(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why U.S. Manufacturing’s Record Trade Deficits Aren’t Biting — Yet

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Biden administration, CCP Virus, China, consumers, coronavirus, COVID 19, Covid relief, exports, Federal Reserve, imports, inflation, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing production, stimulus, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Perceptive RealityChek readers (no doubt the great majority!) have surely noticed something odd about my treatment of trade-related developments and the American domestic manufacturing base. For most of the CCP Virus period, I’ve been writing both that U.S.-based industry has been performing well according to practically every major measure, and that the manufacturing trade deficit has been setting new record highs.

It’s not that I’ve ignored a situation that would normally strike me as being utterly paradoxical and even inconceivable over any serious time span. I’ve mainly attributed it to the pandemic’s main economic damage being inflicted on services industries, and to the Trump tariffs on Chinese imports, which have shielded domestic manufacturers from hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of competition that has nothing to do with free trade or free markets.

But the longer manufacturing has excelled as the trade gap has skyrocketed, the more convinced I’ve been that something else was at work, too. What finally illuminated this influence has been the recent controversy these last few weeks over President Biden’s suggestion that he might cut some of those Trump China tariffs in order to curb inflation.

As I’ve written previously (see, e.g., here), there’s no shortage of economic-related reasons to dismiss the claims that levies that began being imposed in mid-2018 bear any responsibilityfor inflation that only became worrisome three years later, and that reducing the tariffs would ease this inflation meaningfully. Even the Biden administration keeps admitting the latter point.

But the increasingly striking contrast between manufacturing’s strong output, job creation, and capital equipment spending on the one hand, and its historically awful trade deficits on the other points to the paramount importance of another explanation I’ve mentioned for doubting that tariffs have fueled inflation. It’s the role played by the economy’s overall level of demand.

I’ve written that trade levies will contribute to higher prices or boost prices all by themselves overwhelmingly when consumers are spending freely – and consequently when businesses understandably believe they have scope to charge more for tariff-ed goods. That is, companies are confident that the higher costs stemming from tariffs can be passed along to customers who simply aren’t very price sensitive.

Strong enough demand, however, has another crucial effect on manufacturing – and on other traded goods: It creates a market growing fast enough to enable domestic companies to prosper even when their foreign competitors are out-performing them and taking share of that market. In other words, even though all entrants aren’t benefitting equally, all can still benefit.

Conversely, when demand for manufactures is expanding sluggishly, or not at all, this kind of win-win situation disappears. Then U.S.-based and foreign industry are competing for a stagnant group of customers, and one’s gain of market share becomes the other’s loss. In this situation, increasing trade deficits mean that American demand is being met by imports to eliminate any incentive for domestic manufacturers to boost production or employment. Indeed, they become hard-pressed even to maintain output and payrolls.

Of course, even if trade deficits keep surging during periods of slow domestic demand, U.S.-based manufacturers can still in principle keep turning out ever more products and hiring ever more workers if they can achieve one goal: super-charging their export sales. But the persistently mammoth scale of the American manufacturing trade shortfall indicates either that foreign demand for U.S.-made goods almost never improves enough to compensate for reduced or stagnant domestic sales, or that foreign economies prevent such growth by keeping many American goods out, or some combination of the two.

Super-strong demand for manufactured goods is precisely what’s characterized the economy since the CCP Virus arrived in force. As a result, the pie has gotten so much bigger that domestic industry as a whole has had no problem finding enough new customers to support healthy production and hiring levels even though imports’ sales have been lapping them.

Specifically, between the first quarter of 2020 and the fourth quarter of last year (the last quarter for which current-dollar (or pre-inflation) U.S. manufacturing production data are available, the U.S. market for manufactures increased by 22.83 percent – or $1.518 trillion. Revealingly, this demand would have been strong enough to enable domestic industry to pass tariff hikes on to customers, and enable these levies to fuel inflation on at least a one-time basis. But tariffs of course have not been raised during this stretch.

Meanwhile, the manufacturing trade deficit soared by 64.31 percent ($566 billion). And the import share of the U.S. market rose from 29.50 percent to 32.47 percent.

But domestic industry was able to boost its production (according to a measure called current-dollar gross output) by 16.55 percent, or just under $954 billion. ,

Contrast these results with the pre-CCP Virus expansion. During those 10.5 years (from the second quarter of 2009 through the fourth quarter of 2019), the U.S. market for manufactured goods increased by just 45.37 percent, or $2.154 trillion. That is, even though it was more than five times longer than the above pandemic period, that market grew by only about twice as much.

The manufacturing trade deficit actually also grew at a slower rate than during the much shorter pandemic period (169.2 percent). But because the pie was expanding more slowly, too, the import share of this domestic manufacturing market climbed from 23.12 percent to 31.10 percent.  These home market share losses combined with inadequate exports were enough to limit the growth of U.S. manufacturing output to 34.64 percent, or $1.512 trillion. Again, though this 2009-2019 growth took place over a time-span more than five times longer than the pandemic period, it was only about twice as great. That is, the pace was much more sluggish.

And not so coincidentally, because pre-CCP Virus demand for manufactures was so sluggish, too, businesses concluded they had little or no scope to raise prices when significant tariffs began to be imposed in 2018. Further, the levies generated no notable inflation over any significant period even on a one-time basis. Companies all along the relevant supply chains (including in China) had to respond with some combination of finding alternative markets, becoming more efficient, or simply eating the higher costs.

The good news is that as long as the U.S. market for manufactures keeps ballooning, domestic industry can keep boosting production and employment even if the manufacturing trade deficit keeps worsening or simply stays astronomical, and even if domestic industry keeps losing market share.

The bad news is that the rocket fuel that ignited this growth spurt is running out. Massive pandemic relief programs that put trillions of dollars into consumers’ pockets aren’t being renewed, and Americans are starting to dig into the savings they were able to pile up in order to finance their expenses (although, as noted here, these savings remain gargantuan). Credit is being made more expensive by the Federal Reserve’s decision both to raise interest rates and to reduce its immense and highly stimulative bond holdings. And some evidence shows that U.S. consumer spending is shifting from goods like manufactures to services (although some other evidence says “Don’t be so sure.”)

Worse, when the stimulus tide finally recedes, domestic industry will likely find itself in a shakier competitive position than before. For without considerably above-trend demand growth, and with the foreign competition controlling more of the remaining market than before the pandemic, it will find itself more dependent than ever on maintaining production and employment (let alone increasing them) by winning back customers it has already lost. And changing purchasing patterns in place will be much more challenging than selling to customers whose patterns haven’t yet been set.

U.S. based manufacturing is variegated enough – including in terms of specific sectors’ strengths and weaknesses – that the above generalizations don’t and won’t hold for every single industry. But the macro numbers make clear that domestic manufacturing as a whole has experienced unusually fat years lately, and generally has been competitive enough to take some advantage of these favorable conditions. But industry’s continuing and indeed widening trade shortfall and market share losses in its own back yard should also be warning both manufacturers overall and Washington that many of domestic industry’s pre-pandemic troubles could come roaring back once leaner years return.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest Data Remain Full of Normalization Puzzles

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Biden, CCP Virus, China, construction, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, exports, goods trade, imports, inflation, inflation adjusted wages, labor shortages, leisure and hospitality, lockdowns, manufacturing, metals, non-oil goods trade deficit, non-supervisory workers, private sector, real wages, reopening, retail, services trade, shutdowns, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, transportation, wage inflation, wages, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

While I was away for a few days last week, two major U.S. government reports came out both giving off conflicting signals on on whether the economy has started to return to normal in critical ways as the CCP Virus subsides and reopening, along with consequent changes in consumer behavior, proceed.

