Following Up: Podcast Now On-Line of National Radio Interview on U.S. China Strategy

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allies, Asia, Buy American, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, Central America, China, decoupling, Following Up, friend-shoring, Gordon G. Chang, Immigration, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, tariffs, Trade, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast of my interview last night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show is now on-line.

Click here for a timely discussion – with co-host Gordon G. Chang – on whether President Biden’s Trump-y Buy American-focused trade policies are undermining his efforts to build effective global alliances to contain China.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

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Making News: Back on National Radio Examining the U.S.’ China Containment Strategy

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Asia, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, Central America, China, decoupling, DR-CAFTA, friend-shoring, Gordon G. Chang, Immigration, Latin America, Making News, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, national security, North American Free Trade Agreement, tariffs, Trade, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to be back tonight on the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor.” Our subject – whether the trade and security elements of America’s strategy for countering the China threat are too often tripping over each other.

No specific air time had been set when the segment was recorded this morning. But the show – also featuring co-host Gordon G. Chang – is broadcast beginning at 10 PM EST, the entire program is always compelling, and you can listen live at links like this. As always, moreover, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

And keep on checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: 2022 Saw More U.S. Trade Deficits but More Secure Supply Chains

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Advanced Technology Products, ATP, Biden adminstration, Canada, Central America, Dominican Republic, European Union, friendshoring, Germany, Immigration, Japan, manufacturing, Mexico, offshoring, South Korea, supply chains, Taiwan, Trade, Trade Deficits, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA, Vietnam, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Sometimes the best-laid plans of mice and men etc etc. So this second look by RealityChek at the final (for now) year-end 2022 official U.S. trade figures is coming out today, rather than yesterday, as I expected.

The big takeaways: First, record deficits were set practically everywhere the eye can see – and on top of sizable increases – when it comes to trade flows in manufacturing, advanced technology products (ATP), and with nearly all of America’s major trade partners (except China, which was covered Friday).

Second, and more encouragingly, regionalization of U.S. trade within the Western Hemisphere kept growing, which is (a) surely making supply chains more secure; and (b) creating more economic opportunity in countries that have long sent the United States large numbers of migrants. In other words, the Biden administration goal of “friendshoring” keeps becoming a thing. 

The biggest absolute numbers were turned in by U.S. manufacturing, which saw its huge, chronic deficit rise by 13.46 percent, from $1.32544 trillion to a twelfth straight record $1.50379 trillion. (Unless otherwise specified, all figures in this post will be in pre-inflation dollars, which are the trade data most closely followed by students of the economy.)

And in context, these figures look just as bad. Although full-year, 2022 results won’t be available until late March, when the pre-inflation manufacturing output numbers come out, as of the third quarter, the manufacturing shortfall stood at 53.09 percent of its value-added production (a measure that avoids significant double counting for complex goods made up of lots of parts and components). That marks the first time this number has topped fifty percent.

Moreover, it could well climb further, since in inflation-adjusted terms, manufacturing output has weakened significantly in the fourth quarter.

The only remotely optimistic development: The growth rate of the manufacturing trade deficit last year slowed from 2021’s 18.84 percent.

The trade gap in advanced technology products widened even faster last year – by 24.58 percent, from $195.95 billion to a sixth consecutive all-time high $244.11 billion.

An even stronger goods trade deficit increase was registered by America’s partners in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) – the successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This shortfall worsened by 34.12 percent, from $158.19 billion to a second straight record .$212.17 billion.

The most dramatic USMCA deficit change came in U.S-Canada goods trade. Here, the gap soared by 63.14 percent, from $50.03 billion to $81.62 billion. That new record deficit was the highest since 2005’s $78.49 billion..

The goods trade deficit with Mexico surged more slowly – by 20.73 percent. But 2022’s $130.55 billion total was a new all-time high as well, surpassing 2020’s $112.08 billion.

American trade with the European Union (EU) was an exception to the 2022 pattern. The goods shortfall fell by 6.78 percent, from $218.74 billion to $203.91 billion, largely reflecting supercharged American exports of natural gas to the continent to make up for reduced post-Ukraine war Russian supplies.

But the goods deficit with the EU’s largest economy, Germany, increased by 5.44 percent, from $69.88 billion to $73.69 billion.

Turning to U.S. goods trade with Asia, the deficit with Japan grew by 12.80 percent on year, from $60.30 billion to $68.01 billion.

The gap with South Korea jumped by 51.39 percent, from $28.98 billion to a third straight record $43.87 billion.

