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Tag Archives: The Wall Street Journal

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: A Welcome Biden Breakthrough on China Tech Policy Coming?

01 Wednesday Feb 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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China, export controls, investment, Michael McCaul, monitoring and enforcement, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Politico, tech, The Wall Street Journal

A key Republican in Congress recently said that the Biden administration is seriously considering a major and long overdue escalation of its efforts to hamstring a Chinese drive to achieve global technology dominance that gravely threatens U.S. national security. And a recent Wall Street Journal investigation has shown exactly why it’s so overdue.

Last week, Michael McCaul, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told Politico that (in reporter Gavin Bade’s words) “The White House is considering new action to block U.S. business with entire swaths of the Chinese tech economy — an investment blockade stricter than previously reported.

As McCaul himself put it, based on conversations he says he’s had with U.S. officials, the administration “is talking about a theory where they would stop capital flows into sectors of the economy like AI [artificial intelligence], quantum, cyber, 5G, and, of course, advanced semiconductors — all those things….They actually want to say, right, you can’t invest in any [Chinese] company that does AI. You can’t invest in any company does cyber” or other similar sectors.”

As I’ve repeatedly suggested, such broad brush measures are vital for two main and closely related reasons. First, there are no Chinese entities (even those laughably classified as “private sector”) in any industry, including tech, that aren’t ultimately under the control of the Chinese government.

So it’s been utterly and dangerously foolhardy to believe – as U.S. administrations long have – that not just capital but knowhow and high tech products that Washington permits to be sent to specific Chinese entities aren’t likely to be made available to or used to benefit any other organization in China. And that includes the government and of course the military.

It’s true that Washington’s national security export control system isn’t totally unaware that such leakage may occur. Therefore, for instance, tech and product transfer requests with clear national security implications are typically approved only for customers that supposedly can be trusted to comply. Efforts to verify their trustworthiness are made as well.

But here we come to the second main reason that much more sweeping bans on doing tech business with China are needed: enforcement is excrutiatingly difficult at best. After all, the Chinese tech sector is enormous, which means that the financial and human resources needed for adequate monitoring would be equally enormous. Even worse, the highly secretive Chinese system boasts an impressive arsenal of tactics aimed evading the controls, and the aforementioned Wall Street Journal article indicates how spectacularly they can succeed.

A Journal investigation has found that “China’s top nuclear-weapons research institute has bought sophisticated U.S. computer chips at least a dozen times in the past two and a half years, circumventing decades-old American export restrictions meant to curb such sales.”

Indeed, because of its nuclear weapons-related work, this institute was one of the first such organizations put on U.S. export control blacklists – and that was back in 1997. So it’s clearly long been the subject of great ostensible American concern. Moreover, in 2020, in order to shrink the opportunities for cheating by the lab, the Trump administration  added “10 entities owned or operated by the academy as well as 17 aliases it uses to the entity list for procuring U.S.-origin items in support of Chinese nuclear-weapon activities.”

How, then, did it manage to obtain these semiconductors? Because in a system like China’s, which is not only highly secretive but totally lacking in independent regulatory systems and even apolitical rule of law, nothing is easier than concocting endless numbers of “aliases” and shell companies and fake arrangements of all kinds. Good luck to any American inspectors trying to keep up. Which is why total U.S. bans on investing in entire Chinese tech sectors would be so welcome.

At the same time, why stop at investment? Similar bans on broad classes of products and tech licensing deals are essential, too – and for exactly the same reasons. China operates nothing less than a vast, government wide mechanism for obtaining advanced tech capabilities from abroad by hook or by crook. Concentrating U.S. countermeasures on specific institutes or entities that can quickly change their identities is simply a fool’s quest. With the widest possible bans, Washington could reap the gains of an approach that’s the secret of success in much of life both inside and outside policymaking: keeping it simple.

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Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Totally Unhinged Establishment Thinking on Taiwan

28 Saturday Jan 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Uncategorized

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Asia-Pacific, China, East Asia, foreign policy establishment, Indo-Pacific, investment, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, Seth Cropsey, Taiwan, tech, The Wall Street Journal, Trade

Because semiconductors are already central to America’s security and prosperity and will only become more important with each passing day, wouldn’t it be great if the United States wasn’t so dependent on Taiwan for supplies – especially of cutting-edge chips – given that the island is located just 100 miles from China?

According to Seth Cropsey, one of America’s most respected military experts and a former national security official, the answer is “No” – because if the United States became much more self-sufficient in semiconductor manufacturing, it wouldn’t have to care so much about…Taiwan.

His January 26 Wall Street Journal article is a wonderful example of a syndrome I’ve long written about (most recently here in the Taiwan context) – the tendency of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, and too many U.S. leaders who have listened to its members’ advice, to use foreign policy measures to solve problems much better dealt with through domestic policy moves whenever possible.

