(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Another U.S. Trade Deal that Puts America Last

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apparel, CAFTA, Central America, Central Anerica Free Trade Agreement, dispute resolution, Dominican Republic, DR-CAFTA, free trade agreements, Guatemala, labor rights, legalism, offshoring, Trade, trade law, {What's Left of) Our Economy

To get a good idea of one of the biggest, and most neglected, failings of U.S. trade policy, look no farther than America’s near-neighbors in Central America. For earlier this month, a development on the labor rights front made clear the America Last approach Washington has taken toward the ways that disputes are handled under various trade agreements the United States has signed – in this case, the deal with six Central American countries plus the Dominican Republic (DR-CAFTA).

On June 14, an arbitration panel established by the dispute resolution chapter of the DR-CAFTA treaty ruled against the United States and for Guatemala in a long-running quarrel between the two signatories over labor rights practices in the latter. On the face of it, it’s hard to take seriously the arbiters’ conclusion that Guatemala indeed is not enforcing its own labor laws ostensibly aimed at safeguarding workers’ rights, but that this failure hasn’t affected bilateral trade flows. After all, in a world where its major industrial export industry – apparel – has to compete on price with super-low wage garment giants like China, Vietnam, and Bangladesh, keeping wages down is essential to the Guatemalan apparel sector’s very survival.

But the fundamental problem with this situation has nothing to do with the merits of the case. It has to do with the structure of the dispute-resolution process set up by the DR-CAFTA treaty, which is basically the same as that set up by all U.S. bilateral and regional free trade deals. Simply put, it bears absolutely no resemblance to economic or policy realities.

Two especially important and related points to keep in mind: First, when the DR-CAFTA deal was ratified by Congress, in 2005, the combined economies of all six Central American countries proper only equaled the output of New Haven, Connecticut. Adding the Dominican Republican barely moved this needle. Because of this gargantuan size disparity, access to the American economy was clearly the paramount prize in this arrangement, and the non-U.S. signatories needed the deal much more than did the United States.

Second, largely as a result, the DR-CAFTA deal was less an example of trade policy than of economic development policy. Yes, cheerleaders for the agreement talked of opening exciting new markets for American domestic producers – talk belied by the micro nature of Central American and Dominican markets). And yes, they spoke of enhancing the competitiveness of the American textile industry – claims belied by the impossibility that the pact could overcome the advantages of the Asian apparel giants). But at bottom, the deal was a foreign aid program for the region.

Leave aside its clear failure to achieve meaningful “democracy, economic reform, and regional integration” – at least if you believe even a fraction of countless news reports of out-of-control lawlessness and violence in Central America. Given the non-U.S. signatories’ desperate need for any American help they could get, why on earth would Washington permit the treaty to create a system for choosing arbitration panels – which have the last say in determining a dispute’s winner and loser – that treats the United States and the other DR-CAFTA countries as legal equals?

One answer is that the agreement – like many other U.S. trade deals – was actually intended to foster offshoring, not open foreign markets. So the multinational companies that have dominated the American trade policymaking process for so long made sure that dispute resolution aimed first and foremost to prevent the United States from limiting its imports from their Central American and Dominican factories for any reason. And given the absence of significant consumption markets in the region, that observation seems compelling.

But the so-far-standard U.S. approach to dispute-resolution in trade also typifies a legalistic worldview that contrasts sharply with global realities even in an economic sphere where, for numerous reasons, it’s still completely inappropriate. In fact, this legalism is likelier to undermine American interests than serve them.

Principally, the prevalence tariff and non-tariff barriers to both trade and investment, along with various other predatory practices, shows that the consensus on acceptable economic behavior needed for a genuine legal system to function adequately simply does not exist in fact. Ditto for the great majority of economies that rely heavily on amassing net exports to generate growth. As a result, international commerce is anything but the positive-sum arena portrayed by politicians and academics. So any arrangements meant to negate national power are bound to handcuff the United States. Worse, they handcuff America needlessly.

Perhaps one day, the worldwide consensus needed for a genuine, legitimate system of trade law will emerge. Until it does, however, the United States should capitalize on the leverage it enjoys as the world’s most open major trading power and market of last resort, and sign trade agreements that establish it as judge, jury, and court of appeals for whatever disputes arise. There’s no better place to start than scrapping the artificial – and indeed forced – egalitarianism of the DR-CAFTA trade agreement.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Will Trump Take Ford’s New China Trade Hint?

