Following Up: Time for a “Truth in Testimony Act” for Think Tanks

Tags

business, civil society groups, Congress, corporations, data, exports, Following Up, globalization, idea laundering, imports, Jobs, labor unions, offshoring, statistics, think tanks, Trade, trade balances, transparency

So far, my work on the problems for our democracy caused by corporate- or other special interest-funded think tanks has emphasized that the media has a special responsibility – and ability — to help solve them. How? By making sure that whenever they quote staffers from these organizations as experts on this or that issue, they reveal who’s signing the tankers’ paychecks.

But another major segment of society also needs to play a role in preventing what I call think tank idea-laundering – posing as objective, academicky-type organizations in order to portray their staffs’ findings as the products of disinterested scholarly research rather than exercises in agenda-pushing. That segment is government.

Legislatures at the local, state, and federal levels should pass what might be called “Truth in Testifying Acts.” That is, whenever they invite input from think tanks in hearings they hold, or in public comment exercises they conduct, the law-making bodies should require these organizations to disclose all their funders with a financial stake in the subject being examined, or the decision that’s pending. As a result, the public or any other consumers of these analyses would have the information they need to judge how much credibility they feel the information deserves, and what kind of material has been deliberately exaggerated or spotlighted or downplayed or ignored altogether.

In fact, these requirements should be imposed on so-called civil society groups, foundations, labor unions, academic institutions, and business organizations, too. Sometimes their biases are obvious from their names, but only sometimes. Best to err therefore on the side of caution – and more disclosure.

Further, while we’re on the subject, I’d like to see something else added to these Truth in Testimony Acts, or follow-on legislation, which is especially relevant to the trade issues I follow so closely: requirements that business groups and their think tank fronts lay out comprehensively their own domestic and international operations and structures, and those of their major funders. They’re needed because representatives of these organizations have long gotten away with literal intellectual murder by presenting legislators with shamelessly cherry-picked data.

For example, when trade agreements and other trade policy decisions are being examined, it’s become standard operating procedure for witnesses in favor of greater liberalization to present figures on exports from the country as a whole, from individual states or Congressional districts (always of major concern to Senators and House members), or from whatever company or industry they represent. And typically, they’re allowed to ignore the import and trade balance sides of the equation. Talk about a total crock.

Similarly, these individuals and organizations are happy to report on how many workers they employ nationally, and in various states and localities, and how many of these jobs depend on exports at a given moment. But they have no interest in discussing how these trends have changed over time, or how many jobs and how much production they’ve sent overseas or have lost to imports, or how these situations have evolved, say, over the life of a certain trade deal.

The companies and industries justify this selectivity by contending that information on imports and offshoring is proprietary, and that keeping it confidential is crucial to their commercial success. That’s often true. But the Truth in Testimony Act should specify that if witnesses wish to keep close to their vest information on one side of the trade ledger (e.g., their firm’s imports), then they can’t brag about their performance on the other side (e.g., their firm’s exports). There’s simply no reason to allow these businesses to play, “Heads, We Win; Tails, You Lose.”

Nor need there be anything the slightest bit coercive about such requirements. If businesses and industries and their various representatives feel so strongly about the secrets to their success, they should be free to decline invites to appear before lawmakers.

Actually, I’d like to extend these requirements to the financial statements public companies need to file with the feds. As with their testimony, such businesses often include flattering trade-related information in quarterly and annual financial statements. If they’re not willing to give investors the full picture, they should need to drop the whole subject.

And why restrict such disclosures to public businesses? Companies of all kinds are required to report all sorts of information to Washington. Their submissions form the basis of much of the economic data that is made publicly available by the federal government. The shield of anonymity provided by the Census Bureau and other statistical agencies to prevent rivals from using the data to gain advantage is entirely reasonable from the standpoint of these businesses. But from a national standpoint, it makes no sense at all. Indeed, it puts policymakers and the public in the position of flying largely blind when it comes to evaluating the impact of trade policy decisions.

The same kind of problem is created by the narrow range of trade-related info that businesses are legally obligated to share. Why not force them to specify their job and production offshoring, the wages of their U.S. and overseas workers, their foreign and domestic procurement, the foreign and domestic content of their products, and similar statistics? And why not demand time series, so that long-term patterns can be identified?  BTW — content information has been required of auto-makers selling in the United States since the 1990s, so major precedent exists. 

The business secrets problem is easily solved: If all firms wishing the privilege of operating in the United States need to share the same information, no one company is put behind the eight-ball. And again, no coercion is involved. Companies would be perfectly free not to comply – and exit the world’s most lucrative market by far in the process. And what about the regulatory burden that would be placed on smaller firms? There’s a strong argument for exempting them, as larger firms dominate U.S. trade flows anyway.

Such a sweeping “Truth in Globalization Act” would probably be a heavier legislative lift than the “Truth in Testimony Act,” so I’d focus first on the former. But both are urgently needed to ensure the soundest possible U.S. policymaking process.  And how could anyone genuinely devoted to the national interest object?  

Advertisement

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Trade Cover-Up at Bloomberg? Or Just Ignorance?

Tags

Bloomberg, exports, food insecurity, health insurance, hunger, Idaho, imports, Matthew Winkler, poverty, Trade, trade balances, Trump, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Memo to Bloomberg News and its Editor-in-Chief Emeritus Matthew Winkler: If you’re going to try to foist a flagrant piece of trade fakeonomics on your readers, choose a contention that can’t be debunked after twenty minutes searching on Google.

According to an August 18 article by Winkler, Idaho is America’s “top performing” state economy and “relies heavily on international trade for its success.” Moreover – irony alert! Even though its “21^st century economy…shows that the U.S. does best when it puts the world first,” the state’s (inexplicably) doofy voters went for that quintessential America-Firster, Donald Trump, in the last year’s presidential election – and by a two-to-one margin!

And the author marshals some impressive statistics to back up this claim. Winkler’s big takeaway on Idaho:

“It’s had the best combination over the 12 months that ended on March 31 of robust personal income, job growth, stock-market gains and home-price appreciation because its largest employers sell the bulk of their products overseas, count the world’s biggest multinational companies among their customers and suppliers, and make most of their money from the technology driving globalization.”

