(What’s Left of) Our Economy: October Costs Manufacturing Some Jobs Momentum

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, automotive, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, election 2020, Employment, fabricated metal products, food products, Jobs, Joe Biden, machinery, manufacturing, metals, motor vehicle parts, NFP, non-farm jobs, non-farm payrolls, private sector jobs, recession, regulation, tariffs, taxes, Trade, transportation equipment, Trump, Wuhan virus

The manufacturing jobs picture revealed in this morning’s October official U.S. jobs report was a classic glass-half-empty/half-full story. But for the first time since the employment rebound from its CCP Virus-induced lows, the gloomier view seems to have the edge – though a modest one. The main reason: In October, the rate of cumulative manufacturing job creation fell slightly behind that of the U.S. government’s entire employment universe (so-called non-farm payrolls, or NFP), and of the private sector.

Domestic industry increased its employment level on net by 38,000 in October on a sequential basis. That figure represented a decrease from the September total – which has been revised down from 66,000 to 60,000. But it’s an improvement over August’s also downwardly revised 30,000 total.

In addition, as opposed to dominating the manufacturing jobs picture for good and ill, as it has during the pandemic recovery period, automotive jobs, rose by a mere 1,400. The downward revision in combined vehicle and parts payrolls in September, however (from 14,300 to 7,700) did account for more than all of the total downward manufacturing revision for the month.

October’s manufacturing net jobs-creation leaders were fabricated metals products (7,200), food manufacturing (6,200), primary metals (6,000), and machinery (3,900). The first two categories enjoyed their second straight month of relatively strong job improvement, while the primary metals gain amounted to an important turnaround from September’s 3,400 net employment loss.

At the same time the October machinery results – important because that sector influences so much manufacturing activity overall, and because of its close connections to non-manufacturing industries like agriculture and construction) – were much less impressive than the 12,600 employment rise of September. Worse, this figure itself was downgraded from the initially reported 13,800.

The only significant October jobs loser in manufacturing was transportation equipment. This large category – which includes automotive – shed 2,400 jobs on net. The big problem here was motor vehicle parts, where employment fell by 2,800.

October’s employment progress means that manufacturing overall has regained 742,000 (54.44 percent) of the 1.363 million jobs it lost during the worst of the CCP Virus economic slump of March and April. (Those earlier job losses represented 10.61 percent of the last pre-virus – February – manufacturing employment level.)

As of October, non-farm payrolls total had regained 12.070 million (54.47 percent) of the 22.160 million total decrease they suffered in March and April. So although by this definition, overall U.S. employment plunged by 14.53 percent during the virus low point – more proportionately than manufacturing) — the rate of its jobs rebound is now slightly faster.

Faster still has been the bounceback in private sector jobs. Non-government employment (whose status is much more revealing of the economy’s fundamentals than government employment) fell by 21.191 million in March and April combined – greater relative losses (16.34 percent) than experienced either by manufacturing or the non-farm sector. But its strong October performance mean that it’s regained 12.317 million of these position on net – an increase of 58.12 percent.

But as if the CCP Virus and its decimation of the economy haven’t created enough uncertainties for manufacturing employment (and for the economy as a whole), this week’s Election 2020 results could further muddy the waters – especially if the White House changes hands. Despite October’s jobs slowdown, industry’s employment and output have held up well, due no doubt significantly to President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies and domestic overhauls in taxes and regulations. The Trump manufacturing record pre-virus has also been strong. Would a Biden administration reversal of these moves put U.S. manufacturing back behind the eight-ball? Or would it find new alternative growth fuels for industry?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Through the Pandemic Fog, Signs of Trump Trade Progress Keep Coming

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, aircraft, Boeing, CCP Virus, Census Bureau, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, goods trade, healthcare goods, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, medical devices, non-oil goods trade deficit, pharmaceuticals, services trade, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, trade war, Trump, Wuhan virus

Proof positive that much of the U.S. government grinds on whatever the political tumult surrounding it: Despite the controversies that erupted due to the largely unexpected, still-incomplete, and increasingly contested Presidential election results, the Census Bureau nonetheless still put out the new monthly U.S. trade report yesterday – this one taking the story through September.

And by the bizarro economic standards of the bizarro CCP Virus era, the figures were strangely normal: The various September deficits remained awfully high given an economy whose levels are still markedly subdued despite a powerful growth rebound in the third quarter (which ended in September). Yet although these results have been widely interpreted as a stinging rebuke to effectiveness of President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies (see, e.g., here and here), widely overlooked details reveal major mitigating developments – and resulting reasons for continued encouragement.

