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A speaking engagement yesterday prevented me from posting promptly on that morning’s monthly U.S. jobs report (for May), but after crunching the numbers, two conclusions come through loud and clear. First, the overall results added up to a total stinker. And second, like last month’s release, they contained more evidence that President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies are taking a toll on hiring in manufacturing.

As with economy-wide (“non-farm”) hiring in May, manufacturing employment creation in general grew weakly – and for the fourth straight month. Industry’s payrolls rose by a measly 3,000 on month in May. The revisions, meanwhile, left the discouraging situation basically intact, as April’s previously reported 4,000 net sequential job gain was upgraded to 5,000, but March’s former flatline is now judged to have been a 3,000 net monthly job decrease.

As usual, however, when it comes to the trade policy implications, the results that count are those in manufacturing sectors actually significantly affected by trade policy moves like Mr. Trump’s tariffs. First let’s examine industry’s major metals-using sectors – both the necessary data for these industries goes back to April, 2018 (the first full month when these levies were in effect) and because the industries themselves are much easier to identify.

Here are the figures for these sectors’ employment changes between that month and this past April (both the originally reported numbers and today’s revisions), and between April, 2018 and May, 2019. (All these results, incidentally, are still preliminary.) Serving as control groups are the results for the entire private sector in the United States, for all of manufacturing, and for the durable goods super-sector (where all the main metals-using industries have been found).

                                                    Old thru April   New thru April   April Thru May

entire private sector:                  +1.79 percent     +1.93 percent      +2.00 percent

overall manufacturing:              +1.58 percent     +1.60 percent      +1.62 percent

durable goods:                           +1.92 percent     +1.94 percent      +1.99 percent

fabricated metals products:       +1.82 percent     +1.71 percent      +1.65 percent

non-electrical machinery:         +2.68 percent     +2.52 percent      +2.64 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:    +0.42 percent     +0.20 percent     + 0.48 percent

household appliances:               not available       -4.57 percent       not available

aerospace products & parts:      not available      +7.02 percent       not available

The pattern is clear. Even in metals-using sectors that had been outperforming the overall private sector and overall manufacturing in absolute terms, hiring momentum has waned. Moreover, it’s recently been slackening at a faster rate than evident in those larger sectors. That’s clear from the narrowing of the gap that can generally be seen between the employment increases in the metals-using sectors and the broader parts of the economy.

The impact of the China tariffs remains a puzzle, though, because they’ve been in place for a briefer period of time, and because the industry classification system used by the Trump administration in developing its tariff lists is different from the system used by the Labor Department to track employment changes. In addition, the level of China content of domestic manufactured goods can vary considerably, meaning that the impact of the tariffs can vary just as considerably.

Nevertheless, some exact and reasonably close matches can be identified, and, at least through April (the latest month for which data are available for the specific sectors below, which are narrower than those in the table for metals-using industries), the same relative hiring weakness can be seen. That is, job creation in the China tariffs-affected sectors has been growing more slowly than job creation in the private sector in toto, or in manufacturing overall. This trend is visible even in sectors that have greatly bested the private sector and manufacturing control groups in absolute levels of job creation.

                                   July-March    Old July-April   New July-April    July-May

private sector:         +1.23 percent   +1.44 percent    +1.39 percent    +1.46 percent

overall                   +0.98 percent  +1.03 percent     +1.02 percent     +1.04 percent  


aircraft engines       +1.39 percent    not available    +1.51 percent    not available

   and engine parts:

industrial heating   +2.46 percent     not available    +1.45 percent    not available


oil & gas drilling   +5.83 percent      not available   +5.02 percent    not available

    platform parts:

farm machinery     +1.67 percent      not available   +0.17 percent     not available

    & equipment:

ball bearings:        +1.82 percent       not available   +1.54 percent     not available

These results don’t mean that the Trump tariffs, as some keep predicting, are going to throw the American economy into recession, much less that if they do start biting significantly, that they won’t be a price worth paying for overhauling decades of boneheaded, offshoring-friendly, national security threatening (especially in the case of China) trade policies. In fact, they don’t even add up to evidence that the levies are biting significantly now.

But empirical evidence of some damage is finally emerging, at least on the jobs front, and it should be seen as a warning to tariff supporters – including the President – to stop insisting that the current trade wars will entail no costs or need for sacrifice whatever.