He seems unaware, however, of all the data showing that Idaho’s trade performance has been anything but impressive. For example, let’s look at the state’s goods export performance, and over an analytically respectable period of time.  This information is easily found on the Census Bureau’s website. These data show that, from 2013 to 2016, measured in current dollars, Idaho’s goods sales overseas actually shrank as a share of the U.S. total: from 0.4 percent to 0.3 percent. Moreover, its exports as a share of its the state economy fell faster than the corresponding figure for the entire country – by 23.76 percent versus 17.09 percent.

Idaho has indeed grown faster than the nation as a whole during this period – by 6.57 percent in toto in constant dollars (the same value unit used for the above trade figures) versus 6.48 percent. But it clearly hasn’t grown much faster. And exports have hardly been at the leading edge.

It’s true, moreover, that Idaho has run a merchandise trade surplus during this period. Indeed, it’s risen from $244 million to $383 million. (We’re back to pre-inflation dollars here, because the Census state trade date don’t adjust for price changes.) But that’s mainly because its imports have tanked. Does Winkler view that as a positive? If so, he wouldn’t be much of an enthusiast for trade’s contribution to the U.S. economy overall – since in those years it ran a goods deficit that grew from $738.8 billion to $778.2 billion.

Similarly, Idaho has performed relatively well in terms of those measures that shed light on how well its economy has been performing for its inhabitants. For example, its wages have been growing faster, in current dollar terms, than their national counterparts, both measured by the average and by the median. The former in Idaho is up during those years by 7.43 percent, versus 5.57 percent for the United States as a whole. The latter is up 7.93 percent between 2013 and 2016 versus 6.85 percent for all American workers. (See this Bureau of Labor Statistics site for national- and state-level information for 2016 and this source for the 2013 numbers.) At the same time, how can trade and especially exports be credited if the latter have fared so poorly?

In fact, if the state’s trade performance was really up to snuff lately, maybe its average and mean wages wouldn’t be lagging the national averages so significantly as of last year – by 11.45 percent for the former and by 15.55 percent for the latter. In addition, maybe its poverty rate wouldn’t rank in the top half nationally. Along with its level of hunger and food insecurity. And the percentage of its population lacking health insurance. (Find these and more such info here.)

Again, these data are no secret. But Winkler either was completely unaware of them and had no interest in thorough research, or he was hoping you wouldn’t find out.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Mixed Results from a Deep, Dynamic Dive into U.S.-China Trade Figures

Tags

advanced manufacturing, China, commodities, exports, high value manufacturing, imports, manufacturing, Trade, trade balances, Trade Deficits, trade surpluses, {What's Left of) Our Economy

On Tuesday, RealityChek performed its first deep dive into the U.S.-China trade figures for the first half of 2017, and how they compare with the performance of the January-to-June, 2016 period. Today. It goes dynamic, looking through that same, detailed industry-by-industry lens which sectors have seen the biggest improvements and worst deteriorations in their exports to and imports from China, and in their trade balances with the PRC.

The same technical considerations that applied to Tuesday’s static figures apply to those below. The categories presented are from the federal government’s prime system for slicing and dicing the U.S. economy: the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). And the level of detail is NAICS’ most granular – the six-digit level. It’s especially revealing because it does the best job of distinguishing between finished goods and parts and components and other inputs for these goods – which matters greatly because so much international trade is conducted in these intermediates. Because of data limitations, however, the aerospace results shown below are five-digit statistics, which combine finished goods and their parts and components.

In addition, because services trade statistics come out so much later than goods trade statistics, only the latter are presented here.

Finally, because today’s emphasis is on rates of change, I’ve confined my research to the top 50 industries for all the metrics examined below, in order to prevent the results from being distorted by big percentage increases or decreases for sectors with very low export, import, and trade balance numbers. Fortunately, because U.S. trade is so highly concentrated, the top 50 lists are highly representative of the nation’s trade as a whole.

To begin, here are the fastest growing U.S. merchandise exports to China between the first half of last year and the first half of this year:

1. Crude oil & natural gas: +3,250.25 percent

2. Wheat: +251.29 percent

3. Primary smelted non-ferrous metals: +194.76 percent

4. Cotton: +149.26 percent

5. Miscellaneous engine equipment: +72.10 percent

6. Liquid natural gas: +66.23 percent

7. Petroleum refinery products: +58.41 percent

8. Motor vehicle transmission & power train parts: +52.84

9. Plastics and rubber industry machinery: +45.41 percent

10. Pharmaceuticals: +45.25 percent

Although four of the ten items are high-value manufactures, which generate outsized benefits for the American economy in terms of high wage job creation, productivity growth, and innovation, they dominate the bottom of this list. And their growth rates are considerably lower than those for the commodities and low-value products so prominent at the top of the list.

Encouragingly, though, the China list is a higher-value list than that for U.S. merchandise exports as a whole (presented right below). And by and large, the advance manufactures sectors above are increasing their exports to China much faster than the leaders worldwide are increasing their exports globally.

1. Non-anthracite coal & petroleum gases: +180.9 percent

2. Crude oil & natural gas: +109.0 percent

3. Cotton: +89.9 percent

4. Liquid natural gas: +62.4 percent

5. Semiconductor manufacturing equipment: +58.2 percent

6. Primary smelted non-ferrous metals: +54.0 percent

7. Soybeans: +27.6 percent

8. Petroleum refinery products: +26.1 percent

9. Motor vehicle engines & engine parts: +19.2 percent

10. Corn: +18.7 percent

Now for the goods categories that performed worst in boosting their exports to China:

1. Industrial valves: -32.46 percent

2. Miscellaneous grains: -30.76 percent

3. Broadcast & wireless communications equipment: -20.89 percent

4. Electricity measuring & testing instruments: -20.48 percent

5. Telecomms equipment: -17.58 percent

7. Aerospace: -10.74 percent

8. Photo films, plates, paper & chemicals: -7.9 percent

9. Irradiation apparatus: -4.87 percent

10. Semiconductors & related devices: -2.67 percent

Worrisomely, this list is completely dominated by advanced manufactures. What about the worst performing U.S. global export sectors?  Here they are:

1. Medicinal & botanical drugs & vitamins: -25.4 percent

2. Turbines & turbine generator sets: -15.1 percent

3. Computer parts: -9.4 percent

4. Autos and light trucks: -8.3 percent

5. Telecomms equipment: -6.6 percent

6. Electricity measuring & test instruments: -5.9 percent

7. Aerospace: -4.0 percent (5-digit, due to reporting limits)

7. Surgical and medical instruments: -1.1 percent

8. Electro-medical apparatus: -0.9 percent

9. Industrial valves: -0.1 percent

9. Computers: -0.1 percent

10. Surgical appliances & supplies: +0.2 percent

10. Analytical laboratory instruments: +0.2 percent

There’s considerable overlap between this list and the China list. But whereas the China export winners generally are increasing their sales to China much faster than the best global export performers are increasing their worldwide sales, the biggest China export losers are seeing bigger sales declines than the biggest worldwide export losers.