The monthly trade figures (for April) showed a sequential decline, following a record surge, in America’s chronically huge gap between exports and much larger amounts of imports. Moreover the monthly drop took place as economic growth sped along at unusual rates after being shut down by government mandates and consumer caution. So maybe they’re an early sign that a return to immediate pre-virus conditions has begun?

Or is their most important message that these deficits, and especially the import levels, are still hovering near all-time highs in (the most widely followed) pre-inflation terms even though the economy as of the latest (first quarter) numbers is still a bit smaller in (the most widely followed) inflation-adjusted terms than during the last full pre-pandemic quarter (the fourth quarter of 2019)?

Indeed, the deficits are gargantuan even though President Biden has left former President Trump’s substantial tariffs on metals and goods from China practically untouched. 

The monthly inflation numbers (for May) are similarly confusing. They revealed that consumer prices (just one inflation measure published by Washington, but an important one) rose by 4.93 percent in seasonally adjusted terms. That was their fastest annual pace since September, 2008’s 4.95 percent. Surely, as widely claimed (including by the Federal Reserve, which wields so much influence over the economy, this upswing stems from a combination of bottlenecks resulting from (1) the sudden, widespread reopening; (2) the unusually low overall inflation numbers generated a year ago, when the economy was near the depths of its viruts- and shutdown-induced slump; and (3) the immense dose of stimulus injected into the economy by both elected politicians and the unelected Fed.

At the same time, the Fed has told us that its stimulus isn’t ending anytime soon, and although the Biden administration and Congressional Democrats are displaying some cold feet about approving more such levels of economic fuel (e.g., in the form of outlays on infrastructure, and a wide variety of income supports and enhanced unemployment benefits), it’s difficult to imagine that most or even much of this spending will actually be withdrawn even once a post-virus recovery is an indisputable reality.

But the biggest surprise of all: Despite the economy-wide inflation pressures, and by-now-routine claims that employers are dealing with nearly crippling labor shortages, wages overall adjusted for inflation keep going down.

Compounding the confusion over whatever conclusions can legitimately be drawn from these two reports: They cover two different months.

But let’s begin with the most important details from the April trade report. The ambiguity embodied in the data begins with the total deficit figure. The record March result was revised up from $74.45 billion to $75.03 billion but April’s $68.90 shortfall for goods and services combined, though the second worst monthly figure ever, was 8.17 percent smaller. That’s the biggest sequential drop since February, 2020 (8.39 percent), when China’s export-heavy economy was still largely closed because of the virus.

The same holds for the goods trade gap. The record March figure was revised up, too, from $91.56 billion to $92.86 billion. But April’s $86.68 billion result represented a 6.65 percent monthly decline, and this falloff was the biggest since the 8.39 percent plunge of January, 2019 – when American businesses were still adjusting both to Trump’s tariffs and anticipated tariffs.

Also still fueling the high U.S. deficits – a worsening of services trade balances. Here, U.S. trade has long been in surplus, but the surpluses keep shrinking because service sectors like travel are still suffering from the pandemic’s arrival and the consequent decimation of travel and othe transportation in particular. In fact, the April figure of $17.78 billion was the lowest since September, 2012’s $18.62 billion.

One key set of trade flows does, however, provide some evidence of Trump tariff effectiveness – U.S. non-oil goods trade, which encompasses those exports and imports whose magnitudes are most heavily influenced by trade policy (because, as known by RealityChek regulars, trade in oil is almost never the subject of any trade policy decisions and services trade liberalization remains at very early stages). In April, the monthly shortfall retreated 4.16 percent from its March record of $90.12 billion to $86.37 billion – which is only the fourth highest such total ever.

The import figures I focused on last month exhibit the same overall patterns: April saw big drops from record levels but the absolute numbers remain distressingly high. March’s initially reported record $274.48 billion in total imports was revised up considerably – to $277.69 billion. April’s total of $273.89 billion represented a 1.37 percent drop, but nonetheless was the second worst such figure on record.

March’s record monthly goods import figure was upgraded, too – from $234.44 billion to $236.52 billion. April’s total of $231.97 billion was a 1.92 percent drop but these purchases also still represented the second highest of alll time.

As for non-oil goods imports, the $215.33 billion April total was 1.98 percent down from an upwardly revised record $219.68 billion, and also the second biggest ever. Biggest drop since last April’s 10.91

Whether normalization is returning in manufacturing is more difficult to tell. Imports in March hit a record $207.59 billion, and did drop by 4.59 percent sequentially to $198.06 billion in April. That decrease, however, was a typical monthly move for manufacturing imports, and the April figure was still the third highest ever.

Incidentally, the April manufacturing deficit of $103.60 billion was 4.64 percent lower than March’s $108.66 billion. The March total was the second highest on record, but April’s figure was only the seventh all-time worst. The record, $110.20 billion, came last October, and it’s notable that the gap has narrowed on net despite the resilience shown during the pandemic period by manufacturing output.

More evidence of the Trump tariffs’ impact comes from the data on goods trade with China – whose products have attracted nearly all of these levies, and that cover hundreds of billions of dollars worth of products. The April figure of $37.59 billion was 6.56 percent lower than its March predecessor – a thoroughly unexceptional sequential decline and monthly level by historical standards. But the monthly dropoff was consideraby greater than the aforementioned 1.98 percent decrease for non-oil goods – the closest global proxy.

As a result of all these inconclusive developments, I’ll be awaiting the May trade report with even more interest than usual.

But despite all the uncertainties I mentioned at the start of this post, those May inflation figures have made me more confident than before in my previous contention that current price surges are anomalies by the extremely low inflation generated by the CCP Virus-battered economy of a year ago, and by the sudden reopening of so much of the economy following the long shutdowns and lockdowns. Even clearer, as I see it: Claims of significant, troubling wage inflation are especially weak.

After all, that 4.93 percent year-on-year May price increase followed a previous May-to-May rise that was just 0.22 percent. That was the feeblest such rise since September, 2015’s 0.13 percent. In addition, May’s month-to-month 0.64 price advance was smaller than April’s 0.77 percent. Two months do not a trend make, but these numbers certainly don’t point to raging inflation fires.

Nor do the wage data. Otherwise after-inflation total private sector wages wouldn’t be down more on-month in May (-0.18 percent) than in April (-0.09 percent). And the same couldn’t be said of constant dollar wages for non-supervisory workers (-0.20 percent in May versus flat in April).

Getting more granular, the price-adjusted wage trends are as bad or worse in construction; trade, transportation and utilities overall; retail trade; and education and health services.

The two big exceptions: the leisure and hospitality workforces that have been so decimated by the virus (and especially the non-supervisory group) and the transportation and warehousing sub-sector of the transportation and utilities industry category that contains a trucking sector unusually strained by the rapid reopening. In both cases, however, (and especially the leisure and hospitality industry), inflation-adjusted wages in absolute terms are well below the national private sector average. If anything, therefore, it seems like some wage inflation for these workers is long overdue.

Making News: A New Piece on the U.S.-China Meeting, an Upcoming Radio Interview…& More!

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Alaska, Biden administration, China, Eamonn Fingleton, Making News, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, The American Conservative, The National Interest, Trade, Trade Deficits

I’m pleased to announce that my latest article for an outside publication: a piece for The National Interest on the outcome of last week’s U.S.-China meeting in Alaska. Click here for an analysis that follows up my assessment of the session’s first day, and explains why Presiden Biden’s emissaries undermined America’s position vis-a-vis the People’s Republic.

Special background tidbit: My suggested headline was “Half-Baked in Alaska.” But media outlets themselves typically claim the final word on titles, and rightly so, since marketing considerations are involved. But I’d be curious whether RealityChek readers prefer The National Interest‘s choice or mine.

