Glad I Didn’t Say That! Alcoa Flip-Flops on Aluminum Tariffs

Tags

Alcoa, aluminum, Glad I Didn't Say That!, tariffs, Trade, Trump

“For investors who thought the 10% tariff on aluminum imports was supposed to be good for U.S. aluminum producers, Alcoa Chief Executive Roy Harvey explained on the post-earnings conference call with analysts why it’s actually the opposite. ‘First, because tariffs are driving only a limited increase in supply, U.S. imports will remain essential,’ Harvey said….”

– Marketwatch.com, July 22, 2018

 

“Alcoa actually benefited from the trade war, as CFO William Oplinger explained, ‘Our smelters benefited from tariffs pushing up the Midwest regional premiums, so the impact of tariffs was a net benefit to Alcoa of $27 million.’”

– Benzinga.com, October 18, 2018

 

(Sources: “Alcoa CEO explains why aluminum tariffs are hurting, not helping,” by Tomi Kilgore, Marketwatch.com, July 22, 2018, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-trump-administrations-aluminum-tariffs-are-hurting-alcoa-more-than-helping-2018-07-19 & “Alcoa Rises After Crushing Earnings, But Market Cycles Point In The Other Direction,” by Steve Miller, Benzinga.com, October 18,  2018, https://www.benzinga.com/news/earnings/18/10/12530003/alcoa-rises-after-crushing-earnings-but-market-cycles-point-in-the-othe)

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Private Sector Job Creation is Still Overstated, but its Comeback Continues

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government, health care services, Jobs, private sector, recovery, subsidized private sector, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since we get a breather till the last week of the month in the flow of major nation-wide U.S. economic data, why not revisit one of my favorite unofficial measures of the American economy’s health? That’s the share of job creation that’s accounted for by what I call the subsidized private sector – those parts of the economy – notably healthcare services – that are officially classified as private sector industries, but that don’t really deserve the label because they depend so heavily (including for employment levels) on massive government subsidies.

This distinction matters, or should matter, because nearly all Americans rightly believe that the private sector, not the government, is the economy’s best hope for productive, sustainable growth. In turn, genuine private sector job creation is a much better gauge of the economy’s health than private sector job creation whose numbers are inflated by including the subsidized industries’ performance.

So I’m glad to report that the results for the first three-quarters of this year (through September) show the continuation of a trend I’d spotted a while ago: The subsidized private sector’s share of new total jobs and new private sector jobs is considerably lower so far during the Trump years than during Barack Obama’s presidency. At the same time, the subsidized private sector is still punching above its weight in terms of job creation, which isn’t such good news.

Let’s start, as usual, with 2013, since it was a year by which time the current economic recovery (which began in mid-2009) was well established. Conveniently, it also permits examining progress over a five-year period.

Between January and September, 2013, the subsidized private sector generated 11.14 percent of the economy’s total net new jobs created, and 10.83 percent of all the such jobs credited to the private sector as conventionally defined. The “real private sector,” meanwhile, produced fully 91.79 percent of the economy’s new hires, and 89.17 percent of the employment improvement placed in the conventional private sector category. (A drop in government employment accounts for the failure of these percentages to add up to 100.)

But what a change by 2016 – the last year of the Obama administration. During the first nine months of that year, the subsidized private sector’s share of total payroll increases had more than doubled – to 23.04 percent. And its share of all the conventional private sector jobs added during this period rose even faster – to 27.92 percent. Largely as a result, the real private sector accounted for only 59.43 percent of all net new U.S. employment. And the real private sector’s share of job gains credited to the conventionally defined private sector dropped to 72.06 percent.

So far this year, the subsidized private sector’s share of all U.S. job creation is down to 19.73 percent. The real private sector share of this total bounced all the way back to 76.27 percent, and its share of conventional private sector job gains was up to 79.44 percent.

But between 2017 and 2018, progress along these lines was much slower than during the previous year. In fact, when examined on a stand-still basis (different from the dynamic basis represented by the above employment change numbers), the subsidized private sector’s share of total U.S. employment actually has edged up over the last year – from 15.85 percent to 15.89 percent, and these industries’ share of conventionally defined private sector employment remained at 18.69 percent. 