As for the awfully high deficits: The combined goods and services trade gap actually decreased on month by 4.73 percent, from a downwardly adjusted $67.04 billion to $63.86 billion. Yet this monthly total (during a troubled economic time) was still firmly in the neighborhood of trade shortfalls during the bubbly mid-2000s, when Washington’s trade policy was about as cluelessly import- and especially China-friendly as possible.

Moreover, back in those days, oil made up a much bigger share of the total goods deficit than today. So obviously, most of the remaining gap owes a good deal to U.S. trade policy decisions – as will be seen below.

Encouragingly, total U.S. exports to a world still largely struggling with virus-related downturns of its own were up 2.55 percent sequentially in September, and registered their best performance ($176.35 billion) since March – just as major pandemic effects were taking hold. Total September imports of $240.22 billion also represented the highest amount ($240.22 billion) since March, but the monthly increase was only 0.51 percent. And where export growth has consistently been strong since May, import growth has begun slowing markedly.

Yet the persistence of high combined goods and services U.S. trade shortfalls stems mainly from problems with services trade that are clearly CCP Virus-related. For example, the longstanding services surplus (which of course includes travel services) is on track for its biggest drop since recessionary 2001. So far, through the first three quarters of 2020, it’s sunk by 20.47 percent on a year-to-date basis.

Indeed, the $43.96 billion reduction in the services surplus has been greater than the $38.54 billion increase in the overall deficit – meaning that if the service surplus had simply remained the same, the total deficit would have declined year-to-date (although still less than expected at least during a normal deep recession).

As indicated above, however, the total trade numbers don’t tell the whole story about the successes or failures of trade policy. That’s because, as known by RealityChek regulars, services are one huge sector where trade agreements and similar decisions have had relatively little impact so far. Ditto for oil

At first glance, examing trade flows that are substantially “Made in Washington” also reveals a nice-sized monthly September reduction in that deficit (4.62 percent), but to a level that’s the third worst on record ($80.74 billion) – just behind the August and July totals, respectively. And on a year-to-date basis, the Made in Washington deficit is up 3.80 percent from last year,to $663.55 billion.

Yet here’s where another detail comes in. This entails the woes of Boeing, which have spread beyond the safety debacle stemming from crashes of its popular 737 Max model to the global virus-induced collapse in air travel.

The safety problems of 2019 cut the longstanding U.S. civilian aircraft trade surplus by nearly 28 percent, or $8.86 billion on a January-September basis. Had the surplus stayed stable, it would have risen only from $600.08 billion during the first three quarters of 2018 to $630.39 billion, rather than $639.25 billion. Given all the import front-running seen throughout 2019 to try to avoid the Trump China tariffs (which artificially inflated the entire non-oil import total), that’s not a bad performance at all.

The aircraft effect has been much more dramatic this year. Year-to-date through September, the Made in Washington deficit is up from that $630.29 billion to $663.55 billion. Yet the nosedive in the aircraft surplus (all the way from $23.16 billion to just under $3 billion) accounts for nearly 83 percent of that increase.

Want another aircraft effect? Check out the manufacturing trade deficit – so rightly the focus of the President’s attention. Month-to-month, it rose by only 1.46 percent. But the new September level of $103.87 billion is the second-worst monthly total of all time – just behind July’s $104.63 billion. Even worse: The aircraft industry’s problems didn’t add to this number, since its trade deficit actually shrunk slightly on month.

But for the entire year so far, the plunge in the aircraft surplus (which, not so coincidentally, has been mirrored by smaller but not trivial reductions in the surpluses of all sorts of aircraft parts, including engines) has made a sizable difference. From January-September, 2019 to this year’s comparable period, the manufacturing trade shortfall has grown by $10.18 billion, from $777.60 billion to $787.78 billion. Take out the $20.16 billion worsening of the aircraft trade surplus, and the $10.18 billion higher year-to-date manufacturing trade deficit becomes a nearly $10 billion lower year-to-date manufacturing trade deficit.

And when it comes to both the manufacturing and overall Made in Washington trade deficits and a virus effect, don’t forget its healthcare goods component. Specifically, the U.S. trade deficit in pharmaceutical preparations jumped by $12.58 billion year-to-date between last year and this year, and in the categories containing (but not restricted to) protective gear like masks and gowns, testing swabs, ventilators, and oxygen tents by another $2.33 billion.

Since China remains so important for Made in Washington and manufacturing trade flows, bilateral exports, imports, and deficits not surprisingly reveal a major pandemic effect, too. The big China difference is how strongly the September data confirm that President Trump’s goals of reducing the bilateral trade gap and decoupling economically from the People’s Republic are being achieved even without taking the CCP Virus into account.

On a monthly basis, the goods trade gap with China dipped fractionally in September, to $29.67 billion. This total represented the second straight such drop and the lowest level since Aprils $28.40 billion. These merchandise imports inched up sequentially in September by just under one percent and have been virtually flat since July, but goods exports improved by 4.53 percent.

