(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Another Big Demographic Blow to Those Chinese Century Forecasts

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China, demographics, GDP, gross domestic product, national security, per capita GDP, population, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

China just came out with its final – for now – 2021 population growth figures, and they strengthen the case against the People’s Republic becoming rich and powerful enough to dominate the world before too long. Indeed, combined with stunning recent figures on Chinese performance on a key measure of prosperity, they add to the evidence that far from becoming a “Chinese Century,” the 21^st century is likeliest to become one of Chinese stagnation and even relative decline.

The demographic figures show that China’s population during 2021 increased by only about 480,000 – or 0.03 percent. For comparison’s sake, the U.S. population last year rose by about 392,600 – or 0.10 percent. That rate is widely viewed as alarmingly slow (see, e.g., here), but it’s triple that of China’s. Moreover, China’s population growth has been historically sluggish for the last decade. Its last decennial census revealed an increase of only 72 million between 2010 and 2020 – the smallest rise since the first such headcount in 1953.

Even worse, these developments are entirely consistent with recent authoritative predictions that, if not somehow reversed, China will experience a population bust for the rest of this century that will be nothing less than mind-blowing. Specifically, by 2100, it will fall by fully one half – and be just twice as large as the projected U.S. population (as opposed to being 4.24 times bigger today).

These population trends debunk the Chinese Century forecasts because of a related economic trend – China’s growth in per capita gross domestic product (GDP). This statistic gauges how much total economic output (GDP) a country is generating divided by each one of its inhabitants. If a country’s per capita GDP is growing, then its economy is growing faster than its population, and therefore the average individal is generating more wealth every year, and that therefore there’s more wealth (in theory) to spread among the population each year. If per capita GDP is shrinking, then there’s less wealth being created per person and therefore less available to share.

China’s per capita GDP isn’t shrinking. But according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it hasn’t been growing very rapidly, either, for the past forty years despite the country’s very fast overall growth. More important, when it comes to those Chinese Century forecasts, it’s been growing much more slowly than U.S. per capita GDP; the gap has widened greatly; and it’s forecast to continue widening for the next few years at least. And of course, China’s wealth per head as of 2020 was less than one-sixth of America’s to begin with.

If this forecast is correct, and China’s population and per capita GDP keep falling relative to their U.S. counterparts, the strategic and economic implications, as I’ve discussed, are game-changing. They mean that even measured by total size of economy, far from turning in China’s favor, or even narrowing, the U.S.-China gap would double in America’s favor. So the United States would have many more resources to devote to its millitary, or to improving its technological competitiveness, than its chief rival. (Whether Americans wind up spending this money wisely is another question altogether).

Economically, the implications mean that the United States would become a much more promising growth market than China, both in terms of the total sizes of their GDP and in terms of how much wealth the average Chinese and average  American could actually spend.

Interestingly, moreover, these trends played out between 2020 and 2021 alone. On a quarter-to-quarter basis, the United States has been growing faster than China. And America slightly widened its per capita GDP lead.

China of course remains a huge market in absolute terms, and its massive military buildup and impressive technological progress will enable it to keep mounting major and worsening threats to American security, ranging from an attack on global semiconductor manufacturing kingpin Taiwan to the cyberhacking of U.S. government agencies and private businesses (along with their customers). Nor is there any guarantee that Americans will avoid catastrophic policy mistakes or other problems.

But it’s hard to escape the notion that much of America’s China policy in recent decades (the Trump years excepted) was heavily influenced by defeatist attitudes on the part of its leaders (that is, those that weren’t in effect on Beijing’s payroll in one way or another). China’s latest Census results make clear that such gloom, which produced so many decisions that enriched and strengthened China because “There was no alternative,” is getting ever harder to justify.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: An Omicron Bump in the US Manufacturing Recovery

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aircraft, aircraft parts, automotive, CCP Virus, chemicals, coronavirus, COVID 19, facemasks, Federal Reserve, machinery, manufacturing, masks, medical devices, miscellaneous durable goods, monetary policy, non-metallic mineral products, Omicron variant, personal protective equipment, petroleum and coal products, pharmaceuticals, plastics and rubber products, PPE, printing, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, stimulus, ventilators, wood products, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The big takeaway from today’s Federal Reserve after-inflation U.S. manufacturing data (for December) is that it may show domestic starting to suffer from the arrival into America of the super-infectious Omicron strain of the CCP Virus and the renewed economic curbs and behavioral changes it’s spurring, along with the spread of vaccine mandates in the ranks of U.S. businesses (of course, before yesterday’s Supreme Court decision striking down such policies for the private sector).

And especially discouraging: Just as Omicron began taking off, inflation-adjusted domestic output of medical equipment and supplies – including all the protective gear and treatment devices needed to fight the virus – fell sequentially at its fastest rate since the worst of the spring, 2020 pandemic-induced depression. Indeed, monthly real production in this category is now lower than in February, 2020 – the last full data month before the virus’ first variant began distorting the U.S. economy.

December’s 0.28 percent monthly decline in price-adjusted American manufacturing output represented industry’s first sequential retreat since September’s (hurricanes-affected) 0.52 percent drop. But the solid growth of recent months stayed largely unrevised.

The December results (which will remain preliminary for several more months) brought 2021’s yearly improvement in inflation-adjusted manufacturing output to 3.71 percent. That’s the best growth since 2011’s 6.48 percent, but as known by RealityChek regulars, it’s important to look at possible baseline effects nowadays. And this strong performance in part reflected the virus-fostered 1.94 percent fall-off in such growth in 2020.

The December downturn stemmed in part from problems (like the global semiconductor shortage) in the automotive sector, which shrank on month by 1.29 percent – following sequential expansion in November of a downwardly revised 1.69 percent. But even without the drag from vehicles and parts, domestic industry’s constant dollar production would still have been off by 0.22 percent.

Aside from automotive, the most important December real manufacturing growth loser by far was miscellaneous durable goods – a category that includes those pandemic-fighting essential medical devices and equipment industries. Its price-adjusted output slumped by 2.68 percent – the biggest downturn since April, 2020’s18.43 percent, during the worst of the CCP Virus’ first wave. Even so, measured by real production, the sector is 2.49 percent larger than in February, 2020, right before the pandemic’s initial major economic impact.