With the subsidized private sector’s share of total job-creation this year nearly four percentage points higher (the 19.73 percent referred to in the previous paragraph), it’s clear that these industries keep creating an outsized share of overall new U.S. hiring.   

As always, please remember that I’m not portraying the subsidized private sector as worthless or only marginally important. Of course we need healthcare services in particular, and as the American population continues to age, we’ll continue to need a lot more. All I’m saying is that the nation needs to define its terms properly, and recognize that, without immense government spending (and the consequently greater debts), many of the jobs we’ve come to consider private sector jobs simply wouldn’t exist.

Making News: National Radio Podcast on Trump, China, and Currency Now On-Line

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China, currency, currency manipulation, electronics, Gordon G. Chang, supply chains, tariffs, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I’m pleased to report that I was interviewed on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show last night on the Trump administration’s decision yesterday to absolve China of charges of manipulating its currency to gain trade advantages.

The opportunity (as is often the case lately) came up too late to preview last night, but fortunately, the podcast is available, and you can access it at this link.  The conversation – which also included co-host Gordon G. Chang – also covered the crucial question of whether companies can and will move their supply chains out of China in response to the Trump tariffs.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence that Trump’s Metals Tariffs are Winning

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aluminum, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, steel, tariffs, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One big and neglected result from the Trump administration’s metals tariffs comes ssthrough loud and clear from going deep into the weeds of yesterday’s report on September industrial production from the Federal Reserve: American steel production is growing robustly – refuting charges (see., e.g., here and here) that the steel makers would simply sit on their hands and enjoy bigger profits – as is the output of primary aluminum.

Here are the numbers for inflation-adjusted production of steel – including its major sub-sectors – starting in April (because the tariffs began to be imposed in late March) through September, and year-on-year for September:

                                                         April thru Sept            Sept year-on-year

overall iron & steel mill products:   +3.84 percent               +7.54 percent

raw steel:                                          +1.60 percent               +8.30 percent

construction steel:                           +10.73 percent             +14.50 percent

consumer durable steel:                     -3.59 percent                -6.44 percent

can and closure steel:                      +42.48 percent             +15.86 percent

equipment steel:                              +16.87 percent              +14.44 percent

miscellaneous steel:                           -1.47 percent                +5.44 percent

The results are particularly impressive when compared with inflation-adjusted production in the rest of manufacturing during this period:

                                                         April thru Sept             Sept year-on-year

overall manufacturing:                     +0.77 percent                +3.85 percent

The aluminum industry results are decidedly more mixed, because of domestic aluminum companies’ significant reliance on imported primary aluminum and alumina both for their smelting and for other further processing operations. But the primary production jump is impressive. And on a year-on-year basis, the rest of the industry is still performing respectably.

                                                         April thru Sept            Sept year-on-year

overall aluminum:                            +1.86 percent                  +4.89 percent

primary aluminum production:      +13.84 percent                 +47.92 percent

secondary smelting & alloying:      -0.34 percent                     +2.75 percent

misc aluminum materials:               -2.31 percent                     +0.52 percent

aluminum extruded product:           -2.01 percent                      +4.03 percent

Combine these statistics with the strong output recorded for metals-using industries – which are widely reported to be hammered by higher input prices – and a clear picture emerges of a metals tariff policy definitely deserving the description of “winning.” Maybe one day their news media will let Americans in on the story.

Making News: On Israeli TV, “Jersey Joe” Piscopo Radio…& More!

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AM 970 The Answer, Breitbart.com, Brexit, i24News, Making News, retailers, stock market, The Joe Piscopo Show, Trade, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA

I’m pleased to report several recent media appearances.

Last night, I was interviewed on Israel’s i24News TV network on what could be the decisive stage in negotiations between the European Union and the United Kingdom over Brexit – the latter’s decision to leave the former.  Unfortunately, i24News doesn’t make streaming videos of its content available gratis.

Yesterday morning, I appeared on The Joe Piscopo Show on New York City’s AM 970 The Answer radio.  Since I only found out about this opportunity in the wee hours that morning (don’t ask!) I couldn’t send out a pre-program alert, but a podcast is available here.

Scroll down to the link naming me, click the play button, and if you want to skip to my segment, drag the thingamajig along the bottom to the 40-minute mark.  You’ll hear a discussion that ranged from the stock market’s recent gyrations to the new U.S.-Mexico-Canada [Trade] Agreement to the troubles of American retailers.