Next let’s look at those merchandise sectors whose trade balances with China improved the most from January-June, 2016 to January-June, 2017. These trade balance figures matter decisively, of course, because standard economic theory holds that countries that trade products most successfully will become the countries that make these products most successfully. That’s how trade is supposed to create the most efficient possible global patterns of production. In this list, the industries marked with asterisks are those whose trade deficit with China decreased:

1. Semiconductors & related devices: $190 million deficit to $615 million surplus

2. Crude oil & natural gas: +3,250.38 percent

3. Non-anthracite coal & petroleum gases: 1,537.71 percent

4. Niscellaneous metal ores: +807.54 percent

5. Smelted non-ferrous metals: +519.07 percent

6. Wheat: +251.43 percent

7. Cotton: +149.26 percent

8. Treated wood products: +139.62 percent

9. Miscellaneous women & girls’ outerwear: +131.72 percent*

10. Heavy-duty trucks & chassis: +105.11 percent

Here are the goods sectors that have improved their global trade balances the most on a year-to-date basis:

1. Primary smelted non-ferrous metals: $5.00 billion deficit to $0.76 billion surplus

2. Relays and industrial controls: $1.27 billion deficit to $2.26 billion surplus

3. Semiconductors: $1.48 billion deficit to $1.01 billion surplus

4. Non-costume jewelry: +574.44 percent

5. Drawn/rolled/extruded miscellaneous non-ferrous metals: +305.69 percent

6. Miscellaneous basic inorganic chemicals: +300.00 percent

7. Non-anthracite coal and petroleum gases: +224.29 percent

8. Medicinal and botanical drugs and vitamins: +104.35 percent

9. Cotton: +91.09 percent

10. Semiconductor manufacturing equipment: +64.82 percent

Both lists are pretty evenly split between higher value and lower value sectors, which looks like a wash for America’s global competitiveness.

The list of America’s fastest growing goods imports from China features mostly manufactured products as well, but few would be characterized as cutting edge:

1. Switchgear & switchboard apparatus: +278.27 percent

2. Printed circuit assemblies: +49.98 percent

3. Aluminum sheet, plates, and foils: +39.64 percent

4. Goods returned from Canada: +28.75 percent

5. Broadcast & wireless communications equipment: +26.74 percent

6. Miscellaneous basic organic chemicals: +23.42 percent

7. Miscellaneous special classification provisions: +22.62 percent

8. Lighting equipment: +18.83 percent

9. Telecomms equipment: +18.20 percent

10. Miscellaneous manufactures: +16.85 percent

And here’s the global counterpart of this list:

1. Switchgear and switchboard apparatus: +174.3 percent

2. Crude oil and natural gas: +53.7 percent

3. Printed circuit assemblies: +44.2 percent

4. Iron and steel: +41.3 percent

5. Primary aluminum: +38.6 percent

6. Non-diagnostic biological products: +29.4 percent

7. Petroleum refinery products: +22.2 percent

8. Miscellaneous non-citrus fruits: +20.8 percent

9. Motors and generators: +13.7 percent

10. Lighting equipment: +12.7 percent

10. Surgical appliances and supplies: +12.7 percent

According to my count, both lists are comprised mainly of high-value products (six for the China imports and seven for the global imports). More important, both import lists contain more high value products than the lists of fastest-growing American exports to China and worldwide.

Interestingly, the list of sectors where imports from China have fallen fastest contains lots of low-value goods, along with electronics ranging from consumer sectors to semiconductors. Moreover, in every one of the sectors, these imports from China have fallen faster than U.S. imports worldwide (indicated inside parentheses), strongly indicating that America-based businesses have been changing their sourcing practices.:

1. Miscellaneous women & girls’ outerwear: -56.72 percent (-51.5 percent)

2. Tires & tire parts: -30.04 percent (-0.9 percent)

3. Semiconductors & related devices: -29.28 percent (-6.4 percent)

4. Computer parts: -19.17 percent (-12.3 percent)

5. Women & girls blouses & shirts: -19.02 percent (-12.1 percent)

6. Audio & video equipment: -14.95 percent (-5.3 percent)

7. Computer storage devices: -12.31 percent (-3.1 percent)

8. Miscellaneous footwear: -8.24 percent (-4.9 percent)

9. Women & girls’ dresses: -6.71 percent (-1.9 percent)

10. Men’s footwear (non-athletic): -4.45 percent (-0.5 percent)

How does this list compare with that of those U.S. global goods imports with the slowest growth rates between the first six months of last year and the first six months of this year? Here’s that list:

1. Medicinal and botanical drugs and vitamins: -39.4 percent

2. Computer parts: -12.3 percent

3. Women’s and girls’ blouses/shirts: -12.1 percent

4. Primary smelted non-ferrous metals: -8.8 percent

5. Men’s and boys non-work shirt shirts: -8.3 percent

6. Non-costume jewelry: -6.7 percent

7. Semiconductors and related devices: -6.4 percent

8. Audio and video equipment: -5.3 percent

9. Jewelers materials/lapidary work: -4.1 percent

10. Aerospace products: -3.4 percent

Both lists look like oddly mixed bags. But whereas the China list contains just one industry widely considered to be crucial to America’s economic future, along with its national security (semiconductors), the global list includes aerospace along with semiconductors.