The advantages of using domestic policy should be screamingly obvious. As I’ve also previously pointed out (most recently at length here), American policymakers will almost always have much more control over developments within our borders than without. And when it comes to Taiwan-like situations, rebuilding the nation’s capacity to manufacture semiconductors per se carries absolutely no risk of war with a nuclear-armed China.

What’s particularly bizarre about this Cropsey op-ed is that he completely overlooks two eminently reasonable arguments for concentrating tightly on Taiwan’s security, at least for the time being. The first is one I strongly agree with – regaining the semiconductor prowess the United States needs will take many years. So until then, it’s imperative – and in fact in my opinion vital – that America take whatever steps are needed to prevent China from taking over Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province that it’s vowed to reabsorb by force if necessary. After all, it should be easy to see how Beijing either could win access to Taiwan’s crucial, world-leading production technology, or deny the United States (and the rest of the world) access to the huge volumes of chips that Taiwan’s factories turn out.

The second argument absent from his column – and which I don’t agree with – is that irrespective of the semiconductors, if China gained control over Taiwan, it would take a huge step toward becoming the kingpin of East Asia, perhaps the world’s most economically dynamic regions, and limit or cut off U.S. access to crucial markets and sea lanes.

I disagree for two reasons. First, leaving the semiconductors out of the picture, the chronic and huge trade deficits run up by the United States with the region show that doing business with East Asia has been a longtime major net loser for America’s domestic economy. Second, and also putting semiconductors aside, East Asia has relied for so long on amassing trade surpluses, especially with the United States, to achieve adequate growth that its countries (including China) simply can’t afford such decoupling.

As I just made clear, opponents of my position can cite valid concerns. But Cropsey never mentions them. Instead, he’s simply worried that the Biden administration’s focus on rebuilding America’s own semiconductor manufacturing mean that Washington “looks to be playing for time—not time to rearm and prepare for a fight, but to reduce Taiwan’s importance to the U.S.” and that this would harm U.S. interests because “An America that no longer needs Taiwanese semiconductors [would be able to]abandon its old friend.”

I admire Taiwan’s economic, technological, and political achievements as much as anyone. But even overlooking the enormous extent to which Taiwan’s massive investments in China’s technology industries (just like America’s) have shortsightedly helped create and magnify the very threat the island faces, the idea that honoring a friendship only for its own sake is remotely as important as minimizing the odds of a nuclear war is just loony. And nothing exempifies the nature of too much American foreign policy discussion for decades as well as a major newspaper’s belief that such arguments deserve to be taken seriously.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: A Wall Street Kingpin Lays a Grand Strategy Egg

11 Wednesday Jan 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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America First, China, climate change, ESG, fossil fuels, globalism, globalization, Immigration, industrial policy, Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, productivity, supply chains, The Wall Street Journal, Ukraine War, Wall Street, woke capitalism

In several senses, it’s not entirely surprising that The Wall Street Journal recently allowed Jamie Dimon to share his thoughts on the domestic and especially global grand strategies the United States should pursue in the post-Ukraine War world.

After all, Dimon heads JPMorgan Chase, the nation’s biggest and most important bank. As a result, he clearly needs to know a lot about the U.S. economy. And as Wall Street’s biggest poohbah, he surely must know a lot about the state of the world overall – in particular since he’s had extensive contacts with the heads of state, senior officials, and business leaders of many countries.

What is somewhat surprising, then, is how little of Dimon’s analysis and advice is new or even interesting, and how much of it could well put America ever further behind the eight-ball.

Dimon’s article wasn’t completely devoid of merit. Since he’s dabbled in some (symbolic) woke-ism himself, it was good to see him seemingly take a shot at what’s become mainstream liberal as well as radical lefty dogma by urging the education of “all Americans about the sacrifice of those who came before us for democracy at home and abroad.”

Given the strong support by the Biden administration and by some finance bigwigs for influential for encouraging and even requiring lenders to take climate change risks into account when extending credit, it was encouraging to read his pragmatic position that “Secure and reliable oil and gas production is compatible with reducing CO2 over the long run, and is far better than burning more coal.”

Dimon showed that, unlike many on Wall Street, he supports some forms of industrial policy to make sure that “we don’t rely on potential adversaries for critical goods and services.”

And he endorsed the larger point that the neoliberal globalization-based triumphalism that undergirded the policies of globalist pre-Trump Presidents needs to be buried for good:

“America and the West can no longer maintain a false sense of security based on the illusion that dictatorships and oppressive nations won’t use their economic and military powers to advance their aims—particularly against what they perceive as weak, incompetent and disorganized Western democracies. In a troubled world, we are reminded that national security is and always will be paramount, even if it seems to recede in tranquil times.”

But on most of the biggest issues and just about all specifics, Dimon either punted or retreated into the same globalist territory that proved as profitable for Big Finance as it was too often dangerously naive for the nation as a whole.