On a year-to-date basis, America’s China trade looks like it’s in even better shape. U.S. goods imports from China are off by nearly 11 percent ($37.54 billion) over this stretch, and the trade gap has become 15.24 percent ($40.06 billion) smaller.

This progress, moreover, has been achieved even though total U.S. exports of civilian aircraft and parts (including engines) to China have shrunk by $4.09 billion and the trade deficit in the virus-related medical equipment categories has risen by $1.25 billion. (Oddly, the bilateral pharmaceutical preparations trade balance has improved with the surplus improving from $449 million to $836 million.)

When all of these virus-related complications and the inevitably disruptive and therefore initial efficiency-reducing impact of the Trump trade policies are considered, two questions arise that are equally fascinating and important. First, once these temporary shocks pass, will this approach to globalization look more like a win or a loss for the U.S. economy? Second, will American election politics give the nation a chance to find out?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Good News About Manufacturing Reshoring to the U.S.

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, automotive, Canada, China, domestic content, Foley & Lardner, manufacturing, Mexico, quotas, reshoring, rules of origin, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA

President Trump’s critics have often complained that even if his trade war with and tariffs on China have prompted many U.S.-owned and other companies to move production out of the People’s Republic, relatively few are relocating back to the United States. (See, e.g., here.) So it was especially interesting to come across a survey of mainly America-headquartered firms indicating that the Trump policies actually deserve pretty high marks for benefiting domestic industry.

The study was conducted by the legal and business advisory firm Foley & Lardner, and involved 143 executives (presumably from 143 companies). Fully 78 percent were “primarily based in the U.S.” and most of the rest were from Mexico. And their businesses ranged throughout the manufacturing sector, with the two biggest industries represented being automotive and general manufacturing (22 percent each). These companies’ sizes and places in global supply chains varied significantly, too.

When it comes to China production and sourcing strategies, Foley found that 21 percent of these respondents “have already” moved “some” of their facilities out of the People’s Republic, 22 percent were “currently in the process of doing so,” and 16 percent are “considering” this option. Of the remaining 39 percent of respondents, 16 percent have rejected leaving China, and 23 percent say they haven’t considered such a move to date.

These numbers roughly correspond with the results of other, similar surveys and reports. (E.g., this one.) But the real eye opener came from answers to the question “To what other countries are you moving, or considering moving, production or sourcing of goods and/or services?” Of the companies that said they’re moving production or sourcing from China, 74 percent mentioned the United States. The next most popular option was Mexico (47 percent), followed by Canada (24 percent), and Vietnam (12 percent).

These percentages (and others) add up to more than 100 because, as the question implied, firms can be leaving China for more than one country, in order to hedge their bets against dangers like tariffs, pandemics, and the like. But they make clear that the United States has been prominently in the mix, and so has the Western Hemisphere – which helps U.S.-based manufacturing because goods made in Mexico and Canada tend to have relatively high levels of American-made parts and components and other industrial inputs.

To be sure, there’s some evidence that these levels have been falling in recent years. But there’s also reason to expect that the Trump administration’s U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA – its rewrite of the North American Free Trade Agreement), will reverse these trends at least in part because its provisions require that goods receiving tariff-free treatment in the tri-national trade zone contain higher levels of North American content overall, and because of quotas on U.S. automotive imports from Mexico (which haven’t kicked in yet but which seem likely to in the not-too-distant future).

I’d be the last one to claim that the Foley report settles the argument over how effective the Trump trade policies have been in encouraging manufacturing reshoring. But when all the hard data showing U.S. domestic manufacturing’s resilience both during the current pandemic (in terms of both jobs and output), and during a disruptive event like a trade war, are considered, the Foley findings look anything but fanciful.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Records and More Puzzles in the GDP Report’s Trade Numbers

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, CCP Virus, Commerce Department, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, GDP, global financial crisis, goods, Great Recession, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, recession, services, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus

So many all-time and multi-year and even decade worsts revealed by the trade data revealed in the official U.S. economic growth figures released this morning! And even though these data on changes in the gross domestic product (GDP) for the third quarter of this year are pretty meaningless from an economic standpoint – because they’re so thoroughly distorted by the government-ordered shutdowns and reopenings due to the CCP Virus – they’re worth noting for the record, anyway.

But here’s something else worth noting – as with the last batch of GDP figures (the final-for-now results for the second quarter), the trade figures don’t seem to add up.

