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Our So-Called Foreign Policy: My Ukraine Peace Plan

06 Tuesday Jun 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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Russia, Ukraine, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, sanctions, diplomacy, NATO, energy, European Union, North Atlantic treaty Organization, EU, nuclear war, Ukraine War, World War 3

As I’ve repeatedly argued, every day the Ukraine war lasts, the United States runs an ever greater risk of the conflict going nuclear and the American homeland coming under attack. And as I’ve also argued, the creation of any such nuclear risk is completely unacceptable because despite all the military aid provided by Washington, the U.S government still hasn’t backed admitting Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). That alliance of course is made up of countries whose security the United States has officially designated as vital, and thus by definition worth incurring such risks.

So in order to ensure that U.S. leaders don’t continue exposing the American population to a catastrophe that would make the September 11 attacks look like a mosquito bite on behalf of a country Washington still doesn’t regard as worth that candle, the war needs to end ASAP. And here’s a plan (or as they like to say in the political and policy worlds, a “framework”) that might do the trick.

First, an immediate ceasefire is declared, and then enforced by troops from some of the large developing countries that have voted to condemn the Russian invasion but failed so far to provide Ukraine with any support (like India or Indonesia or Brazil).

Second, (and the sequencing of the following steps can take any number of forms), NATO announces that it will never admit Ukraine as a member, But  NATO and other countries reserve the right to provide Kyiv with as much in the way of conventional armaments (including systems considered as “offensive”) as they wish.

Third (Version A), Russia gets to keep the Crimea but agrees that the the two eastern Ukrainian provinces with the big ethnic Russian populations will decide their own fates in internationally supervised referenda. In addition, any inhabitants of all three regions who wish to leave either before or after such votes get relocation assistance (preferably to Ukraine, but other European countries should feel free to take them in, too). The funding would come partly from the West (mainly by the European members of NATO), and partly from a percentage of revenues earned by Russia from the dropping of sanctions on Russian energy exports.

Third (Version B), same as above but Russia simply gets to keep the two eastern provinces and Crimea outright. Again, however, emigration by any of their inhabitants is funded by the West and by those Russian energy revenues. For the record, I like version A best.

Fourth, Russia drops its objections to Ukraine joining the European Union (EU).

Fifth, in order to enable Ukraine to maximize the economic benefits of EU membership, the West (again, mainly the European members of NATO) commits to large economic aid and reconstruction packages dependent largely on Kyiv’s progress in rooting out corruption. I’d also be in favor of empowering the donors to bypass the Ukrainian government in financing worthy recipients directly, to ensure that Ukrainian officials don’t steal most of the assistance.

Sixth, non-energy sanctions on doing any kind of business with Russia are phased out contingent on the absence of Russian aggressive actions against Ukraine (including efforts by Russian-funded paramilitary groups to destabilize Ukrainian territory). That is, the longer Moscow behaves well toward Ukraine, the more sanctions get dropped.

Seventh, the West agrees not to prosecute any Russian officials (including military officers) for war crimes.

Eighth and last, Russia and NATO begin negotiations to explore ideas for new arrangements that longer term could further enhance the security both of Russia and its European neighbors, including the Balkans and Moldova. These initiatives should be led by the Europeans.

Because the above proposals are just a framework, and neither set in stone nor presented in any great degree of detail, I’m absolutely open to suggestion regarding modifications, refinements, and additions. But for anyone wishing to pony up their ideas, I hope they consider first and foremost the needs to (a) defuse an exceedingly dangerous current situation with frightening potential to damage the American homeland gravely; (b) give both Russia and Ukraine significant reasons to claim at least partial victories; and (c) realize how easy it is to make the perfect the enemy of the good.

And on that last point, I hope that Ukraine war hawks and others who stress the imperatives of punishing any and all aggressions, and/or forcing the Russians to pay serious penalties for their invasion, and ensuring that Russia in the future becomes to weak to endanger Ukraine or any other country ever again, would keep the following in mind: The current regime in Moscow is so mismanaging the country and wasting its considerable resources (especially human), that it’s doing a great job of diminishing its power and potential all by itself.

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Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Thinking Straight About Ukraine and Taiwan

10 Monday Apr 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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Baltics, Biden, China, credibility, deterrence, extended deterrence, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, semiconductors, strategic ambiguity, Taiwan, Ukraine, Ukraine War, vital interests, Vladimir Putin

A flurry of developments in the last few days has underscored my frequently made and related points that

(a) America’s Ukraine policy is the height of recklessness because it’s courting any risk of nuclear war on behalf of a country whose fate it stlll doesn’t consider a vital interest; and

(b) the common claim that the best way to protect (genuinely vital) Taiwan is to beat help Kyiv defea Russia is nonsensical – and dangerously so precisely because of that nuclear war risk.

The evidence that Washington doesn’t view Ukraine as vital? Its continued refusal to admit it into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the longstanding U.S. security alliance. As explained repeatedly on RealityChek, for decades, the NATO allies have been protected not only by an American pledge to come to their defense whenever needed, but by a U.S. nuclear umbrella. This arrangement aimed at deterring attack by convincing potential aggressors that a such an assault on attack on any of them would trigger – if necessary – a response with the most destuctive weapons ever created and therefore their total annihilation.