For example, he wants Washington to “fix the immigration policies that are tearing us apart, dramatically reducing illegal immigration and dramatically increasing legal immigration.” Completely ignored is the depressing impact the latter would have on wages that have already been falling recently in inflation-adjusted terms, and on desperately needed productivity growth – as a bigger supply of cheap labor is bound to kill many incentives for businesses to improve their efficiency by innovating technology-wise or devising better management approaches.

And on China, Dimon’s clearly determined to talk his company’s book, insisting that “We should acknowledge that we have common interests in combating nuclear proliferation, climate change and terrorism.” and blithely predicting that “Tough but thoughtful negotiations over strategic, military and economic concerns—including unfair competition—should yield a better situation for all.”

But most important, Dimon fully endorses the foundations of the very globalist strategy that for decades perversely ignored the distinctive and paramount advantages the United States brings to world affairs and has thereby created many of the dangers and vulnerabilities with which the nation has been struggling.

The way Dimon seems to see it, there’s no reason to pay any attention to the extraordinary degree of security the America enjoys merely by virtue of its geographic isolation and powerful military; or to its extraordinary degree of economic self-sufficiency thanks to its immense and diverse natural resource base, its technological prowess, and its dynamic free market-dominated economic system. And evidently, it’s just as pointless to concentrate foreign and economic policy on the nation’s equally formidable potential to build on these advantages.

Instead, like other globalists, Dimon flatly rejects the idea that “America can stand alone,” or should seek to maximize its ability to do so. Instead, it should keep defining nothing less than “global peace and order” as “a vital American interest” – the standard globalist recipe for yoking the country’s fate to an agenda of more open-ended military interventions, more hastily approved and usually wasteful foreign aid, and more nation-building in areas lacking any ingredients of nation-hood.

Asa result, it would anchor America’s safety and prosperity on efforts to shape foreign conditions (over which is has relatively little control), rather than on efforts to shape domestic conditions (over which is has much more control). (For a much fuller description of this America First strategy and its differences with globalism, see this 2018 article.) 

In fact, and revealingly, Dimon’s piece was titled “The West Needs America’s Leadership.” If only he and other globalists would start thinking seriously about what America really needs. 

(Full disclosure:  I own several JPMorgan bond and preferred stock issues.)    

 

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: No U.S. Learning Curve on Denying China Vital Tech

18 Thursday Aug 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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China, Commerce Department, export controls, innovation, Kate O'Keefe, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, sanctions, tech, The Wall Street Journal

The biggest reason to be appalled by The Wall Street Journal‘s excellent report yesterday on America’s efforts to control exports of high tech goods and knowhow to China wasn’t the raw data it contained – which showed that the U.S. government almost never rejects requests by business to sell high tech goods and knowhow to China.

No – as disturbing and scary as these findings are, the biggest reason to be appalled by the article is how clearly it reveals that, after decades of dealing with China, and despite the recent U.S. decision to spend huge amounts of money to try to stay ahead of China technologically, Washington has learned absolutely nothing about the threat to America’s national security, independence, and prosperity posed by this increasingly hostile and dangerous adversary, or how to counter it effectively. And maybe it hasn’t wanted to learn?

In fact, the article, by Journal reporter Kate O’Keefe, adds to the evidence that U.S. officials don’t even view China as especially hostile – let alone dangerous – at all. The People’s Republic is evidently assumed to be a country and an economy that in key respects closely resembles most other major powers with which U.S. companies do business.

Sure, U.S. export controls policies put China in a special category, and subject it to special restrictions for goods like weapons and satellite and space equipment, whose transfer to China is banned outright. But when it comes to “dual use” products and tech – which have both civilian and military applications, and which comprise an enormous group of goods and services – the American approach in practice treats China

>as if it’s got an independent private sector that can be sharply distinguished from its government agencies;

>as if China’s civilian government agencies can be easily distinguished from its national security apparatus;

>as if virtually all these entities operate in reasonably transparent ways and can be “trusted” to act safely in their role as “end-users” of these purchases;

>as if America’s main export control or sanctions challenge is making sure that cutting edge products and tech aren’t provided either directly to the Chinese military or other branches of the Chinese bureaucracy that jeopardize U.S. interests (like the secret police), or indirectly – via a small handful of other actors that, for whatever reason (Corruption? Tragically misguided patriotism?), will pass them along to the Bad Guys; and

>as if the U.S. government has the ability to make sure that prohibited items are kept out of the wrong hands.

Just two examples from O’Keefe’s article of how patently inane this approach has been:

>”Kharon, a Washington, D.C.-based research and data-analytics firm, said it has identified tens of thousands of Chinese entities that may meet the U.S. criteria for military end-user export restrictions, even though there are only roughly 70 on the Commerce Department’s current list.” (Commerce is the lead export control agency.)

