Making News: New National Radio Podcast on the Supply Chain Crisis and Decoupling from China

Tags

CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, decoupling, Gordon G. Chang, John Batchelor, Making News, supply chain, Trade, West Coast ports, Western Hemisphere

I’m pleased to announce that I retuned to John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show last night. Click here for a link to the podcast, in which John, Gordon G. Chang, and I shed light on the national and global supply chain crises and what they’re saying about how connected the U.S. economy is from China nowadays, how connected it should be – and how to break away.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Advertisement

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Dangerous New Bubbles or a Virus Mirage?

Tags

bubbles, business investment, CCP Virus, consumer spending, coronavirus, COVID 19, Financial Crisis, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, lockdowns, logistics, nonresidential fixed investment, real GDP, recession, recovery, reopening, Richard F. Moody, semiconductor shortage, toxic combination, transportation, West Coast ports, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s a great example of how badly the U.S. economy might be getting distorted by last year’s steep, sharp, largely government-mandated recession, and by the V-shaped recovery experienced since then.as CCPVirus-related restrictions have been lifted. Therefore, it’s also a great example of how the many of the resulting statistics may still be of limited usefulness at best in figuring out the economy’s underlying health.

The possible example?  New official figures showing that, as of the second quarter of this year, the U.S. economy is even more dangerously bubble-ized than it was just before the financial crisis of 2007-08.

As RealityChek regulars might recall, for several years I wrote regularly on what I called the quality of America’s growth. (Here‘s my most recent post.) I viewed the subject as important because there’s broad agreement that a big reason the financial crisis erupted was the over-reliance earlier in that decade n the wrong kind of growth. Specifically, personal spending and housing had become predominant engines of expansion – and therefore prosperity. Their bloated roles inflated intertwined bubbles whose bursting nearly collapsed the U.S. and entire global economies, and produced the worst American economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

As a result, there was equally broad agreement that the nation needed to transform what you might call its business model from one depending largely on borrowing, spending, and paying for them by counting on home prices to rise forever, to one based on saving, investing, and producing. As former President Obama cogently put it, America needed “an economy built to last.”

Therefore, I decided to track how well the nation was succeeding at this version of “build back better” by monitoring the official quarterly reports on economic growth to examine the importance of housing and consumption (which I called the “toxic combination”) in the nation’s economic profile and whether and how they were changing.

For some perspective, in the third quarter of 2005, as the spending and housing bubbles were at their worst, these two segments of the economy accounted for 73.90 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP – the standard measure of the economy’s size) adjusted for inflation (the most widely followed of the GDP data. By the end of the Great Recession caused by the bursting of these bubbles, in the second quarter of 2009, this figure was down to 71.55 percent – mainly because housing had crashed.

At the end of the Obama administration (the fourth quarter of 2016), the toxic combination has rebounded to represent 72.31 percent of after-inflation GDP. So in quality-of-growth terms, the economy was heading in the wrong direction. And under President Trump, this discouraging trend continued. As of the fourth quarter of 2019 (the last quarter before the pandemic began significantly affecting the economy), this figure rose further, to 73.19 percent.

Yesterday, the government reported on GDP for the second quarter of this year, and it revealed that the toxic combination share of the economy in constant dollar terms to 74.24 percent. In other words, the toxic combination had become a bigger part of the economy than during the most heated housing and spending bubble days.

But does that mean that the economy really is even more, and more worrisomely lopsided than it was back then? That’s far from clear. Pessimists could argue that recent growth has relied heavily on the unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus provided by Washington since spring, 2020. Optimists could point out that far from overspending, consumers have been saving massively. Something else of note: Business investment’s share of real GDP in the second quarter of this year came to 14.80 percent – awfully lofty by recent standards.  During the 2005 peak of the last bubble, that spending (officially called “nonresidential fixed investment”) was 11.62 percent. 

My own take is that this situation mainly reflects the unexpected strength of the reopening-driven recovery and the transportation and logistics bottlenecks it’s created. An succinct summary of the situation was provided by Richard F. Moody, chief economist of Regions Bank. He wrote yesterday that the new GDP data “embody the predicament facing the U.S. economy, which is that the supply side of the economy has simply been unable to keep pace with demand.” The result is not only the strong recent inflation figures, but a ballooning of personal spending’s share of the economy.