In addition, I’m scheduled to appear today on Moe Ansari’s nationally syndicated “Market Wrap” radio program to discuss the Alaska meeting and its implications yet further. The segment is likely to air at about 8:30 PM EST, and you can listen live at this link. As usual, if you’re not able to tune in, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

Finally, it was great to be quoted in veteran British economic journalist Eamonn Fingleton in his latest article for The American Conservative. Click here for an informative treatment of why America’s continuing, towering trade deficits matter decisively.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump is Winning the Trade and Decoupling Wars

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, FDI, foreign direct investment, goods trade, merchandise trade, MSCI, non-oil goods trade deficit, pension funds, Rhodium Group, Securities and Exchange Commission, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade war, Trump, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s become increasingly clear in the last few days that President Trump’s trade war with China and his apparent efforts to decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies have achieved real successes. Just why exactly? Because of a recent flurry of claims in the Mainstream Media that the trade war has been an ignominious defeat for the President and his tariffs, and that decoupling can only backfire on America if it’s taken too far (an outcome that’s supposedly imminent). (See here, here, and here in particular.)

As RealityChek regulars know, such media doom- and fear-mongering – spread both by journalists and by the purported experts they keep quoting who have been disastrously wrong literally for decades about trade and broader economic expansion with China – are now well established contrarian indicators. And here’s some of the key data that these proven failures have overlooked.

Let’s start with the least controversial measure of decoupling – two-way trade. Let’s generally use the end of the previous administration as our baseline, since decoupling really is a Trump-specific priority. And let’s generally end with the end of 2019, not only because it’s our last full data year, but because the coronavirus pandemic clearly is distorting the data, and won’t be with us forever (although some of its effects on supply chains and the like might – also because of reinforcement from the trade war). We’ll also stick with goods trade, since detailed service trade figures are always late to come out, and because they’re rarely major subjects of trade policy.

Between 2016 and 2019, combined US goods imports from and goods exports to China actually grew by 2.92 percent. So where’s the decoupling, you might ask? It becomes clear from using economic analysis best practices and putting these figures into context – mainly, the performance of the entire economy.

And in this case and many of those below, it’s crucial to know that the economy grew during this period, too. As a result, in 2016, this two-way goods trade (also called merchandise trade) amounted to 3.08 percent gross domestic product (GDP) – the nation’s total output of goods and services. In 2019, it was down to 2.60 percent. That is, like a supertanker, this trade doen’t turn around right away.

Therefore, it is indeed legitimate to fault Mr. Trump for claiming that trade wars are easy to win. But the supertanker is turning. And the impact on the economy? In 2016, it expanded by 2.78 percent. In 2019? 3.98 percent. So not much damage evident there. (All these figures are pre-inflation figures, because detailed inflation-adjusted trade figures aren’t available.)

Similar trends hold for the U.S.-China goods trade deficit, which the President views as the most important scorecard for his China trade policy success. Between 2016 and 2019 in absolute terms, it barely budged – dipping by just 0.47 percent. That could be a rounding error.

But viewed in the proper context, this trade deficit fell from 1.85 percent of GDP to 1.61 percent. And again, the economy grew much faster in 2019 than in 2016.

It’s still possible to ask what any of the trade decoupling had to do with the President’s ballyhooed tariffs. But the only reasonble answer? “A lot.” That’s because even after the signing of the so-called Phase One U.S.-China trade deal in January, levies of 7.5 percent remain on categories of imports from China that have been totalling about $120 billion annually lately, and tariffs of 25 percent remain on $250 billion more. (That’s most of the $451.65 billion in total goods imported by the United States from China in 2019.)

For comparison’s sake, between 2016 and 2019, the U.S. worldwide non-oil goods trade deficit – that’s the deficit that’s most impacted by trade policy decisions like tariffs, and the portion of the deficit that’s most like US-China trade – rose by 24 percent. That’s more than 50 times faster than the increase in the China goods deficit.

So there can’t be any serious doubt that the Trump China tariffs have worked both directly (by keeping Chinese goods out of the U.S. market) and indirectly (by encouraging companies that had been producing in China for export to the United States to move elsewhere). Moreover, since that “elsewhere” is always to much friendlier countries, that’s a plus for Americans even though the decoupling by most accounts has only returned modest amounts of jobs stateside.

Moreover, there’s a strong case to be made that the Trump tariffs on China have prevented the U.S. economy’s CCP Virus-induced recession from being much worse. That contention is borne out by the fact that, as RealityChek reported earlier this month, the latest available apples-to-apples statistics show that China’s goods trade surplus with the world as a whole had increased by some 25 percent between July, 2019 and July, 2020. But during that period, the China goods surplus with the United State fell by about 18 percent.

As a result, according to the standard way of measuring the economy and how developments in areas like trade affect its growth or shrinkage, China over roughly the last year has been growing at the expense of the world as a whole, but not at America’s. Indeed, quite the opposite. After decades of trade with China slowing U.S. growth, such commerce is now supporting growth.

The decoupling picture, however, wouldn’t be complete without investment flows. Here, on one front, the disengagement has been even more extensive. The consulting firm Rhodium Group does a good job of crunching the numbers on foreign direct investment (FDI) – those transactions that involve so-called hard assets, like real estate and factories and warehouses and entire companies, as opposed to portfolio investment, which involves stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments.

By a happy coincidence, Rhodium has just issued its latest report, which takes us through the first half of 2020. Yes, that covers the virus era, when it’s natural to expect all kind of economic and commercial activity to decline. But the pre-virus era trends will become clear enough, too.

According to Rhodium, two-way FDI flows between the United States and China in the first six months of this year (measured by the value of completed deals) hit their lowest level since the second half of 2011. And the peak came during comparable periods between early 2016 and late 2017 – when these investments were running nearly four times their current levels. Moreover that peak, not so coincidentally, bridged the Obama-Trump transition.

Chinese FDI into the US during that first half of this year actually rose a great deal – from $1.3 to $4.7 billion. But this increase resulted entirely – and then some – from a single purchase by the big Chinese social media company WeChat of a 10 percent stake in the U.S. company Universal Music. Without that transaction, Chinese flows into the US would have dropped, and even the current somewhat artificially high level is only about a fifth as high as its peak – hit in late 2016. So you can see a decided Trump effect here, too.

U.S. FDI flows into China have held up better, if that’s the term you want to use. But they were off 31 percent between the second half of 2019 and the first halfof this year – to $4.1b. And their peak level – hit in 2014 – was $8.5b. So that’s another big Trump-related drop.

One disturbing counter-trend that the Trump administration has been too slow to address: There’s abundant evidence that U.S. financial investment into China – buys of assets like stocks and bonds – keeps surging.

One indication: According to the Financial Times earlier this month, since the Wall Street firm MSCI in June, 2017, first announced plans to include Chinese domestically listed “A-share” companies into one of its widely followed indices, “roughly $875bn in foreign investment has flowed into Chinese equities through stock connect programmes linking Hong Kong with onshore bourses in Shanghai and Shenzhen.”

And although the U.S. share is difficult to quantify, between private investors and state-level government workers’ pension funds, this analysis from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission makes clear that it’s considerable.  (Due to Trump administration pressure, the body overseeing federal pension plans’ investments has delayed a decision to channel funds into the aforementioned MSCI index.)   