And since the resulting nuclear conflict would threaten America’s very existence as well, this policy of “extended deterrence” was bolstered by the stationing of relatively small U.S. conventional forces directly in harm’s way. Their purpose – lending credibility to the American nuclear threat by leaving a President no choice but to push “the button” to save them in the likely event of their being overrun by a superior foe.

Given the literally existential stakes involved, U.S. leaders would need to be literally crazy to adopt such policies to defend countries whose loss would not pose literally mortal threats to American survival, independence, or prosperity. That’s why not every country on earth enjoys NATO-like protections.

But Ukraine lately has been a weird – and indeed absolutely perverse – exception. U.S. policy is clearly running some nuclear war risk – not by deploying any combat forces in the country (some auditors of weapons shipments are officially on the ground) but by deploying major forces in the immediate vicinity of a conflict that could well spill over borders and engage them.

At the same time, the United States still opposes admitting Ukraine as a NATO member and therefore extending to Kyiv that nuclear guarantee. Indeed, according to a Financial Times piece last Thursday, the Biden administration even opposes setting up a timetable for Ukrainian membership.

Reportedly, the main reason is fear of further provoking Russia, and increasing the odds of potentially catastrophic nuclear weapons use. But of course, if Ukraine is vital enough to be risking nuclear war already – due to the next-door military deployments – then what’s the problem? Would a NATO admissions announcement really worsen that risk materially?

If so, U.S. officials strangely haven’t made that argument. And if so, why is that even a consideration? When a truly vital interest is endangered, those are exactly the risks that by definition are worth running. In fact, when a truly vital interest is endangered, why not pour in U.S. forces to try turning the tide decisively?

Instead, the real reason is surely that U.S. leaders understand that Ukraine isn’t vital at all, but have decided to run not-trivial nuclear war risk anyway in hopes of threading a needle. I’m still waiting for a convincing explanation of why that strategy isn’t terrifyingly irresponsible.

One common answer: Preventing Russian success in Ukraine will best protect the nearby NATO countries – and at zero nuclear war risk because there would be no need for them to invoke the explicit nuclear guarantee they do enjoy.

That’s not a crazy argument. But this reasoning still leaves the United States in the bizarre (and needlessly dangerous) position of running non-trivial nuclear war risk to protect a non-vital country in order to avoid any nuclear war risk to protect countries that are deemed vital.

This argument is weird not least because – logically anyway – it credits the U.S. nuclear umbrella with little or no effectiveness. Why else would proponents believe that, having subdued a country with no explicit U.S. nuclear guarantee, Russia would inevitably attack a country with one? Along with tripwire forces?

This argument also ignores Russia’s failure to attack these very NATO countries. And it’s so far let them alone even though, especially in the case of the Baltic countries, they’re immediate Russian neighbors and in 1940 were officially absorbed into the old Soviet Union. They also contain big ethnic Russian  populations. That may not strike Russian dictator Vladimir Putin as an historical justification for re-gaining them as strong as that which he cites for Ukraine. But it’s still no doubt significant in his mind. It’s hard to avoid crediting the NATO nuclear guarantee for this success.

Which brings us to Taiwan. Unlike Ukraine, it’s genuinely vital to the United States. Unless you want to chance living in a world where China controls the global supply of semiconductors, and the technology needed to manufacture the most advanced versions of these chips. These rapidly improving devices are the building blocks of all the computing and communications systems central to the weapons that will soon dominate war-fighting, and of future innovation in the military and civilian worlds alike (including in artificial intelligence). Not so incidentally, increasingly advanced semiconductors will determine whether your privacy remains private.

Ukraine hawks of course insist that frustrating Russia there will help deter China from attacking Taiwan as well. And it’s true that Taiwan doesn’t enjoy a nuclear guarantee from the United States. It’s not even a formal treaty ally. But bilateral defense relations have recently moved much closer, and President Biden has several times promised that the United States will in fact move to defend the island against Beijing (see, e.g., here), removing much of the “strategic ambiguity” that has marked American policy for decades.

And these kinds of measures – which include a weekend statement from a Congressional Republican leader endorsing such actions, too – will deter China much more effectively than anything that happens in Ukraine for a very simple reason: Combined with such specific steps, and likely follow-ons, Taiwan very importance makes them credible.

With Ukraine, the opposite proposition obviously holds: Because it was never vital, U.S. efforts to prevent an invasion failed. For high stakes commitments to achieve low stakes goals are inherently non-credible.

Importantly, making grandiose promises to achieve transparently less-than-grandiose goals is no way to build or maintain credibility worldwide, either.  Instead, it’s much likelier to create or reenforce impressions of stupidity or pigheadedness – not good looks when last I checked.

The argument that going too far down the above Taiwan road needlessly creates too much risk can’t be dismissed out of hand. But even if it increases the odds of World War 3, because Taiwan is vital – and unless the word is meaningless –  going further down the road (including with symbolic gestures like the meeting in California between House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and Taiwan’s president) can’t be ruled out, either.