Moody expects that both problems will end “later rather than sooner,” and for all I know, he (and other inflation pessimists) are right. But unless you believe that West Coast ports will remain clogged forever, that semiconductors will remain in short supply forever, that truck drivers will remain scarce forever, that businesses will never adjust adequately to any of this, and/or that new CCP Virus variants will keep the whole economy on lockdown-related pins and needles forever, the important point is that these problems will end. Once they do, or when the end is in sight, we’ll be able to figure out just how bubbly the economy has or hasn’t grown – but not, I’m afraid, one moment sooner.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Let’s Hope the Lousy New U.S. Trade Figures are Transitory, Too

Tags

Commerce Department, Donald Trump, exports, Federal Reserve, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, Jerome Powell, real GDP, real trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, West Coast ports, {What's Left of) Our Economy

No two ways about it. Until the longer term revisions come in, the first quarter of 2021 was a lousy one for inflation-adjusted U.S. trade flows – and lousy to a record extent. The only possible positive takeaway:  These numbers and the trends underlying them might be just as transitory and CCP Virus-induced as I (and many others)  believe today’s high inflation numbers are   

According to today’s final (for now) Commerce Department read on economic growth for the first three months of this year, the real gross domestic product (GDP – the government’s measure for the economy’s size) increased by 6.21 percent on an annual basis.

That’s an excellent figure although (like virtually all other economic data) it’s a considerably artificial number (because of the sudden reopening of the economy after equally sudden government-mandated shutdowns and resulting consumer caution), and although it’s a bit less than the 6.25 percent estimated last month. Indeed, it’s a big improvement over the 4.26 percent registered in the fourth quarter of last year

But the after-inflation trade deficit figures just keep rising – and reaching all-time highs. The initial read on this constant dollar trade gap for the first quarter was an annualized $1.1755 trillion. Last month, this figure was revised up to $1.1939 trillion. This morning’s result: $1.2123 trillion. Consequently, the price-adjusted first quarter trade deficit turns out to be 8.05 percent worse than the fourth quarter’s $1.1220 trillion.

Optimists can note that this sequential increase was smaller than the 10.12 percent rise between the third and fourth quarters of last year. But this slowdown is pretty modest.

Since the real trade deficit figure is higher than previously reported and grew faster, and the total economy grew slightly more slowly in inflation-adjusted terms, the trade shortfall’s bite into growth was bigger – 1.50 percent out of the 6.21 percent increase as opposed to the previously reported 1.25 percent out of 6.25 percent growth.

This means that, had the real trade deficit simply remain unchanged, the economy would have expanded 24.15 percent more after inflation in the first quarter. The previous GDP read yielded a figure of 20 percent.

In glass-half-full terms, that’s a smaller subtraction from growth than the multi-decade high 35.92 percent suffered in the fourth quarter. But it’s a lot of foregone growth nonetheless.

The constant dollar trade deficit as a share of GDP hit another new record, too – 6.35 percent. Upon recalling that the previous pre-pandemic high of 6.10 percent came in the fourth quarter of 2005, during the bubble whose bursting brought on the global financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession, that could be an ominous development.

And more bad news: The worsening of the real trade deficit came on both the export and import fronts in the first quarter. Today’s GDP report showed that inflation-adjusted U.S. overseas sales of goods and services dropped sequentially by 0.53 percent, while total American purchases from abroad increased by 2.30 percent.

So do these new figures foreshadow the new post-CCP Virus normal for U.S. trade – despite (or because of?) the Trump tariffs? We’ll find out more about the effects of trade policy once the next official monthly U.S. trade figures (for May) come out next Friday. 

For now, though (and probably after those new data), the most responsible answer I can provide is, “It’s too soon to tell.” Indeed, as if the U.S. economy still wasn’t being distorted enough by the rapid transition from pandemic-induced recession to robust expansion, and still facing enough consequent uncertainties, on top of the ongoing congestion at U.S. West Coast ports, a big logjam has emerged at a giant port in export-heavy China.