And on Thursday, October 11, Breitbart.com featured my finding that metals-using industries in the United States were defying all expectations that they’d start hemorrhaging jobs due to the Trump steel and aluminum tariffs – not to mention refuting numerous news reports claiming that these jobs were already being shed.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Despite Tariff Alarmism, “Victim Industries'” Manufacturing Output Remains Strong

Tags

China, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, metals-using industries, tariffs, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Federal Reserve’s new (September) industrial production figures contained the latest evidence that President Trump’s metals tariffs are showing no sign of harming America’s metals-using industries. Indeed, on top of their inflation-adjusted output generally remaining impressive compared with that of the rest of domestic manufacturing, industries that had apparently paid a high price for the levies (chiefly major appliances, where separate safeguard tariffs on household laundry equipment have been in place since February) have made up lost ground dramatically.

Moreover, although they began only in July, the industrial production figures so far show no reason to believe that Mr. Trump’s China tariffs are undermining domestic industry, either.

Here’s how major metals-using industries have done in terms of generating real growth between August and September (according to this morning’s preliminary data) – along with the numbers for manufacturing as a whole, and durable goods as a whole (the super-category in which the heaviest metals users tend to be found). This table also includes the previously released and new July-August results.

                                            Old July-Aug       New July-Aug           Aug-Sept

overall manufacturing:       +0.28 percent       +0.29 percent         +0.24 percent

durable goods:                  +1.01 percent         +1.08 percent         +0.59 percent

fabricated metals products: +0.22 percent       +0.51 percent        +0.05 percent

machinery:                          +1.07 percent       +1.87 percent        +0.88 percent

automotive:                         +4.02 percent       +4.27 percent        +1.70 percent

small appliances:                 +0.81 percent      +1.98 percent        +1.34 percent

major appliances:                 -2.76 percent        -1.58 percent        +3.26 percent

As with domestic manufacturing as a whole, the metals-users experienced a sequential production slowdown in September – and in fact one that exceeded that for manufacturing overall. But this slowdown came right after a July-August performance that was much stronger than for the rest of industry, and where revisions were much more positive.

The longer-term statistics tell much the same story – including about a big comeback for appliance production. Here are the real output data since April (used as the baseline since the metals tariffs were imposed beginning in late March):

                                               old thru Aug       new thru Aug       thru Sept

overall manufacturing:          0.54 percent       +0.52 percent    +0.76 percent

durables manufacturing:     +0.48 percent       +0.82 percent    +1.41 percent

fabricated metals products: +0.79 percent       +1.22 percent    +1.28 percent

machinery:                           +0.09 percent      +1.93 percent    +2.84 percent

automotive:                         -0.63 percent        -0.30 percent    +1.39 percent

small appliances:                 -5.33 percent        -2.54 percent     -1.23 percent

major appliances”                -5.25 percent        -4.00 percent     -0.87 percent

Finally, although the China tariffs are much more recent, reports are already appearing claiming that they, too, are backfiring on American industry. Yet just as with the metals tariffs, the official data refute these claims. Here are the real output figures for manufacturing as a whole, and its two super-sectors, for the two months preceding the first tariffs on imports from China and for the two months following them:

                                                         May-July                             July-Sept

overall manufacturing:                 +1.15 percent                      +0.54 percent

durable goods:                              +1.28 percent                      +1.68 percent

non-durable goods:                       +1.01 percent                       -0.63 percent

True, a slowdown is apparent. But it’s entirely due to weak performance in the non-durable goods sector. And it’s likely that this setback owes at least partly to Hurricane Florence, since among the worst results were those in the textiles sector, which boasts a large presence in the Southeastern United States.

As always, the data going forward could change the tariff-impact picture significantly. It will need to for the narrative to start finally matching up with the reality.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Trump is Making Headway on Trade Deficits

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China, Made in Washington trade deficit, Obama, recession, recovery, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Given that two of President Trump’s main trade policy aims have been to reduce the gargantuan U.S. global trade deficit and the comparably huge trade gap with China, it’s been entirely predictable that the chortlers are out with claims that he’s failing on both grounds. (See, e.g., here and here.)

