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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence that Pay Really is Worsening U.S. Inflation

09 Monday May 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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ECI, Employment Cost Index, Federal Reserve, inflation, Labor Department, labor productivity, multifactor productivity, productivity, recession, wages, workers, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Back in February, I wrote that although U.S. workers’ hourly wages were rising more slowly than the standard measure of consumer prices (the Consumer Price Index, or CPI), and therefore on that basis couldn’t be blamed for the recent, historically high inflation, there was one reason to be worried about the last few years’ healthy pay hikes: Such pay was rising faster than worker productivity.

I explained that this trend inevitably fueled inflation because “when businesses are in situations where wages are rising but their operations are becoming more efficient at a faster rate, they can maintain and even increase profits without passing higher costs on to their customers. When productivity is rising more slowly than inflation, this option isn’t available – or not nearly as readily.”

And more important than my views on the subject, these concerns have been expressed by Jerome Powell, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the U.S. central bank that has the federal government’s main inflation-fighting responsibilities.

So it’s discouraging to report that new government data on both pay and productivity have come out in the last two weeks, and they make clear that the pay-productivity gap has just been widening faster than ever.

The pay data come from the Labor Department’s latest Employment Cost Index (ECI), which tracks not only hourly wages but salaries and benefits, while the productivity figures come from Labor’s new release on labor productivity, which measures how much output a single worker turns out in a single hour. And conveniently, both releases take the story through the first quarter of this year.

The results? From the fourth quarter of last year through this year’s first quarter, total compensation for all private sector workers, the ECI increased by 1.42 percent, while labor productivity for non-farm businesses (the category most closely followed, and basically identical with the private sector) fell by 1.93 percent. That last number was labor productivity’s worst such performance since the third quarter of 1947. (As RealityChek regulars know, I focus on private sector workers because their pay levels largely reflect market forces, not politicians’ decisions, and consequently reveal more about the labor picture’s fundamentals.)  

The year-on-year statistics aren’t much better – if at all. Between the first quarter of last year and the first quarter of this year, the ECI for the private sector grew by 4.75 percent, but labor productivity dipped by 0.62 percent.

And since the U.S. economy began recovering from the first wave of the CCP Virus pandemic, during the third quarter of 2020, the private sector ECI is up by 6.61 percent, while labor productivity is down by 0.78 percent.

As also known by RealityChek readers, labor productivity isn’t the economy’s only measure of efficiency. Multifactor productivity is a broader, and therefore presumably more useful gauge. It’s not as easy to work with because its results only come out annually, and the latest only take the story up to the end of last year.

The picture is decidedly more encouraging – at least recently. From 2020-2021, multifactor productivity for non-farm businesses improved by 3.17 percent. But it still wasn’t good relatively speaking, since from the fourth quarter of 2020 through the fourth quarter of 2021, the private sector ECI increased by 4.38 percent.

Worse, from 2001 (when the Labor Department began the ECI) to last year, pay b that gauge was up 74 percent while non-farm business multifactor productivity had advanced by a mere 16.46 percent.  Therefore, clearly the recent pay and productivity numbers don’t simply stem from pandemic-related distortions of the economy. 

To repeat important points from last February’s post, the productivity lag doesn’t mean that U.S. workers overall don’t deserve nice-sized raises and better benefits, and it certainly doesn’t mean that they’re solely or largely to blame even for poor labor productivity growth. After all, managers are paid as handsomely as they are fundamentally to figure out how to make their employees more productive. Also, productivity is a barometer of economic performance that’s unusually difficult to determine precisely.

But the new figures do strengthen the case that labor costs bear significant responsibility for boosting inflation, and that a major fear surrounding overheated price increases – that inflation acquires powerful momentum as surging prices lead to big wage hike demands and vice versa, and create a spiralling effect that’s excuciatingly difficult to end without the Fed throwing the economy into recession. Just as depressingly, the new pay and productivity figures also strengthen the case that, unless the economy becomes a lot more productive very quickly, the sooner this harsh medicine is administered, the better for everyone in the long run.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Pro-Immigration Labor Shortage Claims Keep Going Up as Real Wages Keep Going Down

07 Thursday Apr 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

compensation, Employment Cost Index, immigrants, Immigration, inflation, inflation-adjusted wages, Labor Department, labor shortage, productivity, wages, Washington Post, workers, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s as if the Open Borders Lobby – both its conservative and liberal wings – has recently decided that it’s really had enough of labor market tightness that’s due to reduced immigration, and that’s also giving so many of America’s workers a long-needed pay raise. So it’s been re-upping the pressure to open the floodgates once again and solve this terrible problem. (See, e.g., here, here, and here.)

