(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Real Wages Remain a Trump Economy Weakness

Tags

Barack Obama, blue-collar workers, Employment-Population ratio, inflation adjusted wages, Labor Force Participation Rate, manufacturing, non-supervisory workers, private sector, production workers, real wages, slack, Trump, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As I’ve written repeatedly, I’m convinced that the economic data conclusively show that the U.S. economy on numerous fronts has kicked into a higher gear during the Trump years. But last week’s inflation-adjusted wage figures are an important reminder of one big exception: American workers’ price-adjusted take- home hourly pay.

Indeed, by every relevant measure, these real wages during Mr. Trump’s first 27 months as President have been rising at a pace slower than that during his predecessor Barack Obama’s final 27 months in office. Ditto for manufacturing workers, whose fortunes have been such a Trump focus.

And the comparison flatters Obama even when the data for blue-collar workers – generally the lowest paid members of the American workforce – are stripped out, although in absolute terms the Trump-era performance here has been somewhat better.

Here are the percentage changes through May. (In the lingo of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which tracks these numbers, blue-collar workers are “production and non-supervisory workers.”  And as usual, public sector workers are excluded because their pay levels are overwhelmingly determined by politicians’ decisions, and thus say little about the fundamentals of the economy or the job market.)

                                     m/m        y/y   1^st 27 Trump months  last 27 Obama months

private sector:            +0.18     +1.30              +2.06                         +3.00

manufacturing:          +0.28     +0.46               -0.09                         +2.96

private production:    +0.32     +1.73              +2.29                         +3.27

mfg production:        +0.23     +1.03              +2.08                          +2.73

These results continue to be especially surprising given overall unemployment rates that have been at multi-decade lows – which should be forcing wages up, as employers find themselves forced to offer higher pay in order to compete for increasingly scarce workers. And although, as I’ve written, it’s possible that manufacturers in particular have held the line on wages because they’re not able to find workers with anything close to the skills they need, I wonder how understanding such workers will be about this explanation when it comes time to vote for President in 2020.

At the same time, here’s what’s not open to debate: Despite the plunge in the unemployment rate, other measures – notably the Employment-Population ratio and the Labor Force Participation Rate – show that there’s plenty of slack left in the U.S. labor market. If politicians and business leaders really want to see real wages rise healthily again, they’ll need to figure out how to lure able-bodied Americans still on the sidelines back to work.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Fed Manufacturing Figures Nudge Tariffmageddon a Bit Further Away

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aluminum, China, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, real growth, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s industrial production figures from the Federal Reserve showed not only that U.S. domestic manufacturing regained some strength in May following a string of poor monthly results. They also provided more evidence that President Trump’s tariffs have had little, if any, effect on the performance of either the metals-using industries impacted by levies on steel and aluminum imports, or of sectors supposedly affected by China-related duties.

Two more points come through pretty loud and clear from the new figures on domestic industry’s inflation-adjusted growth. First, the weakness displayed in April by manufacturing as a whole and by metals-using sectors could well have been confined to that month. Second, the safety problems revealed in the Boeing Company’s aircraft have begun to influence the picture and may distort the readings for several more months.

The overall readings for manufacturing were mildly encouraging, with the 0.22 percent sequential rise in real output representing domestic industry’s best reading since December’s 0.64 percent improvement. Revisions were ever so slightly positive.

Most of the leading metals-using industries – where the role played by tariffs is relatively easy to identify – fared better in May than in April, too, as the following table shows. The columns show the changes in after-inflation output for these sectors starting with April, 2018 (the first full month the metals levies went into effect) and each of the last three data months of this year. And as usual, the numbers for manufacturing overall are used as a control group.

                                             April thru March   April thru April   April thru May

overall manufacturing:          +0.45 percent        -0.07 percent      +0.89 percent

durables manufacturing:       +1.34 percent       +0.68 percent      +0.98 percent

fabricated metals products:   +2.76 percent      +1.88 percent       +1.73 percent

machinery:                            +2.31 percent       -0.12 percent       +0.11 percent

automotive:                            -3.10 percent       -3.86 percent        -1.55 percent

major appliances:                   -5.27 percent       -8.24 percent        -3.27 percent

aircraft and parts:                  +5.75 percent      +3.34 percent       +1.15 percent

durable mfg ex-automotive: +2.10 percent       +1.48 percent       +1.41 percent

In general, it’s clear that the metals-using industries are still losing growth momentum versus the rest of manufacturing. But do the duties deserve all or even much of the blame? If so, then why did so many of these sectors turn in better growth numbers in May than in April – especially automotive and major appliances? The latter’s relative comeback is especially striking, given that it’s been experiencing not only metals tariffs, but separate levies on large household laundry equipment and a weakness in U.S. housing. Ditto for automotive, where output has been highly volatile for many months.

The Boeing effect is apparent, too, from the falling output numbers since March, when safety problems started generating grounding decisions and airspace national airspace bans for its widely used 737 Max models. Further, both automotive and aerospace are major users of machinery and fabricated metals products.

