Im-Politic: The Mainstream Media’s Latest Immigration Fakery

Tags

criminal aliens, Im-Politic, immigrants, Immigration, Mainstream Media, The Atlantic, Trump, Vietnam, Vietnam War

Just when I thought that it had become impossible for the Mainstream Media’s pro-Open Borders bias and Trump Derangement Syndrome to make me genuinely angry, along came The Atlantic‘s article yesterday on Trump administration policy toward refugees from Vietnam – including those who arrived in the Vietnam War’s tragic aftermath.

The piece – loudly advertised as an “exclusive” – clearly sought to convey the impression that the Trump administration has decided to start deporting certain groups within this population simply because it’s determined to rid America of as many foreign-born residents as possible, along with preventing the entry of as many newcomers as possible. In the case of the Vietnamese, of course, this policy would be morally outrageous both because so many refugees aided the U.S. military effort and (along with their descendants) face grim fates if they return; and because the United States inflicted so much damage on the country during its decade-plus of massive armed involvement. (I’m not trumpeting a position on the war – which I opposed – here. Just stating a fact.) When I saw the headline, I was up in arms myself.

Imagine my surprise, then, to discover (in the fourth paragraph) what’s really changing:

“The administration last year began pursuing the deportation of many long-term immigrants from Vietnam, Cambodia, and other countries who the administration alleges are ‘violent criminal aliens.’”

Why is that a change? Because, in the authors’ view, this decision violates

“a unique 2008 agreement  [between Washington and Hanoi] that specifically bars the deportation of Vietnamese people who arrived in the United States before July 12, 1995—the date the two former foes reestablished diplomatic relations following the Vietnam War.”

But Trump administration officials have concluded, and told The Atlantic on the record, that the agreement “does not explicitly preclude the removal of pre-1995 cases.”

Which seems eminently reasonable when the article finally makes clear that the U.S. intent now is not indiscriminately to round up Vietnamese-Americans and kick them out of the country in order to advance (circle one or both) nativist or racist goals. Instead, the intent was to treat as exempt from the 2008 deal “people convicted of crimes.”

Indeed, these folks were not only convicted of crimes. According to the Department of Homeland Security’s Katie Waldman, “these are non-citizens who during previous administrations were arrested, convicted, and ultimately ordered removed by a federal immigration judge.”

But how did the Atlantic authors describe a U.S. government effort finally to get rid of convicted criminals who clearly have been using delaying tactics to put off removal orders by the American judicial system? As

>”the latest move in the president’s long record of prioritizing harsh immigration and asylum restrictions….”

>a ”new stance [that] mirrors White House efforts to clamp down on immigration writ large, a frequent complaint of the president’s on the campaign trail and one he links to a litany of ills in the United States.”

>a “shift” that “leaves the fate of a larger number of Vietnamese immigrants in doubt.”

>a betrayal of many “refugees from the Vietnam War. Some are the children of those who once allied with American and South Vietnamese forces, an attribute that renders them undesirable to the current regime in Hanoi, which imputes anti-regime beliefs to the children of those who opposed North Vietnam.”

In fact, if anything, the new Trump policy changes a 2017 administration decision that makes no sense at all for anyone who believes that criminal aliens have no business remaining in the United States one minute longer than necessary: exempting these criminals from deportation if they arrived in the country before 1995. What on earth was that about? And why does The Atlantic, by posting this “scoop” seem to object so strongly – especially since nowhere does this piece challenge the convictions?

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Making News: Last Night’s National Radio China Interview Podcast Now On-Line & a Major Seminar on North America’s Future

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caravans AMLO, Gordon G. Chang, Henry George School of Social Science, Huawei, Immigration, Jorge Castaneda, Lopez Obrador, Making News, NAFTA, North America, North American Free Trade Agreement, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to report that the podcast is now on-line of my interview last night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show. Click here for a lively update on the rapidly evolving  U.S.-China trade conflict and the China tech executive’s arrest provided by John, co-host Gordon G. Chang, and me.