Finally, where have America’s fastest-growing merchandise trade deficits with China been? The list below shows a highly diverse mix of industries. The asterisked sectors are those in which trade surpluses have decreased:

1. Switchgear & switchboard apparatus: +365.30 percent

2. Malt & beer: +80.29 percent*

3. Electricity measuring & testing instruments: +71.39 percent*

4. Primary smelted & refined copper: +56.71 percent*

5. Printed circuit assemblies: +49.75 percent

6. Industrial valves: +43.72 percent

7. Plastic floor coverings: +42.55 percent

8. Miscellaneous grains: +30.82 percent

9. Broadcast & wireless communications equipment: +29.14 percent

10. Goods returned from Canada: +28.75 percent

In terms of manufacturing, and advanced manufacturing, sectors versus lower-value sectors, this China list looks slightly less worrisome in competitiveness terms than the global list below:

1. Non-diagnostic biological products: +856.00 percent.

2. Switchboard and switchgear apparatus: +437.35 percent

3. Oil and gas field machinery and equipment: +130.00 percent

4. Iron and steel: +76.25 percent

5. Surgical appliances and supplies: +71.55 percent

6. Printed circuit assemblies: +47.08 percent

7. Crude oil and natural gas: +45.30 percent

8. Primary aluminum: +42.73 percent

9. Turbines and turbine generator sets: +39.46 percent

10. Copper and nickel ores: +35.96 percent

Needless to say, over longer periods of time, China has significantly closed the competitiveness gap with the United States, and has done so faster than the rest of the world. Over the last year, however, these trade data indicate that China has gained little, if any, ground, by either measure. Holding the competitiveness line, vis-a-vis China or vis-a-vis other trade competitors, is certainly a better performance than the United States generally has registered recently. But it’s doubtful whether many Americans would agree that it’s good enough.    

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Which Sectors are America’s Biggest Trade Winners and Losers?

Tags

commmodities, exports, imports, manufactures, Trade, trade balances, Trade Deficits, trade surpluses, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Welcome to installment two of RealityChek‘s deep dive into new U.S. data that enable us to compare the economy’s merchandise trade performance during the first half of this year with that of the first half of last year. Yesterday, we reviewed America’s biggest goods exporters and importers, and trade deficit and trade surplus sectors – all on a stand-still basis. Today, we’ll look at the fastest and slowest merchandise export and import growers over the last year, and the sectors whose trade balances have improved or worsened to the greatest extents.

Because the subject today is rates of change, and in order to avoid results distorted by unusually small numbers (e.g., the ease with which big percentage changes in a given indicator are resulting from the use of unusually modest base figures), the following lists are drawn from larger lists of the top 50 goods industries in these performance categories. And fortunately, because U.S. imports and exports are relatively highly concentrated, drawing the line at the top 50 costs almost nothing in terms of creating a very representative sample.

Also, as was the case yesterday, these industry categories examined here are those drawn from the six-digit level of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the federal government’s main system for slicing and dicing the economy. The one exception: aerospace. Because of data limitations in that sector, the five-digit data, which combine final products and their parts and components, are presented.

Let’s start with the ten goods industries whose exports, measured in value terms, grew fastest between the first half of last year and the first half of this year, along with the growth rates:

1. Non-anthracite coal & petroleum gases: +180.9 percent

2. Crude oil & natural gas: +109.0 percent

3. Cotton: +89.9 percent

4. LNG: +62.4 percent

5. Semiconductor manufacturing equipment: +58.2 percent

6. Primary smelted non-ferrous metals: +54.0 percent

7. Soybeans: +27.6 percent

8. Petroleum refinery products: +26.1 percent

9. Motor vehicle engines & engine parts: +19.2 percent

10. Corn: +18.7 percent

As is clear, five of these ten sectors are commodity sectors, which add relatively little value to the economy. Two more are industries where relatively little processing, and thus value-adding, takes place (liquid natural gas and the smelted metals). Only three could be considered high value manufactures – the types of industries that historically have made outsized contributions in terms of productivity growth and innovation, and that tend to pay high wages.

Here are the ten industries with the worst export performances on a year-to-date basis:

1. Medicinal & botanical drugs & vitamins: -25.4 percent

2. Turbines & turbine generator sets: -15.1 percent

3. Computer parts: -9.4 percent

4. Autos and light trucks: -8.3 percent

5. Telecomms equipment: -6.6 percent

6. Electricity measuring & test instruments: -5.9 percent

7. Aerospace: -4.0 percent (5-digit, due to reporting limits)

7. Surgical and medical instruments: -1.1 percent

8. Electro-medical apparatus: -0.9 percent

9. Industrial valves: -0.1 percent

9. Computers: -0.1 percent

10. Surgical appliances & supplies: +0.2 percent

10. Analytical laboratory instruments: +0.2 percent

As should be obvious, every single sector here belongs in the high-value manufactures category.

Now for the industries that saw the fastest import growth between the first six months of 2016 and the first six months of this year:

1. Switchgear and switchboard apparatus: +174.3 percent

2. Crude oil and natural gas: +53.7 percent

3. Printed circuit assemblies: +44.2 percent

4. Iron and steel: +41.3 percent

5. Primary aluminum: +38.6 percent

6. Non-diagnostic biological products: +29.4 percent

7. Petroleum refinery products: +22.2 percent

8. Miscellaneous non-citrus fruits: +20.8 percent

9. Motors and generators: +13.7 percent

10. Lighting equipment: +12.7 percent

10. Surgical appliances and supplies: +12.7 percent

This group, too is dominated by high-value industries. And look at those numbers for steel and aluminum, two sectors where the Trump administration has been talking about imposing national security related tariffs

The list of sectors with the worst import growth – indeed, where imports have declined the most – is much more of a mixed bag:

1. Medicinal and botanical drugs and vitamins: -39.4 percent

2. Computer parts: -12.3 percent

3. Women’s and girl’s blouses/shirts: -12.1 percent

4. Primary smelted non-ferrous metals: -8.8 percent

5. Men’s and boys non-work shirt shirts: -8.3 percent

6. Non-costume jewelry: -6.7 percent

7. Semiconductors and related devices: -6.4 percent

8. Audio and video equipment: -5.3 percent

9. Jewelers materials/lapidary work: -4.1 percent

10. Aerospace products: -3.4 percent

Now for the trade balance figures. Remember, they’re especially important because economic theory tells us they’re strong indicators of which industries the United States trades most successfully – and therefore which industries have the brightest futures.

