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Tag Archives: Trade

Following Up: Back on National Radio Tonight & Podcast On-Line of Yesterday’s Appearance

16 Thursday Jun 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

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CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, Federal Reserve, Following Up, inflation, manufacturing, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, monetary policy, recession, tariffs, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my interview late last night on the nationally syndicated “Market Wrap with Moe Ansari.” Click here to and scroll down a bit till you see my name for a timely discussion about the Federal Reserve’s latest inflation-fighting moves, the odds that its tighter monetary policies will trigger a U.S. recession, and where President Biden’s trade policies toward China and the rest of the world may be heading.

In addition, as mentioned yesterday, I’m scheduled to return to the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor” to update the U.S. China policy story. The exact time for the segment hasn’t yet been set, but the show is broadcast weeknights between 9 PM and 1 AM EST, and is always worth tuning in.

If you can’t listen live on-line at websites like this one, as always, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments

Making News: Back on National Radio Tonight on Economic and Foreign Policy Crises…& More!

15 Wednesday Jun 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

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Biden administration, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, competitiveness, Gordon G. Chang, Immigration, Jeremy Beck, Making News, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, NumbersUSA, solar panels, tariffs, tech, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return tonight on the nationally syndicated “Market Wrap with Moe Ansari” to discuss many of the main (and often closely related) economic and foreign policy challenges facing the United States and the world at large. “Market Wrap” airs weeknights between 8 and 9 PM EST, these segments usually begin midway through the show, and you can listen live on-line here.

As usual, if you can’t tune in, I’ll post a link to the podcast of the inteview as soon as it’s available.

In addition, it was great to see Gordon G. Chang quote me yesterday in his latest blog post for the Gatestone Institute – on the Biden administration’s wrongheaded decision to suspend tariffs on imports of solar panels from Chinese-linked factories in Southeast Asia. Click here to read.

Also, last week, Jeremy Beck of the immigration realist organization NumbersUSA focused his latest blog post on my own take on some little known Open Borders-friendly provisions in the version of the big China and tech competitiveness bill passed by the House of Representatives. Here’s the link.

And I just found out that tomorrow night I’m slated to return to the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor” to analyze the latest twists and turns in increasingly tense U.S.-China relations. I’ll provide more details here tomorrow – which is a neat segue into my usual reminder tokeep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is the New (April) U.S. Trade Report a False Dawn?

07 Tuesday Jun 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Advanced Technology Products, Biden, Census Bureau, China, Donald Trump, exports, goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, services trade, South Korea, stimulus, supply chains, Switzerland, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although today’s new official figures showed a major dropoff in the U.S. trade deficit between March and April, and the results came from a normally encouraging combination of more exports and fewer imports, the Census data also show that big caveats and questions are hanging over these results and how enduring they might be.

First and foremost, the improvement in the combined goods and services deficits, and all virtually all the trade balances comprising it, could be resulting from a dramatic slowdown in U.S. economic growth. Second, the latest decline in the chronic and huge U.S. goods trade gap with China surely stems from Beijing’s recent over-the-top (but surely temporary) Zero Covid policies, which have further snagged already tangled up supply chains. And third, large revisions in some of the numbers (especially for services trade) inevitably cast some doubt as to their reliability lately.

In fact, these features of the report – along with the still-near historic levels of many of these trade deficits and other usually typical gap-widening developments like a strong U.S. dollar and still-astronomical levels of economic stimulus from Washington – are telling me that my prediction last month of higher deficits to come will age pretty well.

Not that the narrowing of the trade gap in April was bupkis. The combined goods and services deficit fell 19.11 percent from March’s all-time high of $107.65 billion (which itself was revised down a hefty 1.96 percent) to $87.08 billion. This level was the lowest since December’s $78.87 billion and the nosedive the biggest since December, 2012’s 19.85 percent.

And as just mentioned, the improvement came from the right combination of reasons. Total exports hit their third straight monthly record, rising 3.49 percent from an upwardly revised (by 0.99 percent) $244.11 billion to $252.62 billion

Overall imports, meanwhile, tumbled 3.43 percent from their record $351.79 billion to $339.70 billion. The total was the second biggest ever, but the decrease was the greatest since the 13.16 shrinkage during pandemic-y and recession-y April, 2020.