Other big December losers included:

>printing and related support activities, whose 1.82 percent slide was also the worst since April, 2020 (23.94 percent), and whose real output is now down by 5.14 percent since February, 2020;

>plastics and rubber products, whose 1.78 percent decrease was the worst since April, 2020 as well (19.12 percent), but that also followed seven months of strong gains. As a result, its real production is off just 1.08 percent since February, 2020; and

>petroleum and coal products, whose 1.58 percent fall-off was its worst since February’s seven percent, and whose after-inflation production is 4.49 percent lower than in February, 2020.

The biggest December winners were:

>non-metallic mineral products, which not only generated a 1.49 percent increase, but whose November inflation-adjusted output advance was revised all the way up from 1.25 percent to 3.03 percent. All the same, this sector’s constant-dollar production is still 1.32 percent lower than in February, 2020;

>wood products, whose 1.18 percent real increase in production was its best since March’s 4.05 percent, and which is now 3.03 percent bigger by this measure since February, 2020;

>the big chemicals sector, where real growth hit 0.69 percent following an upwardly revised 0.65 percent in November (from 0.50 percent), and which has grown by 7.93 percent in real terms since just before the pandemic; and – most encouragingly –

>machinery, a manufacturing bellwether because its products are so widely used throughout both industry and big non-manufacturing sectors like construction and agriculture – not to mention many services sectors. Its price-adjusted output increased by 0.68 percent sequentially in December – its best such result since July’s 2.85 percent, and revisions were unchanged on balance. Machinery production is now 5.20 percent higher than in February, 2020.

As for manufacturing industries that have been prominent in the news during the pandemic, they had a lousy December generally.

Aircraft and parts saw its monthly output down by 0.38 percent, and in stunning news, November’s initially reported 1.90 percent increase is now judged to be a 1.04 percent decrease. With October’s after-inflation production rise downgraded, too, aircraft and parts output is now just 10.71 percent higher than in February, 2020. As of last month’s Fed manufacturing data, this figure was a much higher 15.86 percent.

In pharmaceuticals and medicines, December’s 0.13 percent real output dip was the third straight monthly decline, and November and October revisions were fractionally negative on balance. Consequently, in price-adjusted production terms, these sectors were 13.42 percent larger than in February, 2020 – as opposd to the 13.54 percent calculable from last month’s industrial production report.

And as mentioned at the outset, the December results for medical equipment and supplies sector were awful – especially considering that for the next few months at least, Omicron’s metastasis will greatly increase demand for face masks, protective gowns, ventilators, and the like.

Real production of these products tumbled seqentially by 2.75 percent – the worst such performance since April, 2020’s 15.97 percent, during that first CCP Virus wave. Revisions for November and October were mildly positive, but whereas last month’s report revealed that inflation-adjusted production in these sectors was up since just before the first wave struck in force (though by a bare 0.65 percent), it’s now down by 1.50 percent. 

And let’s add another sector to the pandemic industries list – semiconductors and related devices. As implied by the category name, the numbers include more than the microchips that have been in such global short supply in recent months – and whose U.S. production revival has been such a high stated Washington, D.C. policy priority.

Still, it’s noteworthy that constant dollar output in this grouping rose a mere 0.12 percent on month in December, But it is up 16.86 percent since the pre-pandemicky February, 2020.

So far, betting against domestic manufacturing during the virus era has been a losing bet, But the headwinds for the near future at least look especially strong, topped of course by the spread of Omicron not only in the United States but in all the countries to which its manufacturers sell exports. Add to the list the apparent death of President Biden’s Build Back Better bill – which whatever its long-term economic wisdom and other effects, will certainly reduce government support for domestic economic activity – what seems like greater odds of more monetary policy tightening by the Federal Reserve sooner rather than later; and inflation that might be getting high enough to dampen U.S. consumer outlays.  

Tailwinds are by no means absent – like the beginning of spending made possible by the infrastructure bill, the still considerable amount of stimulus being provided by the Fed, and the easing of global supply chain knots. But even this last depends heavily on the medical, regulatory, and behavioral effects of Omicron in the United States and, perhaps even more important, in China, where the regime’s Zero Covid policy looks like a formula for ever broader lockdowns that will paralyze its ports and other infrastructure systems. 

Domestic manufacturers keep telling major surveys that they remain optimistic about the future.  (See here and here for the latest soundings.)  If anything’s certain about the circumstances they’re heading into, it’s that they’ll need every bit of this optimism to keep succeeding. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Transitory Inflation Story Endures

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CCP Virus, consumer price index, core inflation, coronavirus, COVID 19, CPI, energy prices, Federal Reserve, food prices, inflation, Jay Bhattacharya, Jerome Powell, lockdowns, mandates, shortages, stimulus, supply chains, vaccine mandates, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Rather than presenting a good news/bad news story, today’s official U.S. figures on one key measure of inflation (bringing the story through December) put into pretty clear focus an important old news/new news story. And its main implication is that the current version of lofty inflation looks considerably different from the standard versions that have hit the nation previously. Therefore, it’s looking more “transitory” (at least in terms of stemming mainly from developments specific to the CCP Virus epidemic) than ever.

This distinction of course matters because evaluating the nature of today’s inflation will greatly influence how American policymakers (especially the Federal Reserve) respond, and how they should respond. If today’s price increases stem from standard sources, then a standard response – tighter monetary policy, less government spending – make sense. If current inflation is distinctive, more austere economic policies stil may be needed for any number of reasons, but inflation-fighting won’t be a strong one.

The new news? The U.S. government tracks two main measures of inflation: Overall price increases, and price increases for “core” goods and services. The latter gauge strips out food and energy prices – because ordinarily they’re supposed to be extraordinarily volatile for reasons mainly unrelated to the economy’s underlying inflation prone-ness.

But today’s inflation data (for what’s called the Consumer Price Index, or CPI), demonstrates that during the virus era, the core price increases have been more volatile than their overall counterparts.

Let me make clear two crucial points right at the outset, though: First, as I’ve written previously, “transitory” (a term used for months but “retired” recently by the Federal Reserve) doesn’t necessarily mean “short-lived.” That’s because the virus itself and its effects may well not be short-lived. Indeed, because of the unusually rapid spread of the Omicron variant, pandemic-related and inflation-fueling economic disruptions could well last for months more.

Second, viewing today’s inflation as transitory doesn’t mean that the Biden administration and Congress may not have made a serious mistake in supporting a major round of economic stimulus earlier this year – and therefore greatly boosting Americans’ spending power while the amount of goods and services remained limited for all sorts of (CCP Virus-related and other) reasons.