Here are the ten sectors where the trade balance has shown the greatest improvement from the first half of 2016 to the first half of 2017. They’re presented in percentage terms except where deficits have turned into surpluses :

1. Primary smelted non-ferrous metals: $5.00 billion deficit to $0.76 billion surplus

2. Relays and industrial controls: $1.27 billion deficit to $2.26 billion surplus

3. Semiconductors: $1.48 billion deficit to $1.01 billion surplus

4. Non-costume jewelry: +574.44 percent

5. Drawn/rolled/extruded miscellaneous non-ferrous metals: +305.69 percent

6. Miscellaneous basic inorganic chemicals: +300.00 percent

7. Non-anthracite coal and petroleum gases: +224.29 percent

8. Medicinal and botanical drugs and vitamins: +104.35 percent

9. Cotton: +91.09 percent

10. Semiconductor manufacturing equipment: +64.82 percent

Encouragingly, high value manufacturing is pretty well represented here.

And now for those sectors that experienced the worst deterioration in their trade balances.

1. Non-diagnostic biological products: +856.00 percent.

2. Switchboard and switchgear apparatus: +437.35 percent

3. Oil and gas field machinery and equipment: +130.00 percent

4. Iron and steel: +76.25 percent

5. Surgical appliances and supplies: +71.55 percent

6. Printed circuit assemblies: +47.08 percent

7. Crude oil and natural gas: +45.30 percent

8. Primary aluminum: +42.73 percent

9. Turbines and turbine generator sets: +39.46 percent

10. Copper and nickel ores: +35.96 percent

High-value manufactures are well represented here, too – and this list, too, includes steel and aluminum. At the same time, these rates of deterioration are generally smaller than the rates of improvement in the sectors where trade balances changed for the better. So that’s an encouraging development as well.

Of course, whenever “trade” comes up, the word “China” usually isn’t far behind, especially since the Trump administration just announced it was beginning a process that could lead to tariffs on Chinese goods in response to Beijing’s practice of forcing companies to hand over at least some of their best technology in exchange for the privilege of doing business in the vast Chinese market, and to the more conventional intellectual property theft that’s still SOP in the PRC. So tomorrow, RealityChek takes a deep dive into U.S.-China goods trade.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Into the (Crucial!) Weeds on America’s Trade Performance

Tags

comparative advantage, exports, imports, manufacturing, Trade, trade balances, Trade Deficits, trade surpluses, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The U.S. International Trade Commission has finally added the June American trade statistics to its wonderful Trade Dataweb, an invaluable database and search engine. So now it’s possible to view in needed detail the nation’s trade performance for the first half of 2017, and the first groups of these figures is presented below.

Just so you’ll know exactly what you’re seeing, these are results according to the most granular level of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the federal government’s main system for slicing and dicing industry-specific economic data. I like this six-digit level because it draws the greatest number of distinctions between final manufactured products and the parts and components of these products. This distinction is critical because the rapid growth in recent decades of global supply chains (i.e., the rapid growth of American production offshoring) means that a large percentage of U.S. and global trade consists of trade in these manufacturing inputs.

Another technical note: Because trade data for major aerospace products aren’t made public in order to protect corporate information considered proprietary, the six-digit NAICS results in this sector are unreliable, and the five-digit level data are being used.

So here are the nation’s top ten goods exports for the first half of this year, and how their performance has changed in dollar terms since the first half of 2016:

1. Aerospace: -4.0 percent

2. Petroleum refinery products: +26.1 percent

3. Autos & light trucks: -8.5 percent

4. Special classification provisions: +9.7 percent

5. Semiconductors & related devices: +4.7 percent

6. Miscellaneous auto parts: +1.4 percent

7. Miscellaneous basic organic chemicals: +3.7 percent

8. Pharmaceuticals: +3.9 percent

9. Plastics materials & resins: +6.3 percent

10. Primary smelted non-ferrous metals: +54.0 percent

It’s an encouraging list because most of these products are high-value manufactures, which historically have been very productive, still create lots of high-wage jobs, and incorporate lots of innovation. At the same time, these export growth rates seem pretty meh.

Here is a similar list of the top ten goods import categories and how their levels have changed on a year-to-date basis:

1. Autos & light trucks: +4.5 percent

2. Crude oil & natural gas: +53.7 percent

3. Pharmaceuticals: +2.3 percent

4. Goods returned from Canada: +4.3 percent

5. Broadcast & wireless communications equipment: +10.3 percent

6. Computers: +6.2 percent

7. Telecomms equip: +8.2 percent

8. Aerospace products: -3.4 percent

9. Petroleum refinery products: +22.2 percent

10. Semiconductors & related devices: -6.4 percent

This looks like a higher value list, and the growth rates seem somewhat higher. So that appears less bullish.

The real test of trade performance, though, has to do with trade balances. For the theory of comparative advantage that’s at the heart of modern thinking and policy in the trade field tells us that economies that trade goods and services most successfully (as indicated by surpluses) will wind up as the most successful producers of those goods. Conversely, economies that trade goods and services least successfully will wind up as the least successful producers of those goods. How else could unfettered trade flows create an optimal global division of labor – which is supposed to be their prime economic virtue according to mainstream economics?

So here are the ten goods sectors that wracked up the biggest trade surpluses in the first half of this year, and how those balances compare with the first-half 2016 figures:

1. Aerospace products: -2.03 percent

2. Petroleum refinery products: +33.11 percent

3. Plastics materials & resins: +4.73 percent

4. Soybeans: +28.21 percent

5. Other special classification provns: +7.13 percent

6. Corn: +20.26 percent

7. Waste & scrap: -7.82 percent

8. LNG: +56.54 percent

9. Semiconductor machinery: +64.73 percent

10. Non-anthracite coal & natural gases: +223.22 percent

If you recognize the outsize economic value of manufacturing, this is a less encouraging list, since fully half the products are commodities. Nor is the growth rate of the surpluses in these manufacturing sectors impressive except for semiconductor production equipment and petroleum refinery products.

And here’s the trade balance flip side: the sectors with the top ten U.S. goods trade deficits and their rates of change:

1. Autos & light trucks: +10.64 percent

2. Crude oil & nat gas: +45.31 percent

3. Goods returned from Canada: +4.25 percent

4. Computers: +1.16 percent

5. Broadcast & wireless communications equip.: +11.06 percent

6. Telecomms equipment: +19.10 percent

7. Printed circuit assemblies: +47.12 percent

8. Audio & video equipment: -11.50 percent

9. Institutional furniture: +8.56 percent

10. Iron & steel: +76.28 percent

This list is full of high-value manufactures – so that should be a concern. Ditto for the growth rates, which are mainly well into the double-digits. And check out the number for steel — a sector that’s been making headlines because of the Trump administration’s consideration of national security-related tariffs.  