In swelling by 19.65 percent, from $40.23 billion to $48.13 billion, the goods shortfall with Taiwan set recorded its fourth consecutive all-time high.

And consistent with its growing role as an alternative to offshoring export-oriented production to China, the U.S. goods deficit with Vietnam ballooned by 27.77 percent, setting a thirteenth straight record in the process.

At the same time, these geographic trade statistics show that despite the emergence of Asia altenatives to China, U.S. goods trade is becoming increasingly concentrated within the Western Hemisphere.

Between 2021 and 2022, two-way U.S. goods trade with Canada and Mexico combined as a share of total U.S. goods trade rose from 28.76 percent to 29.33 percent. And in 2019, the last full-year before the pandemic’s arrival state-side, this share was just 25.71 percent.

The numbers for Dominican Republic and Central America are much smaller but the trends more dramatic. Between 2021 and 2022, their share of total U.S. goods trade improved from 5.25 percent to 5.34 percent, but since 2019, it’s way up from 1.23 percent.   

 

Making News: Back on National Radio Talking Midterms and Trade…& a New Podcast!

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agriculture, Biden, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, Congress, Democrats, election 2022, environment, fast track, Federal Reserve, friend-shoring, interest rates, Kevin Brady, labor rights, MAGA Republicans, Making News, manufacturing, midterms 2022, monetary policy, recession, regulation, Republicans, reshoring, taxes, Trade Promotion Authority, U.S. content, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, unions, USMCA

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return tonight to the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor.”  Our subjects: yesterday’s midterm election and how it might affect Washington’s approach to international trade.

I don’t know yet when the pre-recorded segment will be broadcast but John’s show is on between 9 PM and midnight EST, the entire program is always compelling, and you can listen live at links like this. As always, moreover, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

In that podcast vein, the recording is now on-line of yesterday’s interview on the also-nationally syndicated “Market Wrap with Moe Ansari.” The segment, which dealt with what the midterm results (which aren’t all in yet!) will mean for the U.S. economy – and the manufacturing sector in particular. It begins about 22 minutes into the program, and you can listen at this link.

Note: My forecast of significant Republican gains in the House and Senate seems to have been on the over-optimistic side, but of course, many key races remain undecided.

And keep on checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How to Really Make Trade Fair

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automotive, BBB, Biden administration, bubbles, Build Back Better, Canada, consumption, Donald Trump, electric vehicles, EVs, fossil fuels, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North America, production, tax breaks, Trade, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA, {What's Left of) Our Economy

There’s no doubt that the next few weeks will see a spate of (low-profile) news articles on how unhappy Canada and Mexico are about proposed new U.S. tax credits for purchasing electric vehicles (EVs) and how these measures could trigger a major new international trade dispute.

There’s also no doubt that any such disputes could be quickly resolved, and legitimate U.S. interests safeguarded, if only Washington would finally start basing U.S. trade policy on economic fundamentals and facts on the ground rather than on the abstract and downright childishly rigid notions of fairness that excessively influenced the approach taken by Donald Trump’s presidency.

The Canadian and Mexican complaints concern a provision in the Biden administration’s Build Back Better (BBB) bill that’s been passed by the House of Representatives but is stuck so far in the Senate. In order to encourage more EV sales, and help speed a transition away from fossil fuel use for climate change reasons, the latest version of BBB would award a refundable tax break of up to $12,500 for most purchases of these vehicles.

The idea is controversial because the administration and other BBB supporters see these rebates as a great opportunity to promote EV production and jobs in the United State by reserving his subsidy for vehicles Made in America. (As you’ll see here, the actual proposed rules get more complicated still – and could change some more.) And according to Canada and Mexico, this arrangement also violates the terms of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA) governing North American trade that replaced the old NAFTA during the Trump years in July, 2020.

Because USMCA largely reflects those prevailing concepts of global economic equity, Canada and Mexico probably have a strong case. But that’s only because this framework continues classifying all countries signing a trade agreement as economic equals. Even worse, there’s no better illustration of this position’s absurdity is the economy of North America.

After all, the United States has always accounted for vast majority of the continent’s total economic output and therefore market for traded goods. According for the latest (2020) World Bank figures, the the United States turned out 87.51 percent of North America’s gross product adjusted for inflation. And when it comes to new car and light truck sales, the U.S. share was 84.24 percent in 2019 (the last full pre-pandemic year, measured by units, and as calculated from here, here, and here).