The trade shortfall in goods was down 15.04 percent from a downwardly revised (by 1.04 percent) $126.81 billion in March to $107.74 percent in April. This level, too, was the lowest since December’s $100.52 billion, and the 15.04 percent sequential tumble the biggest since April, 2015’s 15.09 percent.

Goods exports rose sequentially by 3.57 percent in April, from 170.04 billion to a third consecutive record of $176.11 billion. And U.S. purchases of foreign goods sank by 4.38 percent on month in April, from a downwardly revised (by 0.65 percent) record $296.85 billion to $283.84 billion (as with total imports, the second highest result of all time). The decrease was the biggest since the 12.79 percent drop in that pandemic-y April, 2020.

But even the above sizable revisions paled before those made for services trade. The March surplus was upgraded fully 4.48 percent, from $18.34 billion to $19.16 billion, and the April figure grew by another 7.83 percent to $20.66 billion – the highest level since December’s $21.66 billion.

Services exports (apparently) deserve much of the credit. They reached an all-time high of $76.52 billion. This total bested May, 2019’s previous record of $75.41 billion by only 1.46 percent, but the milestone is significant given the outsized hit suffered by the service sector worldwide during the pandemic period.

April services exports, moreover, rose 3.30 percent from March’s $74.07 billion – a total that itself was revised up by 4.23 percent.

Services imports set their third consecutive monthly record in April, rising 1.73 percent, to $55.86 billion, from March’s upwardly revised (by 4.19 percent) $54.19 billion.

A big April fall-off also came in the non-oil goods trade deficit – known to RealityChek regulars as the Made in Washington trade deficit, because by stripping out figures for oil (which trade diplomacy usually ignores) and services (where liberalization efforts have barely begun), it stems from those U.S. trade flows that have been heavily influenced by trade policy decisions.

This shortfall decreased by 14.72 percent in April, to $108.68 billion, from March’s downwardly revised record $127.42 billion. The drop was the biggest since March, 2013’s 16.74 percent.

The enormous and persistent manufacturing trade deficit retreated in April from record levels, too. But even though the month’s $124.41 billion shortfall was 12.71 percent lower than March’s all-time high $142.22 billion, and even though the monthly decline of 12.71 percent was the biggest since pandemic-y February, 2020’s 23.09 percent, this deficit was still the second biggest ever.

April’s manufactures exports of $109.36 billion were 4.03 percent lower than March’s record $113.96 billion, but were still the second best total on record. Ditto for the month’s manufactures imports, which tumbled 8.85 percent from their March record of $256.18 billion to $233.50 billion.

Another April fall-off from a record monthly deficit came in advanced technology products (ATP). After ballooning by 73.65 percent sequentially in March, to $23.31 billion, the recently volatile gap narrowed in April by 21.50 percent, to $18.30 billion.

Both the better manufactuing and ATP trade figures surely stemmed at least in part from the Zero Covid policies that interfered with so much industrial production from China. The U.S. goods deficit with the People’s Repubic, however, narrowed by just 10.02 percent on month in April, from $34 billion to $30.57 billion. Even so, the level was the lowest since last July’s $28.56 billion.

U.S. goods exports to China were down on month in April by 16.25 percent (their biggest drop since February, 2021’s 278.85 percent), from $13.38 billion to $11.20b. This total is the lowest since last September’s $11.03 billion.

The much greater amount of U.S. goods imports from China plummeted 11.82 percent n month in April, from $47.37 billion to $41.77 billion – the lowest level since last July’s $40.32 billion.

Also notable – breaking a pattern going back several years — the 10.02 percent April monthly drop in the U.S. goods deficit with China was smaller than the month’s sequential decline in the non-oil goods deficit (14.72 percent). And on a yar-to-date basis, the China deficit is up only slightly less (27.59 percent) than the non-oil deficit (28.95 percent). So the next few months’ worth of data may shed some light on whether the Trump (now Biden) tariffs on China are losing their effectiveness, or whether the last few months’ numbers are anomalies.

Other significant April results for individual U.S. trade partners: The goods deficit with South Korea set a new record of $4.09 billion – 23.79 percent higher than March’s total of $3.30 billion and 21.70 percent greater than the old record of $3.36 billion set last September.

