%	-2.0%	0.0%

The bottom line is the cumulative change, meaning that during this period, after-inflation wages for the college-educated actually fell by two percent.  And even for holders of advanced degrees, they only stayed flat.

Nor, as Mullaney (reasonably) supposed, is widespread wage deterioration simply a consequences of the financial crisis and its punishing aftermath. Data compiled by the Economic Policy Institute (the source of the above material, too), show that from 1973 to 2007 (the final year before the recession struck), the wages of college-educated Americans increased by only 14.79 percent. That’s a 34-year period!

It’s true that, even for those who completed “some college” during that longer period, inflation-adjusted wages dipped by 0.65 percent, and they were off by more for those with only high school diplomas or less. But when you throw in the towering levels of student debt so many Americans have amassed in recent years, the case for finishing college looks like even less impressive.

Mullaney’s column also overlooks the heavy price the nation as a whole has paid for the de-industrialization that has eliminated so many middle class job opportunities for working class Americans. Of course, a large percentage of those jobs were wiped out by automation or other efficiency gains. But a large percentage are just as gone because clueless American trade policies either encouraged the offshoring of factories (and labs) to low-income countries or ignored the damage inflicted by predatory competition from higher income countries like Japan. And as I’ve long written, when Washington encouraged downwardly mobile Americans to resort to borrowing to maintain the living standards undermined by these lost incomes, the financial crisis became inevitable.

Nor, as I found out when researching my book The Race to the Bottom back in the late-1990s, more education wasn’t insulating American workers from these globalization-related threats because higher wage, knowledge-intensive jobs were being offshored as well (or taken by high skill H-1B immigrants) and because every other government on earth – including those in low-income countries – was working frantically to better educate its workers, too. And their numbers were immense enough to hold their own wages far below levels in the developed countries.

Moreover, as I also pointed out on Twitter, Trump’s backing among the college educated (and the even better educated) could well be much higher than many polls are showing. The reason? Many such voters are embarrassed to tell telephone pollsters their true political leanings. The evidence? Trump gets much better numbers in on-line polls than in phone surveys.

As always, I’m not saying that Trump would make a good president, much less that he’s beyond criticism. But in covering his campaign – and his constituency – is it too much to ask the media to refrain from blaming victims of America’s unmistakably mismanaged economy for their resentments?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Exim Bank Fight is Much Ado About Very Little

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Adam Smith, conservatives, Exim, Export-Import Bank, exports, financing, manufacturing, Mitch McConnell, subsidies, Ted Cruz, The Race to the Bottom, Trade

The fight in Washington over resurrecting the Export-Import Bank has gotten so heated that it’s responsible for Texas Republican Senator (and presidential candidate) Ted Cruz calling his Kentucky colleague (and Senate leader) Mitch McConnell a liar, and has the nation’s major business groups lobbying furiously for reauthorization. For the life of me, I still can’t figure out what the big deal is.

In principle, I like the idea of the Bank – which has been forced to suspend most of its operations since its authorizing legislation ran out on June 30. It helps promote U.S. overseas sales by providing low-cost, taxpayer-backed financing for American businesses that want to do business with foreign customers that are sort of risky. The financing needed to clinch sales to these customers – in effect, a subsidy – enables the exporters to compete effectively with foreign rivals that receive similarly “attractive financing” from their governments.

It’s hardly free markets – but America faces a world of trade competitors that aggressively intervene to support their own firms and workers all the time. Matching this particular form of subsidy is simply a variation on Adam Smith’s maxim that an appropriate way to fight foreign trade barriers is to create bargaining chips by erecting your own.

At the same time, as I originally pointed out in my book The Race to the Bottom, by fostering trade with partners that aren’t terribly creditworthy, the Bank’s operations have reinforced the illusory claim that the supposedly “emerging markets” of the third world have become keys to future U.S. prosperity, and that reaching and cultivating these markets should trump other possible trade policy goals (like, say, recapturing the import-controlled portions of America’s home market). After all, if exports to a certain country need to be subsidized, that market probably isn’t very sustainable, and businesses should be wary of relying on them.