But in 2019, the United States produced only 68.88 percent of all light vehicles made in North America (also measured by units and calculated from here, here, and here.) Moreover, more than 70 percent of all vehicles manufactured in Mexico were exported to the United States according to the latest U.S. government figures. And for Canada, the most recent data pegs this share at just under 54 percent (based on and calculated from here and here).

What this means is that, without the American market, there probably wouldn’t even be any Canadian and Mexican auto industries at all. They simply wouldn’t have enough customers to reach and maintain the production scale needed to make any economic sense.

So real fairness, stemming from the nature of the North American economy and the North American motor vehicle industry, leads to an obvious solution: Give vehicles from Canada and Mexico shares of the EV tax credits that match their shares of the continent’s light vehicle sales – just under 16 percent.

Therefore, using, say, 2019 as a baseline, from now on, the first just-under-16 percent of their combined light vehicle exports to the United States would be eligible for the credits for each successive year, and the rest would need to be offered at each manufacturer’s full price (a pretty plastic notion in the auto industry, I know, but a decision that would need to be left to whatever the manufacturers choose).

Nothing in this decision would force Canada or Mexico to subject themselves to these requirements; they would remain, as they always have been, completely free to try to sell as many EVs as they could to other markets (including each other’s).

What would change dramatically, though, is a situation that’s needlessly harmed the productive heart of the U.S. economy for far too long, resulting from trade agreements that lock America into an outsized consuming and importing role, but an undersized production and exporting role. In other words, what would change dramatically is a strategy bearing heavy responsibility for addicting the nation to bubble-ized growth. And forgive me for not being impressed by whatever legalistic arguments Mexico, Canada, any other country, or the global economics and trade policy establishments, are sure to raise in objection.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Good News About Manufacturing Reshoring to the U.S.

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, automotive, Canada, China, domestic content, Foley & Lardner, manufacturing, Mexico, quotas, reshoring, rules of origin, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA

President Trump’s critics have often complained that even if his trade war with and tariffs on China have prompted many U.S.-owned and other companies to move production out of the People’s Republic, relatively few are relocating back to the United States. (See, e.g., here.) So it was especially interesting to come across a survey of mainly America-headquartered firms indicating that the Trump policies actually deserve pretty high marks for benefiting domestic industry.

The study was conducted by the legal and business advisory firm Foley & Lardner, and involved 143 executives (presumably from 143 companies). Fully 78 percent were “primarily based in the U.S.” and most of the rest were from Mexico. And their businesses ranged throughout the manufacturing sector, with the two biggest industries represented being automotive and general manufacturing (22 percent each). These companies’ sizes and places in global supply chains varied significantly, too.

When it comes to China production and sourcing strategies, Foley found that 21 percent of these respondents “have already” moved “some” of their facilities out of the People’s Republic, 22 percent were “currently in the process of doing so,” and 16 percent are “considering” this option. Of the remaining 39 percent of respondents, 16 percent have rejected leaving China, and 23 percent say they haven’t considered such a move to date.

These numbers roughly correspond with the results of other, similar surveys and reports. (E.g., this one.) But the real eye opener came from answers to the question “To what other countries are you moving, or considering moving, production or sourcing of goods and/or services?” Of the companies that said they’re moving production or sourcing from China, 74 percent mentioned the United States. The next most popular option was Mexico (47 percent), followed by Canada (24 percent), and Vietnam (12 percent).

These percentages (and others) add up to more than 100 because, as the question implied, firms can be leaving China for more than one country, in order to hedge their bets against dangers like tariffs, pandemics, and the like. But they make clear that the United States has been prominently in the mix, and so has the Western Hemisphere – which helps U.S.-based manufacturing because goods made in Mexico and Canada tend to have relatively high levels of American-made parts and components and other industrial inputs.

To be sure, there’s some evidence that these levels have been falling in recent years. But there’s also reason to expect that the Trump administration’s U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA – its rewrite of the North American Free Trade Agreement), will reverse these trends at least in part because its provisions require that goods receiving tariff-free treatment in the tri-national trade zone contain higher levels of North American content overall, and because of quotas on U.S. automotive imports from Mexico (which haven’t kicked in yet but which seem likely to in the not-too-distant future).