And the goods deficit with Switzerland cratered in April by 67.63 percent, to $2.89 billion, from March’s $8.93 billion level. The percentage shrinkage of this bilateral trade gap was the biggest since September, 2018, when a $1.22 billion U.S. deficit turned into a $149 million surplus.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why U.S. Manufacturing’s Record Trade Deficits Aren’t Biting — Yet

06 Monday Jun 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

Biden administration, CCP Virus, China, consumers, coronavirus, COVID 19, Covid relief, exports, Federal Reserve, imports, inflation, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing production, stimulus, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Perceptive RealityChek readers (no doubt the great majority!) have surely noticed something odd about my treatment of trade-related developments and the American domestic manufacturing base. For most of the CCP Virus period, I’ve been writing both that U.S.-based industry has been performing well according to practically every major measure, and that the manufacturing trade deficit has been setting new record highs.

It’s not that I’ve ignored a situation that would normally strike me as being utterly paradoxical and even inconceivable over any serious time span. I’ve mainly attributed it to the pandemic’s main economic damage being inflicted on services industries, and to the Trump tariffs on Chinese imports, which have shielded domestic manufacturers from hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of competition that has nothing to do with free trade or free markets.

But the longer manufacturing has excelled as the trade gap has skyrocketed, the more convinced I’ve been that something else was at work, too. What finally illuminated this influence has been the recent controversy these last few weeks over President Biden’s suggestion that he might cut some of those Trump China tariffs in order to curb inflation.

As I’ve written previously (see, e.g., here), there’s no shortage of economic-related reasons to dismiss the claims that levies that began being imposed in mid-2018 bear any responsibilityfor inflation that only became worrisome three years later, and that reducing the tariffs would ease this inflation meaningfully. Even the Biden administration keeps admitting the latter point.

But the increasingly striking contrast between manufacturing’s strong output, job creation, and capital equipment spending on the one hand, and its historically awful trade deficits on the other points to the paramount importance of another explanation I’ve mentioned for doubting that tariffs have fueled inflation. It’s the role played by the economy’s overall level of demand.

I’ve written that trade levies will contribute to higher prices or boost prices all by themselves overwhelmingly when consumers are spending freely – and consequently when businesses understandably believe they have scope to charge more for tariff-ed goods. That is, companies are confident that the higher costs stemming from tariffs can be passed along to customers who simply aren’t very price sensitive.

Strong enough demand, however, has another crucial effect on manufacturing – and on other traded goods: It creates a market growing fast enough to enable domestic companies to prosper even when their foreign competitors are out-performing them and taking share of that market. In other words, even though all entrants aren’t benefitting equally, all can still benefit.

Conversely, when demand for manufactures is expanding sluggishly, or not at all, this kind of win-win situation disappears. Then U.S.-based and foreign industry are competing for a stagnant group of customers, and one’s gain of market share becomes the other’s loss. In this situation, increasing trade deficits mean that American demand is being met by imports to eliminate any incentive for domestic manufacturers to boost production or employment. Indeed, they become hard-pressed even to maintain output and payrolls.

Of course, even if trade deficits keep surging during periods of slow domestic demand, U.S.-based manufacturers can still in principle keep turning out ever more products and hiring ever more workers if they can achieve one goal: super-charging their export sales. But the persistently mammoth scale of the American manufacturing trade shortfall indicates either that foreign demand for U.S.-made goods almost never improves enough to compensate for reduced or stagnant domestic sales, or that foreign economies prevent such growth by keeping many American goods out, or some combination of the two.

Super-strong demand for manufactured goods is precisely what’s characterized the economy since the CCP Virus arrived in force. As a result, the pie has gotten so much bigger that domestic industry as a whole has had no problem finding enough new customers to support healthy production and hiring levels even though imports’ sales have been lapping them.

Specifically, between the first quarter of 2020 and the fourth quarter of last year (the last quarter for which current-dollar (or pre-inflation) U.S. manufacturing production data are available, the U.S. market for manufactures increased by 22.83 percent – or $1.518 trillion. Revealingly, this demand would have been strong enough to enable domestic industry to pass tariff hikes on to customers, and enable these levies to fuel inflation on at least a one-time basis. But tariffs of course have not been raised during this stretch.

Meanwhile, the manufacturing trade deficit soared by 64.31 percent ($566 billion). And the import share of the U.S. market rose from 29.50 percent to 32.47 percent.