In addition, the share of U.S. exports aided by the Bank is miniscule. During fiscal year 2014, Exim says it supported $27.4 billion worth of these transactions. That works out to 1.68 percent of total goods exports. It’s true that, just as not all goods and services produced necessarily have the same long-term value to a national economy, not all exports are created equal. As I’ve repeatedly written, manufacturing plays a special role due to its heavy reliance on research and development, the high wages it pays, and its economy-leading productivity growth. Exim overwhelmingly works with manufacturers, but those $27.4 billion worth of 2014 fiscal year Bank-aided manufactures exports come to only 2.30 percent of the U.S. total that calendar year.

I’m kind of sympathetic to the argument that cutting smallish programs can create outsized political benefits by demonstrating will. In other words, how can politicians who can’t even agree on eliminating trifles ever hope to agree on meaningful spending reductions? In addition, the Bank has had a not-trivial scandal problem in recent years, reinforcing conservative charges that it embodies “crony capitalism.”

Yet the Bank has experienced only very low default rates on its loans, and largely as a result, it’s actually a net contributor to the U.S. Treasury. Its minor role makes clear that the Bank is anything but a game-changer – as its sometimes fevered corporate supporters often imply. (In fact, if they were really concerned about leveling the global playing field for domestic producers, they’d drop their opposition to unilateral U.S. sanctions on currency manipulation and other predatory foreign trade practices.) But Exim’s record adds force to supporters’ arguments that the nation’s economy is better off with its activities than without them.

By the same token, however, although conservatives are right to worry about official overreach and its dangers, Exim is anything but a poster child for government corruption or inefficiency. If their leaner government campaign is serious, Congressional Republican hardliners will target much more appropriate targets than the Export-Import Bank.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Know-Nothing-ism on Trade from The Wall Street Journal

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Abraham Lincoln, American history, Asia, free trade, George Washington, import substitution, investment, Mark Twain, Obama, protectionism, The Race to the Bottom, Theodore Roosevelt, Trade, Wall Street Journal, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s clearly time for Wall Street Journal editorial writers to start reading more Abraham Lincoln and Mark Twain – specifically the adage (attributed to both) that it’s “Better to keep your mouth shut and be thought a fool than to open it and remove all doubt.” Because the paper’s broadside on trade today makes clear its management doesn’t understand the first thing about American economic or political history, and perhaps even less about Asia.

According to the Journal, opponents of President Obama’s trade liberalization agenda “are invoking the fantasy that buying foreign goods means fewer American jobs. This has become union orthodoxy in the U.S., as it used to be in India and other places that stagnated under ‘import substitution.’ This was the dominant theory of development in the 1950s and 1960s that rejected imports in favor of domestic-made products. East Asia rejected this policy in the 1970s, and India began to do so in the 1990s, with spectacular increases in living standards.”

Even more emphatically, Journal editors conclude that “Candidates who oppose free trade don’t belong in the Oval Office.”

Here’s what these pundits don’t seem to know. First, among the “other places” that have “rejected imports in favor of domestic-made products” was the United States during the 19^th century. Yes, the same 19^th century during which the nation became the greatest industrial, technological and agricultural powerhouse in human history. And living standards became the envy of the world – attracting hitherto unheard of tides of immigrants.

Consequently, the Journal’s criteria for the U.S. presidency would have excluded George Washington, Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt, among others.

And has East Asia really rejected protectionism? Not even close. The region’s opening to trade and investment has been highly selective at best – and targeted. The region’s most successful governments have encouraged imports that build up their countries’ productive capacities (like capital goods), and discouraged purchases of foreign consumer goods. As for investment, Asian countries from China to Malaysia have attached conditions on incoming capital ranging from technology transfer to domestic content standards to requirements that certain shares of the resulting output be exported. My book The Race to the Bottom documented these policies exhaustively.

Obviously, this isn’t the 19^th century, and the United States isn’t East Asia. But for interlocking reasons including the energy revolution, the immense size of its domestic market, its own recent economic out-performance, and the heavy net export dependence of most of the world’s leading trading powers, the case for a more discriminating U.S. approach to foreign trade and a greater emphasis on economic self-sufficiency remains compelling today.

Many arguments for further trade liberalization are still compelling, too. But its advocates are better advised to describe domestic and international economic history correctly, rather than traffick in myth and advertise their ignorance.