Like so many foreign policy and national security questions, though, “how far” – and trying to thread that needle – is a matter for legitimate debate. But because Ukraine isn’t vital, assuming any nuclear risk on its behalf has been a foolhardy, potentially suicidal blunder. And indisputably so – at least for anyone without a death wish.

Making News: Podcast Now On-Line of NYC Radio Interview on Leading International Crises

28 Tuesday Mar 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

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border security, China, Frank Morano, Immigration, Iran, Iraq, Iraq war, ISIS, Making News, Middle East, nuclear war, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Taiwan, terrorism, The Other Side of Midnight, Ukraine, Ukraine War, WABC AM

I’m pleased to announce that the the podcast is now on-line of a panel discussion I participated in last night in the wee hours EST on Frank Morano’s popular radio show “The Other Side of Midnight” on New York City’s WABC-AM.

Click here for a free-wheeling discussion of topics including updates on global hot spots Ukraine and Taiwan, the future of U.S. policy in the still chaotic Middle East, and what lessons should be learned from the second Iraq War that the United States launched twenty years ago.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Im-Politic: DeSantis’ Real Ukraine Mistake

24 Friday Mar 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

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election 2024, foreign policy, Im-Politic, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, nuclear war, politics, Ron DeSantis, Russia, Ukraine, Ukraine War, vital interests, Vladimir Putin

Since the Ukraine War is the first international crisis in decades that could draw the United States into a nuclear war, and since Florida Republican Governor Ron DeSantis could well become the nation’s next president, it’s vital to explain why the real mistake made by DeSantis in recently commenting on U.S. policy toward the conflict isn’t the one his critics have charged he’s made.

Instead, it’s a mistake that’s not only different, but actually serious, because it could eventually force him to support deeper and more dangerous U.S. involvement if he ever wins the White House.

The mistake DeSantis supposedly made in an interview published yesterday was flip-flopping, or at least seeming to walk back, an earlier statement downplaying Ukraine’s importance to the United States, and stating that because of nuclear war risk, should sharply limit its military aid and shift its focus to pushing for a peace deal.

Here’s his full statement to Fox News-talker Tucker Carlson. To me, the key passages are:

“While the U.S. has many vital national interests – securing our borders, addressing the crisis of readiness within our military, achieving energy security and independence, and checking the economic, cultural, and military power of the Chinese Communist Party – becoming further entangled in a territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia is not one of them.” And

“Without question, peace should be the objective. The U.S. should not provide assistance that could require the deployment of American troops or enable Ukraine to engage in offensive operations beyond its borders. F-16s and long-range missiles should therefore be off the table. These moves would risk explicitly drawing the United States into the conflict and drawing us closer to a hot war between the world’s two largest nuclear powers. That risk is unacceptable.”

The core ideas: Ukraine’s fate is not a vital national interest of the United States’, and is therefore obviously not worth risking exposing America to a nuclear attack from Russia.

Full disclosure: At this point, DeSantis is my preferred presidential candidate. So keep that in mind as I evaluate his comments. And this Ukraine position is my position. But of course, it’s far from a consensus. According to supporters of current Biden administration policies (and even more aggressive actions), these first DeSantis remarks were fundamentally off-base because Ukraine is in fact a vital U.S. interest, and because therefore Russia’s aggression must in fact be defeated (a goal that could take several somewhat different forms) “no matter what,” as Mr. Biden recently declared.

It should be apparent even to DeSantis opponents or those neutral, though, that he was not proposing dropping all aid to Ukraine and leaving that country at Vladimir Putin’s mercy. But backers of the current (and even more aggressive) American policies thought confirmation of their flip-flop (or less dramatic “walk back”) claim came in yesterday’s DeSantis remarks. Here’s the passage they believe shows that the Florida Governor now sees the error of his ways in calling the war a “territorial dispute that’s not of “vital” importance to America:

“Well, I think the [“territorial dispute statement has] been mischaracterized. Obviously, Russia invaded (last year) — that was wrong. They invaded Crimea and took that in 2014 — That was wrong.

“What I’m referring to is where the fighting is going on now which is that eastern border region Donbas, and then Crimea, and you have a situation where Russia has had that. I don’t think legitimately but they had. There’s a lot of ethnic Russians there. So, that’s some difficult fighting and that’s what I was referring to and so it wasn’t that I thought Russia had a right to that, and so if I should have made that more clear, I could have done it, but I think the larger point is, okay, Russia is not showing the ability to take over Ukraine, to topple the government or certainly to threaten NATO. That’s a good thing. I just don’t think that’s a sufficient interest for us to escalate more involvement. I would not want to see American troops involved there. But the idea that I think somehow Russia was justified (in invading) – that’s nonsense.”  

I don’t see how these words can be read in any way other than saying that “territorial dispute” was poor wording, and that DeSantis still opposes any U.S. steps to “escalate more involvement.”