Last week, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell noted that “This is an extraordinarily unusual time, and we really don’t have a template or any experience in a situation like this. We have to be humble about our ability to understand the data.” As the new U.S. GDP report should be making clear, American trade flows are no exception.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New GDP Figures Show Slower U.S. Trade Normalization

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, GDP, gross domestic product, inflation-adjusted growth, lockdowns, real GDP, real trade deficit, reopening, semiconductor shortage, trade deficit, West Coast ports, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

When the the U.S. government’s first read on the economy’s growth during the first quarter of this year came out, I wrote that the trade highlights showed some tentative signs of normalization for CCP Virus-distorted flows of exports, imports, and for the resulting trade balances.

As of this morning, we have the second report on change between January and March in the gross domestic product (GDP), and the normalization trend still looks intact – but in weakened form.

The new data judged that first quarter growth in inflation-adjusted terms at an annual rate was a bit faster than previously estimated – 6.25 percent versus 6.24 percent. Yet the real combined goods and services trade deficit of $1.1939 billion annualized is 1.57 percent bigger than the quarterly record $1.1755 trillion reported a month ago.

As a result, the overall deficit a represented a 6.41 percent worsening from the fourth quarter figure, as opposed to the 4.77 percent increase previously reported. That’s still much lower than the 10.12 percent rise from the third quarter to the fourth quarter. And it’s orders of magnitude less than the 31.47 percent recorded during the spectacularly high growth second to third quarter period. But it’s definitely a step backward.

Ditto for the impact on after-inflation economic growth of the overall trade deficit’s increase. The initial read for the second quarter reported that the gap’s widening subtracted 0.87 percentage points from the 6.24 percent annualized total real GDP growth figure. In other words, constant dollar GDP growth would have been 13.94 percent greater had the real trade deficit not climbed at all.

Now the growth-killing impact of the trade shortfall’s expansion is pegged at 1.25 percentage points from 6.25 percent annualized price-adjusted economic growth. So that real GDP growth would have been 20 percent faster had the deficit not worsened. As with the increase in the deficit itself, the impact on growth of the deficit’s rise is smaller than it was in the fourth quarter – when it hit 35.92 percent for the worse, a multi-decade high. But the improvement is now a good deal smaller than first thought.

On a static basis, however, the inflation-adjusted adjusted total trade deficit’s share of the real economy keeps surging. This morning, it came in at 6.25 percent – as opposed to the 6.16 percent first reported. The fourth quarter level was only 5.97 percent and the third quarter’s just 5.48 percent.

Consequently, the real trade deficit is still bigger relative to the whole economy than during the fourth quarter of 2005, when it hit 6.10 percent. That incidentally was the previous record, and that time is of course known as the bubble decade – after which the financial crisis and Great Recession quickly followed.

Moreover, although signs of overall economic normalization keep mushrooming (thanks, e.g., to the spread of CCP Virus immunity and continued stimulus spending), trade flows may still be in for months more of pandemic-related distortions. Indeed, they may worsen.

After all, on top of all the stimulus the economy will keep receiving for the foreseeable future, two major bottlenecks crimping growth are easing. Specifically, progress is now being reported not only in clearing West Coast ports congestion, but in alleviating the global semiconductor shortage (albeit partly because the production cuts it forced on customers are cutting their demand).

It’s true that these bottlenecks – which have stemmed largely from the sudden stop-start nature of transitions from lockdowns to reopenings – have affected both U.S. exports and imports. But with the United States still a strongly consumer-dominated economy, and almost certain to recover much faster than many of its leading trade partners (many of which will therefore be relying on generating their own trade surpluses for growth more than ever), it’s all too easy to see how its trade deficits will either keep setting records or at least stay at their current lofty levels well into the next year.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Inflation Isn’t Worrisome So Far

Tags

CCP Virus, CNBC, coronavirus, COVID 19, Federal Reserve, inflation, logistics, reopening, semiconductor shortage, shutdowns, Steve Liesman, stimulus, supply chains, transportation, West Coast ports, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

By now you’ve surely seen or heard – or should have seen or heard – that the new U.S. official figures (for April) show that inflation is back big time and could all too easily spin out of control. The emphasis should be on “could,” because, as also widely observed (including by the Federal Reserve, which is a major U.S. government line of inflation defense), the recent price rises arguably stem from developments that are temporary byproducts of America’s utterly unprecedented economic circumstances these days – reopening in fits and starts, but overall quickly, from lengthy government-mandated shutdowns aimed at fighting the CCP Virus.