>The Commerce Department has added to its list of entities for which Americans need a license to do business the officially state-owned flagship Chinese semiconductor manufacturer SMIC – but only after a U.S. defense contractor “documented the chip maker’s military customers.”

Back in 2012, I wrote that China represents a systemic challenge requiring a completely different export control (and sanctions) approach. Nowadays, when China has grown so much stronger in large part because of this La-La-Land (to be charitable) U.S. strategy, a course change is more important than ever.

What this means is that, no matter how they’re classified by the Chinese regime or structured on paper, every single entity in the People’s Republic that’s in the tech or broader manufacturing sector must be recognized as being under Beijing’s actual or potential control. Therefore, they can be counted on to (a) make available to the authorities anything they acquire that can undermine U.S. interests and/or keep the leadership in power; and (b) do everything possible, including with the regime’s active help, to cover its tracks.

This doesn’t mean that difficult China export control and sanctions policy issues don’t lie ahead for Washington. For that, we can thank all the U.S. leaders before Donald Trump’s presidency who so recklessly turned the People’s Republic into such a powerhouse tech manufacturer and major tech market. (At the same time, the fundamentally moronic export control system remained largely intact during the Trump years.) But one critical reform can be put in place immediately – new regulations realizing that if a product or technology is deemed too dangerous to sell or transfer to any one China entity, it’s by definition too dangerous to sell or transfer to all Chinese entities. Because the China challenge is systemic.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Strong Case for Decoupling from China Much Faster

15 Monday Aug 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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China, China market, decoupling, exports, globalization, imports, Joseph C. Sternberg, protectionism, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, XiJinping, {What's Left of) Our Economy

What if Americans no longer had to pay so much attention to two of the biggest economic reasons for worry about China? Specifically, if Americans didn’t need to be nearly so concerned that much smarter, tougher measures against China’s predatory economic policies would cost their exporters access to a gigantic current and potentially bigger market? And they believed that decoupling from the hostile, dangerous People’s Republic could be much less economically damaging than widely supposed? 

Those are fascinating and important questions asked and suggested by Wall Street Journal columnist Joseph C. Sternberg in a piece over the weekend, and he presented some compelling evidence that, however “preposterous” it sounds now, these possibilities are surprisingly close to becoming realities. Moreover, they’re getting closer all the time, thanks to dictator Xi Jinping’s reversal of the free market-ish reforms and integration into the global economy begun by Beijing in the 1980s.

His evidence? The big payoff that supposedly motivated the U.S. and foreign governments and their multinational companies to push so hard to bring China into the world trading system – that aforementioned access to the Chinese market – is stalling out way short of expectations. In fact, as Sternberg documents, “China makes a disproportionately low contribution to Western firms’ bottom lines relative to its population and potential.”

To support these claims, the author cites data showing that the China market’s share of the revenues of several big Western economies’ multinational businesses (including America’s) remains well below ten percent. And this even though:

(a) more than twenty years have passed since China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), which entitled the People’s Republic to nearly all the benefits of integration with the global economy (while de facto enabling it to avoid most of the obligations); and

(b) China’s share of global economic output (which should approximate its share of the worldwide market for goods and services) had reached more than 15 percent in 2020 – and this percentage had jumped by some 50 percent in 2013.

But even these figures may be exaggerated, at least in the U.S. case. The financial research firm Calcbench has examined the share of revenues 67 of companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index earned in China in 2020. It came to a total of 10.48 percent – a little higher than Sternberg’s figure.

Most of the firms most reliant on China revenues, however, like Qualcomm (59.5 percent of its global total), Texas Instruments (55.5 percent), Lam Research (35.1 percent), and Applied Materials (31.7 percent) are either semiconductor manufacturers, producers of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, or makers of other advanced electronics parts and components. And large percentages of their China revenues are sold to the China-based factories that turn out consumer electronics products (like personal computers and cell phones), and that export huge shares of their own output. That is, those revenues aren’t really earned by sales to final customers located in China. They’re earned by sales to final customers located outside China (like the United States).

Just how large are some of these export percentages? According to this source and this source, 64.4 percent of all the cell phones made in China were sold overseas. According to this source and this source, 65.04 percent of the notebook computers made in the People’s Republic were exported that year. So that should more than satisfy the definition of “large”.   

One important claim that Sternberg gets wrong, however – that contention that “Countries wanted to open China to trade because of its population of more than 1.4 billion consumers. Their ascent into the global middle class, buying U.S. and European goods and services along the way, was the great prize to be won.”