As is so often the case, the Open Borders-happy Washington Post editorial board has made the case most succinctly: “[C]ompanies are frantically trying to hire enough workers to keep up with the surge in demand for everything from waffle irons to cars. The nation has more than 11 million job openings and 6 million unemployed.

“This imbalance is giving workers and job seekers tremendous power. Pay is rising at the fastest pace in years….”

Yet this claim is not only profoundly anti-American worker. It’s completely false – at least if you look at the only measures of pay that reveal anything about whether employees are getting ahead or not. And they’re of course the compensation measures adjusted for inflation.

What do they show? Between 2020 and 2021, inflation-adjusted hourly pay for all U.S. workers in the private sector were down by 2.10 percent and for blue-collar workers by 1.52 percent. (As known by RealityChek regulars, the U.S. Labor Department that tracks pay trends for the federal government doesn’t monitor any type of compensation for public sector workers because their wages and salaries and benefits are determined largely by politicians’ decisions, not the forces of supply and demand. As a result, they’re thought to say little about the labor market’s true strengths or weaknesses.)

Do you know when such wages have fallen by that much? Try “never” for the entire workforce (where the Labor Department data go back to 2006), and for blue collar workers, several times during the 1970s, which were a terrible time for the economy overall. (For this group, the official numbers go back to 1964).

But haven’t better benefits compensated? Two Labor Department data sets do measure changes in all forms of compensation. The best known, and the one most closely followed by the Federal Reserve and leading economists everywhere, is the Employment Cost Index (ECI). It covers state and local government (though not federal) employees as well as private sector workers. But there’s no evidence of any inflation-adjusted gains for the nation’s workforce – much less outsized gains – from these statistics either.

From the fourth quarter of 2020 to the fourth quarter of 2021, this index did increase by 4.37 percent for all covered workers (breakouts for white- and blue-collar employees only go up to 2006). Yet during this period, the Labor Department’s inflation measure, the Consumer Price Index, was up 7.42 percent. That’s called “falling behind” in my book.

When business (and government on the state and local levels) starts offering pay that’s rising higher than the inflation rate, then Americans as a whole can start worrying about genuine labor shortages. (And even then, as I’ve written, it would be much better for the economy as a whole if companies responded by boosting their productivity, rather than by agitating for more mass immigation with the aim of driving wages down and of course dodging any incentives to operate more efficiently.) For now, though, it’s obvious that what U.S. business is “frantic” about (to use the Post‘s term) isn’t a shortage of workers. It’s a shortage of cheap workers.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: One Reason Wages May Indeed be Fueling U.S. Inflation

07 Monday Feb 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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business, consumer price index, ECI, Employment Cost Index, Federal Reserve, inflation, Jerome Powell, labor productivity, management, multifactor productivity, productivity, wages, workers, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As known by RealityChek regulars, I’ve pushed back strongly (e.g., here) against claims that today’s historically lofty levels of U.S. inflation have been driven largely or even significantly by wage costs. My main point: However healthy, if the wage increases American workers have gained recently lag behind the overall increase in prices across the entire economy – which has been the case – then how can they deserve much blame?

Even so, one other consideration needs to be added to the mix. It was mentioned by Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell in his press conference following the central bank’s announcement of its monetary policy decisions during the December meeting of its Open Market Committee (the partly rotating group of Fed governors that determines short-term interest rates and, more recently, the pace of bond buying or selling).

As Powell stated, the Fed is watching “the risks that persistent real wage growth in excess of productivity [growth] could put upward pressure on inflation.” That’s because when businesses are in situations where wages are rising but their operations are becoming more efficient at a faster rate, they can maintain and even increase profits without passing higher costs on to their customers. When productivity is rising more slowly than inflation, this option isn’t available – or not nearly as readily.

Powell also said that “we don’t see that yet.” But in fact, if you compare one measure of employee pay that he’s been watching closely with the most current measure of productivity growth, that’s exactly what you’ll see – and been happening consistently for two decades.

The pay gauge in question is the Employment Cost Index (ECI) created by the Labor Department. What’s especially useful about it is that is takes into account not only wages and salaries, but the full range of benefits workers receive. This data series goes back to 2001, and if you (1) look at the total compensation figures for all private sector workers (as always, I leave out government workers because their pay is determined largely by politicians’ decisions, not market forces) in pre-inflation terms, then (2) place them side-by-side with the inflation results, and then (3), check these against the Labor Department’s labor productivity results, it’s clear that pay has been rising considerably faster than productivity.

For example, during largely high-inflation 2021, the employment cost index (which is measured quarterly) rose on an annual basis during all four quarters.Yet during the second, third, and fourth quarters of last year, labor productivity by the same yardstick improved more slowly than the ECI. In other words, worker pay was rising faster than productivity.