But his rationale for opposition changed significantly here. As opposed to simply denying that Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity are vital U.S. security interests and therefore not worth the nuclear risk, here he’s saying that there’s not “sufficient interest for us to escalate more involvement because “Russia is not showing the ability to take over Ukraine, to topple the government or certainly to threaten NATO.”

That is, previously, DeSantis’ position focused solely on Ukraine’s intrinsic value to the United States. Russia’s strength or lack thereof was immaterial. Because he’s said nothing about changing, much less ending, the U.S. commitment to the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) alliance, whose members are protected by an American nuclear guarantee, I assumed that he believed that nuclear deterrence plus the major buildup of conventional forces from NATO members in those allies in Ukraine’s neighborhood would suffice to keep Putin at bay whatever Ukraine’s fate (which is my position).

But in the new interview, DeSantis made his opposition to a harder Ukraine line conditional on Russia’s capabilities, not Ukraine’s intrinsic importance. And I worry that if he becomes President this stance could trap him into a Biden-like Ukraine policy, with all the nuclear war risk, if Russia proves stronger (or more reckless) than he currently surmises, or after it becomes stronger in a post-Ukraine war world. As a result, he would wind up risking nuclear attack on America for a country that he may still consider of inadequate intrinsic interest to the United States – which I view as the height of foreign policy irresponsibility.

It’s still very early in the 2024 presidential cycle. In fact, DeSantis isn’t even a declared candidate yet. He’s a foreign policy newbie and it’s not even known yet who he’s been getting his foreign advice from – if he’s indeed getting any in a systematic way. So there’s still time for DeSantis to tack back to a genuine America First-type approach.

If he doesn’t, all else equal, I’d have to reconsider my support. And the next presidential campaign’s foreign policy debate, and the nation’s approach to Ukraine War and national security overall, will be all the poorer.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The U.S. Keeps Enabling European Free-Riding on Ukraine & Defense Generally

21 Tuesday Mar 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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allies, Biden, burden sharing, defense spending, EU, Europe, European Union, free-riding, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Ukraine, Ukraine War

Twenty-three years ago, I published an article (which you can download here) on defense burden-sharing in the America’s premier national security alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), titled “Promises, Promises.” I borrowed the title from a 1968 Broadway musical that was ultimately about cynically made pledges because I thought it was perfect for a study that documented how NATO’s European members kept welshing on their vows to raise their defense spending to serious levels – and how the real blame ultimately rested with an overly indulgent United States.

Twenty-three years later, the first major war in Europe since 1945 keeps dragging on, and fresh evidence makes clear (a) that the Europeans (both inside and outside NATO) remain defense deadbeats; and (b) that a prime reason remains their so-far-well-founded confidence that they can rely on the United States to pick up any slack.

Not that no burden-sharing progress has been made at all. As NATO itself just reported, seven members (including the United States) have now met the guideline of spending at least two percent of their national economic output on the military. That’s up from three in 2014.

Just three problems here. First, NATO has thirty members, meaning that the vast majority are still skimping on defense. Second, the two percent guideline was agreed to in 2014. Even had no Ukraine War broken out, that would be a pretty modest move in nine years. With a conflict raging in Europe itself, it’s minimal at best. And in fact, only one NATO country crossed that two percent threshhold since the Russian invasion – Lithuania, which is located awfully close to the war zone.

Third, the NATO guideline is just that – an aspiration, not a hard-and-fast promise, let alone something contained in a legally binding treaty. And reportedly, there’s scant enthusiasm among alliance members for raising it.

Of course, in this Ukraine War era, defense spending isn’t the only contribution that can be made to Europe’s security, and NATO isn’t the only grouping capable of helping out. But the widely followed “Ukraine Support Tracker” compiled by Germany’s Kiel Institute for the World Economy shows that after some brief, belated signs that countries in the European Union (EU – whose members contain both most NATO countries and others on the continent) were collectively stepping up with both military and mainly economic aid for Ukraine, these countries have begun slacking off again in relative terms.

As the Kiel analysts put in their February 21 update:

“Over 2022, the US led the way with major support decisions for Ukraine, with EU countries following with some delay and overtaking the US in the meantime with their total commitments. With additional data now collected (November 21 to January 15), the US again takes the lead.”

The specific numbers? “With additional pledges of nearly 37 billion euros in December, the Americans have earmarked a total of just over 73.1 billion euros for Ukraine support. For the EU, the comparable figure is 54.9 billion euros.”

My “Promises, Promises” article documented in detail that the European NATO members kept free-riding on the United States because Washington repeatedly all but told them that America’s commitment to Europe’s defense would remain unchanged whatever the allies did spending-wise.   

These days, President Biden has also essentially invited the Europeans to free ride by repeatedly declaring that the United States would stand with Ukraine against Russia’s aggression – as he expressed it most recently last month in Poland – “no matter what.”  

Foreign policy realists (a group that should include you as well as me) aren’t mainly bothered by the flagrant unfairness of this situation. As long as it’s tolerated by the United States, free-riding is arguably in the interests of the NATO allies – and ultimately that’s what realists believe foreign policymaking should be all about (though allied leaders might usefully ponder the possible limits of even American patience).     