Let’s start with the records. Largely due to the strongest sequential U.S. growth on record (33.1 percent after inflation on an annualized basis), fueled by significant reopening plus massive government stimulus or relief funds (choose your own label), the quarterly inflation adjusted trade deficit hit an astounding $1.0108 trillion annualized. (The inflation-adjusted, or “real,” statistics are the ones most closely followed; therefore, unless otherwise specified, they’ll be the ones used from hereon in.)

Not only was that total a record in absolute terms. The 30.41 percent increase from the final second quarter level of $775.1 billion was the biggest since the Commerce Department began presenting trade deficit figures (as opposed to the simple export and import findings) in 2002. For context, the next greatest such jump was only 13.18 percent, between the first and second quarters of 2010.

The economy was recovering then, too – from the Great Recession that followed the global financial crisis – but that quarter’s annualized growth rate was only 3.69 percent.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the GDP reports treat increases in the trade deficit as subtractions from growth, and the third quarter’s was the worst in absolute terms (3.09 percentage points from that 33.1 percent annualized growth total) since the 3.22 percentage points sliced from growth in the third quarter of 1982. (For some reason, these data go back even further than that.)

In relative terms, though, the trade effect in 1982 couldn’t have differed more from the situation this year, as during that third quarter, the economy shrank in price-adjusted terms by 1.5 percent on an annual basis.

But those internal numbers!

According to the Commerce Department, exports in the third quarter added up to $2.1667 trillion annualized. But if you actually add the separate goods and services numbers provided, you get a sum of $2.1921 trillion. On the import side, the separate figures add up to a total of $3.2123 trillion, not the reported $3.1775 trillion. Therefore, the quarterly deficit would seem to be $1.0202 trillion, not the $1.0108 trillion presented.

As with the previous discrepancies, although this batch’s aren’t big enough to change the overall picture, they do raise some questions about the reliability of the rest of the data. So I’ll be hoping that the apparent confusion will be cleared up a month from now, when Commerce releases its second estimate for third quarter GDP – but not holding my breath.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Green Shoots of Recovery in New York City?

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, CCP Virus, consumer spending, coronavirus, COVID 19, election 2020, healthcare, Jobs, New York City, restaurants, stimulus package, subsidized private sector, The Partnership for New York City, Wuhan virus

Since I’m a New York City native, I’m a New York City fan. (At least I think that logically follows!) Therefore, one of the most disturbing trends I’ve followed in the CCP Virus era concerns the especially serious troubles the City has suffered this year, economically as well as medically.

I still haven’t made up my mind about whether New York has been pushed by the virus into a period of long-term decline, or whether we’ll see a return to normal once the pandemic has been brought under control (insert your own definition of this goal).

Yet for the last two months, whenever the case for pessimism seems to become conclusive (see, e.g., so much of the evidence in this recent New York Times piece), an email appears in my inbox from a friend who sends me the regular updates on the City’s economy from the Partnership for New York City.

The organization, comprised of hundreds of New York’s most prominent business leaders, says it seeks to “build bridges between the leaders of global industries and government, drawing on the resources and expertise of business to help solve public challenges, create jobs and strengthen neighborhoods throughout the five boroughs.”

Whatever you think of its sincerity or effectiveness or overall objectivity, the data it regularly releases tracks with statistics I monitor from other sources, so it seems reliable to me. And some of the figures it’s presented lately have been major stunners.

For example, as early as late July, the Partnership reported, consumer spending in the City had nearly returned to 2019 levels. In late March, it had plunged to 53 percent below them. Just as unexpected – the big laggards were New York’s wealthiest boroughs, Manhattan and Brooklyn (although maybe the Manhattan results weren’t so surprising, given its dependence on business from office workers, so many of whom weren’t commuting to their offices).

According to a late-September bulletin from the Partnership, not only had New York’s private sector employment increased on month, but “the city has outpaced U.S. private sector job growth for three consecutive months.” The leader here was the healthcare sector – which RealityChek regulars know are only partly private sector jobs, given the industry’s massive dependence on government subsidies. (See, e.g., here.) But the same problem distorts the national figures, so this finding still legitimately counts as a pleasant surprise.

Even more surprising: “209 business licenses were issued in September, up 11% from 189 licenses issued in August. The number of new business licenses has increased for four consecutive months and is up 260% since May.”

Of course, this number of businesses is less-than-tiny for such a gargantuan metropolis. But any signs of entrepreneurship these days are encouraging, and support the even more encouraging possibility that the City remains a powerful magnet for individuals with talent and drive.

No one can doubt that New York still faces massive challenges going forward, especially since the onset of winter, and the growth of lockdown fatigue, means that a second virus wave may hit. Moreover, the colder the weather gets, the greater the struggles of a hugely important restaurant sector that’s been able collectively to hang on with its fingernails thanks to regulatory reforms that helped eateries expand outdoor dining since late spring.