So can anyone reasonably claim “Mission accomplished” for the Trump trade and decoupling policies? Not yet. But is a “job well done so far” conclusion merited? Certainly for anyone who’s not Trump-ly Deranged.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Biggest Mid-Year U.S. Trade Winners & Losers II

Tags

CCP Virus, competitiveness, coronavirus, COVID 19, intermediate goods, manufacturing, supply chains, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade surpluses, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Last Friday, RealityChek launched its midyear 2000 review of U.S. trade flows – which speaks volumes about which parts of the economy have held up best and have been hit harrdest by the CCP Virus. Today, following that post’s look at the goods sectors that have racked up the biggest trade surpluses and deficits between January and June, 2019, and this January and June, we’ll examine which industries have seen their trade balances improve and worsen the most during this period, and how these lists compare with those of full-year 2019.

Three big takeaways here: First, in contrast to the lists of biggest trade surplus and deficit sectors presented last week, which featured surprisingly little change on a year-to-date basis, the lists showing the sectors where the biggest changes in trade balances took place revealed enormous turnover.

Second, although a majority of the industries that saw the greatest improvements in their trade balances were already running trade surpluses, a significant number (seven of the 22 that could be counted in this way) were industries running deficits. (Because figures for crude oil and natural gas are now reported separately, as opposed to being lumped together, no such conclusion was possible for them.) Even better, one sector – miscellaneous metal containers – turned its deficit into a surplus. One plausible interpretation is that most of the most globally competitive industries in the nation have retained competitiveness so far during the pandemic, and some have improved lagging competitiveness. All the same, clearly at work here, especially concerning the sectors whose deficits have shrunk markedly, are virus-related effects that may be relatively short-lived.

Third, although most of the 21 parts of the economy whose trade balances deteriorated the most were industries already in deficit – indicating that sectors in competitive trouble pre-CCP Virus remain in such trouble – eight were running trade surpluses. That pattern indicates that the virus has damaged them.

One methodological point that needs to be made right away: These “Top 20” lists both contain more than 20 entries because of confusion caused by apparent duplication for aerospace-related sectors in the government industry classification system I’ve used. So I decided to present any aerospace data that the government figures indicate belong in these Top 20s, but also added other sectors to maximize the odds that each list contains 20 sectors that truly qualify.

But before getting too deeply into the methodological weeds, here’s the list of the Top 20 sectors that generated the greatest improvements in their trade balances between the first six months of 2019 and the first six months of 2020, along with the percentage changes. And as mentioned above, their ranking on the comparable full-year 2019 list is included. Industries that didn’t make that 2019 list are indicated with a hyphen. Industries in surplus and deficit are identified with Ss and Ds, respectively.

biggest trade balance improvers                                                               2019 rank

1. miscellanous metal containers:       $91m deficit to $72m surplus              –

2 miscellaneous grains:                             +503.71 percent                             –   S

3. semiconductor production equipment:  +245.18 percent                             –   S

4. iron ores:                                               +234.48 percent                              –   S

5. electronic connectors and parts:            +144.56 percent                            –    S

6. gaskets, packing and sealing devices:   +103.91 percent                            –     S

7. semiconductors:                                      +86.87 percent                            1     S

8. animal fats and oils:                                +82.00 percent                            8     S

9. crude oil:                                                 +60.24 percent               (new category)

10. misc measuring & control devices:       +54.06 percent                           –      S

11. heavy duty trucks and chassis:              +48.74 percent                           –      D

12. aircraft parts & auxiliary equipment:    +43.89 percent                           –      D

13. specialty canned foods:                         +42.37 percent                          20     S

14. cheese:                                                  +40.06 percent                           13     S

15. misc non-ferrous smelted metals:         +37.01 percent                            –      S

16. construction machinery:                       +36.34 percent                            –      D

17. peanuts:                                                +36.12 percent                            –      S

18. autos and light trucks:                         +35.76 percent                             –     D

19. aircraft engines and engine parts:       +35.55 percent                             –      D

20. iron and steel products:                       +34.99 percent                            –      D

21. male cut and sew apparel:                  +33.37 percent                             –      D

22. pulp mill products:                             +33.16 percent                             –      S

Let’s return to the methodology briefly. All the statistics in these mid-year trade posts cover goods industries. Service industries are left out because the government database I rely doesn’t report on the latter, and because comparably detailed data won’t be released for a while.

This database is maintained by the the U.S. International Trade Commission, which enables users to access them with its terrific Trade Dataweb interactive search engine. The specific goods categories used are those of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) – the federal government’s main way to slice and dice the U.S. economy. And the level of disaggregation I’m using is the sixth, since it’s the level at which you can keep the numbers of sectors analyzed manageable, and at the same time make distinctions between final products on the one hand, and their parts and components on the other (vitally important given much more specialized manufacturing has become).

Aside from the substantial degree of turnover, one prominent feature of this list is its domination by intermediate goods. Parts, components, and materials used in the production of final manufactured goods, or the machinery used in that production, account for 15 of these 22 sectors. Perhaps it’s a sign that global supply chains have proven more resilient during the pandemic than is commonly supposed, and that U.S. links on these chains have been performing exceedingly well?

In addition, 17 of the 22 are manufacturing industries, compared with 16 of the 20 on last year’s list. That’s a step backward for fans of U.S.-based manufacturing, but not a big one.

Nevertheless, two of the sectors that have improved their trade balances most are in the aerospace sector, and regardless of classification issues, since both those industries are deficit industries, their performance undoubtedly reflects both the drastic reductions in air travel imposed due to the CCP Virus (which affect orders for imported engines, their parts, and other parts)nd these goods), as well as the troubles at Boeing, which also reduce demand for foreign-made inputs.

A third deficit manufacturing sector – men’s and boy’s apparel – has also surely seen its trade shortfall shrink because American consumers are buying so few of these largely foreign-made goods. (In an upcoming post looking at export and import changes, we’ll see if this domestic demand-related hypotheses holds any water.)

Now it’s time for the list of those sectors in which trade balances worsened the most.

biggest trade balance losers                                                                2019 rank

1. misc non-ferrous extruded metals:       -1,354.67 percent                 7      D

2. smelted non-ferrous non-alum metals: -1,254.08 percent                 1      D

3. farm machinery and equipment:             -404.19 percent                  –      D

4. miscellaneous textile products:              -399.55 percent                  –      D

5. computer storage devices:                      -271.11 percent                  –      D

6. jewelry and silverware:                            -98.97 percent                  –      D

7. non-diagnostic biological products:         -61.67 percent                16     S

8. computer parts:                                        -60.12 percent                  –      S

9. misc electrical equipment/components:  -50.76 percent                 15    D

10. misc apparel & apparel accessories:     -46.82 percent                   –     D

11. non-anthracite coal/petroleum gases:   -44.91 percent                   –      S

12. cyclic crude & intermediate products: -40.48 percent                   –      S

13. motor vehicle bodies:                           -39.49 percent                  –       S

14. computer storage devices:                   -39.07 percent                   –      D

15. civil aircraft, engines, equip, parts:     -36.95 percent                   –      S

16. medicinal/botanical drugs/vitamins:   -28.40 percent                   –      D

17. perfumes, makeup, and toiletries:       -28.19 percent                   –      S

18. communication and energy wire:        -25.63 percent                   –     D

19. power distribn/specialty transformers: -24.03 percent                  –     D

20. misc electronic components:               -23.92 percent                   –     D

21. corrugated & solid fiber boxes:           -23.61 percent                   –     S

Turnover here has been even greater than on the improvers’ list, with only four of the 21 sectors appearing on the full-year, 2019 list. And talk about manufacturing-heavy! Industry represents all of the sectors save one (non-anthracite coal and petroleum gases). That’s more than the 17 of 20 on the full-year 2019 list of trade deficit growers.

Moreover the dominance of intermediate goods industries (only four of the 20 manufacturing sectors – medicinal and botanical drugs and vitamins; perfumes, makeup, and toiletress, apparel and apparel accessories’ and jewelry and silverware) looks like evidence that not all such U.S. supply chain-related sectors have performed relatively well during the pandemic.