The impact of the tariffs on products from China remains much more of a puzzle, and for the same reasons that have been apparent since their onset, in August, 2018. They have covered thousands of products, most of which so far have been intermediate goods, and their role as these kinds of inputs for manufacturing industries varies dramatically from final product to final product. In addition, Washington uses different manufacturing classification systems for designating the tariff-ed products and for measuring manufacturing production. The levies have been in place for a shorter period of time than the metals duties. And their scope has widened since the first batch went into effect in August, along with many rates having changed.

Nonetheless, here are some figures for the handful of industries for which I’m sure the numbers create a reasonably accurate picture, with each column measuring real output changes since last August.

                                        August thru March   August thru April   August thru May

overall manufacturing:       -0.45 percent           -0.96 percent         -0.75 percent

ball bearings:                     +0.22 percent          +0.11 percent        +0.01 percent

industrial heating equip:     -0.83 percent          -5.41 percent          -4.70 percent

farm machinery & equip: -11.65 percent         -10.27 percent         -7.51 percent

oil/gas drilling platform    +4.08 percent          +2.58 percent         +4.59 percent

   parts

Unfortunately, no consistent trend emerges. Two of the sectors’ improved between March and May (farm machinery and equipment, and oil and gas drilling platform parts), and two worsened (ball bearings and industrial heating equipment).

And although as long as the China tariffs continue , the future will provide results over a more statistically significant time frame, because the footprint of Chinese inputs in most of U.S. Manufacturing sectors will continue to be so broad and deep, their costs are likely to remain just as hard to discern.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Tariffs-Led Wholesale Price Inflation Going, Going….

Tags

aluminum, China, inflation, metals, metals-using industries, Producer Price Index, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, wholesale prices, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Amid all the recent trade policy-related news, I’ve struggled (unsuccessfully) to keep up with the U.S. inflation data, but kept my nose to the grindstone this week and have now managed to scrutinize the new producer price figures (for May) in detail. These Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) figures contain unmistakable signs that whatever tariff-led inflation had begun to be generated in the American wholesale sector has been dramatically dissipating lately – which no doubt has much to do with continuingly weakening core inflation on the consumer side.

As usual, let’s start with the impact of President Trumps metals tariffs, which have lasted the longest (their first full month was April, 2018), and it’s easiest to identify the industries affected, since steel and aluminum-heavy sectors are pretty obvious (along with the metals themselves), and since we’re not dealing with the dependency on metals from any one trade competitor.

And a special bonus: It’s with steel and aluminum prices per se that the loss of any inflationary momentum comes through most clearly. Specifically, after rising 12.37 percent between April and their most recent (September) peak, prices for steel mill shapes fell 6.44 percent through May. As a result, they’re now 5.14 percent higher than during their first tariffs month. In their control group (the processed goods minus foods and feeds – or “core” – super-category) prices rose by 3.41 percent from April through their peak (in October), and have since declined by 2.62 percent. Consequently, they’re now 0.70 percent higher than during the first metals tariffs month.

So although in absolute terms, steel prices remain higher than those in their super-category, they peaked earlier and have come down faster.

Aluminum prices have been much weaker for much longer. After rising by 6.66 percent between April and their (latest) June peak, aluminum mill shapes prices are down by 6.53 percent. As a result, they’re now actually 0.30 percent lower than during their first full tariffs month.

Significantly, signs of markedly decelerating inflation are just as evident in numerous metals-using manufacturing sectors. In past posts on producer price trends, I looked first at industries where price increases since the metals tariffs onset had initially been faster than that for their super-category – final demand goods minus food and energy products.

The table below makes plain that a sizable, widespread slowdown has taken place. The columns show the percentage price changes between April and whichever month saw such prices hit their latest peak; and such changes for such goods since January. In every instance, the percentage changes for the latter have been much smaller than for the former. And in the cases of mining machinery and equipment and construction machinery and equipment, the slowdowns were more dramatic even than that for the super-category (which was awfully dramatic).

                                                               April to peak (month)          Since Jan.

Final demand less food and energy:       +1.73 (May, 2019)              +0.17

pumps/compressors:                               +3.82 (May, 2019)              +0.57

mining mach & equipment:                    +7.52 (April, 2019)            +0.03

construction machinery & equipment:   +5.75 (April, 2019)            +0.04

metal-forming machine tools:                +3.77 (Feb.,2019)              +0.77

But it would be reasonable to counter that four manufacturing sectors are too few to show anything conclusively. So here are results for nine more whose early inflation numbers were stronger than that of the core final demand super-category. Every single one has experienced an inflation slowdown since January, and except for railroad equipment and possibly oil and gas field machinery, all involved several orders of magnitude.