But domestic industry was able to boost its production (according to a measure called current-dollar gross output) by 16.55 percent, or just under $954 billion. ,

Contrast these results with the pre-CCP Virus expansion. During those 10.5 years (from the second quarter of 2009 through the fourth quarter of 2019), the U.S. market for manufactured goods increased by just 45.37 percent, or $2.154 trillion. That is, even though it was more than five times longer than the above pandemic period, that market grew by only about twice as much.

The manufacturing trade deficit actually also grew at a slower rate than during the much shorter pandemic period (169.2 percent). But because the pie was expanding more slowly, too, the import share of this domestic manufacturing market climbed from 23.12 percent to 31.10 percent.  These home market share losses combined with inadequate exports were enough to limit the growth of U.S. manufacturing output to 34.64 percent, or $1.512 trillion. Again, though this 2009-2019 growth took place over a time-span more than five times longer than the pandemic period, it was only about twice as great. That is, the pace was much more sluggish.

And not so coincidentally, because pre-CCP Virus demand for manufactures was so sluggish, too, businesses concluded they had little or no scope to raise prices when significant tariffs began to be imposed in 2018. Further, the levies generated no notable inflation over any significant period even on a one-time basis. Companies all along the relevant supply chains (including in China) had to respond with some combination of finding alternative markets, becoming more efficient, or simply eating the higher costs.

The good news is that as long as the U.S. market for manufactures keeps ballooning, domestic industry can keep boosting production and employment even if the manufacturing trade deficit keeps worsening or simply stays astronomical, and even if domestic industry keeps losing market share.

The bad news is that the rocket fuel that ignited this growth spurt is running out. Massive pandemic relief programs that put trillions of dollars into consumers’ pockets aren’t being renewed, and Americans are starting to dig into the savings they were able to pile up in order to finance their expenses (although, as noted here, these savings remain gargantuan). Credit is being made more expensive by the Federal Reserve’s decision both to raise interest rates and to reduce its immense and highly stimulative bond holdings. And some evidence shows that U.S. consumer spending is shifting from goods like manufactures to services (although some other evidence says “Don’t be so sure.”)

Worse, when the stimulus tide finally recedes, domestic industry will likely find itself in a shakier competitive position than before. For without considerably above-trend demand growth, and with the foreign competition controlling more of the remaining market than before the pandemic, it will find itself more dependent than ever on maintaining production and employment (let alone increasing them) by winning back customers it has already lost. And changing purchasing patterns in place will be much more challenging than selling to customers whose patterns haven’t yet been set.

U.S. based manufacturing is variegated enough – including in terms of specific sectors’ strengths and weaknesses – that the above generalizations don’t and won’t hold for every single industry. But the macro numbers make clear that domestic manufacturing as a whole has experienced unusually fat years lately, and generally has been competitive enough to take some advantage of these favorable conditions. But industry’s continuing and indeed widening trade shortfall and market share losses in its own back yard should also be warning both manufacturers overall and Washington that many of domestic industry’s pre-pandemic troubles could come roaring back once leaner years return.

Following Up: Podcast On-Line of Latest National Radio Radio Interview on Tariffs and Inflation

02 Thursday Jun 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

Biden, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, economics, Following Up, Gordon G. Chang, inflation, Janet Yellen, tariffs, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my appearance last night on “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor.” The segment features John, me, and co-host Gordon G. Chang discussing a bad recent idea that can’t seem to be killed off entirely – the proposal to fight lofty U.S. inflation by cutting tariffs on some goods imports from China. Here’s the link.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Win for Transparency on Corporate Vulnerability to China

14 Saturday May 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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China, Congress, investment, multinational companies, national security, offshoring, Securities and Exchange Commission, Steve Milloy, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, transparency, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s a development in U.S.-China economic relations that’s potentially game-changing, and that yours truly finds particularly satisfying: The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the federal agency largely responsible for regulating U.S. financial markets require companies publicly traded in America to open their books wide on their ties with and reliance on China.

It’s potentially game-changing because ever since the early 1990s, Washington stepped on the gas to encourage the expansion of trade and investment with China (including massive factory and manufacturing job offshoring), but permitted the multinational companies that by far benefited most from these practices to control the release of most of the information capable of gauging the impact on the broader economy.