Also, late last month, I had the privilege of moderating a seminar held at New York City’s Henry George School of Social Science (where I serve as a Trustee) featuring Jorge Castaneda, a former Mexican foreign minister who also ranks as a leading authority on U.S.-Mexico relations, Mexico’s politics and economy, and Western Hemisphere affairs more generally.

As the title of the seminar noted, North America’s economy is at a crossroads – due to the recent revamp of NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement), the inauguration of a new Mexican President, and the presence of an avowed disrupter in the White House. Let’s not forget, moreover, a new, caravans-fueled stage of the ongoing immigration crisis!

The video is now on-line, and because no one is more qualified than Jorge to explain how all these events do – and don’t – fit together, viewers will be rewarded with a treasure trove of information and incisive analysis.  Here’s the link.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: Back Tonight on Nationally Syndicated Radio on the Trade War & Huawei

Tags

China, Huawei, Iran, Making News, national security, sanctions, tech, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return tonight to John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show to help provide an update on the U.S.-China trade conflict.  The segment, which is slated to begin at 9 PM EST, will also deal with the arrest in Canada of a senior Chinese technology executive for allegedly violating U.S. national security sanctions on Iran.

You can listen live on-line at this link, and as always, if you can’t tune in, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Yes, We (Still) Have No Tariffs-Led Inflation

Tags

China, consumer price index, consumer prices, inflation, metals tariffs, tariffs, Trade, Trump, washing machines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As with yesterday’s producer price data, good luck to anyone trying to find significant tariff-led inflation in the U.S. economy in today’s consumer price numbers (for November), whether on the metals front or the China front. Because it’s still not showing up. There’s one clear exception (household laundry machines), which has been hit with its own product-specific levy since early February, but where doubts still persist about whether the resulting pricing power can stick. Some inflation is also apparent in motor vehicle parts.

Here’s the raw data, first for metals-using consumer goods where – bizarrely – powerful inflationary pressure are already being reported. For comparison’s sake, I’ve also included the statistics for overall “core” inflation (“core CPIU” in government lingo), which strips out volatile food, energy, and housing prices. And for fruits and vegetables, I’ve presented the numbers for these products in their canned and un-canned processed forms, to reveal whether the prices for the steel and aluminum cans in which the former come are driving price trends, or whether other factors have been more important.

                                Oct.-Nov.       Since April        y/y April           y/y Nov

core CPIU             0.14 percent   +0.77 percent  +1.19 percent   +1.51 percent

processed fruits    -0.31 percent   -1.30 percent   -0.36 percent    -0.22 percent

& vegs

canned fruits         -0.42 percent   -0.48 percent   -0.07 percent   +0.69 percent

 & vegs

canned fruits         -0.07 percent   -0.05 percent   -1.52 percent   +0.67 percent

malt beverages     +0.30 percent  +1.78 percent  +0.84 percent   +1.61 percent  

 at home 

alcoholic               +0.25 percent  +1.38 percent  +2.17 percent   +2.60 percent

  beverages away

juices & non-         0.45 percent   +1.64 percent    -0.25 percent   +1.73 percent

-alcoholic drinks

non-frozen, non-    -0.27 percent  +1.19 percent    -0.53 percent   +0.79 percent

  carbonated non-

  alcoholic drinks

non-alcoholic         -0.02 percent  +2.72 percent   +0.03 percent   +3.04 percent

  carbonated drinks

new cars & trucks -0.01 percent   +0.77 percent    -1.62 percent    -0.29 percent

motor vehicle       +0.35 percent   +1.15 percent    -0.74 percent    +2.13 percent

  parts 

The main conclusions emerging from this first table? Between October and November, prices have been weaker than the overall core inflation rate for some products (canned fruits and vegetables, new motor vehicles, and three non-alcoholic drinks categories) and stronger in fewer products (beer and other malt drinks consumed at home, alcoholic beverages consumed in bars and restaurants, and motor vehicle parts). That development alone strongly indicates that metals prices are only one influence on the prices of metals-using products, and likely not the main influence.

