(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing’s (Latest) Recession Looks Like It’s Over

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aluminum, China, Commerce Department, Federal Reserve, Great Recession, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing production, metals tariffs, recession, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Let’s do something a little different this time in RealityChek‘s monthly examination of the Federal Reserve’s latest domestic U.S. manufacturing output figures – which came out this morning and bring the story through December and therefore through full-year 2019 (at least preliminarily).

Instead of focusing on the industries most seriously affected by President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies (mainly the metals tariffs, given big measurement problems with the China duties), let’s look at the question of whether manufacturing remains in recession – which has big, trade war-related implications because this Trump campaign is widely blamed for many of manufacturing’s recent weakness.

There’s considerable evidence that the answer is “Yes” – that industry’s inflation-adjusted production (the measure used by the Fed) is back in growth mode, though just barely.

But the question remains an open one. That’s partly because the answer depends on which baseline date you use for the start of the manufacturing recession, which unit of time you use (along with which particular manufacturing output gauge you favor).

Among that evidence tilting toward “Yes” – today’s Fed data.  Specifically, December’s 0.16 percent monthly increase in constant dollar manufacturing output means that, since June, such production is up. Now it’s only up by 0.04 percent. But since that’s a cumulative increase over the last six months (i.e., two consecutive quarters), the technical definition of recession no longer applies.

Or does it? The same Fed figures show that, between December, 2018 and December, 2019, after-inflation manufacturing output was down – by 1.26 percent. So the recession is still on, right?

Maybe. But use another baseline – April, 2018. As RealityChek regulars know, that’s the first full month in which significant Trump tariffs went into effect (on imports of aluminum and steel). Since then, though, price-adjusted manufacturing production has grown by 0.38 percent. This result, therefore, indicates that, although the President’s trade policies seem to have delivered a hit to domestic manufacturing, it was pretty negligible, and it’s already over (at least for now).

To complicate matters still further, as RealityChek reported last July, according to the Fed’s figures, manufacturing has suffered several recessions since the current economic recovery began (in the middle of 2009).  Indeed, as of this morning, it  still hasn’t recovered from the Great Recession that began at the end of 2007!

At the same time, another set of U.S. government data support the conclusion that there has been no trade war-related manufacturing recession during the Trump years – or manufacturing recession of any kind.

These statistics come from the Commerce Department’s “GDP [Gross Domestic Output] by Industry” reports. They use the same measure used by the Fed for tracking manufacturing growth (or contraction), but they’re kept on a quarterly, not monthly, basis. As a result, these numbers aren’t issued as frequently.

Yet the latest results came out January 9, and although they stop at the third quarter of last year, they show that in real terms, domestic manufacturing under Mr. Trump never shrank on net for two straight quarters, much less over any longer time frame. Here are the quarterly change figures:

2Q 16-1Q 17 :+0.32%

1Q 17-2Q 17: -0.7%

2Q 17-3Q 17: +0.35%

3Q 17-4Q 17: +1.22%

4Q 17-1Q 18: +0.38%

1Q 18-2Q 18: +0.09%

2Q 18-3Q 18: +1.38%*

3Q 18-4Q 18: +0.38%

4Q 18-1Q 19: +0.43%

1Q 19-2Q 19: -0.38%

2Q 19-3Q 19: +0.67%

*those Trump metals tariffs began in this quarter

Indeed, what comes through loud and clear from them is that not only has there been no manufacturing recession on President Trump’s watch, but there hasn’t even been an output slowdown.

It’s always possible to point to the counter-factual – that is, in this instance, to try to figure out how matters would look without any Trump tariffs, or similar Trump efforts to transform U.S. trade policy. And it’s certainly conceivable that domestic industry would have fared even better had Trump abjured all tariffs.

But that’s not the only counter-factual. For example, what if the rest of the world had been able to deal with the pressure created by China’s steel dumping by dumping its own steel into the United States (which hasn’t happened because the Trump metal tariffs were global)? What if China itself had remained completely free to send artificially low-priced (because heavily subsidized) product into the US market? What if President Trump had kept the United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement (TPP), with its wide open back door for imports with lots of Chinese content, while China remained under no obligation whatever to open its market to U.S. products? It’s easy to see that U.S.-based manufacturing could have gone on the critical list.