The result: When the American political system set its China economic policy priorities, it was forced to rely on the offshoring companies themselves for crucial information on the employment and production fall-out at home. And naturally, these firms – along with the sympathetic economists and think tank hacks they funded – presented Members of Congress and journalists with only cherry-picked facts and figures suggesting that the domestic winners far outnumbered the losers.

But this playing field may be in for major leveling thanks to the work of Steve Milloy of the Energy and Environmental Legal Institute. Milloy, a former SEC attorney, has persuaded the Commission to approve his proposal for a “Communist China Audit,” that would ask “companies to disclose to shareholders the extent to which their business relies on China.”

Milloy’s rationale, as explained in a Wall Street Journal op-ed earlier this week? A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would thoroughly disrupt the extensive commercial ties many public companies maintain with China (which include crucial supply chain dependencies of all kinds), and threaten their bottom lines – and the portfolios of their shareholders – with massive losses. In turn, the entire national economy would take a staggering hit. He rightly adds, moreover, that China’s hostility now extends nearly across the board of major U.S. interests.  

Multinational and other public companies are already required to tell shareholders about the various risks they run. But everyone who has looked through their quarterly and annual financial statements knows that politics and geopolitics risk disclosures are invariably vague and scanty, and details on their China-related operations almost non-existent.

Indeed, the author reports that the SEC is already pushing public companies to reveal how significantly Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is affecting their businesses. Since China’s impact on American companies, their shareholders, and the entire American economy is so much greater, he rightly argues that full transparency on this front is all the more important.

I was thrilled to learn about Milloy’s ideas and successes because for many years, I’ve been advocating something very similar. As I wrote in this 2017 post, Congress should pass and a President should sign what I called a “Truth in Testimony Act.” The measure would require any multinationals representatives appearing before Congress on an international trade or investment or technology-related issue

“to specify their job and production offshoring, the wages of their U.S. and overseas workers, their foreign and domestic procurement, the foreign and domestic content of their products, and similar statistics.”

I also recommended that time series be provided, in order to identify long-term patterns. In addition, I pointed out, comparable information has been required of auto-makers selling in the United States since the 1990s, so major precedent exists. And I urged similar requirements for a full range of businesses and their representatives when testifying before the House and Senate, and called for their think tank and academic spokespersons to come clean on all relevant sources of their funding.

Businesses have long protested that such requirements would deprive them of valuable trade secrets and other prime sources of competitive advantage. I countered that (a) if full disclosure is a must for everyone, then no one wins or loses on net; and (b) companies unconvinced by this argument would remain free to opt out of telling Congress their stories.

Milloy’s proposal, however, matters much more, because it would apply to the entire universe of public companies whether they appear before lawmakers or not.

So I’ll be trying to get in touch with him to see if I can help his China audit campaign in any way, and report back on the results, and on any further progress he’s made. As I wrote five years ago, for far too long, the U.S. government has been flying blind on China and other international economic issues and relying on unreliable, incomplete information. Milloy is right in emphasizing that the China threat in every dimension has metastasized. Nothing less than full corporate China-related transparency can be acceptable.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why Biden’s China Tariff Cutting Talk is So (Spectacularly) Ill-Timed

10 Tuesday May 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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Biden administration, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, currency, currency manipulation, exports, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, tariffs, Trade, Trump administration, unemployment, Xi JInPing, yuan, Zero Covid

If the old adage is right and “timing is everything,” or even if it’s simply really important, then it’s clear from recent news out of China that the Biden administration’s public flirtation with cutting tariffs on U.S. imports from the People’s Republic is terribly timed.

The tariff-cutting hints have two sources. First, and worst, as I noted two weeks ago, two top Biden aides have publicly stated that the administration is considering reducing levies on Chinese-made goods they call non-strategic in order to cut inflation. As I explained, the idea that the specific cuts they floated can significantly slow inflation is laughable, and their definition of “non-strategic” could not be more off-base.

The second source is a review of the Trump administration China tariffs that’s required by law because the statute that authorizes their imposition limited their lifespan. The administration can choose to extend them, eliminate them entirely, reduce all of them, or take either or both of those actions selectively, Some tinkering around the edges may justified – for example, because certain industries simply can’t find any or available substitutes from someplace else. But more sweeping cuts or removals could signal a stealth tariff rollback campaign that would be just as ill-advised and ill-timed.