Coming up tomorrow: the best and worst export and import growers, and the sectors with the most rapidly improving and the most rapidly worsening trade balances.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Will Trump Take Ford’s New China Trade Hint?

Tags

(What's Left of) Our Economy Trump, automotive, border adjustment tax, China, Ford Motor Company, imports, Jobs, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, tariffs, trade agreements, trade balances, Trade Deficits

President Trump and his administration have certainly been active on the trade front in their first months in office, both in word and deed. The question remains whether they’ve been effective, and a breaking news story has just added powerfully to the doubters’ case.

The news has to do with Ford Motor Company’s announcement that it will scrap plans to relocate its remaining small car production from the United States to Mexico and supply the American market from an existing plant in Hermosillo, and instead import the vehicles from a retooled factory in China. The initial Ford production decision came under fire from Mr. Trump, and the company’s reaction – a rejiggered Mexico plan – looked chancy for two main reasons:

First, the president had declared his intention to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in large measure to stop such production offshoring. Second, the staunchly pro-trade Republican leaders of the GOP-controlled House of Representatives had been pushing a border adjustment tax proposal that would have imposed new costs on imports from anywhere.

Ford has now underscored why both opponents and supporters of a transformed, less import-friendly U.S. trade policy have been right in one of their major criticisms of Mr. Trump’s emerging strategy: A tight focus on bilateral trade issues and balances overlooks the ability of multinational companies to shift export-oriented production in order to evade country-specific tariffs or other trade curbs.

Not that business’ ability to hopscotch is unlimited. The massive level of sunk corporate costs in export-focused production in China, for example, won’t always be easy to walk away from. And not all countries offer comparable advantages to manufacturers. So given, for example, that China accounts for more than 43 percent of the American merchandise trade deficit, or that Mexico’s geography makes it such an unusually attractive base for selling to U.S. customers, focusing on individual-country or regional priorities often makes good sense.

It’s also legitimate in principle to base trade preferences on non-economic aims, like national security (e.g., rewarding allies or strengthening third world economies against the appeal of terrorism) – though Mr. Trump has expressed strong skepticism for this approach, notably in his Inaugural Address. And of course, prioritization is often the key to any successful public policy.

But what’s especially strange about the Trump trade strategy so far is the president’s indifference – at best – to the border adjustment tax idea. On top of undercutting corporate tariff arbitrage strategies by levying a tax on all imports (and encouraging exports), the measure would also bring in revenue needed to finance crucial domestic needs like infrastructure and healthcare reform without completely busting the federal budget. And its passage would by no means preclude addressing special trade priorities of all kinds with additional restrictions.

Ford’s new production announcement is just the latest in a series of comments from Corporate America that bear out one of President Trump’s central insights: that trade policy changes can decisively influence corporate sourcing decisions to America’s benefit. Now, however, he needs to recognize that his essential goal of using trade restrictions to lure valuable manufacturing production and jobs back to the United States requires policies with global scope. The half- (at best) measures he’s favored so far are just too easily gamed.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Let’s Stop Hiding the Main Facts About Multinationals and Trade

Tags

2016 election, automotive, Caroline Freund, Colgate Palmolive, Donald Trump, exports, Ford, Hillary Clinton, imports, Jobs, multinational corporations, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Trade, trade balances, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since U.S. trade policy is such a hot topic in this year’s presidential election, you’d expect that American leaders and voters and journalists could rely on reasonably good data for judging the claims of office-seekers and other participants. Sadly, when it comes to a crucially important globalization-related subject – the activities of multinational corporations – you’d be wrong. The following media and think tank examples show exactly what I mean.

Last week, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump last week slammed Ford Motor Company for announcing the move of its U.S. small-car production to Mexico. This week, the firm denied his charges that it was a serial killer of American jobs, and noted that last year, it had moved big truck production from Mexico to American factories.

In the process, it made the plausible point that these sourcing decisions made eminent sense. Low-cost Mexico, Ford noted, was a great place for small-car production because these products are low-margin, Meanwhile, the higher priced United States was a perfectly fine place for building its larger, higher margin vehicles.

Of course, Trump could have countered by asking why truck production had been located in Mexico to begin with, and added that Ford had confirmed one of his previous indictment of such offshoring by stating that most of this new Mexico production would be imported back to the United States – a practice made much easier by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

But this debate – and so many others like it – could be easily resolved with the following information:

>The share of Ford’s total global vehicle and parts production located in the United States the year before NAFTA went into effect (1994), and the share located in Mexico.

>That Ford U.S.-Mexico division of labor today.

>The share of Ford’s Mexico vehicle and parts production sold in the Mexican market, exported to the United States, and sold to third countries pre- and post-NAFTA.

>The same export information for Ford’s U.S. production.

>The Mexican and U.S. shares of Ford’s vehicle content pre- and post-NAFTA.

>A breakdown of all these results by segment.

>A tally of Ford’s domestic exports to and imports from Mexico, and to and from the rest of the world, year-by-year since NAFTA’s signing. A breakdown detailing information for other Ford foreign production sites would be helpful, too.

That seems like pretty basic stuff. It also seems like the kind of information that’s absolutely essential for properly evaluating the impact of NAFTA – and similar trade policy decisions – on the American economy.

But Ford won’t produce it, and Washington doesn’t require such disclosure – agreeing with the company that it’s proprietary information crucial to competitive advantages and ultimate success. But as the press coverage make clear, Ford is free to release any information voluntarily, whether it illustrates the big picture or not, and does so with gusto when it portrays the company in a favorable light. Does that sound like a sound basis for policymaking to you?

The Peterson Institute for International Economics recently provided our second example of this problem. In a September 12 post, Senior Research Fellow Caroline Freund looked at the question, “Multinational Corporations: Friends or Foes of the American Worker?” and more specifically at the charge (leveled in this case by Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton) that “Too many companies lobbied for trade deals so they could sell products abroad but then they instead moved abroad and sold back into the United States.”

She concludes that, although stagnating American wages are indeed a valid concern, “On balance, multinational corporations are very good for the US economy.” And in response to a question she received from a concerned citizens, she used the example of the Colgate-Palmolive Company and its Mexican-made toothpaste.