Further evidence for the relatively low importance of metals prices, and therefore tariffs? Over the latest data month, prices for canned fruits and vegetables have fallen slightly faster than those for all processed fruits and vegetables, but prices for canned fruits have fallen more slowly. So it’s hard justify foisting lots of blame on the cans.

In addition, care is needed in interpreting all the drink statistics. In the first place, as noted in previous RealityChek posts on consumer prices, the beer and non-alcoholic drinks figures don’t distinguish between products sold in bottles from products sold in cans. And the alcoholic beverages numbers don’t even distinguish among beer, wine, and spirits, on top of combining canned products numbers with the results for products sold in bottles and other kinds of containers (although not much wine and spirits seems to come in cans).

A major spread also emerges from the numbers since April – the first full month when any metals tariffs had been imposed. The price increase for automotive parts is relatively strong, and the hikes for all drink categories are especially robust. These indicate that demand for drinks of all kinds has been up significantly during this period, but the data are complicated again by the failure to distinguish drinks sold in cans and in other packages. And most of these trends are clear and complications are clear from the two year-on-year statistics.

Less information about the impact of China tariffs can be gleaned from the new consumer price report, because the first of these levies was only imposed in early July, and most of these were slapped on producer, not consumer goods. But some of these products contain a great deal of producer goods like steel or electronic components, and the figures for two of them are presented below – including the latest monthly results, the price changes since July, and the July and latest year-on-year data. And tariff-led inflation of any kind…just isn’t.

                              Oct.-Nov          Since July          July y/y            Nov y/y

core CPIU         +0.14 percent    +0.34 percent  +1.48 percent    +1.51 percent

tools, hardware  -0.24 percent     -0.31 percent   -0.07 percent     -0.12 percent

  et al

video/audio       +0.14 percent    +1.06 percent   -0.79 percent     -0.38 percent           equipment

But there is one product for which tariff-induced price hikes are clear, and that’s those separately tariff-ed household laundry machines. Here are the data for October-November, since February (shortly after they began, and year-on-year for February and November.

                                    Oct.-Nov.       Since Feb            Feb y/y            Nov y/y

core CPIU               +0.14 percent  +0.74 percent   +0.91 percent   +1.51 percent

laundry equipment +2.97 percent +18.25 percent    -7.61 percent  +15.52 percent

Of course, the steel levies have no doubt contributed to the elevated prices, too. Even here, though, it’s interesting that despite a big October-November price jump, the year-on-year increase in November prices is somewhat lower than that for February. Also, even with the big new monthly surge, washing machine prices remain at four-and-a-half-year lows. In other words, as with steel and aluminum, these goods were flooding the U.S. market and sold at prices having little to do with any free market forces, much less free trade.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Still Desperately Seeking Tariff-Induced Inflation

Tags

aluminum, China, consumer prices, inflation, metals tariffs, producer prices, steel, tariffs, Trump, washing machines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

There’s especially bad news for trade war alarmists contained in this morning’s government report on producer prices. Not only does it contain yet more evidence that any inflation from President Trump’s metals tariffs keeps fading, but it’s now possible to show that his China tariffs aren’t fueling price hikes that are noteworthy, either – let alone increases likely to last.

Regarding the levies on steel and aluminum, which began to be imposed in late March, the weakest pricing trends have been apparent in aluminum. In April, its year-on-year price increases at the wholesale level stood at 11.9 percent, peaked at twenty percent in June, and as of November (the latest data reported this morning), the rate was down to 5.9 percent. That’s largely because wholesale aluminum prices have dropped on a monthly basis for five straight months, including by 1.5 percent from October to November.