At the same time, precisely because the last stimulus bill was explicitly linked to the the pandemic’s effects, because the infusion of new money has been running out, and because President Biden’s Build Back Better bill looks pretty dead in Congress, this fiscal policy mistake’s effects are looking transitory, too.

Don’t forget, moreover, the immense monetary policy support for the economy provided by the Fed. It’s virus-related, too, and yesterday, Chair Jerome Powell made clearer than ever his view that the case for such emergency assistance no longer holds, and that the central bank’s decision to start withdrawing it is firmly on track.

In addition, some of the old news (at least for RealityChek readers) about today’s inflation still holds – and further reenforces the case for “transitory-ness.” And this old news concerns the baseline effects phenomenon – by which unusual results recorded at the beginning of a period of time in which comparisons are made exercise powerful, but intrinsically, misleading results at the end of that period. In this instance, the unusually low annual inflation numbers of 2019-2020 have been bound to play a significant role in generating abnormally strong increases for 2020-2021. (BTW, savvy investors take these baseline effects into account when evaluating stock performance, too. Just Google “easy comps.”)

Nevetheless, even this old news now reflects some of the new news. Meaning that for overall inflation, the baseline effect is fading and will continue to fade for the next two data months. For the core, however, the baseline effect will stay strong through March.

The month-by-month and year-by-year figures for both overall and core CPI illustrate all of these points nicely. First, let’s review the monthly changes in overall CPI for this calendar year:

Dec-Jan:                          0.26 percent

Jan-Feb:                          0.35 percent

Feb-March:                     0.62 percent

March-April:                  0.77 percent

April-May:                     0.64 percent

May-June:                      0.90 percent

June-July:                      0.47 percent

July-Aug:                      0.27 percent

Aug-Sept:                      0.41 percent

Sept-Oct:                      0.94 percent

Oct-Nov:                       0.78 percent

Nov-Dec:                      0.47 percent

That new December figure represents both the smallest such increase since July, and a big slowdown from November. So that’s a noteworthy sign of transitory-ness right there.

Yet on a monthly basis, as shown below, core inflation actually quickened a bit in December:

Dec-Jan:                      0.03 percent

Jan-Feb:                       0.10 percent

Feb-March:                  0.34 percent

March-April:                0.92 percent

April-May:                   0.74 percent

May-June:                    0.88 percent

June-July:                     0.33 percent

July-Aug:                     0.10 percent

Aug-Sept:                    0.24 percent

Sept-Oct:                     0.60 percent

Oct-Nov:                     0.53 percent

Nov-Dec:                    0.55 percent

A closer look, however, shows that the core’s ups and downs have been greater than that for overall inflation, and that was especially true early in the pandemic. From January through April, it skyrocketed from 0.03 percent to 0.92 percent, whereas overall price increases went up more slowly (though still impressively), from 0.26 percent to 0.74 percent.

Similar increase patterns are revealed in the annual overall and core inflation increases, but the volatility trends are somewhat different. First, the overall data:

Jan:                             1.37 percent

Feb:                            1.68 percent

March:                       2.64 percent

April:                         4.16 percent

May:                          4.93 percent

June:                          5.32 percent

July:                           5.28 percent

Aug:                           5.20 percent

Sept:                          5.38 percent

Oct:                            6.24 percent

Nov:                           6.88 percent

Dec:                           7.12 percent

Here the nation has experienced not only accelerating annual inflation, but a fourth straight month of acceleration.

Ditto for annual core inflation:

Jan:                            1.40 percent

Feb:                            1.28 percent

March:                       1.65 percent

April:                         2.96 percent

May:                          3.80 percent

June:                          4.45 percent

July:                          4.24 percent

Aug:                          3.98 percent

Sept:                          4.04 percent

Oct:                           4.58 percent

Nov:                          4.96 percent

Dec:                           5.49 percent

But rather than being more volatile early in the pandemic period, these prices sung the most between last June and September, and during December. Still, if the volatility of overall and core inflation have been in the same ballpark lately, that’s an indication that this most recent burst of inflation has broken the mold.

The baseline effects are also signaling the recent outsized volatility of core inflation. Since it was so unusually depressed early in the first pandemic year 2020, these effects, as mentioned above, will stay prominent in January and February, too. But the baseline effect for regular inflation is already fading and will continue on that path. 

As has been the case for nearly two years now, however, the wild card remains the CCP Virus and now its Omicron variant and even more particularly, government reactions to its stunning transmissability. Moreover, it’s not just the Biden administration that may contribute to inflation-boosting supply chain bottlenecks and shortages due to vaccine mandates, other curbs, and their impact on individual fears and behavior. China’s ongoing Zero Covid policy looms as a major threat, too.     

All of which brings up a point made by Stanford University medical school professor Jay Bhattacharya, a leading public health authority. He’s repeatedly written that “The end of the pandemic is primarily a social and political decision” because although “we have no technology to eradicate the virus,”`the knowhow and strategies for reopening safely and sustainably are already available. If, as I believe, he’s right, then ending virus-induced inflation and making it truly transitory is well within reach, too.  

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Greatest Presidential Job Creator Ever?

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Biden, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, Employment, Jobs, lockdowns, NFP, non-farm payrolls, reopening, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

However unwittingly, President Biden rendered the nation a major public service on Friday with his remarks on his administration’s achievements in boosting American job creation. Specifically, he provided a good indication of how many ways and how dramatically economic data can be spun.

According to the President, “we have added 6.4 million new jobs since January of last year — in one year. And that’s one of the most — that’s the most jobs in any calendar year by any president in history.”

A look at the data provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) shows that Mr. Biden actually slightly understated calendar 2021 overall net new job creation. Non-farm payrolls (BLS’ definition of the American employment universe) increased by 6.448 million during this period.

Mr. Biden’s focus on the calendar year, however, means that he’s taking credit for January. Not only wasn’t he inaugurated until January 20, but each month’s BLS job increase numbers cover the period between the middles of each month. (See the “Technical Note” section of each month’s report.) So the January job creation he’s claiming as his own stopped days before he entered office.

If it’s assumed that the current administration’s impact on employment (and the rest of the economy) didn’t start until the President took the Oath of Office – on a monthly basis, in February – then the employment increase that’s taken place on his watch so far is 6.215 million. That’s nearly 200,000 less than he claimed.

There’s no question that the employment picture orders of magnitude better than that of the last calendar year of the Trump administration – when non-farm payrolls cratered by 9.416 million.