What’s just as predictable? The chortlers are missing the main story: On both fronts, Mr. Trump’s first full year in office (the time-span for which the latest complete data are available), showed noteworthy progress. The main evidence? For both the world as a whole and for China, U.S. trade shortfalls grew more slowly during his first full year in office, even as the American economy grew faster.

As standard economic theory holds, that’s not supposed to happen. Quite the opposite: As growth speeds up, all else equal, trade deficit increases should be expected, as the growth boosts purchases of imports.

As RealityChek readers know, this pattern has been broken often in recent decades. And Trump Year One is an example, especially when the trade flows most heavily influenced by trade policy decisions are examined.

By that I mean what I call the Made in Washington trade deficit – the gap resulting by measuring imports and exports while stripping out oil and services, because trade liberalization in those sectors is in its infancy.

The contrast between the first full Trump year and the previous comparable period (the baseline for which came during former President Obama’s final year in office) is especially instructive. From the second quarter of 2016 to the second quarter of 2017, the Made in Washington trade deficit grew 1.72 times faster than the gross domestic product (GDP) in pre-inflation terms, and the China merchandise deficit grew 1.65 times faster.

Yet from the second quarter of 2017 through the second quarter of 2018 (using the latest GDP figures available), the Made in Washington shortfall increased only half (0.49 times) as fast as the economy overall, while the China goods deficit increased 1.33 times faster than GDP.

Moreover, the first Trump year compares well with the entirety of the current economic recovery, which of course began in mid-2009, early in the first Obama term. We can toss out the results from the second quarter of 2009 to the second quarter of 2010, since the second quarter of 2009 marked the end of the previous recession. But from second quarter 2010-2011 to second quarter 2016-2017, the Made in Washington trade shortfall grew as slowly compared with the economy as it did during the first Trump period only once – from the second quarter of 2010 to the second quarter of 2011 (0.44 times faster). In fact, between the second quarters of 2013-2014, and 2014-2015, this trade shortfall surged by 4.68 and 4.07 times faster than growth.

The relative growth rate of the U.S. goods trade deficit with China diminished during the first full Trump year as well – from 1.65 times faster than the economy, to 1.33 times faster.

On China trade, the immediate pre-Trump years overall look more impressive in comparison with the first full Trump year, but hardly in a slam dunk way. Between second quarter 2010-2011 and second quarter 2016-2017, the China shortfall grew slower compared with growth than it did during the first Trump year three times (2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2015-2016) and faster the other four years.

It’s completely legit to criticize Mr. Trump’s focus on the global trade deficit or the China trade deficit or any trade deficit (although I regard such criticism as wrong for various reasons, including the one analyzed here). And it’s completely legit to criticize other elements of the Trump trade policies (as I have numerous times – e.g., here and here). What’s not legitimate, though, is to accuse the President of failing to make headway in his trade deficit reduction goals – unless you have no interest in the most pertinent facts.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Fair-Weather U.S. Allies?

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alliances, allies, China, East China Sea, Eastern Europe, France, Germany, globalism, internationalism, Japan, NATO, North Atlantic TYreaty Organization, North Korea, nuclear deterrence, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Pew Research Center, Russia, South Korea, Soviet Union, United Kingdom

Establishment analysts and commentators have looked at the results of the Pew Research Center’s recent survey on overseas attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy under President Trump and decided that their most important findings are that his America First approach is costing America valuable influence on the global stage.

Even if you don’t find those conclusions transparently self-serving – since the vast majority of these analysts and commentators are staunch supporters of a more traditional globalist or internationalist approach – consider this alternative interpretation: The Pew survey strongly suggests that the globalist strategy, which has been in place for decades, has failed miserably in a crucial respect. Even though its core principles have required that the United States accept enormous cost and risks (including nuclear) on behalf of allies all over the world, the Pew researchers have found that even under President Obama – a pretty run-of-the-mill globalist – the populations of these same allies had little appreciation for these American burdens.

For me, the most glaring example is South Korea. As RealityChek readers know, for years I’ve been noting that the rapid recent progress of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program means that the United States’ longstanding commitment to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend the South from a northern invasion or simply to deter such an attack is now qualitatively more dangerous than in the past. For if North Korea has not already developed the means to launch a nuclear strike that could take out an American city – or two or three – it’s not far from achieving that goal.