More pricing power has been demonstrated in steel. Year-on-year wholesale prices for this metal advanced by 7.4 percent in April and have continued upward since, though at a much slower pace since August’s 18.6 percent. In November, the annual increase was 19.8 percent.

On a monthly basis since August, steel prices have dipped on net, even though between October and November, they increased by 0.5 percent.

Importantly, these higher metals prices don’t seem to be transferring uniformly into higher prices for metals-heavy products, including parts and components. For example, some mounting price pressure is apparent in pumps, compressors, and equipment; and mining machinery and equipment. But these sectors were greatly outnumbered by those in which price momentum seemed weak at best and going nowhere – such as construction machinery; machine tools; oil field and gas field machinery; aircraft; and motor vehicles and parts.

And if the price increases aren’t at least roughly comparable, then it’s hard to justify singling out tariffs as a major problem to this point.

The Trump China tariffs began in early July, but evidence that they’re igniting much inflation is even more elusive. On the one hand, it’s true that China’s currency is down versus the U.S. dollar since July – by a little over four percent – which all else equal will depress the prices of Chinese-made goods and services versus their American competitors all over the world. On the other, that’s a sign that, when it comes to China, many special variables influence prices (like a wide range of subsidies), along with the usual supply and demand forces.

Most important, here are the wholesale price changes for some leading products on the Trump administration’s list of the first 818 imports from China slapped with tariffs on July 6. So they represent the changes from July through November.

aircraft engines and engine parts:                                  0.35 percent

industrial heating equipment:                                       0.89 percent

oil and gas drilling platform parts:                               0.46 percent

farm machinery and equipment:                                   2.08 percent

paper-making machinery:                                            0.54 percent

ball bearings:                                                                1.12 percent

electric generators:                                                      1.71 percent

electricity transformers:                                              0.35 percent

medical equipment incl X-rays, pacemakers:                  0 percent

Three arguably major price spikes are apparent, but the big question remains whether these increases will stick. We’ll be watching.

Finally, there are the washing machine tariffs. As previously noted, at the retail level, prices of these appliances shot up shortly after they were first imposed in late January – to the unmistakable glee of supporters of the pre-Trump trade policy status quo. But at the wholesale level, home appliance prices (washing machines aren’t broken out from this category) have climbed only 0.76 percent from February through November. And during the last two months, they’ve fallen by 0.7 percent and 0.6 percent sequentially. So good luck with claiming that levies at the border deserve blame for whatever higher prices were paid by American consumers who had the misfortune to buy washing machines earlier this year.

As for the November consumer price data (measuring changes at the retail level), the data don’t come out until tomorrow. But on a monthly basis, they fell by 0.2 percent from July to August and by 3.8 percent between August and September before recovering by 0.2 percent between September and October.

In other words, there’s been deflation in washing machine prices lately. As these and the wholesale price figures make clear, that continues to be a fate richly deserved to date by tariff-led inflation claims.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence of the Crucial U.S. Role in China’s Tech Rise

Tags

Broadcom, China, Daniel Strumpf, Huawei, Intel, Qualcomm, Silicon Valley, tech, tech transfer, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you need any further evidence that American technology firms have played vital roles in China’s transformation into a major technology power capable of threatening U.S. national security as well as economic interests, check out Dan Strumpf’s article in The Wall Street Journal today. In the process, he inevitably exposes gaping holes in President Trump’s China strategy that need to be closed up pronto if the President is serious about checking China’s dangerous rise.

Here are just some of the highlights of Strumpf’s piece – which is limited to U.S. tech firms’ contributions to the emergence of Huawei, whose CFO (and founder’s daughter) was arrested in Canada a week ago on charges of helping the entity use fraud to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran. (As always, I refuse to use words like “company” or “business” in describing Chinese economic actors, since they have nothing in common with corporate organizations in free market economies.)