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(What's Left of) Our Economy Trump, automotive, border adjustment tax, China, Ford Motor Company, imports, Jobs, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, tariffs, trade agreements, trade balances, Trade Deficits

President Trump and his administration have certainly been active on the trade front in their first months in office, both in word and deed. The question remains whether they’ve been effective, and a breaking news story has just added powerfully to the doubters’ case.

The news has to do with Ford Motor Company’s announcement that it will scrap plans to relocate its remaining small car production from the United States to Mexico and supply the American market from an existing plant in Hermosillo, and instead import the vehicles from a retooled factory in China. The initial Ford production decision came under fire from Mr. Trump, and the company’s reaction – a rejiggered Mexico plan – looked chancy for two main reasons:

First, the president had declared his intention to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in large measure to stop such production offshoring. Second, the staunchly pro-trade Republican leaders of the GOP-controlled House of Representatives had been pushing a border adjustment tax proposal that would have imposed new costs on imports from anywhere.

Ford has now underscored why both opponents and supporters of a transformed, less import-friendly U.S. trade policy have been right in one of their major criticisms of Mr. Trump’s emerging strategy: A tight focus on bilateral trade issues and balances overlooks the ability of multinational companies to shift export-oriented production in order to evade country-specific tariffs or other trade curbs.

Not that business’ ability to hopscotch is unlimited. The massive level of sunk corporate costs in export-focused production in China, for example, won’t always be easy to walk away from. And not all countries offer comparable advantages to manufacturers. So given, for example, that China accounts for more than 43 percent of the American merchandise trade deficit, or that Mexico’s geography makes it such an unusually attractive base for selling to U.S. customers, focusing on individual-country or regional priorities often makes good sense.

It’s also legitimate in principle to base trade preferences on non-economic aims, like national security (e.g., rewarding allies or strengthening third world economies against the appeal of terrorism) – though Mr. Trump has expressed strong skepticism for this approach, notably in his Inaugural Address. And of course, prioritization is often the key to any successful public policy.

But what’s especially strange about the Trump trade strategy so far is the president’s indifference – at best – to the border adjustment tax idea. On top of undercutting corporate tariff arbitrage strategies by levying a tax on all imports (and encouraging exports), the measure would also bring in revenue needed to finance crucial domestic needs like infrastructure and healthcare reform without completely busting the federal budget. And its passage would by no means preclude addressing special trade priorities of all kinds with additional restrictions.

Ford’s new production announcement is just the latest in a series of comments from Corporate America that bear out one of President Trump’s central insights: that trade policy changes can decisively influence corporate sourcing decisions to America’s benefit. Now, however, he needs to recognize that his essential goal of using trade restrictions to lure valuable manufacturing production and jobs back to the United States requires policies with global scope. The half- (at best) measures he’s favored so far are just too easily gamed.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Smart Phones, Dumb Economy?

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cell phones, consumers, credit, CreditSesame.com, debt, deflation, inflation, Maria Lamagna, Marketwatch.com, millennials, smartphones, telecommunications services, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I’m always wary of drawing conclusions about the American economy from what I see in everyday life for reasons that should be obvious. All such anecdotes should be viewed suspiciously because individual observations or incidents are much more likely to result from randomness or unique circumstances than to reflect a genuine trend. And I’d be the last to claim that my own experiences have ever been representative of anything larger.

Still, it’s undeniably, and understandably, gratifying when some actual data seems to bear out something that’s had me (figuratively) scratching my head for some time. It’s the seeming tendency of folks who at least appear to be well into the lower depths of the “99 percent” of non-uber-wealthy Americans owning what look (to my admittedly non-expert eye) like state-of-the-art smartphones. Although all sorts of reasonable explanations are possible, a recent survey of consumer finances at least has supported my suspicion that something genuinely peculiar – and not so encouraging – really is going on here.

First, let’s examine some of the extenuating circumstances. Prices for smartphone services have been falling steadily – and steeply over the last few months, thanks largely to the spread of unlimited data plans. Just check out this chart:

Younger consumers in particular also have shown some tendency to value buying experiences (like the extraordinary connectivity provided by modern personal communications) over goods. Some of these millennials and others in the post-baby-boom categories (especially students) may be getting help from their families – and that doesn’t necessarily raise red flags. More disturbing, however, are the odds that many of the young are avoiding or deferring goods purchases (especially big ones they used to make in the twenties and thirties, like cars and homes) because they simply can’t afford them, and are therefore substituting relatively cheap indulgences like phones with every conceivable bell and whistle.