Nor are these results atypical. In fact, from the first quarter of 2001 through the fourth quarter of last year, the ECI is up 74.12 percent but labor productivity is up jus 47.62 percent.

Another way to look at the subject: Before the fourth quarter ECI and labor productivity results came out (on January 28 and February 3, respectively), I looked at the annual changes in both sets of data for the third quarters of each year going back to 2001. During those 21 third quarters, annual productivity growth lagged annual ECI growth in 15.

It’s important to note that these conclusions don’t automatically justify assuming that worker compensation increases are a major driver of today’s inflation after all, much less that productivity growth’s relatively slow advance is employees’ fault. After all, as just noted, labor productivity has been rising more sluggishly than the ECI for two decades. Inflation didn’t take off until last year. Moreover, the labor productivity number reflects far more than the amount of physical and/or mental effort workers put into their jobs. It’s also a function of how well business owners perform – e.g., in terms of giving their employees the equipment and training they need to do their jobs effectively, and of organizing their companies in ways that maximize performance.

In addition, labor productivity isn’t the only gauge of efficiency monitored by the Labor Department. Multifactor productivity (also known as total factor productivity) is tracked, too. This data series, as its name implies, tries to determine efficiency by examining all the inputs that go into corporate operations – including not just person hours worked, but capital, energy, materials, and all the services that are used to produce goods and, yes, other services.

I haven’t compared the trends in the ECI and multifactor productivity, though, for one big reason: Because it depends on collecting so much more information, the multifactor productivity results come out much more slowly than the labor productivity reports. And the 2021 figures don’t seem to be due out for several months.

Finally, as I’ve also noted (see, e.g., here), most economists believe that productivity is one of the most difficult features of the economic landscape to measure. So the wage and productivity comparisons should be viewed with some non-trivial amount of caution. 

Yet if worker compensation is indeed rising faster than productivity, that’s a story that’s unlikely to end well for the U.S. economy. Maybe those multifactor productivity figures – whenever the heck they’re released – will provide some much needed further clarity. 

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Signs of a Slowing “Great Resignation” – For Now

02 Wednesday Feb 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Great Resignation, Jobs, JOLTS, quits, quits rate, workers, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Last month I promised to resume following the U.S. Labor Department’s monthly statistics on job turnover for two reasons. First, these numbers, which are crucial to gauging the extent of the CCP Virus-era “Great Resignation” that’s roiled the nation’s employment picture, started showing signs of returning to pre-pandemic norms. Second, these indications that the peak had been hit of Americans voluntarily leaving their jobs pre-dated the arrival of the virus’ super-infectious (but relatively mild) Omicron variant. That development raised the prospect of infection fear and worsening labor shortages keeping the Resignation going strong and even regaining steam.

Yesterday morning, the latest (December) results came out, and this new JOLTS (Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey) suggests that the gradual normalization continued even as Omicron’s impact began metastasizing.

As reported last month, the November JOLTS release showed a record, in absolute terms, in the number of Americans in the non-farm labor force (the U.S. government’s definition of the national employment universe) who quit their jobs.

Yesterday’s figures show that November remains the absolute quits king, but that this figure has been revised down from 4.527 million to 4.449. And quitters’ ranks shrank further in December – to a preliminary 4.339 million.

The quits data for the private sector no doubt says more about the Great Resignation and its fate, since its employment trends reflect mainly market forces and not politicians’ decisions  And the private sector quits level is declining, too. November’s originally reported 4.311 million number is now judged to be 4.283 million, and the preliminary December figure is 4.129 million.

Both the non-farm and private sector quits levels are still considerably higher than their pre-pandemic peaks (July, 2019’s 3.627 million for the former and the same month’s 3.448 million for the private sector). But as known by RealityChek regulars, these absolute numbers don’t tell the whole story, or even the most important parts of the story. In this case, that’s because the number of U.S. workers keeps growing.

Therefore, it’s vital to look at the quits rate – the percentage of workers voluntarily taking their jobs and shoving them. And by this measure, gradual normalization can be seen, too.

For non-farm workers, November’s three percent result was unrevised, and the figure fell to a preliminary 2.9 percent in December. They’re both above the pre-pandemic high of 2.4 percent (which came in February, July, and August of 2019). But the non-farm quits rate has been flat on net since August.

For private sector workers, November’s 3.4 percent figure stayed unrevised, and the quits rate fell to a preliminary 3.2 percent in December. And although these shares, too, are significantly higher than the pre-pandemic peak (2.8 percent, set in January, 2001), the quits rate has actually inched down since reaching 3.3 percent in August.