Instead, the main concern is pragmatic. In the end, allies are worth having only if they can be counted on to join a fight if one breaks out. At the very least, how can any military engage in any useful planning without knowing what forces will be available? Allies like the NATO free-riders, which plainly aren’t ready to make significant sacrifices on behalf of common security during peacetime, seem anything but dependable in the event of hostilities. That’s something Mr. Biden urgently needs to think through before his Ukraine policy creates the acid test.        

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden Keeps Widening That Dangerous Lippmann Gap

20 Monday Mar 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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alliances, Biden administration, China, defense budget, Defense Department, inflation, Lippmann Gap, military, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, Taiwan, Trump administration, Ukraine, Ukraine War, Walter Lippmann

As made clear by its latest proposed defense budget, the Biden administration is creating an ever more serious Lippmann Gap problem – and courting greater and greater threats to U.S. national security in the process.

As known by RealityChek regulars, this term refers to a danger warned of by twentieth century philosopher and journalist Walter Lippmann – who argued that a country whose foreign policy objectives were exceeding the means at its disposal to achieve those objectives is headed for big trouble.

And practically since it entered office, that’s the fix into which Mr. Biden’s expansive foreign policy goals on the one hand, and his Pentagon budget requests on the other, keep sinking America. Worse, this year, the predicament seems especially worrisome, since the President is conducting foreign and national security policies that inevitably are super-charging tensions with both a nuclear-armed Russia and a nuclear-armed China.

No matter whether you believe either or both of these policies are necessary or not (and I view the Biden Ukraine/Russia policies as unforgivably reckless, because no vital U.S. interests are at stake, and his China policies unavoidable, because Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing prowess has turned it into a vital interest), you have to agree that fire is being played with.

This past week, the administration revealed that it will be asking Congress to approve $842 billion worth of spending on the Pentagon and its operations proper. (As usual, the annual defense budget request additionally includes tens of billions of dollars worth of extra spending, practically all on Energy Department programs for maintaining the country’s nuclear arsenal.)

It’s a lot of money. But it’s only 3.15 percent larger than the funds finally approved for the Defense Department for this current (2023) fiscal year. And when you factor in the administration’s estimate of inflation for 2024 (2.40 percent), in real terms, it’s barely an increase at all. Worse, if you believe that inflation might stay considerably higher, then we’re looking at a prospective defense budget cut in real terms.

Either the President believes that (1) the U.S. military can already handle both the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and a Ukraine War that might at least spill over into the territory of treaty allies; or (2) that neither event will happen; or (3) that they’ll be spaced out neatly enough to enable existing U.S. forces to handle them one at a time; or (4) that a marginally bigger defense budget will at least put the Pentagon on the road toward building the capabilities it needs to handle these new potential threats before they actually materialize.

Do any of these strike you as safe enough bets?

Nor is this type of Biden administration defense budget request anything new. Last year at about this time, the fiscal 2023 Pentagon budget request was unveiled. `As you may recall, “last year at about this time” was roughly a month after Russia invaded Ukraine, and after President Biden resolved to help Kyiv turn back Moscow’s forces. He ruled out using American boots on the ground, but began providing major military assistance and significantly adding to the U.S. military presence in countries throughout Europe – including those right next to Ukraine that Washington had already promised to protect with nuclear weapons if necessary because (unlike Ukraine), they’re members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In addition, since the previous August, the President had stated several times that the U.S. military would come to Taiwan’s rescue if Beijing attacked. Even though the White House has sought to walk back these comments, their number plainly means that the United States has taken on another sizable defense commitment.

But that fiscal 2023 budget request – again, made in March, 2022 – sought only 4.2 percent more in defense spending than was finally approved for fiscal 2022. And after the administration’s expected inflation rate expected, the rise was only 1.5 percent.

Further, Mr. Biden’s first defense budget request (for fiscal 2022), made in April, 2021, sought Pentagon spending that was only 1.6 percent higher than that finally approved for the final Trump administration budget year.

It’s true that this modest Biden request was much bigger than the proposal made by his predecessor for fiscal 2022. But it seemed way too paltry given that at the heart of Mr. Biden’s approach to foreign policy was the promise that America would come charging “back” from four Trump years of alleged retreat from the world stage and in particular neglect of defense alliances.

Of course, defense budget requests are only the first step in the defense spending process, and Congress will surely push through some increases as it’s done in years past. Also crucial to remember: The amount of military spending doesn’t automatically translate into more or less fighting prowess, since spending priorities within the top-line outlay can be and often are shifted to generate more bang for the buck (or achieve other newly added objectives). Indeed, that’s what one aim that the President says he’s aiming to achieve.

Nonetheless, the overall initial budget request certainly limits the extent to which specific programs can absorb more funds without overly shortchanging other important programs. It also tends to exert a gravitational effect on Congress’ political ability to add (or subtract).

Two other big problems to worry about. First, the latest inflation estimates by the Pentagon have been way off. For the 2022-23 calendar year, the actual inflation rate has so far turned out to be nearly three times greater (nearly six percent as of February) than the estimate for that fiscal year (2.2 percent).