But neither actual deficits and surpluses nor how they’ve changed tell the whole story about the CCP Virus’ impact on American trade flows and competitiveness. The export and import flows that comprise them need to be examined, too, and they’ll both be coming up on RealityChek.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Biggest Mid-Year U.S. Trade Winners & Losers I

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, goods trade, manufacturing, merchandise trade, recession, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade surpluses, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s June! Or it’s June at least according to the folks at the U.S. Census Bureau who track America’s international trade flows. And the arrival of this mid-year point means it’s a good time to see effectively various segments of the country’s economy are competing in the global economy, including here at home.

As with most of American life, this regular RealityChek exercise has been deeply affected by the arrival of the CCP Virus, and in particular, by the historic recession (and maybe depression) it’s triggered due to widespread lockdowns. But even though the figures below – which cover the nation’s goods industries but leave out services (because the government database I rely doesn’t report on the latter, and because comparably detailed data won’t be released for a while) are seriously distorted by the pandemic, they’re useful for three reasons.

First, they suggest which parts of the economy are holding up better and worse during a public health crisis the likes of which are, scarily, likely to recur more than once down the road. Second, the goods industries examined here (manufacturing, agriculture, minerals, and energy) have been affected less dramatically than most service industries, which depend heavily on various degrees of personal contact with customers. Therefore, the virus distortion isn’t nearly so great as might be initially supposed. Third, since all these goods sectors s have been affected by the CCP Virus, their trade performance could well reveal important information about their underlying strengths and weaknesses.

We’ll focus today on actual trade balances – deficits and surpluses – and how they’ve changed between the first half of last year and the first half of this year. As usual, the figures come from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s terrific Trade Dataweb interactive search engine. The goods categories used are those of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) – the federal government’s main way to slice and dice the U.S. economy. And the level of disaggregation I’m using is the sixth, since it’s the level at which you can keep the numbers of sectors analyzed manageable, and at the same time make distinctions between final products on the one hand, and their parts and components on the other (vitally important given much more specialized manufacturing has become).

One anomaly you may notice right away: Although these are both Top 20 lists, they each have more than 20 entries. The reason? Truly bizarre changes in the way the government reports results from the aerospace sector. Once upon a time, Washington used separate NAICS 6 categories for aircraft, non-engine aircraft parts, and aircraft engines and parts. Now they’re all being combined – except where they’re not! The best way I could think of to offset these inconsistencies was to include all the aircraft-related figures when they showed up in the Top 20, but add the twenty-first or twenty-second industry on that list to get the closest approximation of a real Top 20.

Let’s start with those parts of the economy that posted the biggest trade surpluses in the first half of 2020, the actual totals in billions of current (i.e., pre-inflation) dollars, and how this list compares with its counterpart from last year. A dash here means that that sector didn’t appear on the top 20 2019 list at all.

Top 20 2020 trade surpluses                                                          2019 rank

1. civilian aircraft, engines, equipment, parts:        $39.475b              –

2. petroleum refinery products:                               $16.138b              1

3. natural gas:                                                          $12.647b              –

4. other special classification provisions:               $10.927b               2

5. plastics materials and resins:                                $8.720b               3

6. waste and scrap:                                                   $6.403b               5

7. soybeans:                                                             $5.882b                4

8. semiconductors:                                                  $5.748b              12

9. corn:                                                                    $4.678b                9

10. used or second hand merchandise:                   $4.635b                7

11. non-poultry meat products:                              $3.388b              10

12. non-anthracite coal & petroleum gases:          $2.982b                 6

13. motor vehicle bodies:                                      $2.915b                 8

14. wheat:                                                             $2.847b                13

15. semiconductor production equipment:           $2.651b                 –

16. tree nuts:                                                         $1.890b               14

17. prepared or preserved poultry:                       $1.825b               17

18. invitro diagnostic substances:                        $1.653b               18

19. paperboard mill products:                              $1.621b               20

20. surface active agents:                                     $1.614b                –

21. computer parts:                                              $1.586b               15

What jumped out at me right away is that, with three exceptions, the top 20 (actually, top 21) for this year and the list last year were identical. Only three sectors – natural gas, semiconductor production equipment, and surface active agents were newcomers to the 2020 list. And shuffling around between these groups was pretty mimimal. Eight of the sectors either maintained their exact same rank between 2019 and 2020, or only moved one spot. Three more moved only two spots. Given the stunning disruption of life in the United States all around the world, those results seem remarkably stable – and indicate that this group of big American trade winners boasts impressive resilience.

From another vantage point, ten of the 21 sectors on the list were manufacturing industries. In 2019, manufacturing placed only eight representatives in the top 21. So for manufacturing fans (as everyone who’s hoping for enduring American prosperity should be), 2020 has been a year of progress so far.

Below are the goods sectors of the economy with the 21 biggest trade deficits.

Top 20 2020 trade deficits                                                           2019 rank

1. autos and light trucks:                                        $42.120b             1

2. goods returned from Canada:                            $39.008b             2 

3. pharmaceutical preparations:                            $34.867b              4

4. computers:                                                         $29.647b             5

5. broadcast & wireless communications equip:  $26.848b              3

6. smelted/ refined non-ferrous non-alum metal: $19.228b              –

7. miscelleaneous extruded non-ferrous metals:  $15.885b              –

8. women’s cut and sew apparel:                          $14.691b             6

9.crude oil:                                                           $13.658b              –

10. non-diagnostic biological products:              $12.486b            14

11. men’s cut and sew apparel:                              $9.706b              7 

12. printed circuit assemblies:                               $9.571b            15 

13. footwear:                                                         $9.276b              9

14. miscellaneous motor vehicle parts:                 $9.176b            10 

15. miscellaneous textile products:                       $8.892b             –

16. aircraft engines and parts:                               $8.709b             8

17. audio and video equipment:                            $8.107b            11

18. major household appliances:                           $6.801b             –

19. medicinal & botanical drugs & vitamins:       $6.651b             –

20. iron and steel products:                                   $6.460b             –

21.miscellaneous plastics products:                      $6.454b           20

One big difference between this list and the trade surplus list: Fully seven industries this year are newcomers. Even so, however, of the 13 sectors that made it onto both lists, shuffling was actually more limited as on the trade surplus list. Nine of them either held the same ranking or only moved one rung up or down the latter.

This trade deficit list, however, is much more manufacturing-heavy than the surplus list. In fact, it’s nearly twice as manufacturing-heavy, with such sectors accounting for 19 of the 21 on each A final, discouraging, difference: The trade deficits of the leading deficit industries are much bigger than the surpluses of the leading surplus industries. That’s a good reminder that even though the overall goods trade deficit (also called the merchandise trade deficit) is down 5.15 percent on a year-to-date basis so far, it was still more than $391 billion.  Similarly, although the manufacturing deficit is down 4.53 percent on a year-to-date basis, it’s still come in at $476.90 billion so far in 2020.  

But we’re far from finished analyzing the year-to-date trade flows. When it comes to trade balances, we still need to look at more dynamic figures – that is, at which sectors have seen the greatest improvements in their trade balances, and which have seen the greatest deterioration. And of course we can’t forget the export and import figures that comprise the trade balance data, and how they’ve changed between January and June of last year and January and June of this year. Keep checking in with RealityChek for those results!

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Good – & Promising – News on Manufacturing Reshoring

Tags

Canada, China, Commerce Department, East Asia, Forbes.com, GDP-by-industry, Kearney, Kenneth Rapoza, manufacturing, manufacturing production, manufacturing trade deficit, Mexico, North America, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

When two separate sources of information agree on a conclusion, the conclusion obviously becomes a lot more important than if it’s got only a single supporter. That’s why I’m excited to report that a major economic consulting firm has just released data showing that American domestic manufacturing has been coping just fine with all the challenges it faces from Trump tariffs aimed at achieving the crucial goal of decoupling U.S. industry and the the broader economy from China.