I’m pretty firmly convinced that the inflation optimists are right, even though the pessimists make strong points in observing that (a) prices have been rising faster on a monthly basis with each passing month this year; and (b) inflation tends to generate its own momentum. That is, the expectation of rising prices typically encourages households and businesses alike to step up their purchases in order to avoid paying more for the same goods and services later on. Further, more expensive inputs for specific businesses can easily prompt those companies to compensate by raising the prices they charge their customers, while at the same time generating the same reactions from other businesses that are their customers, and so on.

I’ll also grant that the pessimists shouldn’t be dismissed when they contend that even temporary inflation can cause serious damage to an economy, especially when we’re talking about price increases that only come to an end after, say, a year or longer rather than after two or three months. Therefore, it’s important to note that the optimists’ case depends heavily on the relatively rapid end to the price-boosting combination of sudden increases in consumer demand resulting from the reopening, and of all the supply bottlenecks that have emerged as businesses struggle to catch up with that demand – which of course is being buoyed by the immense doses of stimulus being injected into the economy, and that may be increased in the near future.   

Indeed, the prolonged shipping backups at West Coast ports should be making clear that the more optimistic definition of “temporary” might rest on some pretty dicey assumptions. In addition, we’re unlikely to see a quick end to the global semiconductor shortage that’s shut down considerable automobile production and thinned inventories all over the world – curbing supply and of course driving up prices.

So why am I optimistic? Largely for a reason that’s been generally overlooked in the inflation uproar. (One major exception has been CNBC’s Steve Liesman, whose segment yesterday partly inspired this post.) When you look at where prices actually are now in the economy as a whole, and even in particularly hot sectors, you find that they’re not much higher than they were just before the pandemic hit (in February, 2020, which will be the baseline month I’ll use). And that’s because they had been falling or weak for so many months while much of the economy was closed.

This methodology, to start, puts an entirely different shine on the news that the overall April inflation rate of 4.2 percent year-on-year was the strongest such surge since September, 2008. But from February, 2020 to April, prices by this broadest measure increased by just 3.1 percent. That’s much higher than the 1.3 percent increase during the previous comparable period (February, 2019-April, 2020). Remember, however: April, 2020 was the depth of the virus-related lockdowns and consequent recession.

During the February-April period before that, prices rose 2.4 percent – and that’s with none of the stop-start distortions currently being experienced. The period before that it was 2.6 percent. And the period before that – also a normal stretch – it was 2.9 percent. And in comparable (also normal) 2011-2012 timespan, it was 3.3 percent. So the new 3.1 percent doesn’t seem all that exceptional when you consider all the abnormalities of this post-virus recovery.

Another widely watched inflation gauge is called “core inflation.” It strips out food and energy prices because they can be volatile over whatever timeframe examined for reasons having nothing to do with the economy’s fundamentals – and supposedly fundamental vulnerability to inflation (e.g., unusual weather that impacts agriculture, or oil price decisions by the OPEC cartel and other major foreign producers).

On a monthly basis, they advanced by 0.9 percent, and year-on-year they were up three percent in April. The former figure was the worst since 1982, and the latter is on the high side as well. But let’s look at the February-April numbers. Between 2020 and 2021, core inflation was 2.6 percent. It was just two percent during the previous comparable period, but again, those numbers are distorted by deflationary April, 2020. The period before it was 2.6 percent – the same as this year, but without the reopening issues. And as recently as 2016, it was even higher – 2.7 percent – even with no virus-related confusion.