According to Freund, Colgate merits an American seal of approval because the company makes more of its profits in Latin America than in the United States; because its “future growth prospects are in emerging markets”; because the share of Colgate employees in America is roughly the same as the U.S.’ share of those profits; because low Mexican production costs generate savings for American consumers; and because research ostensibly shows that companies that boost their employment in Mexico tend to increase their American employment, too.

So Freund deserves credit for using company-specific statistics. But many crucial questions remain unanswered. In addition to the production, sourcing, employment, and trade information mentioned above (and for the entire company, not just toothpaste), it would be helpful to know if even those Colgate-specific data provided are typical of multinational companies as a whole. One reason for suspecting they’re not: Colgate makes consumer goods. Many of America’s leading offshoring firms are producers of parts and components and material for finished manufactured products.

Also, I wouldn’t be so sure about the emerging markets as Colgate’s most promising going forward – especially Latin America. The United States’ hemispheric neighbors benefited tremendously over the last decade or so from a boom in the prices of the raw materials on which their economies heavily depend. Unfortunately, few of them used the opportunity to diversify into higher value sectors that are more durable sources of prosperity. Once commodities demand began slowing, so did their growth. And in the case of the region’s giant, Brazil, along with Venezuela, the news looks like a horror story.

In addition, I’d like to know whether Colgate out so much manufacturing in Mexico before or after Latin America began taking off. Finally, as implied above, if the region goes completely into the tank, will the company move those factories to faster-growing places – including the United States, if it qualifies?

The way to fill this globalization-related information vacuum is obvious: Require such disclosures from the multinationals. The response to their concerns about divulging proprietary information is just as obvious: If all companies are required to release such business secrets, no one of them loses on net. And the penalties? Let’s just say, “Enjoy life as a global company without access to the U.S. market.”

Proposing these measures would bring an added bonus, too: Anyone or any company opposing them will stand revealed want to know less, not more, about America’s position in the world economy, and the policies that deserve responsibility.

Im-Politic: Why Populists Look Strong in Iowa & New Hampshire

Tags

2016 election, Bernie Sanders, Democrats, Donald Trump, Im-Politic, Iowa, New Hampshire, primaries, Republicans, Trade, trade balances, wages, work week

Reporters who cover presidential politics seem think they’ve discovered a major paradox surrounding Iowa and New Hampshire, whose caucus and primary kick off the voting phase of the Republican and Democratic nomination campaigns: Although both states could well hand victories to populist candidates Donald Trump and Senator Bernie Sanders, both boast unemployment rates well below the national average.

A closer look at their economies, however, reveals a more complicated picture that could better explain the appeal of the Republican real estate magnate and the self-described Democratic Socialist Vermont Senator.

As tweeted by the Washington Post’s Dave Weigel, “As Iowa and New Hampshire voters surge toward populist candidates, the unemployment rate in each state: 3.4%, 3.1%.” Both are indeed below the national rate of five percent reported most recently by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and many of his colleagues re-tweeted these findings.

But job quality is a major concern of voters, too, and although Iowa has also excelled in this respect, New Hampshire has under-performed. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, average weekly wages in the United States overall rose by 7.80 percent before inflation between the fourth quarter of 2007 (when the last recession began) and the second quarter of 2015 (the latest available data for individual states). In Iowa, the improvement was a much better 9.40 percent. In New Hampshire, however, this measure of pay increased by only 5.68 percent.

Further, over a seven-and-a-half year period, those are pretty paltry numbers for both states, and the figures don’t even count the mild erosion that results from factoring in the official inflation rate. Even worse, these current dollar weekly wage figures had fallen for three straight quarters in both states. As a result, the appeal of populism becomes a good deal less mysterious.

Because weekly wages can change due to the length of the work week, it also pays to look at the hourly wage figures. Based on the weekly hours totals available for the two states and the nation as a whole, hourly wages in the United States advanced by 7.88 percent between the fourth quarter of 2007 through the second quarter of 2015. This rate was slightly faster than the weekly improvement, because the work week shortened from 34.53 hours to 34.50.

In Iowa hourly wages increased by 7.99 percent. This figure was somewhat smaller than the weekly wage improvement, as the state’s average work week lengthened from 34.26 to 34.70 hours. In New Hampshire, the work week lengthened, too, and also pushed the hourly wage advance down to 4.54 percent. Again, these figures are unimpressive over so many years, and could go far toward explaining the strong poll results racked up by Trump and Sanders.

Another neglected measure of state economic performance produces a more mixed picture – on exports, imports, and trade balances. Iowa is one of only 17 states whose international trade contributed to its growth. Between 2009 (when the current economic recovery began) and 2014 (the latest available figures) it not only ran a goods trade surplus, but that surplus widened – from $3.55 billion to $4.54 billion. New Hampshire, by contrast saw its merchandise deficit worsen considerably – from $3.26 billion to $6.99 billion – meaning that it subtracted from the state’s growth.

Of course, many factors, economic and non-economic, will determine the final Iowa and New Hampshire votes, and even when measuring state economies, overall data can obscure significant intra-state variations that can influence the electorates’ perspectives and turnout rates. But if Trump and Sanders perform as expected in these early contests, the wage and trade statistics will bolster the case that, jobless rates notwithstanding, the dreary U.S. economic recovery was very much on voters’ minds

Following Up: The IMF Again (Unwittingly) Undermines Obama’s TPP

Tags

Canada, Christine LaGarde, export-led growth, Following Up, IMF, International Monetary Fund, Japan, lobbies, Malaysia, Mexico, multinational companies, Obama, offshoring, TPP, Trade, trade balances, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Vietnam

Does the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have it in for President Obama’s trade agenda? Last week, I noted that a speech by IMF chief Christine LaGarde threw freezing water all over the major economic argument made by Mr. Obama and other supporters on behalf of his Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This morning, the Pacific Rim trade deal was drenched by a similarly frigid bucket when the Fund released the data underlying LaGarde’s remarks.

The economic case for the TPP serving U.S. interests holds that it will speed up the nation’s historically phlegmatic recovery by enabling American businesses and their workers to sell to exciting new growth markets overseas. Unfortunately, as LaGarde’s speech confirmed, everything we’ve learned about the world economy in the last year or two is that the globe’s biggest out-performer – at least among the major powers – is none other than the United States. And as I keep writing, America is also a growth champion when it comes to the TPP countries themselves. Today’s latest set of IMF global growth projections provide yet more evidence.