The North’s progress was glaringly obvious in 2013, when Pew last asked South Koreans if they believed that “In making international policy decisions, the U.S. takes into account the interest of countries like ours a great deal/fair amount.” Yet that year, only 36 percent of South Koreans answered “Yes.” This year, only 24 percent of South Koreans gave that answer.

Japan is also protected by an American nuclear umbrella – at least in principle. As with the case of South Korea, it hosts large American military forces whose presence aims to bolster the credibility of that promise. And North Korea has actually fired missiles over Japanese territory – meaning that the threat it poses to Japan and to those U.S. forces is anything but merely theoretical. (If only because the American forces in Japan that defend the islands are supposed to help their comrades-in-arms if war breaks out on the Korean peninsula.) Japan is also alarmed by Chinese encroachments in the East China Sea.

But in 2013, only 38 percent of Japanese agreed that American foreign policy takes their interests into account even a fair amount. This year, that number is down to 28 percent.

The security situation in Europe is not nearly as fraught. But Russia has certainly taken actions that arguably threaten the security of new members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that used to be part of either the old Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc. And as NATO allies, these countries are also entitled to nuclear protection from the United States even though their fates had never before been considered vital American interests and even though Russia retains nuclear forces more than large enough to devastate the United States many times over.

Yet although the new NATO members either border Germany (like Poland) or are located pretty close by, and even though Germans presumably would not want to see Russia reestablish dominance, even in 2013, only 50 percent of Germans believed that Washington takes their interests significantly into account in its foreign policy. The 2018 figure? With Russia at least as menacing? Nineteen percent. And the Germans are anything but outliers, as Pew found roughly the same trend in France and in the United Kingdom (although the share of their populations detecting any meaningful American regard for their interests in 2013 was a good deal lower than in Germany – just 35 percent and 40 percent, respectively).

A common retort by globalists and by allies is that allied populations have no reason to be especially grateful to the United States because these alliances serve crucial American interests, too. But what they forget is that populations (especially from countries whose governments have been champion security free-riders) that don’t believe the United States cares much about them aren’t likely to be populations likely to support the American military when push comes to shove in their regions – as opposed to calling for some version of accommodating the aggressors.

Not that I’m criticizing allied populations. At least in their initial stages, any conflicts will take place almost exclusively on their territories. And P.S. – these kinds of strains were troubling alliance relations for decades before Trump. But the by the same token, the Pew results underscore two truths about U.S. alliances that should be disturbing globalists more than ever.

First, the nuclear risks they still appear to be entirely satisfied with are being run for stakes (the security of relatively small, unimportant countries, as opposed to Japan and the entirety of Western Europe) that are less rationally justifiable than ever. And second, when the United States needs to lead the resistance to aggression, it may have fewer followers than ever.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why the Khashoggi Incident Really Matters

Tags

Al Qaeda, America First, arms sales, Cold War, energy, globalism, globalists, Iran, ISIS, Islam, Israel, Jamal Khashoggi, jihadism, Middle East, oil, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, September 11, terrorism, Trump

Important though it is, the most important question surrounding the possibility that Saudi Arabia’s monarchy has killed Jamal Khashoggi is not whether the United States responds or how it responds if the kingdom did murder the dissident journalist – who happens to be a legal resident of the United States.

Instead, the most important question is really two-fold. First, do the many U.S. foreign policy traditionalists calling for severe punishment understand how such a move could undercut the decades-long approach toward the Saudis that they themselves have strongly supported? Second, and even more intriguing, do these globalists understand that the Khashoggi affair is simply the latest in a long string of signs that it’s well past time for the United States to adopt a genuine America First approach and leave the hot, dysfunctional mess that is the entire Muslim Middle East?

Given the prominence of maintaining good relations with the Saudis in the strategies of American globalists across the the board, it’s nothing less than jaw-dropping to see how many of them – liberal and conservative alike – are calling for strong counter-measures if Khashoggi is in fact dead at Saudi hands. Here’s a representative example from no less than former CIA chief John Brennan – who’s gone on Never Trump rampage in part because he views Trump’s foreign policy views as anathema. My astonishment, however, is justified even if much of the outrage is no more than outrage-signaling – posturing assumed to be safe because the Trump administration will eventually not upset the felafel cart.