Nonetheless, that consumer finance survey – from the Credit Sesame website – sadly suggests that many low-income earners who use smartphones of some kind (it’s not possible to say that they’re the latest and greatest) literally can’t afford them. Instead, they’ve bought them with seriously over-extended credit.

According to Marketwatch.com reporter Maria LaMagna, Credit Sesame examined the finances of 5,000 consumers and found that those whose cell phone accounts are considered delinquent were carrying an average balance of $887. I couldn’t find any information about what percentage of the 5,000 consumers analyzed were carrying such cell phone debt, but here’s a reason to think that the share carrying significant amounts is pretty big: phone service companies don’t usually report customers’ payments histories to credit bureaus until the collections process formally begins. I also wish that the article indicated how credit card-related debt has changed over time.

But it’s hard to believe that a reputable site like Marketwatch would have reported these numbers had they been more the exception than the rule. And the amounts of cell phone-related debt are especially striking given how services are now cratering in price.

It’s entirely possible that cell phone debtors will take advantage of these price plunges to pay up and stay fully paid up. In principle, the companies could start cracking down, too. But there’s also a real chance that the debtors will simply start paying their minimums on time, and that the service companies – currently engaged in price wars determined to get and keep customers practically at all costs – will keep treating them leniently (and milking them as cash cows for as long as they can). Raise your hands if you think this is any way to run an economy for any serious length of time.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Ag Fears Mustn’t Drive Trump’s NAFTA Revamp

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agriculture, automotive, exports, imports, Jacob Bunge, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

You have to hand it to the American agriculture industry: It has great lobbyists and public relations flacks. Just look at the job they’ve done convincing the Trump administration to pay special attention to the farm sector’s concerns when renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada. And as made clear by The Wall Street Journal today, they’re keeping the pressure on in an effort to convince the president that the United States doesn’t hold such overwhelming leverage in these talks with Mexico in particular.

No one can blame ag from doing its job. But maybe the press could do a somewhat better job of providing valuable context, as the Journal article today simply didn’t?

It’s indeed noteworthy, as The Journal‘s Jacob Bunge reported, that American farm exports to Mexico have fallen so far this year, especially given that Mexico is the third largest foreign market for these goods. Moreover, it does look like the drop stems at least partly from Mexico’s search for alternatives to U.S. suppliers in order to create NAFTA revamp bargaining chips.

But a broader examination of bilateral trade flows shows that, however important, agriculture doesn’t deserve pride of place in America’s trade negotiations – with Mexico or any other countries. First of all, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, last year, agriculture (along with forestry, fishing, and hunting) comprised 0.9 percent of the American economy on a value-added basis. Manufacturing represented 11.7 percent.

Last year, moreover, manufactures exports (of $1.05127 trillion) topped agricultural exports ($134.88 billion) by a factor of nearly eight. It’s true that agriculture ran a trade surplus and manufacturing an immense deficit. But the former – about $20 billion – was hardly an economic game-changer, and that was especially so considering the nearly $862 billion scale of the latter.

U.S.-Mexico trade tells a similar story: According to The Journal, 2016 saw America sell $18 billion worth of agricultural products to Mexico. Manufacturing exports were about eight times as great: just over $143 billion.

But there are some big problems with these manufacturing exports. For example, they’re much more than offset by U.S. manufactures imports from Mexico. In fact, since 2009 (the year the current recovery began), this bilateral trade deficit has risen more than twice as fast (by 125 percent) than that with China (52.56 percent).

Moreover, Trump is right about much of this imbalance resulting from NAFTA-induced American production offshoring to Mexico that aims to sell back into the United States. That’s had much to do with the 1990-2013 drop in the United States’ share of North American light vehicle production from 78 to 64 percent, and the rise in Mexico’s share from six to 19 percent. That’s also had much to do with the more than tripling of the U.S. bilateral trade deficit in autos and light trucks since NAFTA’s signing.

In fact, in the first eleven months of 2016, Mexico exported nearly 80 percent of the 3.22 million autos it produced, and fully 77 percent of them were sent north of the border.

As a result, auto industry leaders have plainly stated that without the unfettered access NAFTA provides to the American market, and without the incentives to produce in super-cheap and largely unregulated Mexico created by the treaty, most of their auto investment in Mexico would lose its raison d’etre.