At the same time, that calendar year includes the depths of the steep economic downturn induced by the CCP Virus’ arrival in the United States. In March and April, American employment levels crashdove by a sickening 22.362 million. And as should be remembered, including by those who view the Trump response to the pandemic itself as disastrously bad, this employment calamity mainly stemmed not from Trump economic policy decisions that presumably were inferior to their Biden administration counterparts. They mainly stemmed from health-related economic and behavioral restrictions that the former President supported only belatedly and reluctantly.

In fact, once the economy began reopening (raggedly, to be sure), job creation skyrocketed. From April, 2020 through January. 2021 – bringing the story up to just about the end of Trump’s presidency – NFP rose 12.575 million. That’s twice as much in absolute terms in nine months as in Mr. Biden’s 11 months in office.

As implied, though, this rapid improvement wasn’t mainly Trump’s doing. Clearly, economic stimulus measures helped. But far more important was a reopening and highly uneven return to economic normality. Moreover, because of the federal government’s limited authority over issues such as whether businesses closed altogether, or operate during limited hours, or how their customers should behave, the reopening decisions were overwhelmingly taken at the state and local level.

But as known by RealityChek regulars, President Biden’s remarks ignore a more fundamental concern: The kinds of absolute increases touted by President Biden are far from the whole story when it comes to judging economic performance, and can profoundly mislead even factoring out the whopping distortions of the economy created by the CCP Virus. At least as important are relative increases (or decreases) – in this case, because the size of the American workforce keeps changing.

And when the Biden job creation record is presented in terms of percentage increase, it doesn’t look so extraordinary at all. The Washington Post‘s Andrew Van Dam put it perfectly yesterday:

“The 6.4 million jobs gained this year, while a record in absolute terms, represents only a 4.5 percent increase in the workforce. That’s smaller than the 5.0 percent growth seen in 1978, when a much smaller labor force added 4.3 million jobs. In fact, relative to the size of the workforce, it’s only the 11th best calendar year since record-keeping began in 1939.”

Biden’s boasts about the economy certainly aren’t the first issuing from the Oval Office. Indeed, they’re no more exaggerated than TrumpWorld’s repeated claims that, pre-virus, he “helped America build its strongest economy in history.” But they’re also a needed reminder that whoever’s in office – a Democrat or Republican, an establishmentarian or a disrupter – their economic pronouncements are bound to deserve some Pinocchios.       

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Job Creation Stands Out Again

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aerospace, aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, CCP Virus, chemicals, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Jobs, machinery, manufacturing, medical supplies, NFP, non-farm jobs, non-farm payrolls, non-metallic mineral products, Omicron variant, paper and paper products, personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals, plastics and rubber products, PPE, private sector, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, surgical equipment, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Make that twice in a row. Just as in its November counterpart, the December official U.S. jobs data revealed sluggish overall American employment growth but better numbers for manufacturing. Even better, the gains were broad-based and the revisions of previous solid results were nicely positive.

A glass-half-empty type could rightly point out that industry’s 26,000 sequential payrolls gain last month was its weakest monthly result since April’s 35,000 employment drop. But the sector’s previously reported 31,000 sequential employment improvement is now pegged at 35,000. And after being downgraded from 60,000 to a (still-not-too shabby) 48,000, October’s increase has now been upgraded to 52,000.

For comparison’s sake, industry’s employment improvement came to 0.21 percent – as opposed to 0.17 percent for the private sector as a whole and 0.13 percent for “non-farm payrolls” (the U.S. Labor Department’s definition of the American employment universe).    

In fact, the December results continued a record of job out-performance that’s been consistent throughout the pandemic period.

As of December, manufacturers had replaced 84.19 percent (1.166 million) of the 1.385 million employees they’d shed during the short but steep CCP Virus-induced downturn of March and April, 2020. That figure’s 3.01 percent higher the 81.73 percent of regained jobs calculable from last month’s jobs report. Consequently, manufacturing payrolls are within 1.71 percent of their levels in February, 2020 – the last full data month before the pandemic began hammering and distorting the entire economy.

As for non-farm payrolls, they’ve now regained 84.02 percent (18.790 million) of the 22.362 million jobs lost during the worst of the pandemic. That’s 1.84 percent better than the 82.50 percent share calculable from last month’s jobs report. And there are now just 2.34 percent fewer non-farm U.S. jobs than in February, 2020.

As in the recent past, at first glance today it looks like the U.S. private sector has outdone manufacturing jobs-wise since the current economic rebound began. It’s recovered 87.61 percent (18.708 million) of its 21.353 million job loss during the spring of 2020. That’s 1.80 percent higher than the 86.06 percent figure calculable from the November jobs report. So it’s workforce is now 2.04 percent smaller than just before the pandemic.

But as known by RealityChek regulars, manufacturing’s jobs decline during that terrible spring of 2020 was smaller proportionately than that of the private or non-farm sectors. So even though it’s had less ground to make up, U.S.-based industry has been creating new employment at nearly the pace of the economy as a whole.

Indeed, just before the CCP Virus struck, manufacturing jobs represented 8.45 percent of total non-farm employment and 9.87 percent of private sector employment. As of December, these shares had risen to 8.45 percent and 9.90 percent, respectively.

The list of biggest jobs winners among the major manufacturing sub-sectors tracked by the Labor Department was headed by machinery – where payrolls rose by 7,000 on month in December. That was its biggest advance since July’s 8,700, and especially encouraging both because this industry lost 6,000 jobs in November (slightly better than the 7,000 decrease previously reported), and because its products are used throughout both manufacturing and big non-manufacturing industries like agriculture and construction.

Therefore, if machinery makers are adding strongly to their headcounts, they’re probably expecting demand for their goods to grow further. December’s hiring surge brought machinery employment to within 2.14 percent of its February, 2020 level.

Another major manufacturing employment gainer – automotive, where employment increased by 4,200 sequentially in December, and where the terrible 10,100 job loss reported last month for November is now judged to be just 5,900. As a result, payrolls in automotive – which remains dogged by the global semiconductor shortage – are now 5.28 percent lower than their immediate pre-pandemic levels.

Good December results were reported as well in the very big chemicals sector, which added 2,300 positions on month, and whose November performance was upgraded from no change to a 400-worker increase. Consequently, chemicals employment is now 1.30 percent greater than in February, 2020.