It’s still too early to say that the Great Resignation has even topped out. After all, the Omicron wave may be cresting now, but the next JOLTS report – due out March 9 and covering January – might still cover a period when it’s widespread. Plus, no one knows for sure whether there’s a new variant in store, and how severe it will be. Moreover, that next JOLTS report will contain revisions going back to January, 2017. So clearly it won’t provide much rest for weary observers trying to figure out how quickly the economy is moving past its CCP Virus-era gyrations – if at all.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Could the “Great Resignation” be Ending?

04 Tuesday Jan 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Great Resignation, Jobs, JOLTS, labor market, labor shortages, quits, quits rate, transitory, workers, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Labor Department’s monthly “JOLTS” report is one of the official U.S. economic data series that I stopped covering during the CCP Virus era. After all, the results seemed to be so overwhelmingly driven by pandemic-specific disruptions, and therefore so unrelated to the fundamental state of the U.S. economy.

I’m still wary of putting too much stock in JOLTS, which stands for Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. As the name suggests, it tracks how many positions at American businesses (including in government) are vacant, how many workers are quitting, how many are getting fired or laid off, and how many are getting hired, and it’s one of the key sets of statistics that have revealed both the extent of the labor shortages marking the economy and of what’s been called the “Great Resignation” – a major and indeed record increase in the numbers and percentages of workers voluntarily leaving their employers.

Yet since this development has so clearly (at least to me) stemmed from pandemicky circumstances, I assumed that it would turn out to be largely “transitory” (to use the Federal Reserve’s now “retired” description of elevated inflation).

So why this JOLTS-y post? Because this morning’s latest report, which takes the story through November, does show signs of normalization in those jobs quits. To be sure, the absolute numbers of quits hit yet another record – 4.527 million. In fact, that total represents the seventh straight month in which this quits level topped the pre-CCP Virus high of 3.627 million, set in July, 2019.

As known by RealityChek regulars, though, absolute numbers don’t provide the entire, or even the most important parts of, a picture. In this case, that’s because the numbers of employed Americans have grown substantially since the JOLTS series began at the end of 2000. What matters more is the quits rate – the percentage of the employed leaving their positions.

For non-farm workers (the Labor Department’s U.S. employment universe), this rate, at three percent in November, is still well above the pre-pandemic high of 2.4 percent – which also came in 2019 (in February, July, and August), as well as in April, 2001. But it’s barely risen on net since April’s 2.8 percent.

For private sector workers, the recent quits rates movement is less dramatic, and that’s more important for judging the transitory-ness of the Great Resignation – because the private sector is much bigger than the public, and the trends shaping it are much more reflective of market forces, not politicians’ decisions.

But it still seems worth noting that even though it rose to a record 3.4 percent in November (significantly higher than the pre-pandemic record 2.8 percent, set back in January, 2001, the private sector quits rate has been pretty stable since coming in at 3.3 percent in August.

Two caveats need to be mentioned, though. First, these November results are preliminary. Second, they predate the arrival in the United States of the CCP Virus’ highly infectious Omicron variant, which threatens to roil labor markets once again for the foreseeable future. One thing’s for sure – it’s time for me to renew monitoring these JOLTS reports!

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Real Wage Decline is Really Widespread

30 Thursday Dec 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 3 Comments

Tags

CCP Virus, child care, coronavirus, COVID 19, elder care, health care, inflation adjusted wages, labor shortages, nursing, real wages, supply chain, trucking, wages, warehousing, workers, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A Facebook exchange I was involved in last night prompted me to check the U.S. government data to find out how widespread was the trend of falling real wages – and by definition falling living standards. And the answer is: incredibly widespread – including in supply chain-related sectors where crippling labor shortages are often blamed for much of the bottleneck problem that has helped fuel inflation by reducing the supply of goods sought by Americans.

The exchange began when a Facebook friend posted her view that the U.S. economy was doing far better than gloomy press reports indicated. I countered with my “putting people first” argument that falling living standards meant that the economy was failing in its fundamental mission: improving Americans’ material lives. My interlocutor responded by claiming that the unusually large number of unfilled job openings have appeared during the stop-and-start recovery from the brief but steep CCP Virus-induced downturn showed that many Americans falling behind economically could easily improve their lot by taking jobs in higher paying industries.

I could have answered by pointing out how many Americans in low-paying jobs in particular lack the training to move that wage ladder. But I was more struck by the pervasiveness of the recent decline in inflation-adjusted hourly pay – which shows that even those able to make that transition will find themselves on a downward moving escalator for the time being.

Specifically, I looked at price-adjusted wage trends on a November, 2020-November, 2021 basis for the eight broadest categories tracked by the Bureau of Labo Statistics (BLS). They are: mining and logging; construction; manufacturing; trade, transportation and utilities; information services; professional and business services; leisure and hospitality; and miscellaneous services.