Like all economic forecasts, the new IMF projections should be viewed with some skepticism. But it’s surely noteworthy that they leave intact, and even may strengthen slightly, the story that TPP will tie the United States more closely to global economic laggards, not leaders. Therefore, it’s likeliest to drag America’s own performance down even further.

The new IMF figures update the last set of projections, issued in October, and nearly every major region and country receives a growth downgrade – including the United States. TPP supporters can also in principle take heart from the Fund’s prediction that America’s growth from 2015 to 2017 will be slower than overall global growth. In absolute terms, the ongoing U.S. expansion will also lag those of TPP signatories like Mexico, and apparently Vietnam and Malaysia.

But it’s vital remember that those countries grow mainly by exporting, and more specifically by improving their trade balances. Since the United States is a major customer for all, their growth is unlikely to benefit America on net.

Moreover, economists pay at least as much attention to changes in growth rates as to the growth rates themselves, and in all three cases, slowdowns are expected this year and next. In Mexico’s case, it’s expected to match the U.S. rate (by 0.2 percentage points compared with the October forecast for each year). The Fund doesn’t provide specifics for Vietnam and Malaysia, but it does believe that expansion in their Southeast Asian region will be weaker by nearly the same degree (0.1 percent this year and 0.2 percent in 2017).

And for the larger TPP signatories, the IMF outlook is gloomy as well. The Fund has downgraded expected Japanese and Canadian growth rates for 2016 and 2017 by a bit less than their U.S. counterpart. But both expansions are still expected to lag America’s in absolute terms. Further, in both these cases, too, net exporting to the United States, will be central to any growth hopes.

Given the size and diversity of the U.S. economy – and its consequent potential for even more self-sufficiency than it’s already displayed – American political leaders logically would be trying to separate America from a weak-growing world still further. But lobbies that benefit over the short run from continued trade expansion (like offshoring-happy multinational companies) still wield the whip hand over Washington, D.C. trade policymaking.  So a slowdown in the foolhardy U.S. rush toward greater integration with that feebly growing, export-dependent world is clearly the best that can be realistically hoped for.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: House Fast Track Politics a Lot Less Puzzling When You Look at Imports as Well as Exports

Tags

Congress, exports, fast track, House of Representatives, imports, Obama, TPA. Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP, Trade, trade balances, Trade Promotion Authority, Wall Street Journal, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Wall Street Journal earlier this week expressed puzzlement that so many House Democrats representing districts with strong export growth are so dead-set against President Obama’s trade agenda – or remaining determinedly on the fence. Actually, much of this apparent mystery becomes clearer when you do some research the Journal left out – how imports have affected these districts’ employment.

In fact, examining import flows and the trade balances they produce creates a mystery that could be even bigger: why so many representatives from districts that have been hammered by net trade – the trade measure that really counts – favor Mr. Obama’s proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal and request for fast track negotiating authority.

In the Journal’s defense, import and trade balance figures by Congressional district don’t seem to be available. But a good proxy is easy to find – such figures for America’s trade with China. And it comes from a source that shouldn’t exactly be unknown to journalists – the Economic Policy Institute (EPI).

I combined the Journal’s export figures with the broader China figures for the 2001-2013 period calculated by EPI’s Robert Scott. Here are some of the key findings:

>Of the 20 Congressional districts cited by the Journal as the country’s merchandise export-growth leaders between 2006 and 2013, fully eight were also among those whose employment took the 20 biggest proportional net hits from America’s immense and continually growing goods trade deficit with China.

>Lawmakers from two of those districts – Democrat Suzanne Bonamici of Oregon and Republican Sam Johnson of Texas are confirmed fast track supporters as of now.

>Lawmakers from five other of those districts – California Democrats Mike Honda and Scott Peters, Texas Democrat Sheila Jackson Lee, and Texan Republicans Ted Poe and Michael McCaul – are currently undecided.

>Honda’s 17^th California district, which includes much of Silicon Valley, saw the country’s second highest rate of 2006-13 export growth. But it also suffered the highest percentage job loss due to its overall China trade performance.

>Oregon’s first Oregon district, represented by Bonamici, enjoyed the second highest rate of export growth from 2006 to 2013. But it trailed only Honda’s district as a China jobs loser.

>California Democrat Anna Eshoo is the only House Member from both a major export-growing district and a major China trade-loser district who is on record as opposing the fast track request.

>Of the twelve other House Members from the districts that have fared the worst in China trade, only three appear to support the fast track request, and all are Republicans: Mimi Walters of California, Bill Flores of Texas, and Pete Roskam of Illinois. None come from districts among the top 20 export growers, although Flores’ ranks 31^st and Walters’ ranks 33d.

>Of the six apparently solid “No” votes in this “China losers” group (all Democrats), none are from districts in the top 20 export winners, and none show up in the top 50.

>Of the three undecideds among the “China losers,” one is a Democrat – Zoe Lofgren. Her California 19^th district is not among the 50 fastest export-growers. The two Republican undecideds’ districts – John Carter’s Texas 31^st and Tom Graves’ Georgia 14^th – didn’t make this list, either.

>As for the top ten undecided votes in the House – at least according to The Hill newspaper – only one comes from a district that’s a standout exporter (the 9^th of Washington, represented by Democrat Adam Smith, which has turned in the country’s fourth best performance). And Texas Republican Kay Granger’s 12^th district is the only member whose home base makes the top 50 (32d).

>The Hill’s other top House undecideds come from districts making neither list. They are Alabama Democrat Terri Sewell, Alabama Republican Robert Aderholt, Texas Democrats Beto O’Rourke and Joaquin Castro, Maryland Democrat Steny Hoyer, the House Democratic Whip, Republicans Candice Miller of Michigan and Mark Meadows of North Carolina, and Minnesota’s Collin Peterson, top Democrat on the Agriculture Committee.

>At the same time, it should be remembered that, according to the EPI China trade study, all but one House district gained jobs through trade with the PRC from 2001 to 2013 – California’s.21^st, represented by Republican David Valadao. Not surprisingly, he’s considered certain to vote for fast track.