Other significant December manufacturing jobs winners included non-metallic mineral products (2,100) and plastics and rubber products (2,000).

The only manufacturing jobs loser that saw payrolls down by more than 1,000 was paper and paper products, where employment was off by 1,500. Even here, though, there was a somewhat bright side, as the decline was its first since July, and followed an upwardly revised 2,800 gain – its best since September, 2020’s 3,200. And this sub-sector’s employment levels are off just 1.84 percent since pre-pandemic-y February, 2020.

Given the aforementioned semiconductor shortage, however, it’s worth noting that December saw the semiconductors and electronic components industries (which, as the name suggests, includes more than just microchips), suffer their first back-to-back employment decline since March and April, 2020. The job reductions of 200 in November (upgraded from the previously reported 600) and 800 in December left employment levels 0.08 percent below those just before the CCP Virus struck.

As always, the most detailed employment data for pandemic-related industries are one month behind those in the broader categories, and their November job creation was mixed.

The surgical appliances and supplies sector, which contains personal protective equipment and similar goods, added 1,400 workers sequentially in November. And even though October net hiring remained unrevised at a small 100, these industries have now increased employment by 9.60 percent since February, 2020.

Yet the overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry lost 600 jobs in November, after boosting employment by a downwardly revised 1,400 in October. Its workforce is now 5.27 percent larger than in February, 2020.

Much better results were turned in by the medicines subsector containing vaccines. October’s hiring gain was revised up from 700 to 800, and payrolls rose by another 1,400 in November. These advances have pushed these companies’ payrolls 14.66 higher than just before the pandemic’s arrival.

The mixed pattern continued in the aviation cluster, which has suffered both from aerospace giant Boeing’s manufacturing and safety problems and the pandemic’s restrictions on travel. Good news like the prospect of China allowing the troubled 737 Max model to return to its huge market reportedly have spurred the company to speed up a production rebound, and interestingly, U.S. aircraft employment climbed by 1,000 in November – the best monthly performance since July’s 4,700 jump.

But October’s previously reported small 300 jobs gain was revised down to 200, and with its workforce still 7.75 percent smaller than in February, 2020, aircraft employment’s comeback remains far from complete.

Moreover, the improving aircraft jobs picture doesn’t yet extend to aircraft suppliers. In aircraft engines and engine parts industry, October’s previously reported 100 job decline is now judged to be an increase of 100. But payrolls resumed shrinking in November (by 300), and employment in this sector is now off 13.93 percent since February, 2020.

In non-engine aircraft parts and equipment, employment was unchanged sequentially in November, but a jobs gain of 100 previously reported for October has now been downgraded to a job loss of 100. The bottom line? Its workforce is now 15.74 percent smaller than in February, 2020.

As has been so often the case, and like the rest of the economy, U.S. manufacturing faces perplexing – and in fact unprecedented crosswinds – going forward. And the uncertainties look all the more mysterious since these December jobs results pre-date the arrival of the wildly infectious Omicron variant of the CCP Virus – which could well lead to more health-related restrictions and behavioral changes, even tighter labor markets, and slower economic growth.

But unless Omicron prompts major, protracted shutdowns, manufacturing’s performance during the pandemic so far seems to justify optimism that industry will keep overcoming whatever obstacles come its way — whether policy or pathogens.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: November Was an Awfully Cruel Month for U.S. Trade

Tags

Advanced Technology Products, Canada, CCP Virus, Census Bureau, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, European Union, exports, Federal Reserve, goods trade, imports, inflation, Japan, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, Omicron variant, services trade, stimulus, supply chains, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So maybe the global and especially U.S. supply chain snags of the last year are finally unraveling? That could well be a message being sent by this morning’s official release on American trade figures for November – which was dominated by huge increases in the nation’s goods imports, often to record levels.

Interestingly, though, little of this surge in goods from abroad came from China – probably reflecting some combination of the continuing effects of the Trump (and now Biden) tariffs, the ongoing semiconductor shortage that creates outsized problems for a country so reliant on electronics exports, and widespread power outages stemming from tight coal supplies.

Today’s report from the Census Bureau showed that the overall U.S. trade deficit swelled sequentially from $67.16 billion in October (the smallest since April’s $66.15 billion) to $80.17 billion. That total was the second largest ever (after September’s $81.44 billion). In addition, the 19.38 percent monthly increase was the most since July, 2020’s 19.87 percent. (The worst all-time relative month-to-month increase was 44.12 percent way back in December, 1996, when U.S. trade flows were much smaller, and therefore percentage increases much easier to generate.)

The November goods deficit of $98.99 billion was a record (topping the previous $97.83 billion all-time high of September), and the18.04 percent increase over October’s $83.86 level was the second greatest ever (after the 25.18 percent spurt of March, 2015 that resulted largely from a recovery after the previous month’s harsh winter weather).

Although November’s petroleum trade deficit more than quadrupled on month (to a still-modest $1.07 billion), the month’s shortfall in non-oil goods – the trade flows most influenced by U.S. trade policy decisions – soared by 17.06 percent, to $96.97 biillion. That total is a new record (eclipsing September’s $93.67 billion), and the increase was the biggest since the record 31.24 percent also set in March, 2015.

The roughly $13 billion absolute monthly rise in the November overall trade deficit resulted entirely (and then some) from combined goods and services imports, which were up $13.44 billion. The month’s $304.89 billion total was a second straight record (besting October’s $291.04 billion), and the 4.60 percent increase the biggest since March’s 7.18 percent. (The record relative total monthy import incease was July, 2020’s 10.58 percent.)

The story was similar in goods imports. They, too, set a second straight record, with the $254.93 billion level 5.05 percent higher than October’s previous all-time high of $242.67 billion, and the rate of increase the fastest since March’s 7.73 percent. (This record, too, was set in July 2020 – at 11.93 percent).

Continuing November’s string of consecutive all-time highs was the non-oil goods category of imports. At $232.30 billion, these purchases broke October’s previous record of $221.82 billion by 4.73 percent, a relative rise that was the fastest since March (7.12 percent). Their fastest increase came in July, 2020, too (11.88 percent). 

As indicated earlier, though, goods trade with China departed from this pattern. These imports advanced as well – but by just 0.73 percent. Their $48.39 billion level was the year’s highest, but only slightly above October’s $48.03 billion. Moreover, though elevated, these inflows fell short of the record $52.08 billion in October, 2018 – when U.S. companies were “front-running” their China purchases to bring them into the country before steep tariffs kicked in.