I’d be the last one to claim that the Foley report settles the argument over how effective the Trump trade policies have been in encouraging manufacturing reshoring. But when all the hard data showing U.S. domestic manufacturing’s resilience both during the current pandemic (in terms of both jobs and output), and during a disruptive event like a trade war, are considered, the Foley findings look anything but fanciful.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Strong Internals for America’s 2019 Trade Performance

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Advanced Technology Products, aircraft, Boeing, China, manufacturing, merchandise trade deficit, North America, Pacific Rim, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Because last week’s official U.S. trade figures came out right after President Trump’s acquittal in the Senate impeachment trial and the confusing Iowa Democratic presidential caucuses, I didn’t get the chance to issue more than a limited analysis focusing on some very encouraging highlights for backers of administration trade policy. But the newsworthy results from the release – which covered December and therefore full-year 2019 – by no means stopped there.

For example, the biggest annual drop on record in the still-massive U.S. goods trade deficit with China was accompanied by the shrinking of the value of total merchandise trade between the two economies by more than 18 percent – to its lowest level ($558.87 billion) since 2012 ($536.14 billion). Moreover, since the U.S. economy has grown significantly over the last seven years, this sign of decoupling looks all the more impressive.

Also crucial – although that merchandise trade deficit remains way too big, the portion most heavily influenced by trade policy barely grew (and grew much slower than the overall economy). And even better, the overall merchandise trade deficit became more concentrated within North America. That’s could be a big positive for two reasons. 

First, even before the new U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)came into force, with its modest spurs to regional production and sourcing, American imports from its two neighbors contained relatively high levels of U.S. content. That means that domestic industries and their employees had a relatively big share of their production – along with the associated revenues, jobs, and wages. (At the same time, there’s now considerable disagreement over how these Canada and Mexico content levels compare with goods imported from elsewhere.  See, e.g., here and here.)

Less controversy surrounds the second argument for North American-izing U.S. trade:  America’s fortunes are much more directly affected by the well-being of its immediate neighbors than by conditions elsewhere.

And the new trade report shows that North American-ization advanced rapidly last year. Specifically, between 2018 and 2019, China’s share of this trade gap sank from 47.96 percent to 41.84 percent and that of Pacific Rim countries (an official U.S. government grouping that excludes the Western Hemisphere) from 58.26 percent to 53.37 percent. But North America’s share jumped from 11.40 percent t 15.10 percent.

Moreover, the Chinese share was the lowest since 2011 (40.70 percent), the Pacific Rim’s since 2012 (52.44 percent) and North America’s the highest of the current economic recovery. So anyone telling you that, under President Trump, the merchandise trade deficit has simply changed composition, with no net benefit for America, needs a clue.

The news was also unquestionably good on the manufacturing trade deficit front. As with the China goods deficit, it remains way too humongous. But between 2018 and 2019, it grew at the slowest annual rate (1.09 percent) since 2016. That year – the final year of the Obama administration – this trade shortfall actually shrank by 1.19 percent

Full-year 2019 data for domestic manufacturing output aren’t available yet, so it’s not possible to make the crucial comparison between this trade deficit progress and industry’s overall growth. (It’s up on a third-quarter-to-third-quarter basis, though.) But when evaluating how the manufacturing trade results reflect on President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies, it’s essential to take into account one major development that has had nothing to do with these policies – the safety woes of aircraft giant and usual trade surplus standout Boeing.

During 2019, that small rise in the manufacturing trade deficit amounted to $11.15 billion. There’s no doubt, however, that Boeing’s problems have cut deeply into its trade performance. In fact, last year, the civilian aircraft trade surplus fell from $40.25 billion to $29.77 billion – a difference of $10.48 billion. As a result, had this trade balance simply remained the same, the overall manufacturing trade deficit would have practically leveled off.

Further, Boeing’s problems also worsened the nation’s trade deficit in advanced technology products – which continued worsening in 2019. This high tech trade gap hit $132.37 billion – its third straight all-time high, and a 3.29 percent increase from the 2018 total ($4.22 billion). But without the $10.48 billion increase in the trade deficit for civilian aircraft (which are classified as an advanced technology product), the high tech trade gap would actually have narrowed slightly, and for the first time since 2016.

A classic 1960s ad sought to sell hairspray by claiming, “The closer he gets…the better you look!” From today’s standpoint, that looks kind of chauvinistic. But with a few word changes, it’s a pretty good description of the year in trade, 2019 for the United States, and for President Trump.

Making News: National Media Coverage for RealityChek’s Views on the China Trade Deal…& More!