In fact, as Ohio Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown explained in 2007, the companies “really had way more interest in one billion Chinese workers” when they were lobbying so hard to bring China into the WTO. I.e., they recognized at that point that China would long remain far too poor to become a major final market for their goods and services. But they were rightly confident that, with foreign training and management, China’s vast population could become highly productive (but still extremely cheap workers) long before that. A 2000 study by yours truly presented abundant evidence 

And China’s continuing heavy reliance on exports means that for all its spectacular progress, the People’s Republic is still far from the point where it can generate acceptable levels of growth and employment by relying on its own market for sales. In other words, for decades, the United States in particular -which has run the by far the world’s biggest trade deficit with China – has enjoyed much more leverage over China than vice versa. 

This doesn’t mean that Sternberg is under any illusions that further decoupling the U.S. and other foreign economies from China’s would be painless (though the still relatively self-sufficient U.S. economy would obviously feel much less – short-term – pain). But as he notes, China’s economy is running into big, growing problems – in particular a massive, already deflating real estate bubble that is undercutting the ability to China’s consumers to maintain current levels of spending on anything. In addition, Xi Jinping’s evident determination to squeeze foreign companies out of China as soon as feasible is leaving these foreign companies and economies little choice over the longer run.  So shouldn’t the United States and the rest of the world take these hints more closely to heart and greatly step up decoupling from China?  

Im-Politic: Major Evidence of U.S. Race Relations Progress

19 Tuesday Jul 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

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African Americans, Asian-Americans, Census Bureau, Hispanics, housing, Im-Politic, integration, Latinos, race relations, segregation, The Wall Street Journal, white flight, whites

I’ve always liked the expression “voting with their feet” – which conveys the ideas that (1) the best way to understand how Americans (and people everywhere, for that matter) isn’t to listen to what they say, but to look at how they behave; and (2) one of the best measures of behavior is where they choose to live.

And the expression came quickly to mind as I was reading a recent Wall Street Journal examination of how U.S. housing patterns by race and ethnicity have changed in recent decades. Because what the Journal data show is that, although large majorities of every major racial and ethnic group seem keep telling pollsters, other researchers, and journalists that relations among them have worsened over the years (see, e.g., here, here, and here), they’ve kept living closer together during this period.

In other words, housing in America has become much less segregated and much more integrated. In turn, that looks like an unmistakable sign that bigotry, prejudice, and racial and ethnic tensions aren’t remotely as bad as widely portrayed – much less dangerously mounting.   

This trend is surely especially striking for anyone who remembers or who has read about the often hate-filled housing integration battles that erupted in the late 1960s and early 1970s in places like Queens, New York and suburban Chicago.

But unless you’re deeply skeptical about U.S. Census Bureau findings (the main bases for the Journal report and for the academic research it also cites), it’s clear that major race relations progress has been made by the voting-with-your-feet standards over the last fifty years.

Journal reporters Paul Overberg and Max Rust looked over the Census data and lots of academic research to see “where the homes of whites, Blacks, Latinos and Asians remained most clustered along racial lines, and where they have become more intermixed” since 1970. Their conclusion? In general, “segregation of all racial groups continues to decline steadily from a peak that occurred” around that year.

Moreover, with the exception of Asians, whose segregation levels have always been by far the lowest of any of these groups, every individual group is becoming more integrated with every other group. And the upward move of Asian segregation levels has been minimal.

It’s true, according to the Journal, that levels of white-black segregation remain the highest among the groups. But they’ve also been falling the fastest. Even better, especially for those who remember or have studied the early phases of housing integration and the resulting backlash, Overberg and Rust report one leading researcher’s findings of “an emerging pattern in which the arrival of Latinos and Asians in predominantly white neighborhoods doesn’t trigger white flight, even with the later arrival of Black residents.”

I don’t want to sound Pollyanish about U.S. race relations today. But who can seriously deny the importance of choosing where to live – which strongly determines conditions like your family’s safety, where your kids go to school and who they play with, and how promising a nest egg-building investment your home purchase will be? The housing integration progress documented above makes clear that Americans of all backgrounds are less and less prone to believing that the racial and ethnic character of a neighborhood per se influences these hopes and fears. Which sure doesn’t sound like a nation increasingly and even hopelessly divided along racial and ethnic lines to me.        

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Win for Transparency on Corporate Vulnerability to China

14 Saturday May 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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China, Congress, investment, multinational companies, national security, offshoring, Securities and Exchange Commission, Steve Milloy, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, transparency, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s a development in U.S.-China economic relations that’s potentially game-changing, and that yours truly finds particularly satisfying: The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the federal agency largely responsible for regulating U.S. financial markets require companies publicly traded in America to open their books wide on their ties with and reliance on China.

It’s potentially game-changing because ever since the early 1990s, Washington stepped on the gas to encourage the expansion of trade and investment with China (including massive factory and manufacturing job offshoring), but permitted the multinational companies that by far benefited most from these practices to control the release of most of the information capable of gauging the impact on the broader economy.