Moreover, the $32.32 billion goods deficit with China was far from the high for the year (September’s $36.50 billion), much less anywhere close to the monthly record ($42.89 billion, which also came in October, 2018).

So geographically speaking, where did U.S. goods deficits go up the most month-to-month in November? Among the nation’s biggest trade partners, Canada was the biggest culprit percentage-wise. America’s $6.12 billion of goods purchases from its northern neighbor were the most of 2021 and the biggest such total since September, 2008’s $7.36 billion. And the sequential leap of 60.67 percent (which, to be fair, followed a big October decline of 26.09 percent) was the fastest since January, 2021’s 74.04 percent surge.

The goods deficit with the European Union was up 28.59 percent sequentially in November to a record $20.85 billion. The increase, moreover, was the greatest since the 73.82 percent rate of March, 2020, as Europe was climbing out of its first CCP Virus wave.

And the goods gap was up by 17.74 percent with Japan to $4.16 billion. The total was the year’s second lowest (after February’s $4.02 billion) but the increase was the fastest since July’s 27.43 percent (though it followed a 23.21 percent plunge in October).

Turning to specific products, more new trade records came in the manufacturing sector. The November trade deficit for industry hit a new all-time high of $124.06 billion – a total that broke the old mark (September’s $118.75 billion) by 8.06 percent. Manufacturing exports sank sequentially in November by 4.15 percent, from $102.752 billion to $98.488 billion, and the 2.29 percent increase in manufacturing exports brought them to their second straight monthly worst – $222.553 billion.

With one month left in data year 2021, the manufacturing trade deficit stands at $1.209 trillion, and is running 11.63 percent ahead of 2020’s record rate.

Not that the records stop with manufactures. In Advanced Technology Products, imports of $52.52 billion set their third staight all-time high, and the November deficit of $21.76 billion trailed only November, 2020’s $21.90 billion in this data series’ 33-year history.

One positive all-time trade high was set in November: At $224.22 billion, total exports established their second record monthly total. But the monthly improvement was a measly 0.16 percent.

November’s $155.94 billion worth of goods exports were the second highest monthly total on record – but the level was down 1.81 percent sequentially.

The pandemic-beleaguered services sector delivered some good trade news, too. Its longstanding trade surplus remains low by historic standards, but did climb by 12.68 percent, to $18.82 billion. The increase was the fastest since the 28.08 percent recorded in September, 2004 (when services trade flows were much smaller than today’s), and the total was the best since June’s $20.33 billion.

Services exports enjoyed a strong November, too. They hit $68.27 billion, for their highest mark since the $69.12 billion reached in February, 2020 – just before the pandemic arrived in the United States and began seriously distorting its trade flows and entire economy. Further, the 4.97 percent improvement was the best since January, 2002’s 5.56 percent.

Will November prove to be the cruelest month – at least for the time being – for U.S. trade? A further removal of supply chain bottlenecks and the huge savings still amassed by American consumers say “No.” But the opposite conclusion could easily be reached by pointing to a reduction in the Federal Reserve’s economic stimulus programs, the unlikelihood of Congress approving big spending bills during this midterm election year, and still lofty inflation rates – which at some point will produce a consumer pullback.

The impact of the CCP Virus, it’s highly infectious Omicron variant, and possible future strains? Those are the $64,000 questions that trade and economic policy analysis may well find excruciatingly difficult to answer.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Could the “Great Resignation” be Ending?

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Great Resignation, Jobs, JOLTS, labor market, labor shortages, quits, quits rate, transitory, workers, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Labor Department’s monthly “JOLTS” report is one of the official U.S. economic data series that I stopped covering during the CCP Virus era. After all, the results seemed to be so overwhelmingly driven by pandemic-specific disruptions, and therefore so unrelated to the fundamental state of the U.S. economy.

I’m still wary of putting too much stock in JOLTS, which stands for Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. As the name suggests, it tracks how many positions at American businesses (including in government) are vacant, how many workers are quitting, how many are getting fired or laid off, and how many are getting hired, and it’s one of the key sets of statistics that have revealed both the extent of the labor shortages marking the economy and of what’s been called the “Great Resignation” – a major and indeed record increase in the numbers and percentages of workers voluntarily leaving their employers.

Yet since this development has so clearly (at least to me) stemmed from pandemicky circumstances, I assumed that it would turn out to be largely “transitory” (to use the Federal Reserve’s now “retired” description of elevated inflation).

So why this JOLTS-y post? Because this morning’s latest report, which takes the story through November, does show signs of normalization in those jobs quits. To be sure, the absolute numbers of quits hit yet another record – 4.527 million. In fact, that total represents the seventh straight month in which this quits level topped the pre-CCP Virus high of 3.627 million, set in July, 2019.

As known by RealityChek regulars, though, absolute numbers don’t provide the entire, or even the most important parts of, a picture. In this case, that’s because the numbers of employed Americans have grown substantially since the JOLTS series began at the end of 2000. What matters more is the quits rate – the percentage of the employed leaving their positions.

For non-farm workers (the Labor Department’s U.S. employment universe), this rate, at three percent in November, is still well above the pre-pandemic high of 2.4 percent – which also came in 2019 (in February, July, and August), as well as in April, 2001. But it’s barely risen on net since April’s 2.8 percent.

For private sector workers, the recent quits rates movement is less dramatic, and that’s more important for judging the transitory-ness of the Great Resignation – because the private sector is much bigger than the public, and the trends shaping it are much more reflective of market forces, not politicians’ decisions.

But it still seems worth noting that even though it rose to a record 3.4 percent in November (significantly higher than the pre-pandemic record 2.8 percent, set back in January, 2001, the private sector quits rate has been pretty stable since coming in at 3.3 percent in August.

Two caveats need to be mentioned, though. First, these November results are preliminary. Second, they predate the arrival in the United States of the CCP Virus’ highly infectious Omicron variant, which threatens to roil labor markets once again for the foreseeable future. One thing’s for sure – it’s time for me to renew monitoring these JOLTS reports!

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Real Wage Decline is Really Widespread

Tags

CCP Virus, child care, coronavirus, COVID 19, elder care, health care, inflation adjusted wages, labor shortages, nursing, real wages, supply chain, trucking, wages, warehousing, workers, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A Facebook exchange I was involved in last night prompted me to check the U.S. government data to find out how widespread was the trend of falling real wages – and by definition falling living standards. And the answer is: incredibly widespread – including in supply chain-related sectors where crippling labor shortages are often blamed for much of the bottleneck problem that has helped fuel inflation by reducing the supply of goods sought by Americans.