What’s certain, however, is that according to the most authoritative data available, claims of tariffs-led disaster for U.S. manufacturing have been either much ado about nothing, or much ado about very little. Could the coming months finally bear out the worst fears of cheerleaders for pre-Trump trade policies and other globalists? Of course. But that’s simply speculation, which counts much less than facts.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is Manufacturing Employment Being Undercut by Boeing Along with Trade Wars?

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737 Max, aerospace, aircraft, aluminum, Boeing, China, Jobs, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, supply chain, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of the biggest questions raised by the new (lousy) manufacturing results of this morning’s monthly U.S. jobs report concerns whether industry’s dismal recent performance is being impacted more by President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies or by Boeing’s aircraft safety woes. The bulk of the evidence released this morning seems to point to the trade wars as the continuing main culprit, but also to some Boeing-related puzzles. 

Overall, the sector lost 12,000 jobs on month in December – its worst such result (excluding October, whose figures were distorted by the General Motors strike) since August, 2016’s 23,000 decrease).  Moreover, the year-end annual manufacturing jobs gain of 46,000 was the lowest such figure since 2016’s 7,000 loss.  (For comparison’s sake, 2018’s annual manufacturing employment increase of 264,000 was the best such result since 1997’s 304,000.  

The trade wars evidence for the recent deterioration comes in the form of comparisons between the major metals-using industries during the early months following the imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum, and afterwards (when many Trump critics argue that the trade curbs’ impact began sinking in). As always, the impact of Mr. Trump’s levies on imports from China remain too diffused throughout the manufacturing sector – and too unevenly so – to be gauged reliably. For good measure, they’ve also been threatened and applied in a confusing, on-and-off manner, and the recent Phase One trade deal and announcement of follow-on negotiations looks unlikely to end much of the measurement uncertainty.

First, here are the data on employment changes in those metals-using sectors from April, 2018 (the first full month during which the tariffs were in effect) through last month. Figures for the U.S. private sector overall, manufacturing overall, and manufacturing’s durable goods super-sector (in which most of the main metals users are classified) are included for comparison’s sake. Keep in mind that the results for household appliances also reflect a separate set of tariffs for large household laundry machines that have been in place since February, 2018.

                                                  Old thru Nov      New thru Nov       Thru Dec

entire private sector:                +2.82 percent      +2.81 percent    +2.92 percent

overall manufacturing:            +1.83 percent      +1.84 percent    +1.75 percent

durable goods:                         +1.99 percent      +2.02 percent    +1.94 percent

fabricated metals products:     +1.51 percent       +1.45 percent   +0.96 percent

non-electrical machinery:       +1.26 percent       +1.56 percent   +1.37 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:   -0.45 percent        -0.73 percent    -0.81 percent

household appliances*:            not available        -5.84 percent     not available

aerospace products & parts*:  not available        +9.02 percent     not available

*data are one month behind

There’s no mistaking that net new hiring in the metals-using sectors has been slower than in the rest of manufacturing and the private sector. As is clear from the table below, that’s a substantial change from the early post-metals tariffs period (presented here as April, 2018 through December, 2018 and January, 2019), when most metals-users were leaders in boosting payrolls:

                                                                Thru December           Thru January

entire private sector:                                +1.36 percent            +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:                            +1.39 percent            +1.49 percent

durable goods:                                         +1.72 percent            +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:                     +1.57 percent            +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:                        +2.33 percent           +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:                   +1.07 percent           +1.15 percent

household appliances:                              -2.05 percent –           2.52 percent

aerospace products & parts:                    +5.47 percent           +5.87 percent

But what about the Boeing effect – which figures to be considerable given the major role played by the aircraft and aerospace giant not only in American industry but the entire economy? As the data below show, the impact of the company’s production slowdown and more recent suspension of the previously best-selling but flawed 737 Max model (not to mention worldwide groundings) is anything but clear-cut. Presented here are the job change figures for aircraft and related parts industries, along with the numbers for other major supplier industries and the usual comparison sectors for the eight months preceding and following the announcement of global 737 Max groundings last March. The latest available data for the aerospace-specific industries only go through November, so that’s the final month used for the entire table.