And why, specifically, ill-timed? Because this talk is taking place just as the Chinese economy is experiencing major stresses, and freer access to the U.S. market would give the hostile, aggressive dictatorship in Beijing a badly needed lifeline.

For example, China just reported that its goods exports rose in April at their lowest annual rate (3.9 percent) since June, 2020. Exports have always been a leading engine of Chinese economic expansion and their importance will likely increase as the regime struggles to deflate a massive property bubble that had become a major pillar of growth itself.

It’s true that dictator Xi Jinping’s wildly over-the-top Zero Covid policy, which has locked down or severely restricted the operations of much of China’s economy, deserve much of the blame. But Xi has recently doubled down on this anti-CCP Virus strategy, and low quality Chinese-made vaccines virtually ensure that case numbers will be surging. So don’t expect a significant export rebound anytime soon without some kind of external helping hand (like a Biden cave-in on tariffs).

Indeed, China seems so worried about the export slowdown that it’s resumed its practice of devaluing its currency to achieve trade advantages. All else equal, a weaker yuan makes Made in China products more competitively priced than U.S. and other foreign counterparts, for reasons having nothing to do with free trade or free markets.

And since March 1, China – which every day determines a “midpoint” around which its yuan and the dollar can trade in a very limited range (as opposed to most other major economies, which allow their currencies to trade freely) – has forced down the yuan’s value versus the greenback by an enormous 6.54 percent. The result is the cheapest yuan since early November 3, 2020.

It’s been widely observed that such currency manipulation policies can be a double-edged sword, as they by definition raise the cost of imports still needed by the Chinese manufacturing base. But the rapidly weakening yuan shows that this is a price that Beijing is willing to pay.       

Finally, for anyone doubting China’s need to maintain adequate levels of growth by stimulating exports, this past weekend, the country’ second-ranking leader called the current Chinese employment situation “complicated and grave.” His worries, moreover, aren’t simply economic. As CNN‘s Laura He reminded yesterday, Beijing is “particularly concerned about the risk of mass unemployment, which would shake the legitimacy of the Communist Party.”

For years, I’ve been part of a chorus of China policy critics urging Washington to stop “feeding the beast” with trade and broader economic policies that for decades have immensely increased China’s wealth, improved its technology prowess, and consequently strengthened its military power and potential. The clouds now gathering over China’s economy mustn’t lead to complacency and any easing of current American tariff, tech sanctions, or export control pressures. Instead, they’re all the more reason to keep the vise on this dangerous adversary and even tighten it at every sensible opportunity.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Will the Tech Competitiveness Bill Shaft American Tech Workers?

07 Saturday May 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

China, competitiveness, Congress, Immigration, labor shortages, Lisa Irving, NumbersUSA, semiconductors, STEM, STEM workers, tariffs, tech workers, technology, Trade, visas, {What's Left of) Our Economy

In case you didn’t already think that the U.S. government has become a dysfunctional mess, the immigration realist group NumbersUSA has just highlighted a recent, thoroughly depressing example. It’s the decision of the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives to turn its version of a bill to boost American technological competitiveness (especially versus China) into a device to advance its Open Borders-friendly immigration agenda ever further – and at the expense in particular of native-born tech workers and tech worker hopefuls.

Not that the story of this competitiveness effort wasn’t a prime example of dysfunction already. As I’ve previously pointed out, both the House bill and its Senate counterpart were originally introduced in mid-2020, and these efforts still haven’t become law – even though concerns about China catching up to the United States technologically, and threatening both American national security and prosperity even more sharply, remain as strong and widespread as ever.

And not that the Democrats are solely responsible: As I’ve also noted, Senate Republicans have strongly supported provisions in their version of the legislation that would both greatly weaken a president’s authority to impose tariffs (including on China to offset the economic damage to U.S. industry from its predatory trade and broader economic practices), and reduce various existing tradei barriers to many imports (including from China).

But the immigration provisions of the House version could be just as damaging, and deserve at least as much attention. As explained by NumbersUSA analyst Lisa Irving, this legislation “allows for an unlimited number of green cards for citizens of foreign countries seeking permanent U.S. residency who hold a U.S. doctorate degree, or its equivalent from a foreign institution, in STEM [Science, Technology, Engineering,and Math fields].”