>”Silicon Valley giants from Intel Corp. to Broadcom Inc. and Qualcomm Inc. are top suppliers of Huawei, which buys their components to make equipment such as base stations and routers and Huawei mobile phones.”

>”Qualcomm and Intel are also working with Huawei on its development of next-generation 5G technologies, a field in which the Chinese company’s aim to be a global leader has alarmed some in Washington.”

>”Huawei still relies on imports from U.S. chip companies such as Broadcom, Xilinx Inc. and Analog Devices Inc. for components used in its telecom equipment…Huawei buys equipment from data-storage equipment maker Seagate Technology PLC for use in its enterprise business, and uses memory chips made by Micron Technology Inc. in its smartphones….”

>”Intel and Qualcomm, which draw huge revenue from China, are seen by Huawei as more than suppliers. In Huawei’s annual report, Intel is described as a ‘strategic partner,’ and the companies work together in a range of areas, including next-generation 5G technology.”

>”In 2015, Qualcomm, Huawei and China’s largest chip maker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp., launched a joint venture in Shanghai to work on next-generation chip technology.”

And lest you think it’s just Huawei, click here and here for numerous examples of similar assistance rendered by such American corporations to other Chinese entities and industries.

Strumpf’s article also makes clear the flip side of these American companies’ operations: Chinese entities like Huawei have become major customers and sources of revenue for the U.S. tech sector.

Nonetheless, it’s inconceivable that any Trump administration policy to address the China tech threat can succeed if these sales and partnerships are allowed to continue. Silicon Valley will of course cite these earnings in its inevitable campaign to any attempted curbs on its China activities (while simultaneously urging Washington to “do something” about the Chinese intellectual property theft- and extortion-fueled tech ambitions that has these companies scared silly for their own selfish reasons). And that’s why the President urgently needs to get on TV from the Oval Office, explain comprehensively how the tech firms’ massive giveaway of critical knowhow has undermined their country’s future, how his globalist predecessors’ indulgence has enabled this risky business, why the course change he’s engineering in China policy is so essential, and what his end-game is.

Trade wars may not be easy to win, contrary to the President’s recent boast. But can anyone reasonably doubt that this message will be easy to sell?

Im-Politic: What Trump Can Learn from the Weekly Standard’s Woes

Tags

Daniel McCarthy, Im-Politic, Mainstream Media, neoconservatives, The American Conservative, Trump, Weekly Standard

To many readers, Daniel McCarthy’s excellent new article in the Spectator USA about the likely demise of the Weekly Standard magazine will be most interesting for his thoughts on what this apparently impending event says about how best to keep alive non-mass market political publications. After all, McCarthy edits another such publication: The American Conservative.

To me, his piece is most interesting for another reason: It briefly points to how President Trump can marginalize a Mainstream Media that has worrisomely transformed itself from an essential watchdog for democracy into an unapologetic defender of a failed bipartisan political establishment – and in a much more effective way than by hurling insults on Twitter or at political rallies. And it’s no coincidence that the relevant McCarthy observation supports some suggestions I’ve made along these lines. (See, e.g., here.) 

McCarthy is surely on target when he contends that the Weekly Standard chose the wrong business model – and especially the wrong business model for losing money (which he rightly notes is a feature of virtually all political magazines). And since a healthy democracy depends on the survival of a critical mass of such publications, his advice – stemming from years of experience in the field – seems well worth heeding.

But the following McCarthy passage matters much more now when it comes to Mr. Trump’s conflict with the Mainstream Media – which of course is largely self-serving, but which nonetheless has the potential, if conducted wisely and shrewdly, to push these news organizations into behaving more constructively:

“The Weekly Standard provided prestige and access to political leaders, especially Republicans.