                                                 July, 2018 thru March           March thru Nov

entire private sector:                     +1.38 percent                    +1.03 percent

overall manufacturing:                 +0.98 percent                    +0.28 percent

durable goods:                              +1.17 percent                    +0.11 percent

fabricated metals products:          +0.89 percent                     -0.31 percent

non-electrical machinery:            +1.38 percent                     -1.16 percent

aerospace products & parts:        +4.34 percent                    +2.27 percent

aircraft:                                        +6.59 percent                    +2.09 percent

aircraft engines & engine parts:  +1.04 percent                    +3.67 percent

non-engine aircraft parts/equip: +3.06 percent                     +1.22 percent

The pattern seems to show employment slowdowns nearly across the board. But the two non-aerospace-specific supplier industries – fabricated metals and non-electrical machinery – saw net hiring increases turn into net hiring decreases. Moreover, in aircraft engines and engine parts, payroll improvements actually accelerated.

At least some of this apparent paradox might result from the November end date used here. Boeing didn’t decide to suspend outright production of the troubled model until December 16, and the decision won’t even go into effect until sometime this month. Indeed, the company initially announced that no layoffs were accompanying the halt, although significant workforce reduction plans were finally made public yesterday. In this vein, reports of actual supply chain employment effects didn’t begin appearing until mid-December. Moreover, it’s possible that employment pain has been felt by the non-aerospace-specific companies in Boeing’s vast domestic supply chain before it spread to the aerospace-related firms.

So the safest bottom line so far seems to be this: Contributors to manufacturing’s recent jobs slump might now include both trade war- and non trade war-related developments. And anyone singling out one or the other deserves considerable skepticism.

Making News: Podcast Now On-Line of a Trade Policy Debate with Obama’s Former Top Economic Advisor

Tags

Barack Obama, China, decoupling, Jason Furman, Jobs, Making News, manufacturing, metals tariffs, Munk Debates, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade war, Trump, wages

I’m pleased to start off the New Year by announcing that a podcast is now on-line of a major debate over trade and globalization in which I participated in late this fall.  It was sponsored by Munk Debates – a series of policy exchanges that since 2008 have featured some of the world’s leading thinkers and policymakers in head-to-head events dealing with issues like the future of capitalism, the China threat, the rise of populism, and the emergence of political correctness.

I wasn’t crazy about the clickbait-y title (“Be it resolved, tariffs are terrific.”).  But I say “major” because my interlocutor was no less than Jason Furman, whose previous positions include chief economic advisor to former President Barack Obama. In addition to clashing over various individual on Trump tariffs (e.g., on metals), we also crossed verbal swords over the possibility and desirability of decoupling America’s economy from Chiina.

You can listen to the debate at this link, and given the importance of the subject and the prominence of my opponent, I’d be especially interested in your own reactions.

As usual, moreover, keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: A New America First Interview…& More!

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America First, China, foreign policy, Gordon G. Chang, Hoover Institution, Making News, RealVision.com, Seeking Alpha, tariffs, The Epoch Times, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that a lengthy, detailed interview focusing on my views on the need for a (much more) America First-focused U.S. trade policy has just been posted on The Epoch Times website.

If you’re not familiar with it, The Times is a publication founded in 2000 by “Chinese-Americans who themselves had fled communism [and] sought to create an independent media to bring the world uncensored and truthful information.”  Since then, it’s established a strong reputation as a source of reliable reporting and analysis, especially on China-related subjects, and I’m very gratified by their interest in my work.  Here’s the link.

In addition, yesterday, the popular finance website SeekingAlpha.com posted a long write-up of my recent video interview with RealVision.com on the merits of and need for America First policies on both the trade and foreign policy fronts – and on my assessment that President Trump has a long way to go before his own approaches fully merit the label.  You can access it, along with a video of the interview itself, here.

Finally, on December 20, the Hoover Institution published a blog post by noted China watcher Gordon G. Chang that cited my views on the state of the U.S.-China trade conflict.  Read it at this link.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upoming media appearances and other developments.

Following Up: New National Radio Interview Podcast on the U.S.-China Trade Conflict Now On-Line!

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Boeing, China, General Motors, Gordon G. Chang, Making News, manufacturing, Phase One, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade deal, trade war

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my interview last night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show.  Click here for a timely, information-packed analysis of the current status of and outlook for the U.S.-China trade conflict.  Special bonus:  John, co-host Gordon G. Chang, and I go into detail on what the latest government figures are saying about the state of America’s manufacturing sector.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming news appearances and other developments.

Making News: Updating the Trade Wars on National Radio Tonight, a Major Video Interview Now On-Line…& More!