The exchange began when a Facebook friend posted her view that the U.S. economy was doing far better than gloomy press reports indicated. I countered with my “putting people first” argument that falling living standards meant that the economy was failing in its fundamental mission: improving Americans’ material lives. My interlocutor responded by claiming that the unusually large number of unfilled job openings have appeared during the stop-and-start recovery from the brief but steep CCP Virus-induced downturn showed that many Americans falling behind economically could easily improve their lot by taking jobs in higher paying industries.

I could have answered by pointing out how many Americans in low-paying jobs in particular lack the training to move that wage ladder. But I was more struck by the pervasiveness of the recent decline in inflation-adjusted hourly pay – which shows that even those able to make that transition will find themselves on a downward moving escalator for the time being.

Specifically, I looked at price-adjusted wage trends on a November, 2020-November, 2021 basis for the eight broadest categories tracked by the Bureau of Labo Statistics (BLS). They are: mining and logging; construction; manufacturing; trade, transportation and utilities; information services; professional and business services; leisure and hospitality; and miscellaneous services.

How many of these eight sectors saw real wage declines between the two Novembers? Seven. Leisure and hospitality was the lone exception, and it’s the lowest paying of these categories by far. The constant dollar wage out-performance there was indeed encouraging, but with these hourly earnings still only standing at $6.88 in 1982-84 dollars – versus $11.13 for the private sector as a whole – I wouldn’t claim economic success just yet.

(As known by RealityChek regulars, BLS doesn’t monitor wages in the public sector because there, pay is determined mainly by politicians’ decisions, not economic fundamentals.)

The names of these eight sectors, however, make clear that they’re so broad that they could include subsectors where the story’s very different. And that’s true even for a number of what might be called pandemic-specific sectors with lots of job openings – but only sometimes.

For example, the enormous national healthcare sector is part of the business and professional services grouping, where real hourly wages of $13.44 – higher than the private sector average – are off by a little over one percent so far this year. But for healthcare alone, they’re up by just under one percent (to a lower $12.13, though).

Dig deeper, and you find that after-inflation wages for hospitals, nursing care facilities, elder care facilities, and child care services, have risen, too. But except for hospital workers (a broad, relatively high paying category itself), hourly wages in 1982-84 dollars in none of these sectors is anywhere close to even a measly $10. And none has seen year-on-year wage increases of more than 1.95 percent (for hospital workers).

The wage situation is even worse in many of the supply chain-related industries within the trade, transportation, and utilities super-sector. For example, next time you hear about a dire nation-wide shortage of truck drivers, keep in mind that their real wages have decreased by 3.67 percent annually as of November. And workers at those equally strained warehouses? They’re only off by 0.25 percent. But they’re supposed to be desperate to hire! What gives?

The most obvious answer to me is that a supposed labor shortage in a sector where real wages are decreasing is really a tale of inadequate pay. But that’s a subject for another post – or six. For today, though, it seems abundantly clear that the headline real wage decline number isn’t masking lots of workers gaining ground, and that if you view that standard as the main test of an economy’s success, America’s is definitely flunking.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Inflation Still Looking High & (Yes) Transitory

Tags

consumer price index, core inflation, CPI, Federal Reserve, inflation, PCE, personal consumption expenditures index, transitory, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Nearly two weeks ago, in posting about the latest results for the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI), I wrote that the new data left the case for viewing current high inflation as “transitory” (to use a word now “retired” by the Federal Reserve) reasonably intact.

The main reason? What statisticians call “baseline effects.” That is, this year’s year-on-year inflation rates are so high at least partly because last year’s CCP Virus-induced inflation rates (the baseline for measuring this year’s prices and their annual changes) were unusually low. Therefore, as the economy has rebounded (however raggedly) from its steep pandemic-caused slump, demand for goods and services and therefore their prices, have been playing catch up.

Today, the U.S. government released the latest figures for another measure of inflation, the price indexes for Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE). Even though this is the inflation gauge preferred by the Fed (whose monetary policy decisions greatly affect inflation rates), it oddly attracts less attention than the CPI.

But the big takeaway from the new numbers is that they strongly reenforce the baseline effect argument, and the conclusion that today’s strong price increases will end sooner rather than later.

As with the CPI statistics, as of last month, the sequential changes in overall PCE inflation contain some good news, too. Specifically, they show some signs of easing, or at least plateauing. That’s comforting in and of itself since one reason inflation prompts such fear is its potential for feeding on itself and greatly worsening over time. Here are those monthly percentage increases for this calendar year so far.

Jan.             0.3

Feb.            0.3

March         0.6

April           0.6

May            0.5

June            0.5

July            0.4

Aug.           0.4

Sept.           0.3

Oct.            0.7

Nov.           0.6

These figures incorporate two revisions that cancel each other out (September’s initially reported 0.4 percent monthly increase is now judged to have been 0.3 percent, and October’s is now pegged at 0.7 percent instead of 0.6 percent.) But since March, there’s been no net minimal speed-up so far.

The picture looks similar with the so-called core PCE. Like the core CPI, it strips out food and energy costs because they supposedly can be volatile for reasons having little or nothing to do with the economy’s overall inflation prone-ness. Here are its monthly changes for 2020 to date:

Feb.           0.1

March       0.4

April         0.6

May          0.6

June          0.5

July           0.3

Aug.          0.3

Sept.          0.2

Oct.           0.5

Nov.          0.5

October saw an upward revision here, too – from 0.4 percent. But otherwise we see a plateauing – at most – since April.

Now for the annual percentage change figures – the ones that make clear that baseline effect. Here they are, by month, for the current year so far:

Jan.           1.4

Feb.          1.6

March       2.5

April         3.6

May          4.0

June          4.0

July           4.1

Aug.          4.2

Sept.          4.4

Oct.           5.1

Nov.          5.7

Both the October and November numbers represent major acceleration following a slower speed-up since April. And to add (a little) insult to injury, the October annual overall PCE increase was revised up from five percent.