The result: When the American political system set its China economic policy priorities, it was forced to rely on the offshoring companies themselves for crucial information on the employment and production fall-out at home. And naturally, these firms – along with the sympathetic economists and think tank hacks they funded – presented Members of Congress and journalists with only cherry-picked facts and figures suggesting that the domestic winners far outnumbered the losers.

But this playing field may be in for major leveling thanks to the work of Steve Milloy of the Energy and Environmental Legal Institute. Milloy, a former SEC attorney, has persuaded the Commission to approve his proposal for a “Communist China Audit,” that would ask “companies to disclose to shareholders the extent to which their business relies on China.”

Milloy’s rationale, as explained in a Wall Street Journal op-ed earlier this week? A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would thoroughly disrupt the extensive commercial ties many public companies maintain with China (which include crucial supply chain dependencies of all kinds), and threaten their bottom lines – and the portfolios of their shareholders – with massive losses. In turn, the entire national economy would take a staggering hit. He rightly adds, moreover, that China’s hostility now extends nearly across the board of major U.S. interests.  

Multinational and other public companies are already required to tell shareholders about the various risks they run. But everyone who has looked through their quarterly and annual financial statements knows that politics and geopolitics risk disclosures are invariably vague and scanty, and details on their China-related operations almost non-existent.

Indeed, the author reports that the SEC is already pushing public companies to reveal how significantly Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is affecting their businesses. Since China’s impact on American companies, their shareholders, and the entire American economy is so much greater, he rightly argues that full transparency on this front is all the more important.

I was thrilled to learn about Milloy’s ideas and successes because for many years, I’ve been advocating something very similar. As I wrote in this 2017 post, Congress should pass and a President should sign what I called a “Truth in Testimony Act.” The measure would require any multinationals representatives appearing before Congress on an international trade or investment or technology-related issue

“to specify their job and production offshoring, the wages of their U.S. and overseas workers, their foreign and domestic procurement, the foreign and domestic content of their products, and similar statistics.”

I also recommended that time series be provided, in order to identify long-term patterns. In addition, I pointed out, comparable information has been required of auto-makers selling in the United States since the 1990s, so major precedent exists. And I urged similar requirements for a full range of businesses and their representatives when testifying before the House and Senate, and called for their think tank and academic spokespersons to come clean on all relevant sources of their funding.

Businesses have long protested that such requirements would deprive them of valuable trade secrets and other prime sources of competitive advantage. I countered that (a) if full disclosure is a must for everyone, then no one wins or loses on net; and (b) companies unconvinced by this argument would remain free to opt out of telling Congress their stories.

Milloy’s proposal, however, matters much more, because it would apply to the entire universe of public companies whether they appear before lawmakers or not.

So I’ll be trying to get in touch with him to see if I can help his China audit campaign in any way, and report back on the results, and on any further progress he’s made. As I wrote five years ago, for far too long, the U.S. government has been flying blind on China and other international economic issues and relying on unreliable, incomplete information. Milloy is right in emphasizing that the China threat in every dimension has metastasized. Nothing less than full corporate China-related transparency can be acceptable.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: An Epic Wall Street Journal Fail on Trump Tariffs

17 Sunday Apr 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

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aluminum, beverages, Donald Trump, tariffs, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Wall Street Journal‘s recent editorial on how U.S. tariffs on aluminum imports are decimating the American American beverage industry serves at least one useful purpose: It makes clear that the newspaper’s editorial writers either don’t understand the importance of presenting data in context, or don’t care because they know the big picture would kneecap their argument.

According to this piece, these Trump-era levies show the dangers of trade barriers that “are a form of industrial policy that is really about favoring some producers at the expense of consumers,” and are fueling current inflation to boot. Their main evidence? First, that Since the tariffs were imposed in March, 2018, U.S. beverage manufacturers have “paid an equivalent of $1.4 billion in Section 232 aluminum tariffs through February 2022 [for the aluminum they use in cans”; and second, that this industry paid $463 million in tariff costs in 2021 alone.

The fueling inflatio argument can be dispensed with easily. In 2021, the U.S. economy produced just under $23 trillion worth of goods and services before factoring in inflation. (I’m using pre-inflation data throughout this post because that’s the gauge used by the Journal for tariff costs.) The non-durable goods sector (in which beverages are found) generated $3.455 trillion. As anyone can see at a glance, $463 million as a percentage of these totals is miniscule – to put it charitably. Its percentage of the non-durable goods sector alone is just 0.013. And these added costs are moving the needle on overall U.S. inflation exactly how?

But even when you look at the beverage industry by itself, the inflation and cost burdens fade into insignificance. Although official data are hard to find, this source pegs the sector’s total U.S. sales at $253.42 billion. The $463 million in tariff costs represents a grand total of 0.18 percent of that total. If the industry finds that amount crippling, or even noteworthy, it desperately needs new management.