No one is calling for neglecting America’s farm sector during the NAFTA renegotiation. But the outsized role played by manufacturing, and manufacturing trade deficits in regional trade, along with manufacturing’s historic role as the United States’ productivity growth and innovation leader, couldn’t make clearer that letting ag export fears dominate this economic diplomacy would be a classic case of letting the tail wag the dog.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Ups & Downs for Manufacturing Production, but Recovery Still Incomplete

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automotive, durable goods, Federal Reserve, Great Recession, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, non-durable goods, recovery, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Domestic manufacturing has entered a period of output volatility, today’s new Federal Reserve figures indicate. Inflation-adjusted production in May – the latest data – fell sequentially (by 0.39 percent) for the second time in three months, following a six-month streak of sequential improvements. But April’s big rise was upgraded from one percent to 1.16 percent – the strongest such showing since May, 2010’s 1.49 percent, early in the current recovery. At the same time, March’s already downgraded 0.41 percent real monthly output decrease was lowered again, to a 0.75 percent slide. That was the worst such retreat since winter-affected January, 2014’s 1.09 percent.

Automotive revisions figured prominently in these upgrades and downgrades, with April’s initially reported five percent constant dollar monthly production surge now judged to be 4.12 percent. In May, after-inflation output for the sector, which has led generally led manufacturing’s rebound from the Great Recession, tumbled 2.02 percent on month.  

Durable goods – manufacturing’s biggest super-sector – was most seriously affected by the auto volatility.  Its April monthly real output was boosted to an upwardly revised 1.20 percent – the fastest such pace since February, 2014’s winter-affected 1.80 percent.  But its May after-inflation on-month production was dragged down to a 0.84 percent fall – the worst since the 0.99 percent decrease resulting partly from January, 2014’s similarly cold weather.    

Non-durables’ production performance has been steadier, with May’s 0.10 percent on-month real gain its fourth such improvement in five months. Moreover, April’s sequential inflation-adjusted production growth was upgraded from an already strong 0.98 percent to 1.10 percent – it best such performance since October, 2008’s 2.15 percent. And non-durables’ annual real output increase of 1.53 percent was its best year-on-year rise since February, 2016’s 1.55 percent.

All the same, the new figures and volatility left domestic manufacturing’s price-adjusted output 3.99 percent less than at its pre-recession peak, more than nine years ago.

Here are the manufacturing highlights of the Federal Reserve’s new release on May industrial production:

>U.S. real manufacturing output fell in May sequentially for the second time in three months. But the 0.39 percent decline – which followed six straight months of sequential growth – was modest compared with many of the March and April revisions, which could be starting a period of new volatility.

>April’s strong initially reported inflation-adjusted output rise of one percent was revised up to 1.16 percent. That was the best such performance since May, 2010’s 1.49 percent, when the manufacturing recovery from the Great Recession was still gathering steam.

>But March’s already downgraded 0.41 percent monthly real production decline was cut further, to 0.75 percent. That was domestic manufacturing’s worst such growth showing since the 1.09 percent fall-off in January 2014, which was affected by harsh winter weather.

>February’s last (downwardly revised) 0.27 percent monthly after-inflation output increase was revised back up to 0.38 percent.

>Some these swings can be traced to the automotive sector, which has led manufacturing’s real growth for most of the current economic recovery.

>April on-month price-adjusted auto production was initially reported to have advanced by five percent – its best growth since July, 2015’s 7.84 percent. Leading the way was a reported 8.04 percent surge in real vehicle output, also the best since July, 2015 (12.38 percent).

>The new April numbers: 4.12 percent and 6.76 percent, respectively. And in May, constant-dollar production fell by 2.02 percent.

>Automotive’s ups and downs most profoundly affected production of durable goods – manufacturing’s largest super-sector.

>The poor May automotive performance contributed to the 0.84 percent sequential durable goods real production shrinkage that month – the worst such decline since winter-affected January, 2014’s 0.99 percent.

>But the initially reported 1.01 April monthly durables production advance is now estimated at 1.20 percent – the super-sector’s fastest growth since the winter-affected 1.80 percent in February, 2014. Combined with the lower automotive results, this development indicated some relative strength outside automotive.  

>And thanks to the strong and upwardly revised April monthly figures, durable goods year-on-year after-inflation production gain that month was upgraded from 2.03 percent to 2.22 percent – still the best such increase since January, 2015’s 3.15 percent, which was also affected by harsh winter weather.

>In April, however, the annual durable goods real output improvement sank to 1.66 percent.

>The new Fed figures show that real output in non-durable goods has been steadier than in durables, but April was a standout nonetheless. Their robust sequential output growth of 0.98 percent was revised up to 1.10 percent – which produced the best monthly result since the 2.15 percent recorded in October, 2008 – even before the Great Recession broke out.