“The Weekly Standard’s value lay in the fact that it was an insider magazine. It was a top-down product — there was never an independent mass audience clamoring for a second National Review or for a specifically neoconservative publication. (Commentary, as a monthly, already served that market as far as demand could justify.) What was important was that the magazine be read not by a mass market but by Republican officials and their staff and various other influential persons, primarily in Washington, D.C. If officialdom read the Weekly Standard, then it was worth continuing to spend millions on it. In business terms as well as ideologically and literarily, the Weekly Standard had a lot in common with the New Republic, which for decades was dependent upon Marty Peretz’s singular financial support as owner of a magazine that touted itself during the Clinton years as the ‘inflight magazine of Air Force One.’”

Although McCarthy doesn’t make this point explicitly, it captures what’s truly essential about the above analysis: The power and influence of the Standard and the rest of the Mainstream Media – and in the case of smallish political magazines, their ability to attract angel funders – depends on their access to leading political figures, and in particular, on enjoying such close access that their audiences can depend on them to reveal the so-called real inside story of big political and policy decisions.

To accomplish this goal, writers and editors from these organizations need (credibly) to make clear that they’re regularly welcomed into the confidences of bigwigs right on up to the presidency, specifically at chummy off-the-record or on-background lunches and dinners and other such get-togethers that advance the interests of each kind of participant. In addition to turning the favored journalists into must-follows for the political- and policy-minded (and into power-brokers of sorts themselves), these gatherings enable the hosts to make key points or send key messages (often about potentially controversial plans or proposals) to the public at large through sympathetic conduits. In the process, politicians can avoid being held accountable for the content of these messages if they backfire or fall flat.

It’s clear that Mr. Trump hasn’t treated Weekly Standard, or many other – if any – Mainstream Media figures like political intimates. And since it represents a neoconservative school of thought that has never enjoyed any notable popular following, the magazine’s obvious loss of insider status has undoubtedly contributed to its weakening viability under the current administration.

But as I’ve written (see, e.g., the post linked above), the President keeps giving exclusive interviews to other major news organizations – including to the most hostile – which inevitably enhances or sustains their prestige. On the one hand, it’s clear that, as widely observed, Mr. Trump is engaging with the Mainstream Media in the belief that any publicity is good publicity – and likely due to his own (arguably well founded) confidence that he always prevails politically whenever these encounters turn testy. (Think “Jim Acosta“.) On the other, this approach certainly hasn’t made the Mainstream Media pay any significant, much less prohibitive, price for propagating Fake News and too often flagrantly exhibiting bias.

As a result, the establishment press has little incentive to report more responsibly. And ultimately, by continuing to act as if there’s no adequate alternative to the increasingly fallen Washington- and New York-based press corps for his own communications purposes, and for serving larger national purposes, Mr. Trump is squandering a major opportunity for all Americans – even Never Trump-ers – along with a chance to undermine influential enemies and expand his base.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Today’s Jobs Data Once More Refutes Tariff Alarmism

Tags

aluminum, China, Jobs, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, private sector, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As usual with these releases lately, the newest U.S. monthly jobs report (for November) contains lots of valuable information about the impact of President Trump’s tariff-centric policy on the domestic economy. And as usual, this morning’s findings provide ample evidence that manufacturing sectors widely reported to be either currently hurting or likely to be damaged by levies either on imports of steel and aluminum, or products from China, are actually outperforming the rest of industry and even the rest of the entire economy.

Let’s begin with manufacturing industries that make heavy use of metals as inputs, and that have often been portrayed as major victims of the Trump metals tariffs. Here are the changes in their payrolls since April – i.e., the months since those tariffs began to be imposed in late March. For comparison’s sake, the table also includes the employment results for the entire private sector, and for manufacturing as a whole.