                                                                  April to peak (month)       Since Jan.

agricultural machinery & equipment:        +4.18 (April, 2019)          +0.04

tools, dies, jigs, fixtures, molds:                +2.82 (Feb., 2019)           +0.51

industrial material handling equipment:    +3.83 (May, 2019)          +0.22

oil and gas field machinery:                      +1.99 (March, 2019)       +1.01

household appliances:                               +4.53 (Feb., 2019)          +1.39

lawn & garden equipment:                        +2.19 (May, 2019)          +0.13

truck trailers:                                             +6.96 (May, 2019)          +0.81

aircraft:                                                      +2.20 (May, 2019)         +0.52

railroad equipment                                    +2.76 (March, 2019)      +2.67

For good measure, a slowdown is also occurring for metals-using industries where price increases have been relatively weak since the metals tariffs were imposed, as apparent from the table below: 

                                                                 April to peak (month)    Since Jan.

metal-cutting machine tools:                     +1.75 (May, 2019)        +0.69 

passenger cars:                                          +1.20 (Oct., 2018)         -0.30

heavy trucks:                                             +1.22 (Jan., 2019)           0.00

light trucks:                                                +2.43 (Nov., 2018)       -1.72

motor vehicle parts:                                   +0.71 (April, 2019)      +0.31

travel trailers & campers:                          +2.24 (March, 2018)    +0.42

Switch over to “intermediate demand” goods and you find a broad-based, often dramatic inflation deceleration as well – even though price increases in this super-category have accelerated!

                                                                 April to peak (month)    Since Jan.

core intermediate demand:                       +1.11 (May, 2019)         +1.26

metal containers:                                      +5.01 (May, 2019)         +2.95

fab wire products:                                  +11.49 (March, 2019)     +0.23

non-fluid power valves:                          + 4.01 (May, 2019)        +0.98

bolts, nuts, screws, rivets, washers:        +7.98 (April, 2019)        -0.43

fabricated structural metals products:     +5.10 (May, 2019)        +2.18

hardware:                                                 +5.10 (May, 2019)       +0.49

heating equipment:                                  +6.99 (May, 2019)       +1.85

fluid power equipment:                           +4.54 (May, 2019)       +1.33

mechanical power transmission equip:   +3.73 (May, 2019)      +0.40

A/C & refrigeration equip:                     +4.16 (April, 2019)     +1.37

ball and roller bearings:                          +5.85 (March, 2019)   +2.96

The first Trump China tariffs weren’t imposed until early July, so the sample size is smaller. And as previously noted, it’s relatively difficult identifying their precise effects because the list of tariff-ed sectors uses an industry classification system different from that used by BLS to monitor price changes, and the China content of these products can vary significantly. In addition, the group of tariff-ed goods have grown since then, the level of levies differs widely, and the original duties for many have been increased (not to mention the suspension of this major increase for several months earlier this year.  For the exact phases of the U.S.-China trade war until the latest – May 10 – Trump tariff increase, see here.).

But on this policy front, too, the exact same recent wholesale inflation slowdown is apparent as documented above for metals and metals-using industries. And for goods in the core intermediate demand super-category, the China tariff-affected goods have also seen produce price inflation slow as price inflation for the super-category has sped up. The only exceptions are the transformer category (where the inflation levels have been very low in absolute terms and the speed-up marginal) and possibly the oil and gas field machinery sector (where the monthly inflation rates for the two periods seem to be about the same_. Here, again, are the results for the entire August, 2018-May, 2019 period (covering the full duration of the China tariffs in toto), and for the post-January period.

                                                                              Aug.-May            Since Jan.

core intermediate demand goods:                     -1.85 percent       +1.26 percent

aircraft engines and engine parts:                    +1.32 percent       +0.35 percent

ball bearings:                                                   +4.23 percent       +2.96 percent

electric generators:                                          +2.41 percent       +0.18 percent

medical, surgical & personal aid devices:      +0.94 percent         -0.05 percent

core commodity final demand:                      +1.12 percent          0.00 percent

industrial heating equipment:                        +3.50 percent        +1.85 percent

oil and gas drilling platform parts:                +1.84 percent        +1.01 percent

farm machinery and equipment:                   +2.29 percent           0.00 percent

paper-making machinery:                             +2.92 percent         +0.88 percent

electricity transformers:                                +0.61 percent         +0.70 percent

X-ray and electro-medical equipment:         +0.35 percent          +0.12 percent

It might be an exaggeration to say “If you blinked, you missed tariffs-led inflation in the wholesale economy.” But as the above figures make clear, for now, it’s not much of an exaggeration.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing’s Productivity Lag Keeps Worsening

Tags

Labor Department, labor productivity, manufacturing, multi-factor productivity, non-farm business, productivity, {What's Left of) Our Economy

They’re not as exciting as the trade data and the jobs data these days. In fact, they rarely generate any excitement. And this year, they had the misfortune of coming out on the 75^th anniversary of D-Day. All the same, last Thursday’s second set of government figures on labor productivity for the first quarter of this year matters because it strengthened the case for a disturbing trend: Although this measure of efficiency – and indirectly, success in fostering healthy growth and sustainably rising living standards – confirmed the initial encouraging results for the economy as a whole, manufacturing’s laggard status looks worse than ever..

As RealityChek regulars know, the labor productivity measured in last week’s report is the narrower of the two productivity gauges regularly published by the Department of Labor. As opposed to multi-factor productivity, which measures how much in the way of a variety of business inputs is needed to generate a unit of output, labor productivity only tells us how much each hour of work put in by an employee achieves that result. But the labor productivity figures come out on a timelier basis, so they’re understandably watched closely.