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America First, Breitbart.com, Edward Harrison, Federal Reserve, foreign policy, Gordon G. Chang, IndustryToday.com, inflation-adjusted output, John Carney, Making News, manufacturing, Phase One, RealVision.com, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to be returning to John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show tonight to help John and co-host Gordon G. Chang figure out where the U.S.-China trade conflict stands after the “Phase One” deal announced recently.  The segment is slated to begin at 10 PM EST, and you can listen live on-line here for what’s sure to be a great discussion and look forward.

In addition, on December 16, John Carney of Breitbart.com quoted from my critical assessment of the agreement in his own (more positive) examination of Phase One.  Here’s the link.

In early December, I recorded a lengthy interview with Edward Harrison of the RealVision.com financial news network on whether or not President Trump is carrying out “America First”-style trade and foreign policies, and why they’re necessary.  Click here to watch.

Finally, yesterday, IndustryToday.com reposted my report on the Federal Reserve’s November manufacturing production figures.  You can see it at this link.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: GM and Boeing Effects Still Affecting U.S. Manufacturing Output

Tags

737 Max, aircraft, aluminum, Boeing, China, durable goods, Federal Reserve, General Motors General Motors strike, GM, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing production, metals-using industries, steel, supply chain, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Like its immediate predecessor, this morning’s Federal Reserve release on inflation-adjusted U.S. manufacturing output made clear how the recent strike at General Motors have grossly distorted the latest results, as well as how Boeing’s mounting 737 Max aircraft safety woes remain difficult to identify from these production statistics.

First, let’s look at the overall numbers. According to the Fed, constant dollar American manufacturing output in November jumped sequentially by 1.15 percent. That was the best such increase since October, 2017’s 1.36 percent, and quite the turnaround from October’s 0.70 percent monthly drop-off (which was revised slightly downward).

These figures still left domestic industry in a recession, but not much of one. Since July, 2018, its price-adjusted output is down by 0.14 percent.

But the big role of the GM strike’s end in November’s turnaround couldn’t be clearer. In October, combined U.S. combined vehicle and parts output sank by 5.98 percent after inflation from September’s total. That decline was considerably less than the 7.65 percent nosedive reported last month, but still the worst such performance since the 7.18 percent decrease in January.

Last month, however, thanks to the return of the striking workers, real automotive production skyrocketed by a whopping 12.45 percent – the best monthly performance since the 29.95 percent surge of July, 2009 – as the last recession (which was especially woeful for auto and parts makers) came to an end.

Another way to look at the automotive effect: Without the GM strike, October’s 0.70 percent overall manufacturing after-inflation production decrease would have been a much better (but by no means great) 0.28 percent decline. And without the GM strike’s end, the 1.15 percent jump in price-adjusted manufacturing output would have been only 0.25 percent.

But the impact of Boeing’s safety troubles is as unclear as those of the GM strike are obvious. In November, American aircraft and parts production rose another 0.40 percent on month in real terms. Moreover, since March (when governments around the world began grounding the 737 Max or banning it from their airspace), such production is only down a total of 0.34 percent. Since April (the first full data month since that March flood of bad news), it’s actually up by 2.32 percent.

Therefore, as has been the case recently, the aircraft sector as such has kept outgrowing many of the biggest industries making up its domestic supply chain (which extends way beyond finished parts and into the materials they’re made from). Here’s how these big supplier industries’ output has changed since April, with the overall manufacturing sector’s performance and that of the durable goods super-category in which most are found included for comparison’s sake:

overall manufacturing: +0.68 percent

durable goods: +1.25 percent

primary metals: -1.13 percent

fabricated metals products: -0.54 percent

machinery: +0.16 percent

The above results also indicate that at least some of the economy’s biggest metals-using industries still lack the relative production strength they displayed for the first several months after steel and aluminum tariffs were imposed in March, 2018. Here are their latest numbers from April (the first full data month affected by these levies) through November, also with the overall manufacturing and durable goods results included:

                                          Old Ape thru Oct    New Apr thru Oct    April thru Nov

overall manufacturing: –      0.54 percent            -0.81 percent         +0.33 percent

durables manufacturing:    -0.32 percent            -0.40 percent         +1.75 percent

fabricated metals prods:   +1.42 percent           +1.26 percent         +1.48 percent

machinery:                        -0.81 percent            -0.77 percent          -1.02 percent

automotive:                    -12.24 percent           -11.34 percent          -0.30 percent

major appliances:             -9.14 percent            -9.08 percent          -6.31 percent

aircraft and parts:            +3.59 percent           +4.37 percent         +4.79 percent