The fiscal situation seems dire as well – unless Democrats sweep to power in next week’s national elections and approve the kind of big aid package for cities and states that Republicans have generally resisted. (The continuing deadlock over a broader relief bill, which could drag on if Republicans retain the White House and/or Senate, obviously could remain a big problem, too.)

Even then, the City will be hard-pressed going forward to fund needed services adequately without the kinds of tax increases that tend to drive taxpayers away, cuts in more controversial outlays that tend to antagonize powerful constituencies like public employee unions, or some combination of both.

For now, however, these Partnership reports have been revealing impressive resilience in the New York City economy. And it bears remembering that, over any significant period of time, so far no one has ever made any serious money betting against it.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Curious Trade War Omission from the New York Fed

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, China, exports, Made in Washington trade flows, manufacturing, New York Fed, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump

If you were writing an economics blog item for a major government institution in America, and your subject was a trend that for two years now has been a major controversy in America, wouldn’t you include information on how that trend actually was affecting America?

Not apparently if you’re Hunter L. Clark, and you work for the New York branch of the Federal Reserve system – which hasn’t exactly been shy about weighing in on this controversy (President Trump’s tariffs on China) before (See, e.g., here and here.) Even more unusual: that previous New York Fed contribution to the trade war debate had emphatically concluded that the President’s policies have been an abject failure. Had this new item presented U.S.-relevant data, the clear conclusion would have been that the trade war has succeeded in at least one crucial respect.

Specifically, in a post last Friday, Clark wrote on how China’s export performance so far this year has been “supercharged” by the CCP Virus pandemic (which of course originated in one of its major cities).

Clark also noted various (convincing) reasons that this surge might be temporary, and even observed that some other counties had actually out-performed China export-wise. But China’s exports to the United States – which of course the tariffs (along with the rest of the President’s trade policies) aimed to curb and ultimately reduce) – went completely unmentioned. And that’s an awfully odd omission because combining Clark’s figures with readily available U.S. Census data shows that this wave of China export increases completely missed the United States.

According to Clark, compared with the same quarters last year, China’s overall goods exports this year “slightly increased in the second quarter and are currently forecast to grow by close to 6 percent in the third and fourth quarters of this year.” He italicized “increased” because forecasts generally expected a ten percent decline in Chinese overseas sales during these periods.

But despite that slight increase in China’s global merchandise exports between the second quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020, during that year, official U.S. data show that these exports to the United States fell by 6.67 percent. And in contrast to the six percent improvement in China’s worldwide exports between the third quarter of 2019 and the third quarter of this year, its exports to the United States were down by 2.98 percent.

Also relevant to the trade war debate – did the Trump tariffs simply result in shifting the makeup of U.S. imports from China to other countries, therefore accomplishing nothing (at best) economically for the nation according to one of the Trump’s (and Trumpers’) favorite scorecards? Clark more reasonably doesn’t investigate this question, but the official American data make the Trump record look awfully good according to this standard, too.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the best global proxy for U.S.-China goods trade is U.S. non-oil China goods trade, and that’s especially true on the import side, since the United States buys no oil from China. And the numbers for this “Made in Washington” import flow (so named because commerce in these goods is strongly influenced by government trade policy) make clear that, whatever import shifting has taken place hasn’t prevented overall U.S. purchases of these foreign products from falling also.

Between the second quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020, they fell by a whopping 18.92 percent. Since the U.S. September trade figures won’t be out until early next month, full third quarter results aren’t yet available. But on a July-August basis, these global Made in Washington imports were off by 2.13 percent.

These subjects, moreover, clearly are of more than academic or political score-settling interest. Despite facing the same CCP Virus-induced disruptions as the rest of the economy, domestic manufacturing – which is heavily exposed to Chinese and other foreign competition – has held up well. In inflation-adjusted terms, it’s production from its February peak through September is down just over six percent. Employment has been relatively resilient, too, along with capital spending.

Imagine how much worse its troubles would have been if it experienced the kind of Chinese export flood that’s washed over other economies. Indeed, this counter-factual seems eminently worthy of study. Including by the New York Fed.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Has the U.S. Seen Peak Manufacturing Output for the Virus Era?

Tags

(What's Left of) Our Economy, appliances, automotive, capex, capital spending, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Federal Reserve, furniture, household appliances, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, Institute for Supply Management, machinery, manufacturing, real growth, recession, recovery, Wuhan virus

Today’s monthly Federal Reserve report on U.S. manufacturing production was full of surprises, but not enough were of the good kind. And with signs of economic slowing on the rise, the new figures – for September – could mean that, for the time being, industry’s relative out-performance during the pandemic era will begin weakening markedly as well.