The release’s headline figure confirmed the solid labor productivity gain originally reported for the first quarter in the “non-farm business” sector – the Department’s definition of the American economic universe when it comes to productivity. Although the 3.4 percent annualized sequential rate of improvement was a little slower than the first 3.6 percent estimate, it remained the best such result since the 3.7 percent recorded for the third quarter of 2014. Moreover, it still left labor productivity growth accelerating since the third quarter of last year.

For manufacturing, however, the first quarter’s sequential labor productivity increase was revised way down – from a pretty good 1.7 percent to a dismal 0.4 percent.

Even worse, whereas non-farm business productivity improved because both output and hours worked rose (the productivity gain recipe we want to see), the much smaller increase for manufacturing stemmed from hours worked dropping even faster than output (the productivity gain recipe we don’t want to see).

As a result of this poor manufacturing performance, the labor productivity gap between industry and the rest of the economy has been widening – and not in a good way for industry. Here’s an updated table showing the total labor productivity gains for non-farm businesses and for manufacturing during the two previous economic expansions and the current expansion (in order to ensure apples-to-apples comparisons).

                                                               Non-farm business       Manufacturing

1990s expansion (2Q 1991-1Q 2001):     +23.74 percent         +45.86 percent

bubble expansion (4Q 2001-4Q 2007):    +16.59 percent        +30.23 percent

current expansion: (2Q 2009 to present): +12.18 percent          +9.59 percent

It’s worrisome enough that the non-farm business increases have been decelerating since the 1990s expansion. But the extent of the manufacturing slowdown has been nothing less than shocking. Indeed, during the current recovery, manufacturing has clearly lost its labor productivity leadership status – and by a considerable margin.

Alternatively put, even though the 1990s expansion and the current expansion have lasted roughly the same amount of time, the rise in non-farm labor productivity during this recovery has been only about half as fast, and that for manufacturing only about a fifth as fast.

American manufacturing has shown some important signs of revival under President Trump – especially in job creation and output (at least until recently). But whatever the results of Mr. Trump’s trade wars, unless its labor productivity performance improves dramatically, its comeback will remain sorely incomplete.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Jobs Report Again Shows Evidence of Tariffs Damage

Tags

China, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A speaking engagement yesterday prevented me from posting promptly on that morning’s monthly U.S. jobs report (for May), but after crunching the numbers, two conclusions come through loud and clear. First, the overall results added up to a total stinker. And second, like last month’s release, they contained more evidence that President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies are taking a toll on hiring in manufacturing.

As with economy-wide (“non-farm”) hiring in May, manufacturing employment creation in general grew weakly – and for the fourth straight month. Industry’s payrolls rose by a measly 3,000 on month in May. The revisions, meanwhile, left the discouraging situation basically intact, as April’s previously reported 4,000 net sequential job gain was upgraded to 5,000, but March’s former flatline is now judged to have been a 3,000 net monthly job decrease.

As usual, however, when it comes to the trade policy implications, the results that count are those in manufacturing sectors actually significantly affected by trade policy moves like Mr. Trump’s tariffs. First let’s examine industry’s major metals-using sectors – both the necessary data for these industries goes back to April, 2018 (the first full month when these levies were in effect) and because the industries themselves are much easier to identify.

Here are the figures for these sectors’ employment changes between that month and this past April (both the originally reported numbers and today’s revisions), and between April, 2018 and May, 2019. (All these results, incidentally, are still preliminary.) Serving as control groups are the results for the entire private sector in the United States, for all of manufacturing, and for the durable goods super-sector (where all the main metals-using industries have been found).

                                                    Old thru April   New thru April   April Thru May

entire private sector:                  +1.79 percent     +1.93 percent      +2.00 percent

overall manufacturing:              +1.58 percent     +1.60 percent      +1.62 percent

durable goods:                           +1.92 percent     +1.94 percent      +1.99 percent

fabricated metals products:       +1.82 percent     +1.71 percent      +1.65 percent

non-electrical machinery:         +2.68 percent     +2.52 percent      +2.64 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:    +0.42 percent     +0.20 percent     + 0.48 percent

household appliances:               not available       -4.57 percent       not available

aerospace products & parts:      not available      +7.02 percent       not available

The pattern is clear. Even in metals-using sectors that had been outperforming the overall private sector and overall manufacturing in absolute terms, hiring momentum has waned. Moreover, it’s recently been slackening at a faster rate than evident in those larger sectors. That’s clear from the narrowing of the gap that can generally be seen between the employment increases in the metals-using sectors and the broader parts of the economy.

The impact of the China tariffs remains a puzzle, though, because they’ve been in place for a briefer period of time, and because the industry classification system used by the Trump administration in developing its tariff lists is different from the system used by the Labor Department to track employment changes. In addition, the level of China content of domestic manufactured goods can vary considerably, meaning that the impact of the tariffs can vary just as considerably.

Nevertheless, some exact and reasonably close matches can be identified, and, at least through April (the latest month for which data are available for the specific sectors below, which are narrower than those in the table for metals-using industries), the same relative hiring weakness can be seen. That is, job creation in the China tariffs-affected sectors has been growing more slowly than job creation in the private sector in toto, or in manufacturing overall. This trend is visible even in sectors that have greatly bested the private sector and manufacturing control groups in absolute levels of job creation.