I’m excited because these results track with my own analysis of U.S. trade and manufacturing output data – which I’ve been able to update because of a new Commerce Department release measuring manufacturing production through the end of last year. And you should be excited, too – because the more self-reliant U.S.-based industry becomes, the better able it will be to add to the nation’s growth without boosting its indebtedness. In addition, the more secure the country will be both in terms of traditional national security and America’s ability to provide all the military equipment it needs, and in terms of health security and its ability to provide all the drugs and medical equipment it needs to fight CCP Virus-like pandemics.

The consulting firm data comes from Kearney, and I need to tip my hat to Forbes.com contributor Kenneth Rapoza for initially spotlighting it. According to the company, its seventh annual Reshoring Index reveals that last year, imports from low-cost Asian countries like China (well, none are really “like China,” but you get it) as a percentage of U.S. industry’s output hit its lowest annual level since 2014. The decrease was the first since 2011, and the yearly drop was by far the biggest in percentage terms since 2008.

What’s especially interesting is that the Kearney figures show that manufacturing imports from Asia made inroads even during much of the Great Recession. Last year, their prominence dwindled notably even though the American economy as a whole was growing solidly. And although domestic manufacturing output slowed annually last year – due partly to the inevitable short-term disruptions and uncertainties created by major policy shifts, and partly due to the safety problems of aerospace giant Boeing – the Kearney report noted, it “held its ground.”

Kearney reported even better news on the “trade shifting” front, and its findings also track with mine. One major criticism of the Trump China tariffs in particular entails the claim that they won’t aid American domestic manufacturing because they’ll simply result in the U.S. customers of tariff-ed Chinese products buying the same goods from elsewhere – especially from Asian sources.

The Kearney study refutes that claim, reporting that not only did the role of Asian imports decrease in 2019, but that due to the tariffs, this decrease was led by a China fall-off, that production reshoring rose “substantially,”and that a major import shifting beneficiary was Mexico – which is good news for Americans since it means that the globalization of industry is now doing more to help a next-door neighbor whose problems do indeed tend to spill across the border. (I’ve also found important trade shifting away from East Asia as a whole and toward North America – meaning both Canada and Mexico.) 

As for my own research, the release Monday of the Commerce Department’s latest Gross Domestic Product by Industry report, combined with the monthly trade statistics, these data also shed light on the relationship between U.S.-based manufacturing’s growth, and the economy’s purchases of manufactured goods from abroad.

The big takeaway, as shown by the table below: The relationship has continued its pattern of weakening – suggesting less import dependence – during the Trump years, although production growth did indeed slow because of that aforementioned tariff-related disruption and the Boeing mess.

The figure in the left-hand column represents U.S.-based manufacturing’s growth during the year in question (according to a gauge called “value added), the middle column represents the growth that year of the manufacturing trade deficit, and the right-hand column shows the ratio between the two growth rates (with the trade gap’s growth coming first). The higher the ratio, more closely linked manufacturing output growth is to the expansion of the manufacturing trade deficit. All figures are in pre-inflation dollars.

2011:             +3.93 percent              +8.21 percent                2.09:1

2012:             +3.19 percent              +6.27 percent               1.97:1

2013:             +3.36 percent              +0.77 percent               0.23:1

2014:             +2.93 percent            +12.39 percent               4.23:1

2015:             +3.72 percent            +13.22 percent               3.55:1

2016:              -1.19 percent              +3.07 percent                 n/a

2017:             +3.99 percent              +7.22 percent              1.81:1

2018              +6.23 percent            +10.68 percent              1.71:1

2019              +1.67 percent              +1.09 percent              0.65:1

Domestic manufacturers obviously haven’t completed their adjustments to the new Trump era trade environment, and the CCP Virus crisis clearly won’t make this task any easier. But Kearney expects that the pandemic will wind up moving more U.S.-owned or -related manufacturing out of China, and so do I. And although the Kearney authors don’t say so explicitly, it’s easy to read their report and conclude that the crisis and the resulting national health security needs will help ensure that the domestic U.S. economy will keep getting a healthy share.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Which Industries Were 2019’s Biggest U.S. Trade Winners & Losers?

Tags

Barack Obama, manufacturing, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade surpluses, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

President Trump has set out to overhaul America’s trade policy, and RealityChek has presented abundant evidence showing that, from the proverbial 30,000-foot level and somewhat below, his years in office have seen impressive progress that’s laying the foundations for a healthier economy.

But what about the makeup of U.S. trade flows? Similar progress has been documented here in the recent leveling off of the still-enormous American trade gap in manufactured goods (despite the safety-related woes of aircraft giant and mega-exporter Boeing) and minimal growth in the Made in Washington trade deficit – the shortfall in those flows most strongly influenced by American trade policy decisions (i.e., which leave out oil and services trade).

At the same time, a detailed industry-by-industry examination of U.S. trade patterns reveals changes that have been more modest, though worth examining, especially when a reasonably obvious comparison is made with their counterparts during the last year of the Obama administration – which the President and his supporters (including me) view as a trade policy failure. Specifically, over these three years, the lists of the American industries that ran the biggest trade surpluses and deficits remained practically the same. By contrast, the lists of sectors that saw their trade balances improve or worsen to the greatest extent had almost nothing in common.

Let’s begin with one of Mr. Trump’s priority objectives – reducing the trade deficit. Despite the different look of aggregate deficits, one key measure of the industries winning and losing out most from trade looks remarkably similar last year to its appearance in the final Obama year, 2016. That’s the sectors of the U.S. economy with the biggest trade surpluses. Below are the Top 20 for 2019, in descending order. The magnitude of the 2019 surplus in value terms comes after the sector’s name, and the right-hand column shows how these industries ranked in 2016. Last year’s trade surplus champions that didn’t make the 2016 list are designated with a hyphen.

The categories come from the federal government’s North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), which has become Washington’s predominant system for slicing and dicing the domestic economy. They represent NAICS’ most granular level of disaggregation – the sixth level. And they leave out a catchall aerospace category that includes both planes and their parts – as opposed to many other NAICS-6 categories, which present the two separately.

Leading 2019 trade surplus sectors                                  2016 rank

1. petroleum refinery products: $30.71b                               1

2. special classification goods: $26.27b                                3

3. plastics materials & resins: 18.74b                                   4

4. soybeans: $18.46b                                                            2

5. waste and scrap: $13.11b                                                 5

6. non-anthracite coal & petroleum gases: $9.27b            16

7. used or second-hand merchandise: $9.16b:                  10

8. motor vehicle bodies: $9.12b                                         7

9. corn: $7.57b                                                                   6

10. non-poultry meat products: $7.36b                            11

11. cotton: +$6.23b                                                          14

12. semiconductors: +$5.91b                                            –

13. wheat: $5.84b                                                            13

14. tree nuts: +$5.10b                                                      15

15. computer parts: +$4.76b                                             9

16. misc basic inorganic chemicals: $3.88b                     –

17. prepared or preserved poultry: $3.75b                      18

18. in-vitro diagnostic substances: $3.39b                      20

19. surface active agents: $3.23b                                    19

20. paperboard mill products: $3.12b                              –

As the table makes clear, there’s been some reshuffling in this group, but not much. Indeed, 17 of the 2016 Top 20 made the 2019 Top 20, and all of the top five in 2016 were top five in 2019, though three of these industries switched orders. And the only major ranking changes occurred in non-anthracite coal and petroleum gases (which move up six places), and in computer parts (which moved down six).