After all, since World War II, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Persian Gulf region has been valued as a prime source of the oil desperately needed for the world economy to function acceptably in peacetime, and crucial to prevailing over ruthless global enemies in hot and cold wars alike. Once the Soviet threat disappeared, the region’s oil retained all of its perceived importance, and the critical mass of the foreign policy establishment gravitated toward seeing first Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and then Iran’s theocracy as the prime threat to the world’s unimpeded access. Crucially, not even evidence of (unofficial?) Saudi support for the Islamic extremists of Al Qaeda who launched the September 11 attacks ever truly threatened the U.S.-Saudi connection. 

Indeed, in recent years, even far left-of-center American politicians joined widespread calls for Washington to create a Middle Eastern-dominated coalition to handle most of the fight against ISIS (a successor group to Al Qaeda). And one of the anchors of this arrangement was expected to be none other than Saudi Arabia.

As I’ve argued for years now, none of the arguments for a close, if informal, U.S.-Saudi alliance holds any more water. North America possesses all the fossil fuels needed by the United States, and thanks to the shale/fracking-led energy technology revolution, the Persian Gulf’s role as key global oil supplier is greatly diminished as well. The terrorist threats likely to keep emanating from the region are best dealt with through much stronger U.S. border controls, not repeated American military interventions or fantasies about the Muslim Middle East’s decrepit (and highly compromised) regimes becoming a strong, reliable bulwark against jihadism.

And those claiming that Israel’s security warrants continuing America’s Middle East policy status quo need to remember that Israel and Saudi Arabia (and most other Sunni monarchies) have now created a tacit alliance to counter Shi’ite Iran. Moreover, Washington can always keep selling or simply giving the Israelis all the weapons they need.

The situation has changed so much that the most compelling argument against steps like cutting off or suspending U.S. arms sales to the Saudis has been advanced by President Trump: a boatload of revenue and jobs would be lost by the American economy, and the Saudis could always turn to alternate suppliers (like the Chinese and, more credibly – because their military equipment is still better – the Russians). In addition, don’t forget this irony: Consistent with its anti-Iran goals, Israel and its own impressive defense-related technologies could also partly fill the vacuum left by a U.S. withdrawal from the Saudi market.

At the same time, there’s no shortage of countries living in dangerous neighborhoods that would remain or could become massive buyers of American weapons. And as pointed out here, the Saudi military has relied on so much U.S. equipment for so long that changing its complexion would be as complicated as it would be expensive. Not to mention the years it would take for a regime that faces imminent threats to complete this task.

As a result, even if Khashoggi miraculously reappears one day, or even if he doesn’t but the Saudis are innocent, here’s hoping that the uproar over his disappearance triggers some major rethinking of America’s Middle East policy. After all, to paraphrase a famous recent remark about governing, a policy firestorm is a terrible thing to waste.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: No Signs of Tariff-Led Consumer Price Inflation, Either

Tags

automotive, beer, canned goods, consumer price index, CPI, inflation, Labor Department, Producer Price Index, tariffs, Trade, Trump, washing machines, wholesale prices, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Honestly, I hate to bombard everyone with official U.S. government data showing that President Trump’s tariffs so far have done exactly zero damage to the U.S. economy, contrary to upteen claims. Except official U.S. government data keeps showing that President Trump’s tariffs so far have done exactly zero damage to the U.S. economy, contrary to upteen claims.

Two days ago, this conclusion was borne out by the Labor Department’s latest report on price changes faced by businesses (measured by the Producer Price Index). Yesterday, the same message was sent loud and clear by the Department’s latest report on price changes faced by consumers (measured by the Consumer Price Index), which take the story up to September.

Since Mr. Trump’s first tariffs on imports from China didn’t go into effect until late August, not enough time has passed to assess their impact. But new American levies on steel and aluminum began to be collected in late-March. In addition, separate tariffs have been imposed on imports of large home washing machines since February. So this post focuses on price changes in sectors that use lots of steel and aluminum – the very sectors of course that have complained loudest about the tariffs. And it will present some seasonally adjusted and non-adjusted figures, because the only year-on-year data provided are unadjusted.

First, the main overall results for the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (not the only U.S. government measure of inflation at the retail level, but one that’s widely cited and that the Labor Department emphasizes). Between August and September, the overall CPI was up 0.1 percent on both adjusted and unadjusted bases. Year-on-year on year, these September prices rose by 2.3 percent (again, on an unadjusted basis).