The estimate for 2023-24 of 2.4 percent roughly matches the latest forecasts of the Federal Reserve and the Congressional Budget Office. But as noted, even if correct, the extra outlays will be minimal in after-inflation terms, as I’ve argued previously, politicians’ great temptation to stimulate the economy with all sorts of giveaways as a new presidential election cycle gets underway could well keep price increases robust.

Second, decisions to spend even much more on, for example, new weapons or troop readiness can take years to result in more effective forces. So even much bigger Biden requests were never going to work instant miracles.

At the same time, the global threat environment is hardly moving at a snail’s pace. And recent reporting from The Wall Street Journal describes what a mammoth strategic transition the Defense Department needs to make – from a force focused on fighting a Middle East-centric global war on terror to one able to handle two great power threats.

The option that I’d prefer is for closing the Lippmann Gap by reducing some U.S. defense commitments (principally relating to Ukraine, along with further downplaying the Middle East) along with hiking military spending faster (to cope with the mounting Chinese threat to Taiwan). But at the rate the Biden administration is going, America’s worrisome mismatch between its foreign policy reach and its grasp seems sure to keep worsening.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Is America Really Back with Anyone?

05 Sunday Mar 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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allies, America First, Biden, Biden administration, developing countries, Donald Trump, Gallup, globalism, liberal global order, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, polls, public opinion, Ukraine, Ukraine War

As RealityChek regulars might have noticed, I haven’t been writing about too many polls lately. The reason? As I explained at the end of last year (here and here) , most were badly off-base on crucial issues that shaped the results of the U.S. midterm elections – especially abortion.

But some new Gallup findings (on a non-political issue) merit an exception. Not that this survey, like way too much polling on foreign policy, hasn’t suffered major problems of its own. All the same, since the claim that “America is back” has been foundational to President Biden’s approach to world affairs, it’s striking that Gallup on Friday reported results suggesting that fewer Americans believe this than they did during the Trump administration.

I write “suggest” because the wording of the relevant question is pretty vague. “In general,” respondents were asked, “how do you think the United States rates in the eyes of the world — very favorably, somewhat favorably, somewhat unfavorably or very unfavorably?”

Of course, this could mean anything from “as a reliable ally” to “as a great place to live,” to “the world’s strongest (or wealthiest) country.” If true, though, whatever the criteria, these Gallup data indicate deep public’s skepticism that Mr. Biden has achieved one of his central foreign policy goals: reversing a dangerous erosion of America’s international popularity stemming from the “America First-style policies pursued by his predecessor.

As the President sees it, this boneheadedly selfish posture threatened to destroy the network of international institutions and above alliances that – consistent with the globalist approach to world affairs he has always supported – considers crucial ingredients for foreign policy success.

But Mr. Biden hasn’t convinced many Americans of these related propositions, reports Gallup. During time in the White House so far, between 48 and 49 percent of American adults said that their country is viewed either “very favorably” or “somewhat favorably” “in the eyes of the world,” with the “verys” coming in at just seven percent in early 2021, 2022, and 2023 alike.

The total unfavorablys ranged from 50 to 51 percent in these years, with the “very unfavorablys” standing at 14 percent, 16 percent, and 17 percent in 2021, 2022, and 2023, respectively.

Although not terrific, these numbers are hardly a disaster, either. But the funny thing is that they’re a good deal worse than the results recorded during the presidency of America First-y, selfish, xenophobic etc Trump.

In Trump’s first year as President (2017), the share of respondents stating that the United States was viewed either “very” or “somewhat favorably” by the rest of the world totaled only 42 percent – a big drop from the 54 percent reported in the final year of Barack Obama’s administration (2016). But in the next three Trump years, the overall favorably percentages rose to 55, 58, and 60 percent.

Moreover, the “very favorably” responses in 2018, 2019, and 2020 stood at seven, 12 and 13 percent, respectively. – also higher than those of the Biden years.

Also awfully interesting: During Trump’s four years in office, the share of American respondents telling Gallup that they believed foreign leaders “had respect” for him increased from 29 percent to 37 percent. The third reading for Biden’s administration showed that 37 percent of respondents also believed that foreign leaders respected him. But that 2023 result is down from 58 percent in early 2021, at the outset of his presidency.

In addition, these Gallup statistics need to be seen in some noteworthy context. For on top of that evidence that Americans aren’t impressed with the payoff of Mr. Biden’s globalist campaign to repair a national reputation supposedly shredded by Trump, there’s considerable evidence that the rest of the world isn’t, either.

The most revealing sign is the international reaction to the President’s efforts to rally global support against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Long-time security allies, even in neighboring Europe, continue free-riding, with this widely followed scorecard revealing that overall U.S. aid to Ukraine still exceeds that provided by all European Union countries combined. Developing countries, meanwhile, keep displaying indifference – at best – despite Mr. Biden’s repeated insistence that global security, prosperity, democracy, and the liberal global order are all stake.