                                   July-March    Old July-April   New July-April    July-May

private sector:         +1.23 percent   +1.44 percent    +1.39 percent    +1.46 percent

overall                   +0.98 percent  +1.03 percent     +1.02 percent     +1.04 percent  

   manufacturing:

aircraft engines       +1.39 percent    not available    +1.51 percent    not available

   and engine parts:

industrial heating   +2.46 percent     not available    +1.45 percent    not available

    equipment:

oil & gas drilling   +5.83 percent      not available   +5.02 percent    not available

    platform parts:

farm machinery     +1.67 percent      not available   +0.17 percent     not available

    & equipment:

ball bearings:        +1.82 percent       not available   +1.54 percent     not available

These results don’t mean that the Trump tariffs, as some keep predicting, are going to throw the American economy into recession, much less that if they do start biting significantly, that they won’t be a price worth paying for overhauling decades of boneheaded, offshoring-friendly, national security threatening (especially in the case of China) trade policies. In fact, they don’t even add up to evidence that the levies are biting significantly now.

But empirical evidence of some damage is finally emerging, at least on the jobs front, and it should be seen as a warning to tariff supporters – including the President – to stop insisting that the current trade wars will entail no costs or need for sacrifice whatever.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Through the Policy Noise, More Evidence of Trade Progress Under Trump

Tags

China, exports, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, real non-oil goods trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s new monthly U.S. trade figures (for April) from the U.S. Census Bureau come at an awkward time statistically speaking. As must be obvious, they predate President Trump’s latest escalation trade war escalations. They’ve been shaped significantly by the safety-related problems at the Boeing Co., long a major American export standout, which may or may not be solved relatively quickly. To make matters more complicated, they incorporate revisions – some of which go back to 2014.

All the same, the trade report contained some data worth noting.

Regarding the macro numbers, the combined U.S. goods and services trade deficit shrank by 2.15 percent on month in April, from an upwardly revised $51.91 billion to $50.79 billion. That’s the second lowest monthly total of this still-young year and, more important, the second lowest total (after February’s $50.03 billion) since June, 2018’s $47.43 billion.

And, in an unusual (literal) footnote, March’s figure was revised up by a substantial 3.81 percent.

Total U.S. exports fell by 2.16 percent on month in April, to $206.85 billion. That’s the biggest percentage sequential decrease since January, 2015’s 2.66 percent. And the April total was the lowest since last December’s $205.66 billion.

Total American imports, though, fell at the same 2.16 percent rate – but the decline was only the fastest since January’s 2.40 percent. The $257.64 billion total import figure was the nation’s lowest since April, 2018’s $257.10 billion.

Year-to-date, the overall trade deficit is 2.02 percent higher than in 2018, although overall economic growth is a little slower.

As known by RealityChek regulars, more insights on how Mr. Trump’s trade policies can be gleaned from examining the “Made in Washington trade deficit” – comprised of U.S. trade flows strongly influenced by trade policy decisions. Such figures strip out oil trade, which is rarely dealt with by trade policy makers, and trade services, where liberalization has still made only modest progress worldwide.

In inflation-adjusted terms (the figures that are used to help calculate overall American economic growth or contraction), this non-oil goods deficit dipped by 0.14 percent month-to-month in April. More revealing, so far in 2019 it’s up 6.13 percent. That sounds like an indictment of the Trump trade record.

But 2018’s comparable figure was 12.71 percent. So even though the economy’s growth changed little, the growth rate of the Made in Washington trade deficit plunged by more than 50 percent – unmistakably good news for anyone wanting the economy to rely less for growth on borrowing and consuming, and more on saving and producing.

The U.S. goods trade shortfall with China shot up 29.66 percent on month in April – which looks like a setback for the President’s trade policy. The more so since the jump was the biggest since the 37.01 percent surge of March, 2015.

All the same, this increase followed the biggest two-month plunge in this trade deficit (39.80 percent) since October-December, 2001 (39.87 percent). In addition, despite the tariff policy gyrations on both sides, the impact of seasonal factors on U.S.-China goods trade can still be detected, as bilateral commerce tends to wane temporarily after big Christmas holiday-related buildups.

Moreover, the China goods deficit through the first four months of 2019 is down 9.88% from the comparable 2018 period – even though the overall goods deficit year-to-date is up 0.33%.

The April widening of the China goods gap was led by a 24.27 percent monthly nosedive in American goods sales to the People’s Republic. This biggest such drop since January, 2018’s 27.35 percent surely represents one sign of the Boeing effect. Although country-specific data aren’t yet available, overall civilian aircraft overseas sales plummeted by 46.89 percent sequentially in April (or just under $2.30 billion in absolute terms).

Goods imports from China rose on month for the first time in six months – by 11.62 percent, to $34.80 billion. This increase was the biggest since May, 2018’s 14.78 percent, by which time tariffs front-running was clearly underway.

