(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Blaming Extra Unemployment Benefits for U.S. Labor Shortages Just Got a Lot Harder

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Jobs, labor markets, labor shortages, recession, unemployment, unemployment benefits, workers, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you’ve been following the economic news for the last few months, you know that one of the most heated policy debates that’s broken out concerns the impact of the supplemental federal unemployment claims that America’s jobless became eligible for due to the CCP Virus- and lockdowns-induced recession and its continuing aftermath.

Specifically, opponents of these payments – which will end for all states on September 6 (unless they don’t?) – charge that they’ve needlessly enabled many workers to avoid or delay returning to businesses, and thereby greatly worsened labor shortages reported by so many employers. Supporters insist that they’ve been a minor contributor, and that the shortages stem from many more important factors, like ongoing health concerns or childcare issues or the apparent decision of many Baby Boomers and near-Boomers that the pandemic created a convenient time to retire.

I’ve believed for months that the biggest truth has been “all of the above,” but have been frustrated by the lack of statistics that could at least start providing reasonably convincing answers. And unfortunately, this post’s appearance doesn’t mean that terrific data has been found. But what I’ve gone over in the last few days seems reasonably informative, and what it tells me is that the extra federal benefits haven’t been a significant deal at all in the U.S. jobs picture.

What I did was compare four indicators of employment for the states that announced that they’d stop paying those extra benefits by the end of June (along with Louisiana, which announced a July 31 cutoff) and for the states that have decided to continue them as long as Washington was sending the funds. The indicators are unemployment rates, numbers of people employed, first-time jobless claims filed, and levels of continuing jobless claims. And recent Labor Department reports make possible comparing the unemployment rates between June and July, and both sets of claims numbers between the week ending June 26 and the week ending July 24. So they should provide some information on whether the announcement of imminent cutoffs led the jobless to secure reemployment faster.

These data can’t provide definitive answers for numerous reasons. For example, as this article makes clear, the $300 extra federal benefits on which I concentrated haven’t been the only extra benefits provided during the pandemic, and even six of the “early cutoff” states have continued to provide some combination of the others. In addition, two of the early cutoff states have been under court orders to continue the benefits (Indiana and Maryland), and lawsuits are pending in three others (Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas.) Moreover, state benefit levels vary tremendously, both in terms of payment amounts and eligibility periods. So depending on where they live, unemployed Americans could have lost various extended benefits and still received benefits from their state governments (for varying timeframes) generous enough to affect their need or desire to return to work.

But what follows is a pretty good start to the search for answers. And analysts do get one break: The states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia to be examined divide evenly into two groups of 26.

First, the jobless rate comparisons. As widely known, these aren’t perfect measures of the national employment situation because they leave out big categories of distressed workers like those too discouraged to even search for a job, and those employed part-time because they have no other choice. And as suggested above, they shed no light on changes in the numbers of retirees.

Be that as it may, of the 26 cutoff states, between June and July, unemployment rates fell in 19, rose in three, and held steady in four. And of the twenty cutoff states where no litigation was either affecting payment policies or coming down the pike, and excluding tardy Louisiana, jobless rates fell in 16, rose in two, and remained unchanged in two.

How does that compare with the unemployment rates in the non-cutoff states? They fell in 18 of the 26 states between June and July, rose in four, and held steady in four. So I don’t see a big difference there.

Turning to employment levels, of the 26 total cutoff states, from June to July, they rose in 23 and fell in three. Of the twenty facing no litigation issues and, again, also excepting Louisiana, employment levels rose in 19 and fell in one. Those results actually slightly lag the performance of the non-cutoff states, where employment levels rose in 25 of the 26 between June and July.

It’s much the same story for initial jobless claims from the week ending June 26 and the week ending July 24. For the 26 total cutoff states, initial claims between these two weeks rose in six and fell in 20. Of the 20 facing no legal issues, and excepting Louisiana, claims rose in five and fell in 15.

That’s almost identical to the results for the non-cutoff states, where initial claims between those two weeks rose in five states and fell in 21. In fact, a slight edge goes to these states on this score, too.

Finally, for continuing claims, in the 26 total cutoff states, these fell in 21 and rose in five between the weeks in question. And of the 20 with no litigation existing or pending, and excluding tardy Louisiana, continuing claims fell in 15 and rose in five.

In this group of 26, 22 saw continuing claims fall and four saw the rise.

Again, I’m not contending that these numbers are definitive. More detailed analysis accounting for more of the aforementioned differences among states would help a lot. Nor do I doubt that labor shortages have emerged in some parts of the economy. But if there’s proof out there that the extended unemployment benefits had much impact, it hasn’t emerged yet – and let’s hope it emerges before the economy runs aground for an extended period again.  

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Big Missing Reason for the Big Jobs Miss

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Anthony S. Fauci, automation, Biden, Build Back Better, CCP Virus, CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, child care, children, coronavirus, COVID 19, FDR, Franklin D. Roosevelt, immunity, Jobs, jobs report, lockdowns, New Deal, parents, productivity, reopening, school closings, skills, skills gap, teachers, unemployment, unemployment benefits, vaccinations, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As reported widely, the big miss marking last Friday’s official monthly U.S. jobs report (for April) ignited a heated debate among politicians, economists, and many others over why the U.S. economy created so much less new employment that month (266,000 net new positions overall) than generally estimated (in the million neighborhood). At the heart of this debate: Do the many positions employers consistently say they’re struggling to fill amid a continuingly high jobless rate mean that the enhanced unemployment benefits offered throughout the pandemic are discouraging Americans from returning to the workplace?