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Boris Johnson, Brexit, China, European Union, IndustryToday.com, Making News, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, Marketwatch.com, NAFTA, North American Free Frade Agreement, Phase One, Trade, trade deal, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, United Kingdom, USMCA

I’m pleased to announce that my views on the new U.S.-China “Phase One” trade deal have just come out via some national media organizations.

First, yesterday’s post arguing that the agreement doesn’t cut the mustard when it comes to advancing U.S. interests was re-posted on the widely read Marketwatch.com website.  Here’s the link.

Second, I was interviewed yesterday on the subject on the nationally syndicated radio show “Market Wrap with Moe Ansari.”  Click here for the link to the podcast.  My segment starts right about the 27-minute mark.  And special bonus!  We also discussed the new U.S.-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA) that replaces the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the reelection of Boris Johnson as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom – which surely makes the country’s departure from the European Union (“Brexit”) are certainty.

In addition, my December 11 RealityChek report on the disappointing performance of the inflation-adjusted wages earned by Americans during the Trump years was re-posted on the IndustryToday.com website.  Click here to see it.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Im-Politic: A Better Way to Pressure Mexico on Immigration

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Border Crisis, border security, Central America, Charles Grassley, illegal aliens, Im-Politic, immigrants, Immigration, Mexico, migrants, remittances, tariffs, Trade, Trump, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA

It’s not every day that I praise veteran Republican Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa. In fact, I don’t believe I’ve ever praised him in print. On trade policy he’s often especially especially clueless – his last foray into this field consisted of threatening to use his chairmanship of the Senate Finance Committee to scuttle the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA) unless President Trump withdrew his tariffs on metals imports from Mexico and Canada.

(Grassley was upset because Mexico in particular had retaliated by slapping tariffs on some key American farm products exported by states like Iowa. He didn’t seem to realize that, as I’ve written here, the tariffs needed to be global in scope to be effective. Meanwhile, however serious American farmers’ woes, they began in earnest years before any Trump tariffs went into effect.)

So imagine my surprise yesterday upon learning that Grassley has proposed a response to Mexico’s foot-dragging on helping to ease the crisis on its border with the United States that’s much better than President Trump’s tariffs.

According to Grassley, the way to pressure Mexico to tighten its own curbs on the floods of Central Americans streaming through its territory toward the United States is to tax the remittances sent to their home country by Mexicans who have moved northward both legally and illegally.

Remittances consist of money sent by immigrants back to their home country – usually to relatives. They encourage immigration because they come from wages earned by newcomers to the United States that are much higher than those they can make in their countries of origin.

And we’re unmistakably talking big numbers – especially for Mexico. The country’s own central bank pegged them at almost $31.5 billion last year. That’s more money coming into the Mexican economy than it makes from oil exports, and in fact its second largest foreign exchange earner after auto parts exports.

Unlike tariffs, remittances taxes wouldn’t harm Americans who buy imports from Mexico – whether consumers or businesses. All the victims would be Mexicans in Mexico. And because so many poor Mexicans in particular rely on these funds to help maintain and improve their living standards, a smaller flow would squeeze their finances and surely increase political instability in a country that’s long suffered more than its share of turmoil. Don’t think Mexico’s leaders – who are already sounding inclined to make concessions to Mr. Trump to avoid the threatened tariffs – could brush these sanctions off.

At least as important, unlike the proposed tariffs, remittance taxes wouldn’t endanger Congressional passage of the USMCA or undermine the Trump administration’s China trade policies by reducing Mexico’s attractiveness as an alternative export platform for companies looking to move in whole or in part out of the People’s Republic.

The President has actually spoken of taking this step to raise the resources needed to finance a Border Wall, but never followed through. At the time, covert and overt Open Borders supporters charged that the move could be counterproductive, since the remittances increased the well-being of their recipients enough to encourage them to stay in Mexico.

But since these payments still represent only a fraction of the earnings of Mexicans in the United States, it makes no sense to believe that many Mexicans in Mexico seriously contemplating moving across the border would be satisfied by receiving a fraction of a loaf if they thought it was all potentially available.