More detailed data are available from individual corporate reports, and point to the same conclusion. This Yahoo Finance item presents the top ten beverage companies operating in the United States by revenue. Add up the figures and you get a $174.09 billion total for last year. The tariff costs as a share of that sum? A thoroughly unimpressive 0.27 percent.

But what about the all-important bottom line? The individual corporate reports of these publicly trade companies reveal this figure to have been $36.74 billion in 2021. The aluminum tariff costs come to 1.26 percent of that total. No one can blame companies for wanting to make every single dollar of profit they can (lawfully), but do the Wall Street Journal editorial writers really believe that the executives of these firms can’t compensate by increasing efficiency? If so, can them all. (Pun intended.)

Finally, the corporate reports also show the total costs incurred by these ten companies in order to produce their products. Last year, they amounted to $76.77 billion. So the tariff costs increased this amount by 0.60 percent. Again, this is worth a pity party? 

The Wall Street Journal editorial board — like everyone else — has a perfect right not to like any and all tariffs, on aluminum or anything else. It also has a perfect right (unless you don’t believe in freedom of the press) to cherry pick the facts to make its case. But readers and others also have rights — including the right to know when a publication is using Fake Commentary tactics like this to make its case, and to wonder whether, if this is the best this staff can do to discredit tariffs, any solid grounds to oppose them exist at all.

Following Up: A Learning Curve on Ukraine Polling

19 Saturday Mar 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

CBS News, No-Fly Zone, nuclear war, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Pew Research Center, polls, public opinion, Quinnipiac University poll, Reuters/Ipsos, Russia, The Wall Street Journal, Ukraine, Ukraine invasion, Ukraine-Russia war, YouGovAmerica

We’re getting some clarity from the – always imperfect – polls on whether Americans support direct U.S. military involvement in the Ukraine war, and the news is mostly good. Specifically, strong majorities currently reject “boots on the ground” and even the more limited no-fly-zone proposal for fear of risking nuclear war with Russia.

In other words, we know more than we did a little more than a week ago, when the Reuters news organization and the Ipsos polling concern asked respondents their views on the no fly zone, but didn’t mention the nuclear war thing in their question. That’s about as smart as asking someone whether they’d take medicine A to cure disease B without mentioning that medicine A could cause an even worse disease C.

Even weirder, the Reuters article describing the survey’s results actually pointed out this crucial omission. Just for the record, though, Reuters and Ipsos weren’t the only examples of polls completely ignoring vital context, as this YouGoveAmerica post makes clear.

But it seems that pollsters are displaying a learning curve – even in the foreign policy field in which, as the above linked RealityChek post shows, they’ve been especially clueless.

For instance, the YouGovAmerica outfit followed up its first ditzy survey on the No Fly Zone with another that – unlike its initial soundings – defined the idea (without naming it) rather than asking if people support it “without a definition.” What a concept! And once respondents were presented with the fact that American pilots shooting at Russian military planes, support fell support fell substantially.

A similar YouGov exercise for CBS News yielded much more opposition to the No Fly Zone. When it was simply mentioned by name, it enjoyed 59 percent to 41 percent backing. When respondents were told this would mean “U.S. forces might have to engage Russian aircraft, and be considered an act of war by Russia,” the results more than flipped. Sixty two percent opposed the idea and only 38 percent favored it.

Earlier this week, the Pew Research Center found that Americans opposed the United States “taking military action” in Ukraine “if it risks a nuclear conflict with Russia” by 62 percent to 35 percent – a margin much wider than that in the YouGovAmerica poll.

Also this week, the polling center at Quinnipiac (Conn.) University mentioned that a No Fly Zone “would lead NATO countries into a war with Russia.” Opponents prevailed over supporters by 54 percent to 32 percent.

Interestingly, much more public caution was displayed concerning the question of whether the United States “should do whatever it can to help Ukraine, even if it means risking a direct war between the U.S. and Russia” or “do whatever it can to help Ukraine, without risking “such a direct war. The don’t-risk-war option won out by 75 percent to 17 percent.

I’ve found less information on an early March Wall Street Journal poll (including on the phrasing of the questions), but it, too, revealed meager support for direct U.S. military involvement in Ukraine. Only 29 percent of respondents backed the N0 Fly Zone, and only ten percent would “send U.S. troops” to the country.

So why did I say at the outset that the polling news was only “mostly good”? Because in my view, the shares of Americans reportedly willing to risk nuclear war over Ukraine are still alarmingly high – in the 30s and 40s percents, except for the Wall Street Journal poll. It makes me wonder whether the mere mention of nuclear war is enough to show the full potential magnitude of these positions. Maybe respondents should have to watch, for example, this movie, too.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Will a Russian Victory Really Bring On a World at War?