As they say in the investment advice world, past performance is no guarantee of future results. Nor should it be forgotten that many economists still find inflation frustratingly difficult to measure, and criticisms of the U.S. government’s methodology abound as well. (See, e.g., here.) But the official American figures are still widely followed, and certainly lie at the heart of the latest bout of inflation angst. And until these data start showing outsized price gains compared with pre-CCP Virus levels that haven’t been affected by virus-era abnormalities, I’m going to stay pretty relaxed about the U.S. inflation picture.*

Please note: This inflation analysis should not be used as investment advice, because I’m not in that business and don’t feel qualified to be in that business. Also, what I do know of that business teaches that asset prices are much more profoundly influenced by what investors as a whole think about the economy than by what I think about it.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Virus Keeps Trade Figures, Like the Whole U.S. Economy, on a Roller Coaster

Tags

Advanced Technology Products, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, goods imports, imports, lockdowns, manufacturing, reopening, shipping, Trade, trade deficit, West Coast ports, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since I keep writing that U.S. trade figures – as well as other economic data – have been and continue to be thoroughly distorted by the sudden stop-start nature of the CCP Virus-era economy, it seems time to replace my usual monthly format with one that shows just how out-of-the-ordinary trade flows have become.

The best evidence? The latest (March) monthly changes in imports reported today by the Census Bureau. Although the understandable headlines for the press coverage of this release focused on the record shortfalls in the overall trade gap ($74.45 billion) and in the goods shortfall ($91.56 billion), to me, the real story for March concerns the big, practically across-the-board jumps in American purchases from abroad – which of course also owe in part to the long-awaited easing of big (virus-related) backups in the West Coast ports through which so many goods enter the nation from Asia. (This congestion has also hampered American exports.)

So on to the March import figures. For combined goods and services, these purchases rose by 6.34 percent sequentially, to $274.45 billion. The absolute total is an all-time record, and the monthly increase the biggest since July’s 10.88 percent, when the economy was starting its first reopening phase.

Goods imports alone grew by 6.98 percent on-month in March, to $234.44 billion. That advance was also the biggest since July, when they surged by 12.31 percent. And the actual March level was the highest on record, too.

Interestingly, the import flows affected most by tariffs and other U.S. trade policy decisions – in goods other than oil – climbed a bit more slowly in March than overall goods imports: by 6.48 percent, to an all-time best (worst?) $217.69 billion. As with that non-oil goods category, the sequential rise was the fastest since July (12.18 percent), but these inflows rose only half as much.

The CCP Virus effect seems to have been especially pronounced in manufacturing. March imports of industrial goods hit a record $207.59 billion, and soared by 22.98 percent sequentially. That increase was the biggest since March, 2015 – when a 23.44 percent rise largely represented a February slump caused by harsh winter weather. By contrast, manufactures imports grew strongly last July, too – during the first economy-wide virus rebound – but by just 12.08 percent.

Within manufacturing, advanced technology imports in March, at $44.54 billion, fell short of their all-time high ($47.25 billion in October, 2018). But the sequential increase of 24.06 percent was the greatest since that weather afffected March, 2015 (24.87 percent).

March goods imports from China expanded a healthy 18.23 percent sequentially in March. But the $40.23 billion monthly total was well below record levels, too. This increase was also way less than the 59.02 percent rocket ride these purchases took in April, 2020, but that occurred when China’s economy was rebounding from its own CCP Virus lockdown. So the March figure could indicate that the Trump tariffs have started to fail.

At the same time, March goods imports from Asia-Pacific countries as a whole (a U.S. government grouping that includes China) ballooned by 25.11 percent on month – considerably faster than China’s increase, and their biggest monthly rise since that weather-affected March, 2015 (32.43 percent). That’s evidence that the Trump tariffs have indeed kept disadvantaging China.

As a result, even if the March trade figures simply extend an already lengthy string of CCP Virus-era official U.S. economic data, and say little about the economy’s fundamentals or even the effectiveness of U.S. tariffs, it still seems valuable to me to be reminded every now and then just how out-there these statistics remain.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Spring-y New U.S. Manufacturing Production Report

Tags

aerospace, automotive, Biden, Boeing, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, Federal Reserve, health security, imports, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, infrastructure, machinery, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, PPE, real growth, semiconductor shortage, stimulus, supply chain, tariffs, Trade, trade war, vaccines, ventilators, West Coast ports, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

You might call today’s March U.S. manufacturing production figures from the Federal Reserve a good news/bad news/good news story. Moreover, the new data on inflation-adjusted factory output contained a surprise worth noting.