The Boeing effect can also be seen in the April manufacturing trade figures. The monthly deficit – which due to trade war factors has been volatile lately – increased sequentially by 12.76 percent, from $76.96 billion to $86.78 billion.

Exports slumped by 9.81 percent month-to-month – or $10.07 billion – with nearly a quarter of the decline due to aircraft.

The much larger amount of manufactures imports was down, too, sequentially in April, but by only 0.14 percent.

Year-to-date, the manufacturing trade deficit stands at $324.17 billion – 4.11 percent higher than the comparable 2018 figure. January-through-April exports are 1.18 percent lower than in the first four months of last year, while imports are 1.21 percent higher.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Krugman’s (Embarrassingly) Phony Tariff History

Tags

1920s, agriculture, Economic History Association, history, Paul M. Krugman, protectionism, tariffs, The New York Times, Trade, Trump, World War I, {What's Left of) Our Economy

To the many reasons I have to envy Paul M. Krugman (his high profile perch as a New York Times pundit, his Nobel Prize in economics, his surely stratospheric income), one more can now be added:  As strongly indicated by his latest column for The Times, he works for folks who allow him to publish any claim he’d like without being fact-checked or even questioned in any way.

In that piece, Krugman sought to debunk President Trump’s recently tweeted claim that “TARIFF is a beautiful word indeed” by showing that “the actual history of U.S. tariffs isn’t pretty.”  One major example he used:  Because America “took a sharply protectionist turn before the infamous 1930 Smoot-Hawley Act,” the country’s farmers “spent the 1920s suffering from low prices for their products and high prices for farm equipment, leading to a surge in foreclosures.”

“Part of the problem was that U.S. tariffs were met with retaliation; even before the Depression struck, the world was engaged in a gradually escalating trade war.”

Sounds pretty convincing, right? In fact, not even close. And not least of which because the only two sources cited by Krugman contain absolutely no mention of low farm prices or foreclosures or unaffordable farm equipment stemming from any trade-related developments. In fact, there’s not even a mention of “high prices for farm equipment” at all.

The sources – articles on the Economic History Association’s website on the 1920s tariffs, and on the U.S. economy in the 1920s (you can read them here and here) – demonstrate that agriculture’s woes during this period (not surprisingly) resulted from many cases. But tariffs don’t make the list. 

Simply put, the main culprits were excessive borrowing by American farmers late in the previous decade based on the assumption that agricultural output in war-torn Europe would remain long depressed, and that this market would for many years be importing ever greater amounts of U.S. farm products; and a subsequent price-depressing glut in American supply when European output recovered faster than expected once World War I ended.

A a result, U.S. farmers were left with lots of new acreage and machinery that suddenly became superfluous even though their new owners still needed to pay off the debts they incurred to buy them.  No wonder so many weren’t able to meet their mortgage payments.

Adding to American agriculture’s problems during this period were a productivity boom triggered by surging mechanization and other advances that permitted agricultural production to rise much faster than domestic (and foreign) consumption; and an economy-wide depression in 1920 and 1921 that primarily resulted from excessive monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve. Again, nothing about tariffs.

Importantly, the 1920s economic history article in particular is a gold mine of information about many developments of that time that shed considerable light on today’s major economic challenges – as I’ll be describing in some future posts.  In the meantime, I’d strongly recommend that anyone with an interest in the American economic invest the time needed to read it – starting with Paul Krugman.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Time to Investigate China’s Enablers in the Trade War

Tags

China, customs fraud, Malaysia, Mexico, Nikkei Asian Review, Taiwan, tariffs, Trade, transshipment, Trump, v, Vietnam, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For decades (decades!), when describing how U.S. trade policy should be overhauled, I’ve emphasized that Washington’s approach needs to be not onl “tougher” or “stronger” — as per the favored terms of politicians and reporters.  It needs to be smarter and more nimble as well.

So here’s to the Japanese publication Nikkei Asian Review. It’s just shown exactly why – and why such smarts and agility are especially important for an administration more than willing to use tariffs on China and other economies to achieve its policy goals. (And thanks also to my Twitter follower “DeSaram-MAGA” for calling my attention to the piece.)

For a team of Nikkei journalists has investigated a key subject that no one in the Trump administration, the Congress, or the American media (at least to my knowledge) has bothered to look at: How much of the falling U.S. imports from China are being replaced by supplies genuinely produced in other countries (like Mexico and Vietnam), and how much are being replaced by goods from China being shipped through other countries either simply by putting them in different boxes and containers, or by slapping a coat of paint on them or making some other superficial change before sending them on to the United States?

The answers matter because if it’s mainly or significantly the former, then it becomes clear that the Trump tariffs really are hurting China by denying it sale opportunities that are being snapped up by other competitors. True, the final result per se won’t achieve the major Trump-ian goal of reducing the overall U.S. trade deficit. But China will be weakened – clearly another one of the President’s objectives – and the beneficiaries at least won’t be a huge, wealthy, powerful dictatorship acting like it wants to expand its influence in East Asia and perhaps the world over at America’s expense.

If the answer is the mainly or significantly the latter, then it becomes clear that numerous other economies – including U.S. allies – helping China evade the American levies, and that unless they halt these practices pronto, the case for worldwide tariffs on lots of products becomes a lot stronger.