In other words, as opposed to taking seriously the evident Biden assumption that popularity matters decisively in international affairs, practically every other country is acting as if its own particular national interests are paramount. That can only reasonably be read as a major hint that this administration should stop harping so much on America being back (especially for others’ benefit) and revive more of an America First mindset.

Glad I Didn’t Say That! Germany Dodges Biden Bullet (Or Did It?)

03 Friday Mar 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Glad I Didn't Say That!

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

allies, Biden, economic aid, geopolitics, Germany, Glad I Didn't Say That!, miitary aid, Olaf Scholz, Ukraine, Ukraine War

“German Chancellor Set for Heat From Biden Over Ukraine Ammunition Supplies: What to Watch”

—Bloomberg.com, March 3, 2023, 12:01 AM EST

 

“Biden Lauds Germany’s Military Aid to Ukraine in Scholz Meeting”

– Bloomberg.com, March 3, 2023, 3:17 PM EST

 

(Sources: “German Chancellor Set for Heat From Biden Over Ukraine Ammunition Supplies: What to Watch,” by Arne Delfs and Michael Niemaber, Bloomberg.com, March 3, 2023, Biden Ukraine Talks With Scholz on Ammunition, China: What to Watch – Bloomberg and “Biden Lauds Germany’s Military Aid to Ukraine in Scholz Meeting,”by Justin Sink and Akayla Gardner, Bloomberg.com, March 2, 2023, Biden Lauds Germany’s Military Aid to Ukraine in Scholz Meeting – Bloomberg)

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden Shows How Not to Make the Case for His Ukraine Policy

25 Saturday Feb 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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Tags

Biden, Common Sense, deterrence, geography, national interests, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, Soviet Union, Thomas Paine, Ukraine, Ukraine War, vital interests, Vladimir Putin

Not that any more evidence was needed, but President Biden’s speech last week in Warsaw, Poland illustrated perfectly why his Ukraine war policy has been so reckless. Unless you think the United States should court nuclear war risk for a song.

Speaking just ahead of the first anniversary of Russia’s, to an audience that he knew would include his own countrymen as well as the large local crowd that assembled to hear him, the President could have said something on the order of:

“If Putin takes any part of Ukraine, he’ll go after our NATO allies and the rest of Europe next, placing his military just an ocean away from U.S. shores”; or

“If Putin takes any part or all of Ukraine, his dominance of the Black Sea region will be a giant step toward inevitable global conquest”; or

“If Putin takes any part or all of Ukraine, he’ll control minerals and other natural resources vital to the U.S. economy, and hold America hostage.

Or the President could have mentioned all these points to make the case that Ukraine’s independence per se is a vital U.S. interest for all sorts of specific reasons. He wouldn’t even have had to explain why, if that’s the case, it wasn’t admitted to the NATO alliance years ago, which would arguably have deterred the Russian attack in the first place by extending it the protection of America’s full nuclear arsenal – as befits a genuinely vital interest.

After all, who was going to call out this whopping inconsistency in his policy? A Regime Media deeply convinced of the globalist claim that the security of literally every country on earth is a vital U.S. interest, whether it’s an official American ally or not?

But Mr. Biden’s speech included none of these arguments. In fact, he’s never made these arguments. Instead, in Warsaw, he continued bloviating about Russia’s foes facing “fundamental questions about the commitment to the most basic of principles.  Would we stand up for the sovereignty of nations?  Would we stand up for the right of people to live free from naked aggression?  Would we stand up for democracy?”

And about the “eternal” stakes being “A choice between chaos and stability.  Between building and destroying.  Between hope and fear.  Between democracy that lifts up the human spirit and the brutal hand of the dictator who crushes it.  Between nothing less than limitation and possibilities, the kind of possibilities that come when people who live not in captivity but in freedom.  Freedom.”

There’s a good reason of course that Mr. Biden has never made specific, interest-based arguments for deep involvement in the Ukraine war – because when it comes to the United States, they’re just so much hokum. In fact, they’re even hokum-y for much of Europe even though it’s in Russia’s neighborhood. Because surely those in its Western half know that for decades during the Cold War, they were nearly as unaffected as Americans by the Soviet Union’s domination not just of Ukraine, but of all of Eastern Europe. And if they don’t, they should.

In the 1777 pamphlet The Crisis that so systematically and eloquently advocated for American independence, Thomas Paine faulted Britain for a “natural temper to fight for a feather” – that is, for vainglory rather than necessity or even significant tangible advantage. Consequently, that country “for centuries past, [had] been nearly fifty years out of every hundred at war with some power or other” and consequently had become a full partner in “the dismal commerce of death” and “the war and desolation [that] have become the trade of the old world.”

The thirteen colonies, by contrast, enjoyed advantages, resulting from geographic distance and consequent remoteness from European power politics and diplomacy, that afforded them “a retreat from their cabals.”

Clearly, this isn’t 1777, but the Atlantic is still a formidable geopolitical barrier; Ukraine is very far away; the United States today, unlike the Thirteen Colonies, is no military pygmy; and the power whose designs Mr. Biden would have the nation resist “as long as it takes” can create an ample nuclear “commerce of death.”