>And non-durables followed up by eaking out 0.10 percent monthly inflation-adjusted production growth in May – their fourth such advance in the last five months.

>Further, the 1.53 percent May non-durables annual constant dollar output increase was its best yearly result since February, 2016’s 1.55 percent.

>Yet not even this recent volatility could turn domestic manufacturing into a recovery-era economic winner. The overall sector is still 3.99 percent smaller in real terms than at its pre-recession peak – more than nine years ago, in December, 2007.

>Durable goods real output is up – but by only 0.13 percent – during this time, while non-durables real output is down 9.08 percent from its pre-recession peak, hit in July, 2007.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: And the Labor Shortage/Immigration Beat Goes On

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CNN.com, fake news, illegal immigrants, illegal immigration, Immigration, labor shortages, productivity, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s yet another Open Borders- and amnesty-friendly article from the Mainstream Media that simply doesn’t add up – this time from CNN.com. In this story about a small San Francisco-area manufacturer who claims that he lost a tenth of his employees due to a 2011 government raid in search of illegal immigrant workers, one whopping inconsistency in particular stands out. It concerns the wages paid by the employer Emerald Packaging of Union City, California.

Emerald’s owner, claims that the company is still suffering from the personnel losses because he can’t find adequate replacements. And the CNN reporters’ sympathy for his supposed plight – and the obvious difficulties encountered by his illegal workers – was made clear by the article’s melodramatic headline: “RAIDED: Immigration agents showed up at Kevin Kelly’s factory and he lost his star workers.”

RealityChek regulars know by now that such claims of labor shortages due to restrictive immigration policies are usually open and shut tip-offs that the business in question is paying inadequate wages, or has refused to automate and become more productive. As I’ve noted repeatedly, mainstream economic theory teaches that when the demand for anything – including labor – exceeds the supply, the price of that commodity (in this case the wage and/or non-wage benefits) tends to rise until a new equilibrium is restored. Alternatively, businesses tend to substitute capital (typically in the form of technology) for what they view as overly expensive labor.

Kelly emphatically denied to the CNN reporter that he’s been skimping on wages by using illegal workers: “When people say these companies are hiring illegal labor because they want to keep their costs down… in our case that argument is complete bulls–t.”

In fact, according to Kelly, the jobs that illegals were filling – and that in some cases have remained unfilled – “aren’t cheap positions.” He added that “They range from $15 an hour entry-level jobs to $35 an hour for experienced mechanics. ‘With overtime of $27 to $35 an hour, you can make pretty good money of $75,000 to over $100,000 a year.’”

But his claims started to fall apart – not that CNN picked up on this – the instant he started discussing in detail the employee whose departure he felt most keenly – an assistant foreman named Miguel Gonzalez.

As the CNN article tells it, “Gonzalez had worked for Emerald Packaging for over 20 years. He started as a box handler, moving and storing product pallets and factory supplies, and worked his way up to assistant foreman. He was a gifted mechanic and Kelly relied on him to help keep the factory running.” Further, he could:

>”walk into my office and tell me what’s going on in the facility.”

>Gonzales was “Keen to learn and move up the ranks [and] routinely took on extra work and hours. He also rarely missed work, even returning to the factory floor just two days after his first child, Casandra, was born.”

>Soon after Gonzalez’ hiring, “he showed initiative by tinkering with and fixing up the machines on the factory floor on his own time to help them operate better. Two years into the job, he was promoted into a role where he learned to set up, repair and maintain the factory equipment.”

>”Over time, [he] taught himself every aspect of the business, including payments and shipping.”

>In Kelly’s words, “He was the single best machine mechanic we had.”

>”Losing him had an immediate impact on production because there just wasn’t anybody of Miguel’s caliber to replace him. There just wasn’t,” said Kelly.

And what was this supremely talented “star worker” making in 2011, after twenty years of superlative performance? Twenty-two dollars per hour. (He also received healthcare and retirement benefits.) According to the Labor Department’s data, that wage is somewhat ($2.50 per hour) more than the average hourly wage (before inflation) for all workers in the plastics packaging manufacturing sector that year, and a little over six dollars an hour more than non-supervisory workers alone make. (It’s not clear whether an assistant foreman qualifies in the Labor Department’s eyes as a supervisory or a non-supervisory worker.) But that $22 per hour is also about $13 dollars an hour less than what Kelly said he pays “experienced mechanics” nowadays (five years later).