The surprises start with the overall figure for the September monthly change in inflation-adjusted output for American factories. Despite an abundance of encouraging data from so-called soft surveys like those issued by the private Institute for Supply Management and the Fed system’s regional banks (see, e.g., here) real manufacturing production dropped by 0.29 percent sequentially. The decrease was the first since April, when national economic activity as a whole bottomed due to the spread of the CCP Virus and resulting shutdowns and stay-at-home orders.

The biggest bright spot in the report came from the upward nature of most revisions. August’s initially reported 0.96 percent monthly gain is now judged to have been 1.13 percent. The July result was upgraded from 3.97 percent to 4.30 percent. And June’s previous 7.64 percent improve was reduced to 3.61 percent. Further, these advances built on similar upward revisions that accompanied last month’s Fed report for August.

In fact, the revisions effect was strong enough to leave domestic industry’s cumulative after-inflation production performance during the virus-induced downturn better than the Fed’s estimate from last month. As of that industrial production report (for August), manufacturing constant dollar production had fallen 6.39 percent from its levels in February – the final month before the pandemic began impacting the economy. Today’s new September release now pegs that decline at only 5.81 percent, and even the monthly September decrease left it at 6.08 percent.

Nevertheless, the breadth of the September monthly decrease in overall price-adjusted manufacturing output unmistakably disappointed. Yes, the automotive sector (vehicles and parts combined) saw its on-month production tumble by 4.01 percent. But in contrast to most of the manufacturing data during the CCP Virus period, automotive didn’t move the overall manufacturing needle much, as real output ex-auto rose only fractionally in September.

Also discouraging –and unexpected, considering the good recent capital spending data reported by the Census Bureau (see, e.g., the “nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft” numbers for new orders in Table 5 in this latest release) – was the 0.41 inflation-adjusted production decline in the big machinery sector following five months of growth.

And even though the U.S. housing sector has been booming during the recession, real output of furniture also slumped for the first time in six months (by 0.96 percent), while price-adjusted household appliances production was down 4.99 percent after its own good five-month run.

As indicated by today’s revisions, these glum September manufacturing output figures could be upgraded in the coming months. Yet given the CCP Virus’ return – which will at best greatly complicate the challenge of maintaining recovery momentum for industry and the entire national economy – no one can reasonably rule out the possibility that, for now, Americans have seen peak post-virus manufacturing production.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Public Outscores the Experts on China Trade Policy

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, allies, America First, Blob, Center for Strategic and International Studies, China, CSIS, elites, globalism, multilateralism, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, World Trade Organization, WTO

So many big takeaways from a new poll on U.S. and global attitudes toward China and U.S. China policy (both the economic and national security dimensions), I hardly know where to begin! But if I could only write a lede paragraph for a single news article (or blog item), here’s what I’d say: The American public is a great deal more sensible on how to deal with the People’s Republic than so-called “thought leaders.” And what I mean by “more sensible” is more “America First-y” and less globalist.

The survey was conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington, D.C.-based think tank not only squarely in the globalist camp, but a charter member of the globalist, bipartisan U.S. foreign policy “Blob” (which includes a sizable trade and economic sub-Blob) that exerted dominant influence over America’s course in world affairs until Donald Trump came along, and whose supposed expertise still mesmerizes the Mainstream Media.

Of special interest, CSIS sampled opinion from everyday Americans, those so-called thought leaders (whose follower-ship, as implied above, is greatly diminished), and thought leaders from countries that are U.S. allies or “partners.”

The gap between public and elites on China policy views seems widest on the economic and trade issues that President Trump has made so central to his approach towards the People’s Republic, and the CSIS survey contains decidedly good news for him and his fans in this area: The general public is much more supportive of the “go-it-alone,” unilateral sanctions and tariffs imposed by Mr. Trump to combat and/or eliminate Chinese transgressions in this area than the Blob-ers.

Although a multilateral approach (using “international agreements and rules to change China” economically) won plurality backing among the general public (34.8 percent), fully 69 percent of the U.S. thought leaders favored this route. Yet nearly a third of the U.S. public (32.8 percent) endorsed employing “U.S. government tools like sanctions and tariffs”, versus only three percent of the deep thinkers.

As I’ve written repeatedly, (e.g., here and here) a multilateral China trade strategy is bound to fail because international institutions (like the World Trade Organization) are too completely filled by countries that either rely heavily on China-style predation to compete in the global economy, and because even (or especially?) longstanding U.S. treaty allies had been doing business so profitably with the People’s Republic that the last development they wanted to see was a disruption of the pre-Trump status quo. So support for multilateralism in this case can legitimately be taken as support for do-nothing-ism – especially since the vast majority of these elites so enthusiastically pushed for the reckless U.S. expansion of commerce with China that’s lined many of their pockets, but that’s undermined American prosperity and national security.