What I’m not seeing, however, is anyone asking whether this is the right debate. It’s increasingly obvious to me that it’s not.

It’s easy to see why those who answer yes are viewing the issue far too narrowly. Surely some unemployed workers are content to stay at home because they’re currently making more from jobless payments than they were making from their previous employer. That should be clear from the number of businesses raising wages to fill the shortages they’re experiencing. (I’m not saying that these raises are or aren’t long overdue or otherwise deserved; simply that the higher pay and other incentives employers are offering can only be interpreted as companies recognizing that the enhanced benefits have, to a degree, increased the relative attraction of remaining on the employment sidelines versus reentering the job market.)

At the same time, is it reasonable to ignore all the other major reasons for this big labor market anomaly? Like ongoing fears of catching the CCP Virus at the workplace, or the need to stay home with school-age children forced to learn remotely? And don’t forget all the uncertainties created by the sudden stop-start nature of the virus-era lockdowns on the economy.

Yes, a rapid U.S. reopening is taking place now. But all over the world, infection surges are producing new economic curbs. Can you blame workers for wondering whether shortly after they leave the unemployment and benefits rolls, their new workplace will need to close, or cut back on its operations, leaving them in the lurch while they either seek other jobs or file for new benefits?

It’s easy to see that all of these developments and circumstances and uncertainties and outright fears are keeping U.S. labor seemingly scarce. You can also add to the list the likelihood of growing skills mismatches in the American economy – that is, the numbers of jobs requiring more or different skills outgrowing the number of workers possessing these skills, and the numbers of companies replacing low-skill jobs with automation of some kind. Not that the resulting mismatches inevitably will be with the nation forever, or even long term. But they’re unmistakably present now.

So maybe the problem is simply too complicated for government to address? Or we’ll simply need to wait until a stable post-CCP Virus normality returns and labor markets start clearing as usual? It seems reasonable that the purely skills-based mismatches will defy ready solutions – unless America’s education system suddenly gets a lot better at preparing students for the economy they’ll be facing, and businesses get more serious about training and retraining workers, and turn  away from needlessly insisting on lofty credentials for jobs that don’t require anything close.

It’s also possible – though that’s the most I’m willing to say – that spreading automation will eventually help businesses become so much more productive that they’ll be able to turn out more products and services, and that this very success will generate all sorts of new jobs whose appearance can’t be predicted with any precision now. (My reservations stem from concerns that the newest forms of automation, especially artificial intelligence and super-sophisticated robotics, are qualitatively more capable of displacing many more kinds of labor than previous technological breakthroughs.)

As long as the federal government and the states remain willing to provide generous unemployment benefits (and other supports), the resulting situation would at least keep most of the jobless adequately fed, clothed, and housed. That’s a big “if,” though, for reasons economic (e.g., maybe Washington can’t keep borrowing and spending massively much longer?) and social and cultural (e.g., maybe ever longer term unemployment will start to produce more in the way of pathological behavior like drug abuse, violent crime, and worse classroom performance from students from families on the dole?).

Consequently, the more progress can be made returning the unemployed to work, the better, and however difficult the challenge of eliminating the purely or largely skills-based mismatches, Americans and their leaders shouldn’t overlook where policy can make a big difference. And the above analysis indicates that one big difference can be made by the U.S. government, and especially its public health authorities.

Specifically, they need finally to stop their CCP Virus alarmism and energetically spread the word that due to a combination of high and mounting degrees of various kinds of immunity, mass vaccinations, and the highly varying nature of the virus’ infectiousness and lethality, normality is unquestionably returning. Further, and crucially, although certain groups of Americans – like the elderly, and those with certain underlying medical conditions – are still too vulnerable and must be protected with special measures, the Biden administration and its health experts should acknowledge that nearly all others can safely return to normal activities because the already low odds of even getting the disease, much less suffering significantly from it, have now plunged to rock bottom.

In other words, Washington should announce that work places are safe to return to, bricks and mortars businesses are now safe to patronize, in-person schooling is just fine for both students and teachers and administrative staff alike, (thus solving the childcare dilemma), and that lockdowns have become a thing of the past.

Instead, of course, you’ve got a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that seems stuck in hyper- (and increasingly unscientific) caution territory, not to mention decimating its own message about vaccines’ effectivness by admitting almost no behavior payoff whatever; and a President and leading figures of his own party continuing to wear facemasks even in settings that “the science” had made crystal clear are as safe as they can be for the fully vaccinated.

To top if off, the President’s chief medical adviser, Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, has just taken pains to speculate that Americans may start wearing facemasks to guard against all sorts of respiratory diseases on a seasonal basis. Given this administration’s record so far, it doesn’t seem all that far-fetched to worry that new CDC guidelines along these lines, plus recommendations to resume some forms of social distancing, and even new business curbs, could quickly follow if this kind of Chicken Little-ism isn’t stopped. For now, though, no wonder so many Americans are still scared stiff of the virus.

It’s becoming more and more common to compare President Biden and his ambitious plans for “Building the U.S. Economy Back Better” with Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal programs.  (See, e.g., here and here.) But it’s hard to imagine Mr. Biden succeeding to any lasting degree if his CCP Virus policy doesn’t start reflecting one of FDR’s most and most deservedly famous insights: “[T]he only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”