First the good news/bad news/good news. The Fed report showed that real domestic manufacturing output rose by 2.79 percent on month in March. That was the best such result since July’s 4.25 percent – much earlier during the recovery from the deep CCP Virus- and lockdowns-induced recession. Rebounds from major downturns tend to be strongest earliest, especially for highly cyclical sectors of the economy like manufacturing, and that surely went double for a slump largely caused by an outside shock like a pandemic and dramatic government responses, rather than one caused by a market-based economy’s ordinary fluctuations.

The bad news was that this robust growth followed a February sequential drop of 3.72 percent that was the worst monthly performance since pandemicky April’s 15.83 percent plunge. Moreover, this revised February figure was a significant downgrade from the initially reported 3.12 percent decline. The other revisions, going back to October, were too small to affect the picture over the last few months.

But then there’s that second piece of good news: As the Fed’s release explained this morning, the lousy February numbers “largely resulted from widespread outages related to severe winter weather in the south central region of the country.” So they stemmed from a (temporary) outside shock, too.

The surprise? Although the U.S. automotive industry continues reducing production due to a global shortage of semiconductors, output in price-adjusted terms grew by 2.79 percent sequentially in March. At the same time, the February fall-off was revised down from 8.26 percent to ten percent even. And the shortage is expected to undercut vehicle production until the fall, so that’s a drag likely to weigh on the overall manufacturing figures for months.

The total March manufacturing figure means that domestic industry’s after-inflation production has grown by 22.88 percent since its recent low-point last April, and has climbed back to within 1.73 percent of its last pre-pandemic reading in February, 2020.

Manufacturing’s monthly current dollar output gains were broadbased in March, including in the crucial machinery sector. In this industry, whose products are widely used not only throughout manufacturing, but in many other important segments of the economy like construction and agriculture, price-adjusted production improved by 2.87 percent. And now it actually stands 2.16 percent higher than during that last pre-CCP Virus month of February, 2020.

Although the semiconductor shortage is bound to crimp production in many industries on top of automotive, domestic manufacturing still seems to be benefiting from two headwinds other than the economy’s generally improving strength that seem to have some staying power, too. The first is aerospace giant Boeing’s continuing, but sometimes uneven, progress exiting its protracted recent safety and manufacturing problems. The pandemic’s blow to air travel worldwide clearly didn’t help, either.

But in March, real output in aircraft and parts jumped by 4.09 percent sequentially, and is now fully 5.07 percent above its February, 2020 pre-CCP Virus level.

The picture was more mixed in the pharmaceutical and medicines category – which includes vaccines. Inflation-adjusted output advanced by 2.90 percent on month in March, but the previously reported January and February numbers were both downgraded dramatically – from an upwardly revised 2.57 percent to 0.85 percent, and from a 1.29 percent rise to a 0.05 percent dip. These moves left the sector’s output 5.83 percent higher than in pre-pandemic February, 2020 with the prospect of more impovement to come as vaccine production continues to boom.

Growth is still lagging, however, in the vital medical equipment and supplies sector – which includes virus-fighting items like face masks, face masks, protective gowns, and ventilators. February’s constant-dollar production was revised up from a 0.56 percent monthly decline to a 0.44 percent drop – but it was still a drop. Growth returned in March – but only by 0.61 percent in real terms. So price-adjusted output in this category – which includes many other products – is still slightly (0.39 percent) below pre-pandemic February, 2020’s levels, despite all the national talk of the need to improve America’s health security.

I’m still bullish on manufacturing’s outlook, though. No one should forget headwinds facing industry aside from the semiconductor shortage – chiefly, the fading of vaccine production at some point, the distinct possibility of many more regulations and higher taxes from a Democratic-conrolled federal government, and the supply chain disruptions resulting largely from clogged West Coast ports (which on top of the Trump tariffs are slowing the import of many foreign inputs still needed by Made in the USA companies).

But arguably more than offsetting these dangers is the so far better-than-expected resumption of total U.S. growth, the virtual certainty of even yet another gigantic dose of stimulus an infrastructure spending, along with President Biden’s decision to retain every dollar’s worth of those sweeping, often towering Trump trade curbs.