How many of these eight sectors saw real wage declines between the two Novembers? Seven. Leisure and hospitality was the lone exception, and it’s the lowest paying of these categories by far. The constant dollar wage out-performance there was indeed encouraging, but with these hourly earnings still only standing at $6.88 in 1982-84 dollars – versus $11.13 for the private sector as a whole – I wouldn’t claim economic success just yet.

(As known by RealityChek regulars, BLS doesn’t monitor wages in the public sector because there, pay is determined mainly by politicians’ decisions, not economic fundamentals.)

The names of these eight sectors, however, make clear that they’re so broad that they could include subsectors where the story’s very different. And that’s true even for a number of what might be called pandemic-specific sectors with lots of job openings – but only sometimes.

For example, the enormous national healthcare sector is part of the business and professional services grouping, where real hourly wages of $13.44 – higher than the private sector average – are off by a little over one percent so far this year. But for healthcare alone, they’re up by just under one percent (to a lower $12.13, though).

Dig deeper, and you find that after-inflation wages for hospitals, nursing care facilities, elder care facilities, and child care services, have risen, too. But except for hospital workers (a broad, relatively high paying category itself), hourly wages in 1982-84 dollars in none of these sectors is anywhere close to even a measly $10. And none has seen year-on-year wage increases of more than 1.95 percent (for hospital workers).

The wage situation is even worse in many of the supply chain-related industries within the trade, transportation, and utilities super-sector. For example, next time you hear about a dire nation-wide shortage of truck drivers, keep in mind that their real wages have decreased by 3.67 percent annually as of November. And workers at those equally strained warehouses? They’re only off by 0.25 percent. But they’re supposed to be desperate to hire! What gives?

The most obvious answer to me is that a supposed labor shortage in a sector where real wages are decreasing is really a tale of inadequate pay. But that’s a subject for another post – or six. For today, though, it seems abundantly clear that the headline real wage decline number isn’t masking lots of workers gaining ground, and that if you view that standard as the main test of an economy’s success, America’s is definitely flunking.

Those Stubborn Facts: Behind Biden’s Lousy Polls on the Economy

14 Sunday Nov 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Those Stubborn Facts

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Biden administration, inflation, inflation-adjusted wages, real wages, Those Stiubborn Facts, Trump administration, wages, workers

After-inflation wages for all private sector workers, Feb.-Oct., 2020: (last Trump year):  +2.81 percent 

After-inflation wages for all private sector workers, Feb.-Oct., 2021 (first Biden year):  -1.84 percent  

After-inflation wages for private non-managerial workers, Feb.-Oct., 2020: +2.84 percent 

After-inflation wages for private non-managerial workers, Feb.-Oct., 2021: -1.53 percent  

 

(Sources: “Average hourly earnings of all employees, 1982-1984 dollars, total private, seasonally adjusted,” Employment, Hours, and Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics survey (National), Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, Data Tools, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics Data (bls.gov) and “Average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees, 1982-84 dollars, total private, seasonally adjusted,” Ibid.)

Im-Politic: In Case You Doubt Biden’s Immigration Plans Will Hammer U.S. Wages

19 Sunday Sep 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Biden, Biden border crisis, Breitbart.com, budget reconciliation, chain migration, Council of Economic Advisers, demand, economics, Im-Politic, Immigration, Jobs, labor market, labor shortage, migrants, Neil Munro, supply, wages, workers

We’ve just gotten a bright, flashing sign that, despite some recent stopgap steps (like this and this) obviously meant to convey the impression that the Biden administration hasn’t completely and dangerously lost control of America’s southern border, the President is just as determined as ever to open the floodgates to seemingly unlimited numbers of foreigners.

Worse, the development I’m writing about also makes clear that the President cares not a whit about the likely economic harm his policies will inflict on workers legally in the country at present – too many of whom haven’t exactly been killing it economically for decades now.

That sign consists of a post on the White House’s website by the Chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) and three other government economists touting “The Economic Benefits of Extending Permanent Legal Status to Unauthorized Immigrants.” Just so we’re totally clear on their intent, in plain English, the title would read, “The Economic Benefits of Giving Amnesty to Illegal Aliens.” And the strength of the administration’s Open Borders ambitions is clearest from the utterly threadbare manner in which the authors deal with a central question: whether amnesty would drive down the wages of workers who live in America legally now.

This question of course is especially salient now because, due to the labor market turmoil generated by the CCP Virus pandemic and resulting behavior changes and official responses, U.S. employers are experiencing problems hiring enough workers, and consequently, these workers are enjoying major new leverage in bargaining for higher wages.

As pointed out in the CEA post, “Permanent legal status is likely to increase the effective labor supply of unauthorized immigrants” and that, “Given that providing legal status to unauthorized immigrants would increase their effective labor supply, critics of legalization argue there could be adverse labor market consequences for native and other immigrant workers.”