There’s no doubt that some businesses that hire illegal immigrants need every body they can get, and there’s no doubt that some illegal immigrants are earning good wages largely as a result. But when a news organization plainly convinced of the desperate need for illegal workers touts a single alleged example of this dire situation that’s so full of gaping holes, Americans are more than entitled to start wondering whether this narrative as a whole is fake news.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Productivity Remains in the Doldrums

Tags

China, Labor Department, labor productivity, living standards, manufacturing, multi-factor productivity, offshoring, productivity, reshoring, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Labor Department reported earlier this week that America’s labor productivity flat-lined at an annual rate between the last quarter of last year and the first quarter of this year. And relatively speaking, that was good news. The initial study of this measure of economic efficiency – and key determinant of the nation’s living standards – estimated that business labor productivity in the non-farm business sector (the government’s main proxy for the entire economy) fell at an annualized 0.6 percent.

Labor productivity, you may recall, is the narrowest of two measures of productivity. It gauges how much in the way of stuff or services Americans produce per hour of work from each worker. So the resulting picture isn’t as complete as that provided by multi-factor productivity – which as the name suggests looks at production per man or woman hour generated by many different inputs. But the labor numbers come out on a much timelier basis (each quarter), and for all the unusual amount of uncertainty that economists admit when they analyze productivity, they’re viewed as being reasonably reliable.

One small consolation, especially if you value manufacturing highly (as you should): Industry’s labor productivity not only grew quarter-to-quarter during the first three months of 2017 (by 0.50 percent annualized). It grew faster than the original estimate of 0.40 percent.

Manufacturing’s role as the economy’s productivity leader is also crystal clear upon reviewing the longer-term trends. During the 1990s expansion (as known by RealityChek regulars, comparing similar phases of the business cycle produces the most informative data), non-farm business labor productivity increased by 23.25 percent, while manufacturing labor productivity improved by 46.18 percent.

That recovery was America’s longest on record – just under ten years. The next expansion, during the bubble decade that preceded the financial crisis, lasted only six years. Non-farm business labor productivity rose by about the same annual pace as during the 1990s – 16.03 percent. But manufacturing labor productivity grew even faster year-by-year, advancing by 41.22 percent during the entire period.

The story is as different during this recovery as it is depressing. Although it’s so far been nearly as long as the 1990s recovery (having started nine years ago), the improvement in non-farm business labor productivity has been just 8.05 percent overall. For manufacturing, it’s been much higher – 21.55 percent – but relatively speaking, it’s a big fall-off.

Incidentally, undoubtedly one big reason for manufacturing’s excellent productivity performance during that bubble decade has to do with production offshoring. As I’ve written repeatedly, the way labor productivity is calculated results in productivity gains being recorded when businesses send jobs overseas, as well as when they use other techniques for saving labor or using their employees more effectively. And because the United States helped China enter the World Trade Organization at the start of that decade, and thus assured multinational companies that they’d remain overwhelmingly free to supply the American market from Chinese factories, that bubble decade was a major manufacturing offshoring decade.

The fall in productivity growth could indicate that, as widely claimed, manufacturing offshoring has dropped off significantly. But the evidence is mixed at best. What’s much more apparent is that, if Americans want their country’s productivity performance to rebound, they’ll press their leaders to make robust growth in domestic manufacturing a much higher priority.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Being Tom Friedman Means Never Having to Say You’re Sorry About China Trade

Tags

China, Mainstream Media, protectionism, pundits, The New York Times, Thomas Friedman, Trade, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Uber-pundit Thomas Friedman’s New York Times column this week about China demonstrated both that “better late than never” may not always be true, and that there’s precious little accountability in the Mainstream Media. Too bad he performed both vital tasks completely unwittingly?

As he traveled through China recently, Friedman told us, his conviction grew that, as President Trump has been charging, “China is not playing fair on trade and has grown in some areas at the expense of U.S. and European workers….” Moreover, he adds, this China challenge “needs to be addressed — now.”

Continued Friedman: “The core problem, U.S. and European business leaders based in China explained, is that when the U.S. allowed China to join the World Trade Organization in 2001 and gain much less restricted access to our markets, we gave China the right to keep protecting parts of its market — because it was a ‘developing economy.’ The assumption was that as China reformed and become more of our equal, its trade barriers and government aid to Chinese companies would melt away.

“They did not.”

And Friedman did a pretty good job of summarizing what RealityChek regulars and so many others have known for years – that China’s mercantilism became considerably worse.

The author ended his piece with a (sort of) ringing call for action: “China needs to know that some people who disagree with everything else Trump stands for — and who value a strong U.S.-China relationship — might just support Trump’s idea for a border-adjustment tax on imports to level the playing field.”