Most students of the economy more closely follow the so-called “core CPI,” which strips out food and energy prices because of their volatility. But they weren’t much different from the overall CPI results. Between August and September, the core CPI increased by 0.2 percent on an unadjusted basis, by 0.1 percent on an adjusted basis, and on year by 2.2 percent (adjusted).

So these numbers don’t exactly scream “Raging inflation!” But what about products with lots of steel and/or aluminum? In most cases, prices went up considerably less than overall prices and core prices, and especially year-on-year – which provides the best indicator of trends over time.

Take new motor vehicles. Their September year-on-year price increase has been just 0.5 percent – less than a quarter the rate of core inflation. And on both adjusted and unadjusted basis, they were down between August and September – by 0.1 and 0.3 percent, respectively. Don’t forget: Both the adjusted and unadjusted monthly figures show that core inflation rose in September.

Take canned fruits and vegetables. Year-on-year, their price is up 1.9 percent as of September – nearly the rate of core inflation and overall inflation. But look beneath the hood: Most of those higher prices were generated by canned vegetables, which were 3.2 percent more expensive this September than during the previous September. So it sounds very much like the price hikes had little to do with cans made more expensive by more expensive metals.

On a sequential basis, the price changes in canned fruits and vegetables seem to make the tariff-induced inflation claims look more convincing. When seasonally adjusted, in particular, prices for the group rose by 0.7 percent in September – much faster than the overall or core consumer inflation rates. But look even more closely at that line item, and you’ll find a footnote making clear that the size of the sample on which the figure is based is “substantially smaller” than the norm. So presumably its reliability isn’t sterling.

Because the CPI data don’t distinguish between canned beer, soda, and soup, and the uncanned varieties, the impact of higher metals prices on these foods is tougher to figure out.

For example, for carbonated drinks, September year-on-year prices rose by 2.1 percent – again, close, but not quite at the overall CPI rate. And of course, many of these drinks are sold in bottles as well. Both the adjusted and unadjusted monthly September consumer inflation rates for these drinks were actually a good deal higher than the overall rate – 0.3 percent and 0.6 percent, respectively. But how many of the drinks surveyed were cans?

The same question arises for beer. The Labor Department distinguishes between suds consumed at home and away from home. For beer (and “ale and other malt beverages”) drunk at home, prices rose in September at an annualized 1.1 percent – less than half the overall inflation rate. On an adjusted and unadjusted basis on month in September, the increases were greater – 0.5 percent and 0.7 percent, respectively. Indeed, they were both greater than the comparable overall inflation numbers. But what was the can-bottle ratio?

For these malt beverages consumed away from home, the annual September price increase was twice as great as for home-consumed drinks in the beer category (2.2 percent). But the monthly increases were in the same neighborhood as for beer etc drunk at home – 0.5 percent adjusted and unadjusted. And there’s still that can-bottle puzzle.

Therefore, there’s no reason to think that price for canned produce and beer-type drinks are rising through the roof due to the metals tariffs.  The case for tariff-led inflation is even weaker for soups – many of which are canned but some of which are powdered or otherwise dried. On-year, their prices were down by 3.8 percent. On month, prices also dropped on both adjusted and unadjusted bases – by 1.4 percent and four percent, respectively. So if anything, prices for soups are deflating.

And finally, let’s take those washing machines. Year-on-year, their September prices rose by a robust 10.6 percent. But the latest figures show that the pricing trend has actually shifted into reverse.  On month, washing machine prices were down by 1.9 percent on an unadjusted basis and by fully 3.8 percent on an adjusted basis.  Moreover, the rate of monthly price drops has been speeding up.  So although producers tried to jack up prices in response to the tariffs, they’re failing to make those price hikes stick.   

As for the future, who knows? But the tariff-led inflation alarmists still haven’t answered this crucial question: If business thinks it will have great scope to boost prices after tariffs are imposed, why isn’t it raising those prices right now? That is, why will companies have the major extra pricing power on Tariff Day Plus One that they will have lacked up until Tariff Day Minus One?

Once that question is answered, tariff alarmism will start looking highly plausible, even if no tariff-led inflation is visible yet. But not one day before.