Here of course is where you’d expect the highly credentialed experts who wrote this post to respond with reams of evidence (or at least citations of scholarly works), decisively proving that, however commonsensical it seems to conclude that increasing the supply of anything (including labor) all else equal will reduce the supply of that thing, it ain’t so in the case of illegal aliens.

But as initially (at least to me) pointed out by Breitbart.com‘s Neil Munro, nothing of the kind happened. Here’s what the CEA said:

“While there is not a large economics literature on the labor market effects of legalization on other workers, in a well-cited National Academies report on the economic and fiscal impact of immigration, a distinguished group of experts concludes that in the longer run, the effect of immigration on wages overall is very small.”

I could write an entire blog post on what’s jaw-droppingly wrong with this sentence’s methodology. Chiefly, it’s not only an appeal to authority – which logically is an implicit confession that the appealers don’t know much themselves about the subject they’re writing about. It’s an appeal to authorities who themselves don’t seem to know much about their subject, or can’t cite any evidence. Therefore they can only offer an evidently unsupported conclusion.

But what’s most important to me about this CEA point is that it never challenges the wages claim made by those “critics of legalization.” All the authors can counter with is a contention that, at some unknown point, the wage depression resulting from amnesty will become “very small.” That’s some comfort to Americans workers today. And for possibly decades.   

Also crucial to point out is how narrow and thus misleading the post’s analytical framework is. It clearly assumes that amnesty won’t stimulate ever greater inflows of foreign laborers who compete against the domestic worker cohort that exists at any given time – which would include the millions of amnestied illegals. Yet everything known about the impact of looser immigration policies – and even official announcements thereof – demonstrates that they exert a powerful magnet effect on other foreigners. Nor do you need to take my word for it. That’s what many migrants themselves have said about the Biden administration’s approach. (See, e.g., here and here.)

The so-called magnet effect of the Biden roll-back of its predecessor’s immigration policies isn’t the only reason to expect the White House’s current approach to supercharge the supply of American workers. To mention just one example, his immigration reform bill and budget reconciliation bill would ease Trump-era limits on “chain migration” – a policy that enables immigrants into the country legally if a spouse, parent, child, or sibling already lives here legally. Further, once these chain migrants arrive, their own relatives receive the same easy entry. And so on. Special bonus: The restrictions on chain migration-related visas granted for employment reasons will be eased even further.

If a better way to keep a huge share of American workers underpaid (especially those in low-wage portions of the economy, which heavily rely on the kinds of low-skill employees who dominate the illegal alien population), let me know. And of course in the cruelest irony of all, as the CEA post shows, among the leading advocates of these wage-hammering measures are the very liberals and progressives that have for decades claimed to be champions of Americans left behind. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Blaming Extra Unemployment Benefits for U.S. Labor Shortages Just Got a Lot Harder

22 Sunday Aug 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Jobs, labor markets, labor shortages, recession, unemployment, unemployment benefits, workers, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you’ve been following the economic news for the last few months, you know that one of the most heated policy debates that’s broken out concerns the impact of the supplemental federal unemployment claims that America’s jobless became eligible for due to the CCP Virus- and lockdowns-induced recession and its continuing aftermath.

Specifically, opponents of these payments – which will end for all states on September 6 (unless they don’t?) – charge that they’ve needlessly enabled many workers to avoid or delay returning to businesses, and thereby greatly worsened labor shortages reported by so many employers. Supporters insist that they’ve been a minor contributor, and that the shortages stem from many more important factors, like ongoing health concerns or childcare issues or the apparent decision of many Baby Boomers and near-Boomers that the pandemic created a convenient time to retire.

I’ve believed for months that the biggest truth has been “all of the above,” but have been frustrated by the lack of statistics that could at least start providing reasonably convincing answers. And unfortunately, this post’s appearance doesn’t mean that terrific data has been found. But what I’ve gone over in the last few days seems reasonably informative, and what it tells me is that the extra federal benefits haven’t been a significant deal at all in the U.S. jobs picture.

What I did was compare four indicators of employment for the states that announced that they’d stop paying those extra benefits by the end of June (along with Louisiana, which announced a July 31 cutoff) and for the states that have decided to continue them as long as Washington was sending the funds. The indicators are unemployment rates, numbers of people employed, first-time jobless claims filed, and levels of continuing jobless claims. And recent Labor Department reports make possible comparing the unemployment rates between June and July, and both sets of claims numbers between the week ending June 26 and the week ending July 24. So they should provide some information on whether the announcement of imminent cutoffs led the jobless to secure reemployment faster.