But Friedman also included this kicker: According to someone he called “the smartest person I know inside China on trade (who will have to go nameless),” such actions “if anything… may be too late.”

As the author’s reaction – “Ouch!” – suggests, there’s a distinct possibility that his source is right about the consequences of waiting sixteen years to grapple seriously with China’s predatory practices.

But here’s what Friedman didn’t tell you: One of the folks who pushed vigorously for the boneheaded American WTO decision was none other than Thomas Friedman! As he wrote in 2000, opponents of China’s admission, like U.S. labor unions, were “head-in-the-sand” protectionists. Nor did Friedman seem to think much of fears that “China’s entry into the WTO will make it a more formidable geopolitical rival to the United States.”

Instead, he confidently wrote that “to say that [admission] will hurt the cause of democratization in China or that it won’t help create more islands from which Chinese democrats can operate and more tools by which they can communicate, is to speak utter nonsense.”

Interestingly, by 2011, Friedman seemed to be having important second thoughts about China’s reformist intentions. But he still doggedly opposed meaningful actions to neutralize Beijing’s currency manipulation, for example, with tariffs.

Since no one likes to admit mistakes – especially whoppers – I can certainly understand Friedman’s failure to report his enthusiasm for a China trade strategy he now recognizes as a titanic failure. Much less clear is why so much of the rest of the Mainstream Media – and especially news talk shows who view him as a globalization oracle – keep giving him a pass.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: April’s U.S. Trade Figures Sure Weren’t Winners

Tags

China, economic growth, exports, GDP, Germany, gross domestic product, high tech goods, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since last Friday was one of those days when both the U.S. jobs figures and trade figures were released the same morning, and since I was traveling that day, I didn’t get a chance to report on the latter as promptly as usual. But that doesn’t mean the trade figures should be overlooked! Here’s a quick rundown of the high- (or low-) lights, which cover the month of April:

>The combined goods and services U.S. trade deficit rose by 5.15 percent on month, from $45.28 billion to $47.62 billion. But for a change, the big news in this total trade shortfall category was in the revision for the March gap – it was upgraded from an initially reported $43.71 billion. That’s a ginormous 3.61 percent.

>Total exports fell sequentially in April by 0.25 percent, from $191.46 billion to $190.98 billion, and total imports increased from $236.74 billion to $238.59 billion, or 0.78 percent.

>And quite naturally, the March revisions were substantial, too. That month’s combined export total was upgraded by 0.25 percent, and the much larger combined import total revised up by 0.87 percent.

>Also disturbing about the new trade figures: They show that for the first four months of this year, the total trade deficit is up by 13.43 percent on a year-to-date basis. That’s more than four times as fast as the total economy grew between the first quarter of last year and the first quarter of this year (4.08 percent – both these figures are in pre-inflation dollars).

>With Germany’s trade policies in the Trump administration’s cross-hairs and therefore in the news, it’s noteworthy that the U.S. merchandise shortfall with Germany grew sequentially by 5.43 percent, to $5.48 billion in April. That’s the highest monthly total since last August’s $6.05 billion.

>U.S. goods imports from Germany fell by 4.11 percent sequentially, but America’s goods exports sank on month by 15.34 percent.

> At the same time, the Germany goods deficit is down by 5.24 percent year-to-date.

>Of America’s other major trade partners, only the merchandise deficit with China increased significantly on month – from $24.58 billion to $27.63 billion, or 12.42 percent.

>U.S. goods exports to China advanced by 2.22 percent, but imports rose by 9.55 percent.

>The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China is 4.21 percent larger in the first four months of this year than it was the first four months of last year.

>The April manufacturing trade deficit of $70.31 billion was just 0.79 percent higher than March’s $69.76 billion. Manufactures exports were off by 7.91 percent sequentially, while the much greater amount of imports fell by just 4.27 percent.

>Year to date, the manufacturing trade deficit looks set to establish yet another annual record. At $276.12 billion, it’s already running 6.20 percent ahead of last year’s pace.

>For the first four months of this year, manufacturing exports are up by 3.44 percent, but imports are 4.64 percent higher.

>The story is even worse in high tech goods. The trade shortfall actual dipped by 0.49 percent on month in April – from $6.07 to $6.04 billion. Exports were 8.28 percent lower than in March, and imports were off by 7.01 percent.

>Year-to-date, however, the high tech trade gap is up by 36.69 percent – from $18.37 billion to $25.11 billion. Exports have inched up by 0.25 percent, but imports are 5.42 percent higher.