The Nikkei journalists present evidence for both propositions. But given the uproar that erupted over the global Trump metals tariffs (imposed precisely to prevent assistance given to the Chinese metals producers who had glutted global markets), signs of customs fraud, transshipment, and related practices are especially important.

The Nikkei team provides some anecdotal evidence on this score. But the data-based case described is much more compelling. For example, the journalists found that although exports of five categories of goods from China to the United States – machinery and parts; electrical equipment and parts; furniture; toys; and automotive equipment and parts – declined between January and March of this year declined by 16 percent, “exports from China to developing countries and from developing countries to the U.S. [of these goods] have generally climbed. Exports via Vietnam, Taiwan and Mexico have increased particularly steeply.”

The rising Chinese exports to these countries strongly suggest that Vietnam, Taiwan, Mexico and others aren’t simply filling the China gap in the U.S. market with goods originating in their own economies. To a great degree, they’re helping Chinese origin goods fill that gap on the sly.

Even more suspicious, according to the article:

“Since the U.S. first slapped punitive tariffs on a broad range of imports from China, the six major Southeast Asian nations and Taiwan have started shipping nearly 1,600 new categories of products to the U.S. that they had never exported to America before.

“Of these new U.S.-bound exports, about 1,000 items, or over 60% of the total, are on Washington’s blacklist.”

That is, unless you believe that in a matter of months, major production capacity for this huge number of products somehow suddenly appeared where little, if any, existed before, then circumvention has to be rife.

The Nikkei findings don’t mean that the Trump administration should build all-encompassing tariff walls immediately. But they do mean that Washington needs to demand prompt answers from the economies in question. U.S. leverage, moreover, in many cases isn’t only economic. It’s grounded in national security, too. Countries like Vietnam, Taiwan, and Malaysia aren’t official U.S. treaty allies, but are all quite pleased that the American military counters China geopolitically by basing lots of assets in their neighborhood.

President Trump plainly understands that the United States needs these countries much less than vice versa both economically and security-wise. But the trade policy overhaul he’s rightly pursuing still needs to do better at guarding against foreign efforts to game the system. In this case, that requites demonstrating one of the most reliable signs of intelligence – curiosity.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New GDP Report Confirmed the Good News Trump Trade Story

Tags

GDP, gross domestic product, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real growth, real trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The U.S. government’s second look at the gross domestic product (GDP) for the first quarter of the year, which came out yesterday, didn’t significantly change the message sent by last month’s initial read on the economic impact of President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies so far – and that’s good news for anyone who’s not afflicted with Trump Derangement Syndrome. (Actually, if extreme Never Trump-ers’ well-being is tied to the American economy’s, it’s good news for them, too, in real life.)

This newest look provides yet more evidence that Mr. Trump’s long overdue overhaul of the nation’s approach to trade – no doubt coupled with other measures like regulatory reform and possibly the tax cuts – is enabling the economy to grow in a healthy, sustainable way. Specifically, the economy’s overall inflation-adjusted growth (the measure that attracts the most attention) has not only been strong. It’s become stronger than the growth of America’s still oversized, debt-producing trade deficits.

The quarter-to-quarter results show this trend emphatically. According to the second GDP read, the economy grew at a price-adjusted annual rate of 3.03 percent in the first quarter of this year. That’s down only slightly from the 3.13 percent real growth previously reported, and considerably faster than the 2.15 percent results for the fourth quarter of last year.

But during that first quarter, the after-inflation overall trade deficit dropped by 5.45 percent. That’s a bit less than the 5.90 percent sequential drop found in the last month’s GDP report (because the trade shortfall was revised slightly higher), but still considerable given the rapid overall expansion. And it’s a major turnaround from the 0.63 constant dollar trade deficit increase between the third and fourth quarters of last year.

All the same, one quarter does not a trend make. That’s why it’s crucial to note that developments over longer time-frames also support optimism about the Trump trade policies’ results. And as previously shown, the most revealing comparison is between the last high growth period recorded by the economy during President Obama’s administration, and the current Trump surge.

Despite the marginal reduction in the first quarter’s real growth figure, it still leaves after-inflation expansion over the last four data quarters at 3.18 percent. That’s the fastest such growth since the 3.37 percent recorded between the second quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015.

But during that Obama-era growth spurt, the real U.S. trade deficit increased by 21.55 percent. During the current Trump high growth period, this trade gap is up only 0.13 percent so far.

Some other trade-related highlights of the new read on first quarter GDP:

>In absolute terms, the inflation-adjusted overall trade deficit for the first quarter was revised up from $899.3 billion to $903.6 billion. That’s the lowest level since the second quarter, 2018’s $841.0 billion.

>Consequently, the real trade deficit as a share of price-adjusted GDP stood at 4.78 percent, not the 4.76 percent reported in the advance GDP release. That’s still the lowest such number since the second quarter of 2018’s 4.54 percent.