Yet much more important than my views is the continuing optimism registered by domestic manufacturers in all of the soft data surveys that come out each month from the private sector and from various branches of the Federal Reserve system. If they’re full of confidence, who am I to rain on their parade?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Record U.S. Trade Gap – & Cause for Trade Optimism??

Tags

American Jobs Plan, Biden, Buy American, CCP Virus, Census Bureau, China, coronavirus, corporate taxes, COVID 19, Donald Trump, exports, goods trade deficit, green energy, imports, lockdowns, Made in Washington trade flows, Pacific Rim, reopening, semiconductor shortage, services trade, subsidies, supply chains, tariffs, tax policy, taxes, Trade, trade deficit, vaccines, West Coast ports, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Despite the overall U.S. trade deficit hitting an all-time monthly high in February, the new trade figures released by the Census Bureau this morning contained lots of encouraging news – including for fans of the Trump tariffs on China and on aluminum and steel (like me). I’m wary of running or continuing a victory lap, because there’s still too much short- and perhaps longer term economic noise surely masking the underlying trends. But the case for trade optimism and its possible policy causes deserves attention.

As for that economic noise, it comes of course not only from the ongoing stop/start CCP Virus- and lockdowns-/reopenings/vaccinations-related distortions of all economic data, but from the harsh winter weather that depressed February economic activity in key areas of the country like Texas; the global shortage of semiconductors that’s impacting output throughout the manufacturing sector (and that’s due in part to the pandemic); and the big backups at the West Coast ports that are greatly slowing the unloading of container ships containing lots of imports from China and the rest of Asia.

As for the data, the combined goods and services trade shortfall of $71.08 billion in February surpassed the previous record, November’s $69.04 billion, by 2.95 percent, and represented a 4.80 percent increase over January’s downwardly revised level of $67.82 billion.

The increase resulted both from a rise in the goods trade gap (of 3.27 percent, to its own record of $88.01 billion) and a shrinkage of the services surplus (of 2.93 percent, to $16.93 billion – the smallest since August, 2012’s $17.08 billion).

Trade flows not setting records, though, notably included any of the imports categories – despite numerous reports of the rapidly rebounding U.S. economy sucking in massive amounts of products (though not services, which have suffered an outsized CCP Virus blow) from abroad.

For example, total merchandise imports actually fell on month in February – by 0.89 percent, to $221.14 billion, from January’s record total of $221.12 billion. Still, the February figure remains in second place historically speaking.

Non-oil goods imports inched up by 0.38 percent sequentially in February – from $85.36 billion to $85.68 billion. But they still fell short of the November record of $86.40 billion. As known by RealityChek regulars, this trade category sheds the most light on the impact on trade flows of trade policy decisions, like tariff changes and trade agreements. (Hence I call the resulting shortfall the Made in Washington trade deficit.) But despite the lofty level, they’re actually down on net since November. Could it be those West Coast ports snags or the harsh winter storms of February or semiconductor-specific problems? Maybe.

The evidence for those propositions? U.S. goods imports from Pacific Rim countries – which are serviced by the West Coast ports – did sink by 11.81 percent on month in February. That’s a much faster rate than the 1.54 percent decrease in overall non-oil goods imports (a close proxy).

But goods imports from China dropped by a greater 13 percent even, which points to some Trump tariff effect as well. In fact, the $34.03 billion worth of February goods imports from China was the lowest monthly number since pandemicky last April. And February’s $24.62 billion bilateral merchandise trade deficit with China was 6.22 percent narrower than the January figure, and the smallest such total since April, too.

America’s goods deficit from Pacific Rim countries in total fell slightly faster than the gap with China (6.84 percent). China’s economy and its exports, however, are supposed to be recovering at world-and region-beating rates, so if that’s the case, it appears that the Trump trade curbs are preventing that rebound from taking place at America’s expense.

U.S. manufacturing trade numbers were encouraging, too, though again, the impact of tariffs as opposed to that of the virus distortions or the February weather or the ports issues or the semiconductor shortage or some combination thereof  is difficult to determine. But industry’s trade shortfall did tumble by 10.53 percent in February, from January’s $99.79 billion to $89.29 billion. That figure also was manufacturing’s lowest since June, 2020’s $89.16 billion and the 10.52 percent decrease was the by far the biggest in percentage terms since November, 2019’s 12.70 percent.