The CSIS poll, moreover, provides some indirect evidence for this argument: Nearly as high a share of the foreign thought leaders backed a multilateral approach for dealing with China economically (65 percent) as their U.S. counterparts. And their support of U.S.-only approaches (seven percent) was only slightly higher than that of the U.S. thought leaders’ three percent. (The foreign thought leaders may be slightly more gung ho for America going it alone due to confidence that their own products will fill any gaps in the China market left by U.S. producers shut out by the trade wars. On a net basis, though, their countries are coming out losers this year.)

At the same time, one surprising (at least to me) economics-related finding emerged from the survey: Whether we’re talking about the American people generally, or thought leaders at home or abroad, just under 20 percent favor substantial decoupling from China as the best economic approach for the United States.

When it comes to messaging, however, the survey isn’t such great news for Mr. Trump – and Trumpers – on China trade issues. On the one hand, answers to the question on evaluating his performance in this area can – although with a stretch – be interpreted to show majority support for the view that his record has achieved noteworthy gains. Principally, 27.8 percent of U.S. public respondents agreed that the President’s China measures have “been effective in producing some tactical changes in Chinese economic policy” and 9.9 percent believe they have “been effective in forcing long-term changes.” Those groups add up to 37.7 percent of the sample.

Another 20.5 percent checked the box stating that Trump policies have “hurt U.S. consumers and exporters but protected important U.S. industries.” A case can be made that at least some members of this group would give these policies good grades, or that many would give them partly good grades, possibly bringing the total for positive views somewhere in the mid-40 percent neighborhood.

Much more certain, however, is that the most popular single answer (with 41.8 percent support) was that the trade war “has damaged U.S. economic interests without achieving positive change in China.”

Also signaling a Trump China messaging problem – as with much other commentary, the CSIS survey mostly measures China policy success as changing Chinese behavior. In my view, that goal is much less important – because it’s much less realistic, at least in terms of producing verifiable reform – than protecting U.S.-based producers from China’s economic predation. The relative resilience shown by domestic industry both throughout the trade war and into the CCP Virus-induced recession indicate that this goal is being achieved. But neither the President nor his economic nor his campaign team mentions it much, if at all.

CSIS’ polling also found that fully 71 percent of U.S. thought leaders gave Trump’s China economic policies the big thumbs down – and although they don’t vote, their aforementioned influence in the Mainstream Media could partly explain why broader American opinion on the Trump record seems so divided. (For the record, foreign thought leaders weren’t asked to rate the Trump strategy.)

But having established that everyday Americans have a good deal to teach the experts on China trade and economic policy, how do the two compare on China-related national security policies? As indicated above, the gap here isn’t nearly so wide, but worth exploring in some detail – as I’ll do in a forthcoming post!

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Trade Wars Would’ve Been Much Easier to Win if Not for Boeing

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, aerospace, aircraft, aircraft parts, Boeing, manufacturing, metals tariffs, tariffs, Trade, trade wars, Trump

Today’s grim news about recent Boeing aircraft orders and deliveries is just the latest valuable reminder that any evaluation of the Trump record on manufacturing and trade policy has to take into account the entire aircraft and parts industry’s transformation from a slight to a bigtime industrial laggard. Moreover, Boeing’s weakness – which has nothing to do with the President’s trade or any other policies — seems likely to continue for the foreseeable future, at least according to Boeing. The company’s latest long-term forecast for the global aircraft market affirms that it will take years for aviation worldwide to return to pre-CCP Virus levels.

The degree of the pain inflicted by Boeing’s troubles – which also include major safety woes that started making headlines in early 2019 – on the whole of domestic industry, and how unrelated manufacturing’s overall Trump era performance has been to the President’s tariff-heavy trade policies, becomes clear from diving into the most detailed U.S. manufacturing output figures available: the Federal Reserve’s industrial production data.

For example, the Fed numbers show that, during the Obama administration, adjusting for inflation, manufacturing output increased by 14.65 percent. Real aircraft and parts production output growth was just slightly slower: 12.39 percent.

But from the start of the Trump years until the arrival of the pandemic (February, 2017 through February, 2020), whereas the manufacturing sector as a whole expanded by 3.60 percent in price-adjusted terms, the aircraft and parts industry shrank by 13.10 percent.

Since the virus struck (from February through the latest available – August – numbers)? Manufacturing output is down by 6.39 percent after inflation, and aircraft and parts production is off by 10.81 percent.

As for the trade war impact, from March, 2018 (the first full month of President Trump’s metals tariffs and a good place for marking the start of the broader trade wars) until February, 2020 (the last month before the virus began significantly affecting manufacturing and the entire domestic economy), overall manufacturing production grew by a bare 0.83 percent. But that poor performance was clearly dragged down by the nation’s aircraft and parts factories – which turned out 10.74 percent less in terms of constant dollar product value.