One interesting bright spot apparent from the above – a nice improvement for production of major appliances, a sector that’s been dealing since February, 2018 with an additional set of product-specific tariffs. But in machinery and fabricated metals products in particular, where output tends to be less volatile than it’s been in automotive and appliances, recent performance clearly has been worse than that from April, 2018 through, say, this past January:

                                                          April, 2018 through January

overall manufacturing:                               +1.07 percent

durables manufacturing:                            +1.74 percent

fabricated metals prods:                            +3.42 percent

machinery:                                                +3.69 percent

automotive:                                               -3.32 percent

major appliances:                                      -1.43 percent

aircraft and parts:                                     +4.19 percent

Will the new “Phase One” trade deal announced with China make it any easier to gauge the impact of tariffs on most of the imports heading to the United States from the PRC? That’s already been difficult enough, because Chinese products have been used so widely, and to such varying extents, as inputs for so many manufacturing industries). And chances are this challenge will become more difficult, given both that it’s far from clear when follow-on talks will begin; and given Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin’s suggestion that the next phase may consist of many different phases.

Surely adding to the complications will be the Boeing effect, which seems certain to start appearing more conspicuously in the data now that the company has announced that 737 Max production will be suspended starting next month, as well as its failure to say how long the halt will last.

So just about all that can be said for sure is that domestic manufacturing had a good month in November – however unclear it remains whether this improvement has legs.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest Details Still Don’t Justify Trump’s China Trade Deal

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agriculture, China, Clyde V. Prestowitz, dispute resolution, enforcement, managed trade, manufacturing, Phase One, trade deal, trade war, Trump, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Rpbert :Lighthizer, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Because the Trump administration has for some reason been putting out the specifics on its new “Phase One” trade deal with China in dribs and drabs, information has come out since Friday’s post panning the agreement suggesting that it might be better than first impressions indicated. At the same time, the case for continued skepticism still looks considerably stronger.

Grounds for optimism can be seen in the Fact Sheet on the deal put out late Friday afternoon by the office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Most promising: This administration indicates that the President has finally adopted a strategy urged by me last month, originally articulated by former U.S. trade negotiator Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr. back in the 1980s, and oddly endorsed by a former senior Chinese official recently – in an interview he would never have given had he not been certain that Beijing would at least receptive.

The strategy has been denigrated by critics as “managed trade” – a supposedly foolhardy departure from the standard free trade approach followed by pre-Trump Presidents. Rather than trying to persuade foreign governments to open their markets to American exports and put in effect other free market practices, managed trade seeks to persuade foreign governments to reduce their surpluses with the United States by boosting their purchases by designated amounts. The big advantage: Managed trade efforts permit negotiators to avoid getting bogged down in philosophical debates about the virtues of economic liberalism, or in mudslinging matches over which economies are “fair” and “unfair.” Instead, they focus on unemotional bargaining over numbers. In addition, as Prestowitz has noted (and the senior Chinese official recently confirmed), Asian governments in particular are much more comfortable haggling over “how much” than preaching ethics and other intangibles.

The President’s interest in managed trade has been evident since he began pushing the Chinese to resume by certain amounts blocked purchases of soybeans and other agricultural commodities. But according to the Fact Sheet, China has not only consented to hit specific targets in its imports of farm products and energy goods like natural gas. (USTR Robert Lighthizer on Friday told reporters that Chinese farm products imports would rise over the next two years by a total of some $16 billion a year over the 2017 figure of $24 billion.) Beijing has also committed to “import various U.S. goods and services [including the agricultural buys] over the next two years in a total amount that exceeds China’s annual level of imports for those goods and services in 2017 by no less than $200 billion.” Even better, these purchases will include manufactures.

If these promises are kept, the massive U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China will shrink considerably, and American output and employment will grow. And the greater the share of manufactured products in this total, the higher quality the growth and the better the jobs.

But what will the manufacturing numbers be? Lighthizer has said that broad target figures will be released. But if it can already quantify China’s pledges to boost agriculture imports, why not for industry? Is it because Chinese promises in these areas haven’t been nailed down? And what’s the deal with the reference to targets? Does it mean that China is free to fall short for certain reasons? For any reasons?