Also of note: In 2016, eight of the Top 20 trade surplus sectors were manufactures, and this number rose to only nine in 2019. So despite the Trump administration’s focus on strengthening domestic manufacturing, little change is evident from this list of leading net exporters.

Yet very different results emerge from a different measure of trade excellence – the twenty industries that have seen their trade balances improved the most between 2018 and 2019, and between 2015 and that final Obama year 2016. Here, for three reasons, I’ve limited the total number of industries I’ve examined to the hundred biggest trade surplus and trade deficit industries.

First, these sectors represent the vast bulk of U.S. goods trade. Second, they enable a filtering out of the “small numbers effect” (that is, big percentage moves that are generated when sectors with small trade flows experiencing changes that are small in absolute terms but big in relative terms). Third, including the big deficit industries enables the identification of sectors whose trade shortfalls have shrunk the most – which on in trade accounting means just as much as boosting surpluses. (These sectors are the ones marked “DF,” for “deficits fell.”)

Just as with the first table, also presented here is where 2019’s biggest trade balance improvers ranked in 2016. And the big takeaway is that overwhelmingly, they didn’t rank at all. An amazing sixteen out of twenty sectors that improved their trade balances the most last year weren’t even on this Top 20 list just three years ago.

Leading trade balance improvers 2018-19                                       2016 rank

(including percentage changes)

1. semiconductors: +196.2 percent                                                         –

2. perfumes, makeup & other toiletries: +147.4 percent                        –

3. dental laboratories products: +120.0 percent                                     –

4. non-small arms ammunition: +79.8 percent                                      6

5. dried peas & beans: +60.4 percent                                                    7

6. carbon & graphite products: +55.9 percent                                      –

7. oil & gas field machinery & equip: +49.3 percent                           –

8. animal fats, oils & byproducts: +48.9 percent                                 –

9. petrochemicals: +44.9 percent                                                         1

10. computer storage devices: +42.7 percent                                    19

11. ships: +40.2 percent                                                                      –

12. misc chemicals: +35.1 percent                                                     –

13. cheese: +34.0 percent                                                                   –

14. potatoes: +33.6 percent                                                                 –

15. jewelry & silverware: +32.1 percent (DF)                                    –

16. search, navigation, detection instruments: +31.1 percent (DF)    –

17. printed circuit assemblies: +31.6 percent (DF)                            –

18. missile & space vehicle engines & parts: +30.0 percent             –

19. motor homes: +28.0 percent                                                        –

20. specialty canned foods: +27.6 percent                                         –

But also interesting – despite the extensive turnover, for both years, 13 of the twenty top trade balance improvers were manufacturing industries.

Maybe, however, the story is significantly different on the deficit side of the trade ledger? Not meaningfully. Below is a list of the twenty American sectors with the biggest trade shortfalls in absolute terms, in descending order. The actual deficits are included, too. In the right-hand column is their ranking on a similar 2016 table. And as with the surplus table above, that catchall aerospace category is excluded.

Leading 2019 trade deficit sectors                                                 2016 rank

1. autos & light trucks: $126.60b                                                        1

2. goods returned: $91.06b                                                                 4

3. broadcast & wireless communs equip: $73.74b                             3

4. pharmaceutical preparations: $62.36b                                            5

5. computers: $59.62b                                                                        6

6. female cut & sew apparel: $42.13b                                               7

7. male cut & sew apparel: $30.97b                                                   8

8. aircraft engines & engine parts: $25.68b                                     12

9. footwear: $25.62b                                                                        10

10. misc motor vehicle parts: $23.69b                                             11

11. audio & video equip: $21.71b                                                     9

12. dolls, toys & games: $17.37b                                                    13

13. iron & steel & ferroalloy products: $17.03b                             16

14. non-diagnostic biological products: $16.97b                             –

15. printed circuit assemblies: $16.75b 1                                         4

16. motor vehicle electrical & electronic equip: $14.63b              15

17. aircraft parts & auxiliary equip: $14.02b                                 18

18. light truck & utility vehicles: $13.19                                        –

19. misc plastics products: $13.03b                                                –

20. curtains & linens: $12.18b                                                       17

In this case, 17 of the 2019 Top 20 were in the 2016 Top 20. And the order hasn’t changed much, either – except arguably in the case of aircraft engines and engine parts, iron and steel and ferroalloy products, and curtains and linens. One major change does need to be noted, though: You may have observed that the second biggest trade deficit industry in 2016 didn’t make the 2019 list at all. That sector? Crude oil and natural gas, thanks to the U.S. energy production revolution of recent years.

All the same, the 2016 and 2019 lists of biggest trade deficit industries are pretty much…all the same. They’re also both manufacturing dominated, with that super-category accounting for 19 of the Top 20 deficit sectors in 2019 and 18 in 2016.

Turn to the industries whose trade balances have worsened the most (including sectors whose surpluses have declined), and you see a substantially different 2016-2019 comparison – but one strongly resembling that between the sectors whose trade balances have improved the most in 2016 and 2019: showing big-time turnover. (As with the biggest trade balance improvers’ list, the following are drawn from the hundred biggest trade surplus and trade deficit industries.) Those sectors whose surpluses fell are designated with (SF):

Leading trade balance “worseners”                                                      2016 rank

(including percentage changes)

1. non-aluminum, non-ferrous metal refining/extruding: +74.0 percent     1

2. semiconductor machinery: +70.8 percent (SF)                                       –

3. military armored vehicles & parts: +53.9 percent (SF)                          –

4. tobacco: +51.4 percent (SF)                                                                   –

5. electricity measuring & testing instruments: +50.8 percent (SF)          –

6. construction machinery: +47.4 percent                                                10

7. misc non-ferrous secondary smelting/refining: +47.3 percent (SF)     –

8, iron ores: +45.4 percent (SF)                                                                –

9. corn: +39.2 percent (SF)                                                                       –

10. non-reinforced plastic plate & sheet: +35.3 percent (SF)                   –

11. margarine & edible fats & oils: +34.6 percent (SF)                           –

12. timber & logs: +33.4 percent (SF)                                                     –

13. mobile homes & trailers: +30.5 percent (SF)                                    –

14. missiles, space vehicles & parts: +29.8 percent (SF)                        –

15. misc electrical equip & components: +27.4 percent                         –

16. non-diagnostic biological products: +23.1 percent                           –

17. aircraft engines & engine parts: +19.8 percent                                 –

18. light trucks & utility vehicles: +19.7 percent                                   –

19. chocolate & confectionary products: +18.4 percent                         –

20. fabricated structural metals: +17.2 percent                                     12

No fewer than 18 of the 20 sectors on the 2019 list don’t appear on the 2016 list. As for the two that did, construction machinery worsened its relative performance (moving up from the tenth worst sector in this respect to the sixth worst) and fabricated structural metals improved its relative performance (moving from the twelfth worst to the twentieth worst industry).

Of modest significance, though, for manufacturing: It accounted for only 15 of these Top 20 biggest trade losers in 2019, down from 18 in 2016.

The implications seem strikingly clear – though one is much more surprising than the other. The not-so-surprising conclusion: Because the supertanker of U.S. trade flows is so big, changing it dramatically is a long-haul affair. So industries that are the biggest trade losers and winners in 2016 can be expected to hold the same positions in 2019.

But on a more dynamic basis (improving and worsening trade balances) substantial change is possible in a three-year period – both for better and for worse.

Tomorrow we’ll turn from industries’ trade balances to how well these generalizations hold for the sectors with the most and the fastest-growing exports and imports.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why 2019 Was a Winner for Trump Trade Policies & America

Tags

Barack Obama, Boeing, China, GDP, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

OK, let’s cut to the chase regarding the new U.S. trade deficit data. (We’ll analyze today’s report from the Census Bureau more comprehensively tomorrow.)