>The U.S. trade deficit in oil fell by a sharp 35.56 percent sequentially in April, from $8.43 billion to $5.43 billion – the lowest monthly total since last September ($5.13 billion).

>But the April non-oil goods deficit of $61.71 billion was 9.22 percent higher than March’s $56.50 billion. It was also the highest monthly total for this shortfall – which is heavily influenced by U.S. trade agreements and other trade policy decisions – since March, 2015’s $61.74 billion (the highest monthly figure in a data series that goes back to 1992).

>Moreover, in real terms, the April non-oil goods deficit climbed 7.62 percent on month, to $62.04 billion. That’s also the highest total since March, 2015’s $62.80 billion (which was another all-time high).

>Since the headline U.S. government data on changes in the gross domestic product (GDP) are adjusted for inflation, this lofty figure for the real non-oil goods deficit indicates that this Made in Washington shortfall’s growth will drag on economic growth in the second quarter of this year.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: JOLTS of Confusing News About the U.S. Jobs Market

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government jobs, job openings, JOLTS, Labor Department, labor shortage, living standards, manufacturing, private sector, productivity, recovery, retail, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since the U.S. economy has settled at its current level of near-full employment (at least by the official figures), the monthly JOLTS reports issued by the Labor Department have been attracting much less attention – including from me! After all, with so many Americans working, it’s been less important (though not totally unimportant) to learn about one of the key findings in each such survey of labor market turnover – how many new job opportunities business and government say they’ve been creating. 

So it’s not surprising that today’s JOLTS report (for April) hasn’t had much impact on the financial markets this morning. But it still contained more than its share of noteworthy results that reinforce what we think we already know about the economy’s current biggest problems, and that raise major questions about other portions of the conventional wisdom.

The overall job openings number, for example, was quite the stunner: At 6.044 million, it was an all-time high in absolute terms. (The JOLTS series dates from December, 2000.) And the 4.48 percent increase over May’s 5.785 million level represented the biggest monthly jump since last July’s 7.91 percent.

Openings in the private sector hit a new record in April, too (5.464 million). And that 4.20 percent monthly rise was the great sequential increase since last July (8.46 percent).

But as RealityChek regulars know, the economy’s growth has been sluggish even by the meager standards of the current economic recovery. In the first quarter of this year, real growth came in at a paltry 1.15 percent annual rate. So the JOLTS figures indicate that employers feel they need record numbers of new employees even though as a group their output is historically lousy.

That adds up to more evidence that American business boosting its productivity only sluggishly at best – which is awful news given that productivity growth is the nation’s best hope for improving living standards in a sustainable, not bubble-ized, way. And as I’ll be reporting on shortly, the latest government labor productivity numbers once more confirm that the economy is stuck in a productivity crisis.

Yet these JOLTS results carry more complicated implications for another broadly accepted feature of the American economy. They support the idea that U.S. businesses are struggling to overcome almost unprecedented labor shortages. How else to explain the enormous number of reported job openings? But companies that desperate to find workers should be raising wages at rapid and indeed accelerating rates. Everything that we know about hourly pay, though, tells us that nothing of the kind is happening. If anything, wage growth, which has underwhelmed throughout the current recovery, is showing signs of slowing.

One other new record revealed by today’s JOLTS report – total government job openings (540,000) have never been higher except in April, 2010, when the call went out for temporary Census workers. Even more interesting, most of the openings were in state and local governments outside the schools.

Also somewhat surprising: The “retail-pocalypse” so commonly bemoaned or hailed (depending on your viewpoint) is nowhere to be seen in this JOLTS report. Sure, retail job openings fell between March and April from 593,000 to 577,000. Moreover, that’s the lowest level since December, 2015, and the numbers now are generally, though unevenly, trending down. But for the first more than seven years of this nearly eight-year old recovery, they were trending solidly up. With overall economic growth down and consumers still cautious, the reported retail openings numbers are far from screaming “disaster!” – or even “serious trouble!”

Finally, although manufacturing output has been modestly recovering lately from its most recent recession, its job openings fell from 404,000 in March (the second highest record and best since January, 2001’a 496,000) to 359,000 in April. Still, the decline followed a major increase in March (from 364,000), and the manufacturing numbers have been pretty volatile for more than two years.

Maybe the safest conclusion to draw from the JOLTS numbers is that, for now, the economy is heading for more of the same. Whether that’s the safest result for incumbent American politicians is another matter entirely.