Lighthizer explained the failure to divulge more detailed, product-by-product numbers even for agriculture by pointing to the need to “avoid distorting markets.” On the one hand, this worry isn’t unreasonable. On the other, the secrecy won’t make it any easier for any Americans without a vested political stake in claiming victory or success to assess progress with any precision.

More ominously, Lighthizer said that China would be free to buy things when “it’s the perfect time in the market to buy things.” That sounds suspiciously like the objection China originally raised when pressed to buy more farm products as part of the Phase One deal – i.e., purchases that ignored levels of Chinese domestic demand would make no economic sense, “might be hard for the domestic market to digest,” and would sharply depress local prices.

Of course, the response to these points needs to be that China has never let free market forces interfere with its mercantile trade policy goals before. Therefore, this is no time to start swallowing this kind of excuse. Indeed, if Beijing is so worried about supporting the prices received by local producers for any good, it can keep them off the market by stuffing the excess imports into warehouses. That’s not America’s problem.

Unfortunately, the Lighthizer statement indicates that the Trump administration has decided to accept this bogus Chinese rationale – which threatens to permit China to insist indefinitely that the time just isn’t ripe to buy all those extra American products called for in the deal. And with China’s growth likely to slow further for the foreseeable future, expect this claim to be trotted out frequently.

Also suspicious: If the United States has secured Chinese agreement to ramp up agriculture imports greatly, why did the agreement need to address “a multitude of [Chinese] non-tariff barriers to U.S. agriculture and seafood products…including for meat, poultry, seafood, rice, dairy, infant formula, horticultural products, animal feed and feed additives, pet food, and products of agriculture biotechnology.”

After all, as long as the promised results keep coming in for American agricultural producers, who cares what Chinese trade barriers remain officially in place? And if the U.S. team did bother to negotiate these provisions to ensure adequate market access for U.S.-based producers once the two years apparently covered by the agreement run out, then this is more a temporary fix than a big win for the American sectors affected.

What about the other structural issues – the intellectual property theft, the technology extortion, and other predatory Chinese practices that threaten both American national security as well as prosperity? The Fact Sheet remains distressingly vague.

For the former, we’re told only that the agreement “addresses numerous longstanding concerns.”

For the latter, the administration claims the establishment of “binding and enforceable obligations to address several of the unfair technology transfer practices of China that were identified” by its prior investigation of Chinese economic predation.” These entail Chinese agreement to end demanding cutting edge knowhow in return for access to the Chinese market and other benefits, and a Chinese commitment “to provide transparency, fairness, and due process in administrative proceedings and to have technology transfer and licensing take place on market terms.”

But how will these Chinese promises be monitored and enforced? How will “transparency, fairness, and due process” be defined?

And speaking of enforcement, it’s encouraging that the agreement “establishes strong procedures for addressing disputes related to the agreement” and in particular “allows each party to take proportionate responsive actions that it deems appropriate.”

Yet how long will it take for the procedures to reach the point at which Washington gains the right to punish Chinese violations with tariffs? One major criticism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been that many years often have passed between the initial filing of complaints till judgments were handed down determining that transgressions had indeed taken place, and authorizing tariffs unless the offending actions were halted. Although the Face Sheet promises resolving disputes “expeditiously,” it’s far from clear yet that the Phase One arrangements will be able to achieve this goal.

In addition, will Beijing enjoy similar authority to determine American violations of Phase One, and to levy punitive tariffs if it’s “deemed appropriate” by China? Moreover, whenever either side concludes that a violation has taken place, what in the agreement, if anything, will prevent the other side from retaliating.

And if the answer is “nothing,” then how would post-Phase One U.S.-China economic relations differ from those relations today – since each country would appear to be as free legally speaking as it is now practically speaking to deal with problems it blames on the other however it wishes, and to respond to any resulting tariffs with whatever countermeasures it chooses? 

The Phase One deal is no cave-in to China, as many have claimed. The high tariffs remaining on most products imported from China belie that description. Nor does it matter whether China’s dictators believe they’ve outwitted or intimidated Mr. Trump, and therefore that they can keep resisting his demands for improved behavior – since the towering obstacles will prevent adequately verifying even the most forthcoming Chinese promises of reform. 