The most important result revealed by the figures – which bring the story up to December and therefore give us our first look at full-year 2019 development – isn’t that the overall U.S. trade deficit fell year-on-year last year (which alone indicates that President Trump is starting to keep one of his signature campaign promises). It isn’t that the huge annual China goods deficit cratered (by 17.62 percent, the biggest such drop on record – including Great Recession year 2009 – and indicating another promise being kept). It isn’t that the still-huge manufacturing deficit has virtually stabilized despite the safety woes of Boeing, long the generator of major trade surpluses. And it isn’t even that these trade gaps have narrowed even as the economy has continued growing acceptably (which most economists insist is practically impossible, especially for a consumer-heavy country like the United States).

Instead, the most important result is that this economic growth continued in 2019 even as that portion of the trade deficit most influenced by trade policy increased at a particularly slow rate. The obvious conclusions? Trade policy can influence the size and rate of change in the trade deficit, and that the Trump trade policies are working.

To remind, this portion of the trade deficit (which I call the Made in Washington trade deficit) sheds light on the above points because it’s the non-oil goods deficit. It’s highly trade policy sensitive because it strips out of the total trade balance numbers the services balance (because so little progress has been made in worldwide services trade liberalization) as well as the oil balance (because oil is rarely the subject of trade deals or other trade policy decisions).

The table below presents the numbers for the last three years of the Obama administration and the first three of the Trump administration – a comparison that’s apt because these time periods are right next to each other in the current (expansionary) business cycle.

Made in Washington trade deficit % change     GDP % change          ratio

2013-14:        +19.35                                                 +4.42                4.38:1

2014-15:        +21.23                                                 +3.98                5.33:1

2015-16:          +2.41                                                 +2.69                0.97:1

2016-17:          +8.05                                                 +4.30                1.87:1

2017-18:        +12.66                                                 +5.43                2.33:1

2018-19:          +1.75                                                +4.12                 0.42:1

As is obvious from the above, the Made in Washington deficit’s growth rates during the Obama years (measured in pre-inflation terms) have been considerably slower than those of the Trump years. And yet the GDP (gross domestic product) growth rates of the first three Trump years have been notably faster than those of the last three Obama years.

In other words, as made clearest by the right-hand column, which shows the ratio between the two, the link between economic growth and trade deficit growth has been weakening significantly during the Trump years. And the President’s tariff-heavy trade policies have plainly played a major role. All else equal, moreover, that means growth that’s more nationally self-sufficient (no small achievement in a still dangerous world), healthier, and therefore more sustainable.

President Trump makes way too many false or exaggerated boasts about the economy (among other subjects). But the 2019 trade data show that when it comes to trade policy, he’s entitled to considerable bragging rights.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing’s Not Only Decoupling from China

Tags

737 Max, aircraft, Boeing, China, Commerce Department, decoupling, GDP-by-industry, manufacturing, output, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Commerce Department’s GDP-by-Industry series is almost always overlooked by followers of the economy, and partly that’s the Commerce Department’s fault. Its updates are invariably a quarter behind, so it’s what analysts call a (seriously) lagging indicator that says relatively little about the more important question of what’s in store.

Nonetheless, even when they’re lagging, distinctive and detailed indicators can clarify long-term trends considerably, and that’s why I like GDP-by-Industry and track it so closely. Because it sheds lots of light on some of the most important economic and trade-related issues of the day – and especially on the impact of President Trump’s tariff-heavy policies. Specifically, the latest set of figures, which were issued January 9, reveal that during the Trump administration, the United States has continued to progress toward the worthy goal of reducing domestic manufacturing’s dependence on imports (and especially imports from increasingly hostile countries like China) for acceptable levels of growth. 

In other words, the People’s Republic isn’t the only country from which American manufacturing is decoupling. 

According to the new data, the latest year-on-quarter results show that between the third quarter of 2018 and the third quarter of 2019, U.S. manufacturing output (measured according to a gauge called gross value added) increased by 1.21 percent. That’s not much. But the manufacturing trade deficit during this period rose by only 2.55 percent. (Both figures are in pre-inflation dollars, because inflation-adjusted manufacturing trade figures aren’t available.)

Although this growth rate is lower than that achieved between the second quarter of 2018 and the second quarter of 2019 (2.03 percent), that figure was accompanied by a much faster increase in the manufacturing trade deficit (7.83 percent). The first quarter to first quarter results? Manufacturing production growth of 2.76 percent, and manufacturing trade deficit increase of 1.29 percent. That is, manufacturing output actually grew faster than the trade deficit. So from that standpoint, the third quarter result are disappointing.

They look even more disappointing when compared with the results from the first two years of the Trump administration. In 2017, manufacturing production also grew somewhat faster (3.99 percent) than the increase in manufacturing’s trade gap (3.16 percent), and in 2018, output grew much faster (6.23 percent to 3.96 percent).

These Trump presidency figures, in turn, have been much better than those reported for President Obama’s administration. Once the current economic recovery entered a normal phase (2011), the manufacturing trade deficit grew much faster than output ever year except for 2013.

So what’s the case for the latest third quarter 2018-third quarter 2019 figures representing continued progress? And why should anyone be happy with 1.21 percent annual manufacturing output growth no matter what’s happening on the trade deficit side?

Two answers suggest themselves. First, since the President began imposing tariffs in earnest (essentially, in April, 2018), importers have been “front-running” their purchases from abroad.  Their efforts to secure these deals before various sets of tariffs kicked in has produced several short-term distortions in the trade deficit in particular. Second, since the spring, Boeing’s safety woes have exerted a major drag both on domestic manufacturing output and on industry’s trade performance – since the aircraft giant has long been America’s leading exporting company.

Just one example of the difference Boeing has made: Between the third quarters of 2018 and 2019, the U.S. civilian aircraft trade surplus dropped from just under $10 billion to just under $6.5 billion. Civilian aircraft is of course the product category containing Boeing’s troubled 737 Max jet, and the plane was grounded worldwide, or banned from many national airspaces, starting in March.

The relationship between trade balances and production is never one-to-one, especially over relatively short time frames. And the matter becomes more complicated in sectors like aircraft, with its long lead times and generally large backlogs. But it’s difficult to believe that the 737 Max crisis and the narrowing of the aircraft trade surplus hasn’t impacted American civilian aircraft production and exports at all. (In fact, between those two quarters civilian aircraft exports, which are strongly related to output levels, sank by $2.75 billion, or nearly 22 percent.)

Moreover, for the purposes of comparing manufacturing output growth and the manufacturing’s trade deficit growth, the aircraft troubles are significant. Had the category’s trade performance simply remained the same between the third quarters of 2018 and 2019, the trade shortfall would have increased not by 2.55 percent, but 1.25 percent – less than half the rate. As result, during that period, manufacturing’s output (1.21 percent) and trade deficit would have grown at very nearly the same pace.

What does the future hold for this key ratio? On the one hand, civilian aircraft production is bound to decrease for the foreseeable future due to the 737 Max production halt announced by Boeing in mid-December. On the other, numerous signs indicate that industry overall has come out of the recession that dogged it for much of the last year and a half (and that by some output measures, never happened at all). Moreover, the Phase One trade deal signed by the United States and China last week could well reduce at least some of the tariff-related uncertainty that’s clearly slowed manufacturing-heavy capital spending decisions by American business in general, and certainly in manufacturing itself.

That looks like a modest case for domestic manufacturing continuing its longer term trend of becoming more self-sufficient while growing adequately – a development that makes major sense in a world that’s far more uncertain.