February manufacturing exports declined by 2.64 percent sequentially, from $81.66 billion to $79.51 billion. But the much greater volume of manufacturing imports sank by 6.98 percent, from $182.46 billion to $168.79 billion.

The China and manufacturing numbers could certainly change – and boost these U.S. trade gaps and the overall trade deficit – as Americans begin to spend their latest round of stimulus checks, as the U.S. recovery continues, and as the West Coast ports and semiconductor issues clear up. 

But especially due to those Chinese exports, this worsening of the U.S. trade picture was reported late last year. And the official U.S. trade figures show that such a surge simply never took place. Moreover, if executed properly, President Biden’s Buy American plans for federal government procurement and support for strengthening critical domestic supply chains could boost American manufacturing and other goods output without increasing imports. His budget requests for major subsidies for key U.S.-based manufacturing operations could help brighten the trade picture, too. Mr. Biden has also decided for now to retain the Trump trade curbs. And P.S. – those clogged West Coast ports hamper American exports as well.    

In addition, trade problems could reappear at some point due to the President’s proposed green energy mandates and corporate tax increases that would inevitably hike the relative cost of producing in the United States. But right now, it looks like due to ongoing and possibly upcoming economic nationalist American policies, the burden of proof is on the U.S. trade pessimists. And that’s quite a switch.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: No, the Trade Deficit’s Worsening Isn’t “Transitory”

Tags

competitiveness, debt, exchange rates, exports, Federal Reserve, imports, manufacturing, recovery, strong dollar, Trade, Trade Deficits, West Coast ports, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I’m continually grateful to Bloomberg BusinessWeek’s Peter Coy for his interest in my tracking of the manufacturing trade deficit, and in particular, how it keeps setting new records — the latest being reported yesterday morning.  In fact, his coverage contrasts especially favorably with that of manufacturing-focused publications and websites themselves.  They devote no attention to these figures at all, even though if what we think we know about international trade is remotely on target, surging trade shortfalls are signalling dismal and perhaps worsening global competitiveness for domestic industry.

So I was a little disappointed to see Peter’s post also repeated the conventional wisdom about the dreadful overall U.S. trade figures released yesterday, and how they mainly reflect clearing up West Coast ports backlogs that are temporarily and unnaturally boosting import numbers.

There’s no doubt that the ports improvement juiced the import number — and helped it rise by a record 7.70 percent month-to-month in March.  But trade goes two ways, remember?  Exports headed abroad through West Coast ports were clogged up, too.  Certainly manufacturers and especially farmers and ranchers had been complaining about their reduced or threatened access to Asian markets in particular.  So has Commerce Secretary Penny L. Pritzker.  Yet the improving West Coast ports situation only resulted in a 0.88 percent monthly rise in U.S. overseas sales.

Nor does the strong dollar – whose recent weakness is also touted as a reason for optimism about future trade flows and their impact on growth – explain adequately why the latest trade figures showed imports rising nearly nine times faster than exports. The exchange rate argument is especially inadequate at a time when the American economy expanded so much more slowly in the first quarter.

Although yesterday’s stunning export-import growth disparity will probably moderate going forward, there’s absolutely no reason to believe it will vanish, or even improve significantly.  Indeed, the latest trade figures should remind us that enormous structural differences exist between the United States and its main trade partners, and that among their leading effects has been making America much more open to imports than they are.

Therefore, until these structural differences are reduced to some meaningful extent, as long as the U.S. economy keeps growing at all, we can expect the trade deficit to keep increasing, to keep slowing that growth, and to keep it ever more dependent on accumulating debt.  Worse, the faster deterioration of the trade deficit impacted most by trade deals and related policies — the non-oil goods deficit — makes clear that current trade policies and the agreements being negotiated now have been part of the problem, not part of the solution.

The Federal Reserve has taken the habit of describing adverse trends it hasn’t predicted as stemming from “transitory” factors — one big reason that it has stuck with a super-easy monetary policy that at best has been yielding ever less impressive results.  Yesterday’s coverage sadly indicates that such hopium — and denialism — is now characterizing the conventional wisdom on trade.