Instead, the deal is mainly a lost opportunity; indeed a big one. Moreover, it raises the crucial question of when the President will finally start downplaying – at least – the consequently futile efforts to negotiate a better trade and broader economic relationship between the United States and China, and start emphasizing the need to keep moving down the road toward what should be the overriding goal of decoupling.      

Glad I Didn’t Say That! The Epic Fail of Tariff Fear-Mongering

Tags

aluminum, China, consumer price index, consumers, core inflation, Glad I Didn't Say That!, inflation, manufacturing, metals, metals-using industries, Producer Price Index, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump

“Trump’s trade war may soon hit consumers’ wallets and paychecks.”

–NBC News, July 18, 2018

“Tariffs will surely lead to higher prices for imported goods and, to a lesser extent, prices for non-imported goods that use imported materials.”

–Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, July 18, 2018

“Tariffs are about to hit consumers, and it won’t be pretty.”

–CNBC, July 25, 2018

“Trade restrictions, by their nature, result in price increases for the goods in question. If the price of steel and aluminum goes up, manufacturers will be forced to pass those costs onto American consumers.”

–The Heritage Foundation, March 2, 2018

U.S. core consumer price* index year on year, November: +0.1 percent

U.S. core producer price index** year on year, November: +0.5 percent

*commodities less food and energy

**final demand goods less food and energy

(Sources: “Trump’s trade war may soon hit consumers’ wallets and paychecks,” by Ben Popken, NBC News, July 18, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/trump-s-trade-war-may-soon-impact-consumers-wallets-paychecks-n890576: “Tariff Troubles: Will Consumers Feel the Pinch?” Public Policy, Knowledge@Wharton, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, July 30, 2018, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/trumps-tariffs-will-impact-average-consumer/; “Tariffs are about to hit consumers, and it won’t be pretty,” by Jeff Cox, CNBC, July 25, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/25/tariffs-are-about-to-hit-consumers-and-it-wont-be-pretty.html; “3 Reasons Why Trump’s Tariffs Would Hurt American Workers,” by Tori K. Smith and Jay Van Andel, Commentary, The Heritage Foundation, March 2, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/trade/commentary/3-reasons-why-trumps-tariffs-would-hurt-american-workers. All compiled in “Christmas Miracle: Rising Wages and Low Inflation Promise a Very Merry Holiday Season,” by John Carney, Breitbart.com, December 11, 2018, https://www.breitbart.com/economy/2019/12/11/low-inflation-christmas/. “Consumer Price Index – November 2019, USDL-19-2144, News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, December 11, 2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cpi.pdf; and “Producer Price Indexes – November, 2019, USDL 19-2146, News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, December 12, 2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ppi.pdf)

Making News: Two Podcasts of National Radio Trade War & Economy Interviews…& an Eye-Opening Look at Amazon.com!

Tags

Amazon.com, Breitbart News Tonight, economy, election 2020, Gordon G. Chang, Henry George School of Social Science, Hong Kong protests, Jobs, jobs report, Making News, manufacturing, publishing, Rebecca Mansour, Rick Manning, Robin Gaster, Smart Talk, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that just out on-line are two podcasts of national radio interviews on the Trump trade wars and a video on an especially startling aspect of Amazon.com’s stunning rise to business titan status.

The latest interview now available was conducted last night on “Breitbart News Tonight” and can be found at this link.  Once you’re there, scroll down a fair ways till you see my name on a December 6 segment – a discussion with hosts Rebecca Mansour and Rick Manning that ranged from the last (excellent) U.S. jobs report to the Hong Kong protests to the intensifying presidential election campaign.

The previous interview was broadcast Wednesday night on “The John Batchelor Show.”  Click here to listen to a conversation with John and co-host Gordon G. Chang on how well the U.S. manufacturing sector is faring as President Trump keeps trying to revamp U.S. trade policy.

The video shows me reversing roles and interviewing economist Robin Gaster on the implications of Amazon.com’s efforts to disrupt yet another major U.S. industry, and one playing an especially important role in American culture – the book publishing industry.  Click here to watch, and keep in mind that the interview is posted in two parts.

Incidentally, this interview is the latest in the “Smart Talk” series sponsored by the Henry George School of Social Science – a New York City-based economic research and education institute on whose Board I’ve served as a Trustee for several years.  “Smart Talk” has featured some of the world’s leading economic thinkers, and if you search around its section on the website, I’m sure you’ll find some fascinating and important material.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.