But before deciding that a strong inflationary spiral has now kicked in, take a look at the annual overall inflation percentage changes by month for 2019-2020:

Jan.           1.90

Feb.          1.87

March      1.34

April        0.41

May         0.51

June         0.91

July         1.04

Aug.        1.30

Sept.        1.38

Oct.         1.17

Nov.        1.11

What sticks out to me is that not only did these annual inflation rates crater starting in March (because of the virus-induced downturn). But after reviving (weakly) in the summer and early fall, they sagged again in…October and November! So this year’s strong annual increases for those months surely result at least to some significant extent from that comparison.

And as with the overall CPI annual increases from 2019-2020, these overall annual PCE percentage changes stayed pretty feeble in November and, as shown below, for one and arguably two months afterwards. Therefore, it’s not until March – when, not so coincidentally, the monthly increase finally exceeded the pre-virus rates of January and February, 2021 – that the baseline distortion will be gone.

Dec.          1.29

Jan.           1.40

Feb.          1.63

March      2.45

April        3.58

When it comes to the core PCE, the 2019-2020 absolute numbers are higher, and the October and November sags less pronounced. In fact, the annual rate bounced back up some in November. But it fell again in December, and even further in January, 2021, and stayed at only about half the rate of the previous January until March and especially April.

Jan.           2.71

Feb.          1.91

March      1.70

April        0.91

May        1.00

June        1.13

July        1.30

Aug.       1.50

Sept.       1.57

Oct.        1.42

Nov.       1.65

And just as with the overall CPI, as shown below, the pre-pandemic January and February, 2020 annual inflation rates weren’t topped again till this past March and April. As a result, the baseline distortion could continue here, too, for the next few months: 

Dec.       1.48

Jan.        1.27

Feb.       1.49

March    1.97

April      3.08

As I’ve written previously, indications that inflation has peaked are rightly no comfort to Americans suffering from burgeoning prices, and don’t mean that the cost of living won’t be rising excessively for many more months. But if inflation isn’t actually out of control, and may return to normal by, say, late next year or thereabouts, then the wisdom of the faster tightening of monetary policy announced by the Fed, and of government spending cuts generally speaking, come into question – at least if policymakers are determined to prop up short-term growth.

The trouble, as I suggested in the last CPI post, is that such supports could keep the economy addicted to artificial stimulus and further from genuinely healthy growth based on economic fundamentals than ever – a story that I continue believing ends badly, however surprised I remain that this high-wire act has lasted as long as it has.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Growth Figures Reveal Historic Service Trade Surplus Collapse

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, real GDP, real trade deficit, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The second official read on U.S. economic growth for this third quarter of this year, released by Washington last month, showed such marginal change from the advance report – and so paled in importance to other developments (chiefly, faster U.S. inflation) – that I didn’t post my usual analysis of the trade highlights.

This morning, the final (for now) numbers came in, and the results once more underscore how thoroughly the CCP Virus and official mitigation efforts (like lockdowns), voluntary behavior changes, and resulting supply chain bottlenecks keep distorting the economy.

And remember: These statistics on changes in the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) after adjusting for inflation all predate the arrival stateside of the highly infectious Omicron strain of the virus.

More specifically, it’s now clear that the third quarter saw a widening of the U.S. trade deficit despite relatively slow national growth rate (2.28 percent in real terms at annual rates), in contrast to the stabilization of the trade deficit during a second quarter of much stronger (6.56 percent) growth. That’s exactly the opposite of what almost always happens, since faster U.S. economic expansion tends to pull in more goods and services from abroad on net.

In addition, these latest after-inflation U.S. trade figures make clearer than ever that much of the virus-related damage to the nation’s trade flows is concentrated on the services side.

So let’s begin with services trade. The United States has long run an inflation-adjusted surplus in these sectors, and the surplus continued in the third quarter of this year. But at $107.6 million, it was the smallest since the first quarter of 2007 ($106.1 million). Moreover, the surplus shrank all the way from its $152.4 million second quarter level.

That’s a deterioration of just under 30 percent – which is not only the most dramatic narrowing of all time (in a data series that began in 2002), but the most dramatic narrowing by a huge margin. The runner up? The 17.62 percent fall-off between the third and fourth quarters of 2004 (17.62 percent), when the absolute totals were much smaller, and therefore big percentage changes much easier to generate.

Most of this deterioration came on the services imports side. Between the second and third quarters, they jumped by 7.80 percent, to $492.2 million. That rate was the fastest since the 8.30 percent increase in the fourth quarter of last year. Services exports were off sequentially by 1.51 percent, to just under $600 million.

As for the other figures, the combined inflation-adjusted goods and services trade deficit hit $1.3166 trillion annualized in the third quarter, still the fifth straight quarterly record, and an increase of 5.79 percent over the second quarter’s $1.2445 trillion.

That growth rate was much higher than the 1.50 percent between the first and second quarters, but remained the second lowest of the pandemic era.

Significantly, though, that after-inflation trade deficit increase was enough to cut overall third quarter economic growth by a sizable 1.26 percentage points. That’s seven times deeper than the 0.18 percentage point reduction in the second quarter, and means that, had the trade gap remained the same, third quarter real growth would have been 3.54 percent annualized – or 55.26 percent stronger.

In fact, on a relative basis, that was the biggest trade hit to U.S. economic expansion since the fourth quarter of 2018, when the gap’s widening knocked 0.51 percentage points off the feeble 0.89 percent annualized real growth rate.

And in another gloomy worst-ever result, the real trade defiicit as a share of the economy hit 6.76 percent – eclipsing the old first quarter record of 6.43 percent.

The third quarter’s goods deficit of $1.4215 trillion annualized was also just modestly (1.43 percent) higher than the second quarter’s $1.4014 trillion. But it, too, was a fifth straight all-time quarterly high.

Total price-adjusted exports dropped by 1.35 percent sequentially in the third quarter, to $2.2730 trillion annualized. The decrease was the biggest since the 20.44 percent nosedive between the first and second quarters of 2020, when the virus first began distorting trade and the entire economy.

Combined goods and services imports only rose by 1.15 percent, to $3.5896 trillion at annual rates – the best performance in this category since the second quarter of 2020 as well, when they sank 17.24 percent. But the absolute import figure still represented the third straight monthly record.

Constant dollar goods exports sagged during the third quarter, too – by 1.29 percent seqentially – to $1.7013 trillion annualized, while goods imports dipped fractionally from the second quarter’s record $3.1255 trillion annualized to $3.1228 trillion.

With strong GDP growth expected for the fourth quarter of this year, the real trade deficit seems sure to keep extending further into record territory. Unless the virus-distorted economy throws observers yet another curve ball?