                                              thru September     thru October       thru November

entire private sector:             +0.77 percent      +1.11 percent       +1.10 percent

overall manufacturing:        + 0.76 percent      +0.96 percent       +1.18 percent

durable goods:                      +1.01 percent      +1.21 percent       +1.40 percent

fabricated metals products:  +1.16 percent      +1.12 percent       +1.01 percent

non-electrical machinery:    +1.39 percent      +1.68 percent       +1.85 percent

automotive vehicles & parts: +0.08 percent    +0.73 percent       +0.64 percent

household appliances:            -0.31 percent     -1.10 percent         not available

aerospace products & parts: +3.75 percent      +4.43 percent        not available

Once again, the heavy metals-users generally have been performing well. Household appliances and the automotive sector seem to be the noteworthy laggards. But the former have also been hit by a separate set of tariffs on large household laundry machines as well as a slump in the nation’s housing sector. And most analysts believe that U.S. auto sales have recently peaked because of that market’s individual dynamics and cycles.

Supporting this analysis: The strong performance of other big metals-using industries, like aerospace and non-electrical machinery – which underscores what should be the obvious reality that numerous developments and forces influence employment trends in any given part of the economy.

The only possible area of concern is fabricated metals products, where jobs are still increasing, but where the pace of employment creation has slowed to some degree.

It’s tougher to judge definitively the impact of President Trump’s tariffs on imports from China both because they haven’t been in place for as long as the metals duties, and because they entail such a large number of goods. But given those caveats, it’s still tough to see anywhere in the jobs data support for the conviction that these tariffs either are backfiring badly on American industry or will do so because U.S. domestic manufacturers rely so extensively on so many Chinese-made parts, components, and materials.

If you’re skeptical, take a look at the job-creation records of key American industries with extensive global supply chains – including many Chinese links. This table starts in July, because the initial tranche of China tariffs was imposed during the first week of that month. And again, for comparison’s sake, it includes the economy’s entire private sector:

July through November

entire private sector:                        +0.63 percent

overall manufacturing                     +0.65 percent

chemicals:                                       +1.62 percent

non-electrical machinery:               +0.61 percent

computer & electronics products:   +0.47 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:          +0.96 percent

non-electrical machinery:               +0.61 percent

Judging the China’s tariffs’ real impact will of course become even tougher for the time being, given the 90-day trade truce just agreed to by Washington and Beijing, which may reduce domestic companies’ uncertainty as to the wisdom of continuing business-as-usual with China – or may not. So far, however, claims of widespread or even likely economic harm stemming from this bilateral trade war look as deserving of urban legend status as this year’s metals tariffs alarmism.

Those Stubborn Facts: Another “Tariff Man”

Tags

Abraham Lincoln, tariffs, Those Stubborn Facts, Trade, Trump

“The internet mocks Donald Trump’s new super-hero alter ego ‘Tariff Man.’”

—Mashable.com, December 4, 2018

“In the days of Henry Clay I was a Henry Clay-tariff-man; and my views have undergone no material change upon that subject.”

–-Abraham Lincoln, May 12, 1860

 

(Sources: “The Internet mocks Donald Trump’s new super-hero alter-ego ‘Tariff Man,’” by Marcus Gilmer, Mashable.com, December 4, 2018, https://mashable.com/article/donald-trump-tariff-man-memes/#AabcVM_AYqq5; “To Edward Wallace,” Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Volume 4, The Abraham Lincoln Association, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/lincoln4/1:40.1?rgn=div2;view=fulltext. Thanks to @TheMovement_USA)

Making News: New China Op-Ed and National Radio Podcast Now On-Line

Tags

China, Gordon G. Chang, Making News, Thaddeus McCotter, The John Batchelor Show, The Washington Times, Trade, trade war, Trump, Xi JInPing

I’m pleased to announce the publication of a new newspaper op-ed piece.  This morning’s Washington Times carried my article assessing the new trade truce arrived at by President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping.  Click here for the op-ed – which also explains why there’s no point in further negotiations with Beijing, and hasn’t been for a long time.

In addition, the podcast is now on-line of last night’s appearance on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show.  Click here for an update on that trade truce featuring John, co-host Gordon G. Chang, former Michigan Republican Congressman Thaddeus McCotter, and me.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.