Aircraft and parts were major industrial also-rans, too, during the comparable 23-month period preceding the first full month of the Trump metals tariffs. Their real production slumped by 4.11 percent, as manufacturing’s overall production rose by 4.07 percent.

The bottom line, then, couldn’t be clearer. The President was wrong in insisting that trade wars for big deficit countries like the United States are “easy to win.” But the facts also demonstrate that the victories the nation has won in these conflicts – which have been significant – would have been come much easier had the aerospace sector and its long-time leader Boeing not turned into such major losers.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Restaurant Nation and its Consequences

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, CCP Virus, coronavirus, drinking places, food services, Jobs, Manhattan Institute, New York City, private sector, private sector jobs, recession, restaurants, The New York Daily News, wages, Wuhan virus

If you’re interested in New York City and its economy, and how it’s been affected by the CCP Virus, and major changes in the nation’s economy and family life, Howard Husock’s op-ed piece in The New York Daily News last month dealing with all these subjects is a must-read. In fact, it’s so interesting and important that it led me to investigate how the rise of the restaurant sector in the City – his prime focus – has played out nationally.

As shown by the author, a researcher at the Manhattan Institute, the restaurant industry has become nothing less than vital to the city’s economy. The wallop it’s taken from the virus and resulting shutdowns has thrown its full recovery – at least for the foreseeable future – into serious doubt. And therefore its sagging fortunes and seemingly gloomy prospects are strongly influencing the debate over how fast the City should return to business-as-usual.

At least as consequential, Husock argues convincingly that the burgeoning importance of the broad food service industry in recent decades reflects a major New York economic and social trend: Restaurants “can no longer be understood as the luxury it once was but, rather, as both a prerequisite for a successful economic recovery and an indicator that one is underway.”

When I looked into the national data (some of which Husock presents), I found that something like this conclusion is warranted for the country as a whole as well – and that it’s worrisome news at best economically.

Husock’s national data goes way back to the early 20^th century, and it looks at the U.S. labor market measured in terms of the types of occupations Americans hold. I’ve looked at the data measuring employment by sector of the economy, and although the restaurant figures only begin with 1990, they picture they draw looks comparable. (RealityChek regulars will note that I’m not using my usual method of comparing economic expansions to economic expansions, or recessions to recessions. My reason: the trends described here seem to hold during all kinds of economies – as I’ll indicate below.)

Chiefly, the numbers make clear that from 1990 to the end of 2019 (just before the virus struck), on a December-to-December basis, total U.S. employment in the private sector grew by 42.58 percent. But in the food services and drinking places category, the increase was 86.48 percent – more than twice as great. In food service businesses alone (excluding bars), the growth was 89.52 percent. That is, the workforces in these sectors, white- and blue-collar employees combined, nearly doubled during this period.

Particularly noteworthy – during the 2000s (which include the 2007-09 Great Recession), total private sector jobs fell by 2.99 percent. For the food service and drinking places, they increased by 14.44 percent, and for eating places alone, by 16.24 percent. So as I just stated, these trends seem to have unfolded during booms and bust alike.

Viewed through another statistical lens, in 1990, food services and drinking places employees represented 7.22 percent of all private sector workers. In December, 2019, this share was 9.44 percent. For eating places alone, the 1990-2019 rise was from 6.44 percent to 8.56 percent.

Also crucial to note: However, increasingly convenient dining or taking out has become for Americans, the rapid relative growth of restaurant-type jobs doesn’t look like a plus for their economy. The main reason? Restaurant industry jobs really do pay poorly.

In December, 2019, the average hourly wage in the private sector was $28.37 before adjusting for inflation. For food services and drinking places in toto, it was $15.34 (not much more than half the private sector average) and for eating places alone, only $15.09.

The only real bright spot in this picture: wages in restaurant-type jobs have been rising faster lately than those for the private sector overall. The data here only date from 2006, but during the 2010-2019 period examined above, on a December-to-December basis, pre-inflation-dollar hourly wages in the private sector advanced by 24.65 percent. For all food service and drinking places, the improvement was 32.12 percent, and for eating places, 31.68 percent.

So the wages gap is closing, but not dramatically.

Precisely because the U.S. workforce was steadily turning into Restaurant Nation until the CCP Virus arrived, as with the New York City economy (though not quite so heavily), the entire economy’s return to a pre-virus normal will depend on financing that will enable a critical mass of this sector to survive. But someone needs to ask whether whether Restaurant Nation is a healthy and sustainable structure for the national economy over the longer haul