These data can’t provide definitive answers for numerous reasons. For example, as this article makes clear, the $300 extra federal benefits on which I concentrated haven’t been the only extra benefits provided during the pandemic, and even six of the “early cutoff” states have continued to provide some combination of the others. In addition, two of the early cutoff states have been under court orders to continue the benefits (Indiana and Maryland), and lawsuits are pending in three others (Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas.) Moreover, state benefit levels vary tremendously, both in terms of payment amounts and eligibility periods. So depending on where they live, unemployed Americans could have lost various extended benefits and still received benefits from their state governments (for varying timeframes) generous enough to affect their need or desire to return to work.

But what follows is a pretty good start to the search for answers. And analysts do get one break: The states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia to be examined divide evenly into two groups of 26.

First, the jobless rate comparisons. As widely known, these aren’t perfect measures of the national employment situation because they leave out big categories of distressed workers like those too discouraged to even search for a job, and those employed part-time because they have no other choice. And as suggested above, they shed no light on changes in the numbers of retirees.

Be that as it may, of the 26 cutoff states, between June and July, unemployment rates fell in 19, rose in three, and held steady in four. And of the twenty cutoff states where no litigation was either affecting payment policies or coming down the pike, and excluding tardy Louisiana, jobless rates fell in 16, rose in two, and remained unchanged in two.

How does that compare with the unemployment rates in the non-cutoff states? They fell in 18 of the 26 states between June and July, rose in four, and held steady in four. So I don’t see a big difference there.

Turning to employment levels, of the 26 total cutoff states, from June to July, they rose in 23 and fell in three. Of the twenty facing no litigation issues and, again, also excepting Louisiana, employment levels rose in 19 and fell in one. Those results actually slightly lag the performance of the non-cutoff states, where employment levels rose in 25 of the 26 between June and July.

It’s much the same story for initial jobless claims from the week ending June 26 and the week ending July 24. For the 26 total cutoff states, initial claims between these two weeks rose in six and fell in 20. Of the 20 facing no legal issues, and excepting Louisiana, claims rose in five and fell in 15.

That’s almost identical to the results for the non-cutoff states, where initial claims between those two weeks rose in five states and fell in 21. In fact, a slight edge goes to these states on this score, too.

Finally, for continuing claims, in the 26 total cutoff states, these fell in 21 and rose in five between the weeks in question. And of the 20 with no litigation existing or pending, and excluding tardy Louisiana, continuing claims fell in 15 and rose in five.

In this group of 26, 22 saw continuing claims fall and four saw the rise.

Again, I’m not contending that these numbers are definitive. More detailed analysis accounting for more of the aforementioned differences among states would help a lot. Nor do I doubt that labor shortages have emerged in some parts of the economy. But if there’s proof out there that the extended unemployment benefits had much impact, it hasn’t emerged yet – and let’s hope it emerges before the economy runs aground for an extended period again.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Can the U.S. Really Eliminate All Its Lousy Jobs?

25 Friday Jun 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

automation, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Daniel Alpert, elder care, Ezra Klein, hospitality, hotels, Jobs, low-wage jobs, productivity, restaurants, seniors, technology, The New York Times, wages, workers, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Over the last month, two noted and anything-but-radical economics commentators have voiced an idea that’s really radical. How radical? It could produce much more fundamental change in the U.S. economy than any actual or even potential effects of the CCP Virus if its policy implications (which they may not be fully aware of) are acted on.

The idea is that the pre-virus economy (they didn’t specify for how long, but there’s no reason to believe the development began recently) was highly dependent on creating huge numbers of crappy, dead end, low-wage jobs, and that a combination of labor cost-boosting factors – like worker shortages created largely by sudden economic reopening, higher minimum wage requirements, and mandates for businesses to adopt more family-friendly practices – is bringing that era to an end.

The implications: Enormous numbers of the companies and even critical masses of entire industries relying on such jobs may go under, and that nothing should be done to restore the previous status quo because in economic terms (which are also reflecting the public’s non-economic preferences) those exploitative business models are simply becoming thoroughly uncompetitive.

In other words, especially in sectors like restaurants, retail, hospitality, and elder care, where the quality of personal service is valued by customers (not that they always get the quality they want), many and even most employers simply may find significantly higher labor costs unaffordable. And many may not be able to persuade enough customers to pay the higher prices they’d need to charge to stay afloat. So they wouldn’t – and good riddance.

The analyst who first led me to these thoughts was Daniel Alpert, a Cornell University Law School fellow, economist, and Wall Street investor. In a June 1 New York Times op-ed article, he argued that:

“The chronic problem we face as we put Covid-19 in the rearview mirror is that the U.S. economy before the pandemic was incredibly dependent on an abundance of low-wage, low-hours jobs. It was a combo that yielded low prices for comfortably middle-class and wealthier customers and low labor costs for bosses, but spectacularly low incomes for tens of millions of others.”