>Trade’s contribution to economic growth in the first quarter remained at its best level in years. In the advance read, the sequential shrinkage of the constant-dollar trade deficit fueled 1.03 percentage points of 3.13 percent annualized growth. As of the new GDP report, these figures stood at 0.96 percentage points of 2.03 percent growth.

In other words, the trade deficit’s improvement accounted for 31.64 percent of the first quarter’s real growth. That’s down from the 32.91 percent figure from the initial read on first quarter GDP, but still the highest such figure since 38.56 percent of the fourth quarter of 2013 (when a reduction in the inflation-adjusted trade deficit fueled 1.23 percentage points of its 3.19 percent annualized growth.

>Because total goods and services exports were revised slightly higher (from $2.5765 trillion annualized to $2.5836 trillion), they remained at record levels.

>Real goods exports exports were estimated to be slightly higher, too – $1.8028 trillion annualized instead of $1.7598 trillion. But that’s still only the second best total on record (after the $1.8092 trillion in the second quarter of 2018).

>After-inflation services exports were also upgraded slightly – from $783.2 billion annualized to $783.6 billion. That still represents their fifth straight quarterly record.

>First quarter constant dollar total imports are still estimated to have fallen sequentially in the first quarter, but only to $3.4871 trillion annualized, not to $3.4758 trillion. That upward revision still left them as representing the third highest level on record.

>The same story unfolded for after-inflation goods imports. Their quarterly drop left them at $2.9229 trillion annualized, not $2.9131 trillion – also a third all-time highest level.

>Real services imports, however, came in higher than the $562.2 billion at annual rates previously reported. The new $563.8 billion total represented a new record.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why the Multinationals Still Should be Ignored on China

Tags

Bloomberg.com, China, multinational companies, multinationals, offshoring, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Is China mainly valued by American multinational businesses as a super-cheap production site for serving U.S. customers, or as a huge and potentially huge-er consumer market? The question has mattered decisively since the beginning of the nation’s controversial and dramatic trade expansion with China because of the impact on domestic U.S. jobs and production.

So it’s important to report that a new poll of the multinationals that operate in the People’s Republic strongly supports the views of trade policy critics (like me) who have charged that the nation’s pre-Trump approach to China’s economic rise has produced America Last results for the United States, and have urged a fundamentally new strategy.

If the multinationals were using China mainly to supply the U.S. market, as the critics have long insisted, then the trade and investment patterns that have emerged with China would inevitably be undercutting America’s economy. For their investment in the People’s Republic would be mainly replacing factories and similar facilities in the United States, and even exports to China would mainly be replacing shipments between plants within the United States.

If, however, these global giants (and the economists they employ to make their case to politicians, the press, and the public) were right in claiming that their activities were mainly focused on satisfying demand in China, and especially final demand, then the U.S. domestic economy would benefit. For their new Chinese customers would be supplementing their existing American customers, and overall markets for products Made in the USA would grow. (See here and here for arguments from multinationals-funded think tanks studies purporting to document that this win-win scenario has been the case for years.)

But a survey conducted by no less than the American Chamber of Commerce in China and by its Shanghai branch makes clear the great extent to which U.S.-owned businesses operating in China are oriented towards customers back home. One of the biggest hints? More (40 percent) of the 239 firms contacted said that (in the words of a Bloomberg.com summary) “the hike of U.S. tariffs announced on May 10 would have a strong negative impact on their business” than said that they would be hurt by a retaliatory Chinese increase in its duties (33 percent). Clearly, the American levies’ increase would damage those companies because of all that they produce in China for export to the United States. And this despite the robust growth of a Chinese consuming class that is said to be the main reason for concentrating on Chinese customer.

Two other big clues: Fully 35 percent of the companies responding said that “their main strategy for dealing with the tension was to restructure so their operations were more heavily ‘in China for China.’” In other words, many of their China operations are still structured to be “in China for somewhere else.” And 53 percent of the businesses reported that they faced no non-tariff retaliatory measures from Beijing since July, 2018 – when the first Trump China tariffs were announced. Why would they if much of their focus was exporting, and thereby helping China earn valuable foreign exchange revenue?

Nonetheless, the American Chamber survey did turn up two semi-surprises. First, only one of the companies responding complained that a curb on China’s forced technology transfer practices “was the most important outcome” for President Trump to achieve in any trade agreement. For decades, reports of this practice have been too numerous to list.

Second, 42 percent of the companies stated that “a return to the status quo before the tariffs was most important for them” – even though mounting corporate complaints about harassment from and discrimination by the Chinese government and its agents in the Chinese “business” sector are mains reason for strong (stated, anyway) bipartisan American support for ramping up the pressure on China. At the same time, this result could be yet another sign of how much U.S. corporate activity in China continues using the country mainly as an export platform.

Even the most charitable interpretation of this survey would conclude that American businesses simply have no coherent idea of what they want U.S. China trade diplomacy to produce. On the one hand, many of them plainly remain unhappy with the Chinese environment in which they operate. On the other, many plainly oppose the only American measures – tariffs – with any hope of improving this environment.

All of which tells me that, although there may be many grounds for criticizing President Trump’s trade war with China, opposition from an American business community that is at best utterly clueless and at worst hopelessly conflicted on the issues isn’t one of them.