Opponents of the President’s Ukraine policy aren’t arguing that the oceans (or other circumstances) mean that the United States has no vital interests abroad. Instead, they’re insisting that, especially in a nuclear age, these interests be defined with precision and with a tight focus on considerations where the cost/benefit ratio is overwhelming weighted to the latter, not on gauzy appeals grounded in simple emotion. Mr. Biden’s failure to justify his approach to Ukraine in anything close to these terms is compelling evidence that this interest-base case simply doesn’t exist, and that the farther he proceeds down this road, the greater the needless peril to which he’s exposing America.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why the Morals of the Ukraine War Really Matter

22 Wednesday Feb 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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Tags

international law, Israel, Leon Hadar, morality, nuclear war, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, public opinion, sovereignty, The National Interest, Ukraine, Ukraine War, Volodymyr Zelenskyy

National Interest contributing editor Leon Hadar has just posted a groundbreaking article on U.S. policy toward the Russian invasion of Ukraine – something I’d thought had become nearly impossible after about a year into the war and upteen zillion words of commentary on and analysis of the conflict. In the piece, Leon (full disclosure: a close personal friend) examines whether Ukraine can develop the kind of relationship with the U.S. government and, more important, the American public, that Israel has long enjoyed: that of a valued ally mainly because it’s admired by Americans, not because its survival advances any important, specific U.S. interests.

Rather than summarize Leon’s reasons for skepticism – which you should definitely read yourself – I’ll deal in this post with a fundamental U.S. foreign policy issue he touches on but that deserves much more attention. That’s because it reveals the importance of an aspect of the national debate over Ukraine policy that I’ve mistakenly belittled – whether that embattled country is a paragon of democracy and other Western ideals and virtues, or just another foreign kleptocracy that’s waged a great propaganda campaign.

My discounting of such moral questions has stemmed from two related beliefs: First, that it’s vastly more important to determine Ukraine’s intrinsic worth in terms of U.S. security, independence, and prosperity than to figure out whether its president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is a valiant freedom fighter or a repressive, corrupt scoundrel. Second, it strikes me as axiomatic that it will always be easier for Americans to agree on concrete, national interest-related questions such as whether Ukraine’s location is strategic, or whether it contains resources America vitally need, than on more nebulous issues like Zelenskyy’s personal character. (I made the underlying point at length here – thirty years ago!)

In fact, my support for such priorities has grown stronger the longer the war has lasted, and the more destuctive it’s become – as both belligerents use increasingly sophisticated and/or long-range weapons that could spread its effects beyond Ukraine’s borders, and increase the odds of conflict between the nuclear-armed U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a nuclear-armed Russia.

I’ve also emphasized that such grave risks could be justified if Ukraine were deemed a vital interest whatever Ukraine’s virtues or vices. But by the same token, I’ve called incurring these risks for less than vital stakes – which is obvious if only because NATO has still chosen not to admit Ukraine and thereby to guarantee its security even if nuclear war might result – the height of recklessness.

At the same time, it shouldn’t be forgotten – and I shouldn’t have forgotten – how the undeniable fact of U.S. sovereignty needs to influence this discussion. Very loosely speaking, sovereignty is the well established notion that in the international sphere, political communities (or individuals, as in the case of monarchies) have a right to act as they wish. This right is constrained only by whatever failures these communities or individuals experience in maintaining control over their territory, and in the view of some, by international law. (Those in the realist/realpolitik camp, like me, put no stock in that latter concept.)

In the United States, the people are sovereign; it would therefore be legitimate if the public decided to support Ukraine’s war effort simply because they admired Ukrainians and/or their government, or loathed their Russian counterparts, or some combination of the two. And this proposition logically holds whether any significant concrete U.S. interests are at stake, and whatever the actual risks of this position might be. Those risks in turn logically include nuclear risks.

So even though I view the moral character of both sides of the Ukraine war per se as irrelevant to America’s well-being, I’m going to be less dismissive of efforts to win this particular debate. The American public has every right to prioritize such considerations, and if friends and foes of current policies believe they can sway opinion by praising or disparaging Ukraine’s qualities (either if they themselves have taken them to heart, or to debunk misconceptions they believe have been created by the other side), that’s now perfectly fine with me.

In fact, as Leon’s article argues persuasively, sentiment and not calculations of self-interest have been the main bases of U.S. support for Israel. This support for Israel hasn’t been cost-free, In particular, it’s no doubt greatly complicated U.S. relations with the Arab Muslim world and all the oil it controls. But it’s hard to argue that this emotion-based and therefore largely uncritical backing of the Jewish state has backfired on America in any major way.

I’d just ask one favor of Ukraine War backers who stress the conflict’s moral dimensions: When making these arguments, how about reminding the public of the nuclear risk issue. For there’s much polling evidence that however much Americans admire the Ukrainian cause, most don’t agree that it merits courting the danger of nuclear attack. (See, e.g., here.) In other words, they evidently realize that, however important and ethical it is to like and value admirable foreign peoples and governments and their survival, it’s even more important and at least as ethical to like and value your own.

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