It’s possible that the Trump tariff threat could suffice to produce enough of a Mexican response to satisfy him on border security and declare victory with no levies. In this vein, it’s significant that Mexico’s president has already signaled his willingness to appease Mr. Trump somehow. But a remittances threat could have accomplished the same goal with much less muss and fuss. If negotiations with Mexico can’t resolve the issue by the announced Trump deadline of June 10, switching tactics to a remittances tax a la Grassley would be an unmistakable no-brainer.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A New North American Trade Study’s Crucial Footnote

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automotive, Canada, Center for Automotive Research, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, regional content, rules of origin, tariffs, trade bloc, Trump, U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USITC, USMCA, {What's Left of) Our Economy

That was some footnote Commissioner Jason E. Kearns apparently insisted be inserted into the U.S. International Trade Commission’s (USITC) recent report on the economic impact of the Trump administration’s attempt to rewrite the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In fact, it contains the key to giving this Congressionally mandated study of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) a passing or failing grade. And a special bonus – it indicates why all three countries should have followed my advice and turned North America into a genuine trade bloc.

The particular Kearns-related footnote I’m talking about (number 66, on p. 57) dealt with the USITC’s analysis of one of the most controversial (and in my view, most promising) provisions of the new framework for North American trade – which has been signed by the continent’s three governments but not yet ratified by any of their legislatures. It’s the agreement’s attempts to restructure automotive industry trade among the signatories. These proposed new arrangements matter greatly because trade in vehicles and parts represents such a big share of overall North American trade (more than 20 percent of America’s total goods trade with Canada and Mexico, according to this study).

In brief, at the Trump administration’s instigation, USMCA increases the share of a vehicle’s content that needs to be made somewhere inside the free trade zone in order to qualify for tariff-free treatment, and includes other measures aimed at curbing and even reversing the movement of U.S.-owned auto production and the related jobs from the United States to much lower wage and overall lower cost Mexico, along with the resulting flows of Mexican-assembled vehicles and parts into the American market.

The USITC concluded that although the new NAFTA would produce slight benefits for the American economy overall, including for domestic U.S. manufacturing, the new content measures (called “rules of origin,” or “ROO” for short) themselves would drag on overall economic performance. In fact, they would even slightly depress U.S. vehicle production, not increase it.

As always the case with such projections, these conclusions are based on numerous assumptions, and as almost always the case, at least some of these assumptions can be pretty dodgy. Two that I have special problems with: First, when it comes to auto parts, the USTIC only examines only trade and investment in engines and transmissions; and second, the Commission doesn’t take into the jobs multiplier of vehicle and parts manufacturing.

These assumptions surely skew the conclusions to the downside because, as important as engines and transmissions are, the report itself acknowledges that other parts nowadays represent about 37 percent of total domestic parts output; and because the auto industry’s multiplier effect is really high. Indeed, according to a 2015 report by the Center for Automotive Research, for each American job created in domestic auto or light truck manufacturing, seven other jobs are created in the rest of the economy. That finding is significant because the Center has claimed that the new origin rules would exact exorbitant costs, and because it gets significant funding from an auto industry that has expressed major reservations about them.

But much more fundamental issues are raised by that footnote 66, especially considering these questionable assumptions. Here it is in full:

“Commissioner Kearns notes that, as described above, the model appears to suggest that the trade restrictiveness of a ROO is inversely related to its positive impact on the U.S. economy. Carried to its logical conclusion, this would appear to suggest that the best ROO is a very weak or nonexistent ROO. In turn, this would result in other countries, which do not incur any obligations to import U.S. products, obtaining unilateral, duty-free access to the U.S. market. If, on the other hand, we were to compute an ROO that optimizes regional content while recognizing that there may be slack in the economy, we may estimate a gain to the overall economy from the automotive ROO.”

Kearns first observation not only makes perfect sense. It’s the only sensible macro-conclusion that can be drawn about rules of origin. Because their complete absence (the counter-factual the Commission seems to have ignored) would indeed permit non-North American producers to reap all the gains generated by the USMCA (mainly, unfettered access to the immense continental market) without incurring any of the obligations. That’s supposed to result in a net plus for the American economy, the predominant market prize in North America?

The second observation is even more interesting. It notes that much more stringent rules (those that would “optimize regional content”) could be expected to leave the overall economy better off than the current rules. And as I’ve observed, the low tariff penalties (2.5 percent) imposed on non-North American auto producers for ignoring the origin rules are guaranteed to minimize the gains they produce. Therefore, much higher tariff penalties – which would approximate those commonly associated with trade blocs aimed at minimizing imports – would come closest to maximizing that what the USITC calls “the gain to the economy from the automotive ROO.”

President Trump claims that an “America First” approach to trade policy distinguishes him sharply from his predecessors. Footnote 66 in the USTIC report makes as possible that a genuine “North America First” strategy would have best advanced that goal – and that in this case, anyway, there was no reward for timidity.