Adds Irving, “This provision would result in further limiting the job prospects and resources for highly qualified Americans in tech fields.” 

To add insult to injury, as Irving reminds, the measure is based on phony and thoroughly debunked claims, mainly propagated by the U.S. technology industry, that it’s facing a crippling labor and talent shortage. In fact, the tech sector’s prime objective is curbing wage and other compensation gains by opening the flood gates ever wider to foreign-born technologists willing to accept much lower pay.   

The best outcome for the cause of American competitiveness — and for its potential to benefit the existing American population economically — would be for the Congressional conference committee assigned with devising a final compromise version that President Biden can sign into law to strip the Senate version of its trade sections, and the House version of these immigration sections

But don’t expect any progress any time soon. Reuters reports that the committee will hold its first meeting next week – and will contain more than 100 House and Senate lawmakers. In other words, more than 100 cooks for this broth.

As a result, even though China continues massively subsidizing its own tech sector, and even though other countries have already responded with their own incentives aimed at attracting and maintaining their capabilities in semiconductors and other industries, “Congressional aides said it could still take months before a final agreement is reached.” In the ultimate sad commentary on American political dysfunction, given the glaring flaws of both bills, that could be a good thing. 

Following Up: Podcast Now On-Line of Last Night’s National Radio Interview on Manufacturing & China Defeatism

05 Thursday May 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

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CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, Following Up, Gordon G. Chang, John Batchelor, manufacturing, reshoring, supply chains, tariffs, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast of my interview last night on the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World” with John Batchelor is now on-line.

Click here for a timely discussion – including co-host Gordon G. Chang – of whether the U.S. manufacturing revival pessimists are right, and bringing factories back from China really is a fool’s quest.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Terrible March for U.S. Trade – With Worse Likely to Come

05 Thursday May 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Advanced Technology Products, Canada, China, currency, dollar, European Union, exchange rates, exports, Federal Reserve, goods trade, imports, inflation, Japan, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, Mexico, oil, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So many records (mainly the wrong kind) were revealed in the latest official monthly U.S. trade figures (for March) that it’s hard to know where to begin. Some important points need to be made before delving into them, though.

First, don’t blame oil. Sure, this trade report broke new ground in containing a full month’s worth of Ukraine war-period data. But despite the disruption in global energy markets triggered by the conflict, on a monthly basis, the U.S. petroleum balance actually improved sequentially, from a $2.94 billion deficit to a $1.58 billion surplus on a pre-inflation basis (the trade flow gauges from these monthly government releases that are most widely followed)

And even on an inflation-adjusted basis, February’s $8.73 billion oil deficit shrank to $5.15 billion in March.

Second, don’t blame inflation much at all. The Census Bureau doesn’t report after-inflation service trade results on a monthly basis, but it does provide this information for goods (which comprise the great majority of U.S. trade flows). And the March figures show that before factoring in inflation, the goods trade deficit worsened by 18.89 percent from $107.78 billon in February to a new record $128.14 billlion, whereas when inflation is counted, this gap widened on month by 18.86 percent, from $115.96 billion in February to $137.83 billion in March. (Major trade wonks will note that these goods and services data are presented according to two different counting methods, but trust me: the difference in results is negligible.)

Third, don’t blame China. The March pre-inflation goods deficit with the People’s Republic was up sequentially from $42.26 billion to $47.37 billion (12.10 percent). But neither that absolute level nor the rate of increase was anything out of the ordinary, much less a record. In fact, the monthly percentage increase was just half the rate of that of the shortfall for total non-oil goods (a close worldwide proxy for China goods trade) – which hit 24.06 percent. One big takeaway here: the Trump China tariffs are still exerting a major effect, along of course with the supply chain knots Beijing has created with its over-the-top Zero Covid policy.

But regardless of where the blame lies, (and it looks like major culprits are continued strong U.S. spending on both consumer goods and capital equipment, combined with an improvement of the supply chain situation outside China), all-time highs and worsts abounded in the March trade report, include worsenings at record paces.

The combined goods and services trade deficit jumped on-month by 22.28 percent, to $109.80 billion. That total was the third straight record for a single month and the increase the fastest since the 43.71 percent explosion in March, 2015 – a month during which much of the country was recovering from severe winter weather.