Less than two weeks later, The Times published another article, by columnist Ezra Klein, that similarly contended:

“The American economy runs on poverty, or at least the constant threat of it. Americans like their goods cheap and their services plentiful and the two of them, together, require a sprawling labor force willing to work tough jobs at crummy wages….We discuss the poor as a pity or a blight, but we rarely admit that America’s high rate of poverty is a policy choice, and there are reasons we choose it over and over again.”

Klein also wrote about some of the likely tradeoffs of mandates that created higher labor costs: “[S]ome small businesses would shutter if they had to pay their workers more. There are services many of us enjoy now that would become rarer or costlier if workers had more bargaining power.” But this prediction seems greatly to low ball the downsides and the collateral damage.

For example, according to this normally reliable source, the number of restaurants in the United States numbered about 660,000 in 2018. That’s more than 18 percent of all the 3,618,550 businesses with more than five employees that the Census Bureau says existed in the United States as of 2019 (the last pre-pandemic year). Since some dining establishments are very small and employ between one and five staff, the percentage of all U.S. businesses that are restaurants is probably somewhat lower. And surely not all of these would close their doors if labor costs rose meaningfully. But it should be obvious that lots of nationwide economic disruption would surely result.

As I’ve repeatedly written, (e.g., here) there’s an alternative to employers offsetting these higher labor costs. Rather than raise their prices significantly (a tactic that may not accomplish all or most of is goal), they could increase productivity. After all, many of these labor-intensive industries are labor-intensive because they’ve been such laggards on the productivity front. For example, between 1987 (the first year such data are available) and 2019 (the last pre-pandemic year), overall labor productivity in U.S. businesses outside the financial sector grew by 71.74 percent, in non-casino hotels and motels by just 51.33 percent, and in restaurants and other eating places, a mere 18.34 percent. And as known by RealityChek regulars, this period hasn’t exactly been a bang-up time for U.S. productivity growth.

There’s no doubt that more automation in particular would wind up displacing jobs – which certainly wouldn’t leave many workers better off on net. It’s entirely possible, though, that even greater net national employment opportunities could be created by these more efficient companies’ greater ability to service more customers affordably, thereby spurring the need to hire to staff expanded operations in other capacities. And in theory, anyway, more automation and use of new technologies could create entire new industries – and impressive employment opportunities. That’s certainly been the case with the internet. But there’s a big rub: Not all the displaced workers might possess the skills or other qualifications to handle any of these new positions.

Moreover, as suggested by my reference to the quality of service, for non-economic reasons, boosting productivity may not be enough to save many of these businesses. For many customers might be turned off by the prospect of dealing with machines rather than courteous and personable human beings, and decide not to patronize these businesses even if automation etc restored affordability.

And in fields such a elder care, it’s doubtful that machines could safely replace humans in quality terms for many years – and that seniors and their family members would find them acceptable on any grounds for many more years. Given America’s aging population, that of course portends a problem transcending economics. One way out: Much greater government subsidies for elder care businesses, or even outright nationalization of this sector. But don’t expect such proposals to uncontroversial.

Another possible way out of this dilemma for business owners generally in low-pay sectors where wages are surging is to accept much lower profits. But any industries that experience such a shift seem doomed to stagnation and even gradual extinction. For how many would want to invest their capital and effort in sectors where the best or even likeliest possible return is scraping by?

The cumulative effect of all these developments on society, as opposed to the economy, wouldn’t be trivial, either. For example, before the CCP Virus’ arrival, dining out and taking out in particular had surged in popularity in the United States for decades. One indication: “In 1955, 25 cents of every $1 spent on food went to restaurants. Today, it’s more than half.” One reason of course is the rise of the two-income household, and the resulting decrease in hours available for food preparation.

In addition, though, as more Americans patronized dine-in restaurants in particular, more surely came to value their particular pleasures. Could they find an adequate substitute if they needed to? And how would such a shift change the rest of their home and work lives? As for society itself, what would the impact be of the disappearance or great scaling back of one major form of communal activity?

The situation is potentially even more dire for the nation’s bars. Between 1987 and 2019, their labor productivity actually plunged by 14.50 percent. Will elevated labor costs spell the end, at least in America, of an institution that’s been around and central to human life for…how many centuries? Millennia? Or will customers get used to robot bar-tenders?

The answers to all the questions posed here are definitely above my pay grade. But something I do know: Despite the pressing need to improve the earnings and lives of low-wage workers, some significant and possibly unprecedented tradeoffs will emerge. And it will be far from easy to make sure that a genuinely New Normal is better on net for these workers and the country at large than the Old.

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