15 Tuesday Mar 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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Antony J. Blinken, Biden, China, Council on Foreign Relations, East China Sea, globalism, Japan, Kim Jong Un, national interests, North Korea, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, South China Sea, South Korea, Taiwan, The Wall Street Journal, Ukraine, Ukraine-Russia war, Vladimir Putin, war, Xi JInPing

Not only do American leaders seem pretty united on the need for the nation to do much more to help Ukraine defend itself from Russian invaders. They and the (overwhelmingly globalist) American political and chattering classes seem largely in agreement on one of the main consequences either of permitting Russia to win, or permitting him to win without inflicting major, lasting damage on Russia’s economy – a return to a world in which aggressive dictators like Russia’s Vladimir Putin will feel much freer than they have for decades to attack their neighbors.

That fear definitely has a troubling ring of reasonableness – and all the more so since, unlike previous historical eras in which such attacks and invasions were much more common, some of the actors possess nuclear weapons.

But there’s something these warnings are overlooking. However vivid such dangers are in principle, it’s hard to identify actual places around the world where potential conquerors have been bidng their time until receiving just the kind of signal that a Russian success in Ukraine allegedly would send.

If you doubt the prominence of this argument for greater U.S. involvement in the conflict, you haven’t been paying attention. For example, in his first public remarks after the invasion, President Biden claimed that “Putin’s actions betray his sinister vision for the future of our world — one where nations take what they want by force.”

In a speech a month earlier, his Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken, asserted that one of the post-World War II global order’s guiding principles was a rejection of

“the right of one country to change the borders of another by force; to dictate to another the policies it pursues or the choices it makes, including with whom to associate; or to exert a sphere of influence that would subjugate sovereign neighbors to its will.

“To allow Russia to violate those principles with impunity would…send a message to others around the world that these principles are expendable, and that, too, would have catastrophic results.”

The conservatives on the Wall Street Journal editorial board, who don’t agree with the Biden administration on much of anything, similarly contended that “Whether the West admits it or not, the invasion is setting a precedent for what the world will tolerate in the 21st century.”

But check out this assessment of worldwide hot spots from the Council on Foreign Relations, often called the seat of America’s globalist foreign policy establishment. Where exactly are the Putins of tomorrow whose will to international power would be even be sharpened by a Russian victory in Ukraine?

Certainly not on the Korean peninsula or in the East China Sea. North Korea no doubt has designs on neighboring South Korea, but they’ve existed for decades. Ditto for China and Taiwan. It’s true that Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping might be emboldened by an inadequate U.S. and international response to Putin’s war. But not from any relief that global norms of behavior that had been holding them back had weakened, or that a Russian victory had set some a kind of precedent – with binding power? Because they take the idea of rule of law more seriously in their treatment of foreigners than they do in their treatment of their own people? Please.

Other than these Asian conflicts – which also include China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, but which also long predate the Ukraine war – where are the aggressors-in-waiting who may feel freer to attack their neighbors? Should we include the other East China Sea dispute, where China is involved, too – even though U.S. allies Japan and South Korea are also contesting each other’s claims to some miniscule islands?

More important, where are the global hot spots where current or potential territorial rivalries could explode into conflict that would imperil global peace and security – including America’s? Nagorno-Karabakh (on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan, unless you’ve been following this tiff closely)? As Mr. Biden would say, “Come on, man.”

I’m sure that there are flashpoints in sub-Saharan Africa that could eventually embroil entire regions in warfare. But it’s as cold-blooded as it is true that these are regions so chronically dysfunctional (and therefore largely disconnected from the wider world) that even complete chaos has no potential to spread much further – or inspire conqueror wannabees in regions of greater concern.

Closer to home for the United States, according to the Congressionally founded U.S. Institute of Peace, some small countries in Latin America have been quarreling with neighbors over territory since 1990, and if they did ignite conflict, refugees would of course come streaming to U.S. borders. But only once – in 1995 – did one of these feuds result in war (between Ecuador and Peru). And I’m glad I don’t have to make the argument that revanchists in either country are chomping at the bit to get a symbolic green light from a Russian victory in Ukraine.

The big takeaways here clearly are (1) that the world isn’t a tinderbox likely to burst into a series of truly dangerous international conflicts depending on the outcome of Russia’s war on Ukraine; and (2) that the potential conflicts that can affect the United States consequentially are and have long been driven by their own dynamics (including current and longstanding American approaches to these situations).

So as has been the case since Russian policy toward its neighbors became more belligerent, what should be driving the U.S. response should be examinations concerning the nature of concrete, specific U.S. interests that are or are not at stake. Claims that Ukraine’s continued independence and full sovereignty are all that stand between today’s relative calm among countries (if not in terms of civil conflicts) and an entire globe engulfed in war deserve the same fate as previous alarmist concotions like the domino theory – getting tossed onto what former President Reagan memorably called the “ash heap of history.”

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