As mentioned above, the $128.14 billion goods trade gap was the highest ever, too, topping its predecessor (January’s $108.60 billion) by 17.99 percent. As for the 18.89 percent monthly increase, that was also the biggest since March, 2015 (25.18 percent).

Even a seeming trade balance bright spot turns out to be pretty dim. The headline number shows the service trade surplus improving by 1.96 percent – from $17.98 billion to $18.34 billion. Unfortunately, nearly all of this increase stemmed from a big downward revision in the initially reported February surplus, from $18.29 billion.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the aforementioned non-oil goods trade deficit can also be called the Made in Washington trade deficit – because by stripping out figures for oil (which trade diplomacy usually ignores) and services (where liberalization efforts have barely begun), it stems from those U.S. trade flows that have been heavily influenced by trade policy decisions.

And not only was the March Made in Washington deficit’s monthly increase of 24.06 percent the second fastest ever (after March, 2015’s 31.24 percent). The March, 2022 level of $128.70 billion was the biggest ever.

The story of the non-oil goods trade gap’s growth was overwhelmingly a manufacturing story. The sector’s huge and chronic trade shortfall shot back up from $106.49 billion in February (which was a nice retreat from January’s $121.03 billion) to a new record $142.22 billion. And the monthly percentage jump of 33.55 percent was the biggest since the 37.62 percent during weather-affected March, 2015.

Manufactures exports advanced sequentially by a strong 20.53 percent this past March. That topped the previous all-time monthly high of $105.37 billion (set back in October, 2014), by 8.15 percent. But the much greater volume of imports skyrocketed by 27.43 percent. And their $256.18 billion total smashed the old record of $222.79 billion (from last December) by 14.98 percent.

Within manufacturing, U.S. trade in advanced technology products (ATP) took a notable beating in March, too. The $23.31 billion trade gap was an all-time high, and its 73.65 percent monthly growth the worst since the shortfall slightly more than doubled on month in March, 2020 – as the Chinese economy and its huge electronics and infotech hardware manufacturing bases reopened after the People’s Republic’s initial pandemic wave.

Yet as noted above, despite these extaordinary manufacturing and ATP trade numbers, the latest March numbers for manufacturing-heavy U.S. China trade were anything but extraordinary. U.S. goods exports to the People’s Republic increased on-month by 15.36 percent – slower than the rate for manufactures exports globally, but the fastest rate since the 52.47 percent rocket ride they took  last October.

Goods imports from China, however, rose much more slowly from February to March than manufactures imports overall – by just 12.10 percent, from $42.26 billion to $47.37 billion.

When it comes to other major U.S. trade partners, the March American goods deficit with Canada of $8.03 billion was the highest such total since July, 2008 ($9.88 billion). It was led by a 30.81 percent advance in imports reflecting the mid-February reopening of bridges between the two countries that had been closed due to CCP Virus restrictions-related protests.

The goods deficit with Mexico worsened even faster – by 35.11 percent, to $11.92 billion. That total was its highest since August, 2020’s $12.77 billion.

Another major monthly increase (31.59 percent) was registered by the U.S. goods shortfall with the European Union, but its March level ($16.87 billion) was subdued relative to recent results.

Anything but subdued was the Japan goods shortfall, which shot up sequentially in March by 49 percent. The $6.77 billion total also was the biggest since November, 2020’s $6.78 billion, and the monthly jump the greatest since the 84.37 percent burst in July, 2020, during the rapid recovery from the sharp U.S. economic downturn induced by the first wave of the CCP Virus and related economic and behavior curbs.

The Europe and Japan trade figures stem significantly from a development that’s bound to turn into an increasingly formidable headwind for the U.S. trade balance for the foreseeable future – the dollar’s rise versus other leading currencies to levels not seen in 20 years. And unless it’s reversed substantially soon, China’s latest currency devaluation, which began in mid-April, will weaken the effects of both the Trump tariffs and the Zero Covid policy. So even if the Federal Reserve’s (so far modest) inflation-fighting efforts do slow the American economy significantly, it’s likely that, as astronomical as the March trade deficits were, we ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

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Terence P. Stewart

Protecting U.S. Workers

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So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Alastair Winter

Chief Economist at Daniel Stewart & Co - Trying to make sense of Global Markets, Macroeconomics & Politics

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Reclaim the American Dream

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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Sober Look

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So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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Michael Pettis' CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS

New Economic Populist

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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