(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why This Trade War Hasn’t Been “Easy to Win”

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China, Hong Kong, Huawei, One Belt One Road, Taiwan, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Friday’s U.S.-China trade war escalation leaves little doubt that I was wrong about the conflict in one major respect. So was President Trump.

Just as Mr. Trump was first unilaterally tariff-ing Chinese products in response to Beijing’s wide-ranging economic predation (which of course extended far beyond trade flows into intertwined investment and technology issues), I confidently stated that Beijing wasn’t about to risk antagonizing its most important market by far with any retaliatory moves. Indeed, although I didn’t agree with his near-blanket statement that “trade wars are good,” I was fully on board with his claim that they’re “easy to win” – or at least reasonably so.

China’s announcement yesterday of new tariffs on $75 billion worth of American goods in response to the most recent round of Trump trade levies was just the latest evidence that Chinese leader Xi Jinping in fact has little compunction about risking American official ire and even believes he might prevail.

Even so, the President and I have an excuse. Our mistake wasn’t maintaining that the bilateral economic balance of power didn’t overwhelmingly favor the United States. Just check out the new claim by the founder of Huawei that U.S. national security sanctions – which could cut the Chinese tech giant off from access to the  U.S.-brand semiconductors central to its products operations – has confronted this entity with a “life and death” crisis. Moreover, trade flows remain as grotesquely lopsided as ever, meaning that the export-heavy Chinese economy still remains much more dependent for adequate growth on selling to the United States than vice versa.

Instead, our mistake has been underestimating just what a delusional bonehead Xi is, and how he can’t seem to resist the temptation to overestimate China’s power and prospects. He’s clearly overreaching in his treatment of Hong Kong, in the process courting a global public opinion backlash that’s likely to dwarf that following the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 – and turn him into a rival and even replacement for President Trump himself as a worldwide punching bag. He’s clearly overreaching regarding Taiwan, even given Beijing’s longstanding view of the island as a renegade province and equally longstanding practice of threatening it militarily. As a result, the United States will be selling the Taiwanese armed forces $8 billion worth of advanced fighter jets. He’s also clearly overreaching in connection with his ballyhooed One Belt One Road global infrastructure project – which is increasingly being recognized as at best the biggest potential white elephant in world history and at worst an equally gargantuan engine of pollution and corruption.  (See, e.g., this post for a typically negative review.)

Even more noteworthy are the signs that Xi’s trade war overreaching is seriously damaging China’s own economy. Just a few of the recent signs: the lowest overall economic growth rate in 27 years; the worst industrial production growth (which includes mining and utilities as well as manufacturing) in 17 years; and all-time record official unemployment in China’s cities.

That last milestone is especially important, since keeping people at work is the top economic priority for China’s leaders. The reason: jobless Chinese workers could turn into politically restive Chinese workers, and pose big dangers to the employment status of Xi and the rest of the ruling Central Committee.

And surely more worrisome for Xi: He must know better than most that China’s official economic data strongly tend to overstate China’s economic performance. In other words, the domestic economic picture is likely even worse than Beijing is letting on.

Why then does Xi keep standing on his high horse? Of course, I have zero inside info. But the only answer that makes sense to me is that he and his colleagues have decided that if they can prick enough American economic fingers (whether among consumers or farmers or investors), the resulting complaints will be amplified through a deafening chorus of gloom-mongering from the staunchly anti-Trump Mainstream Media. Eventually, Americans could talk themselves into a recession that would ensure the election in 2020 of a much more pliable Democrat – chiefly, former Obama Vice President Joe Biden.

That’s not a crazy plan by any means, especially since the President is no slam dunk to win reelection. At the same time, it’s far from clear that Xi or whoever’s advising him on American politics are such whizzes on the subject. If they were, would China under his rule have acted belligerently enough on trade, national security, and human rights to have helped elect Mr. Trump in the first place?

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Making News: On i24News Tonight Updating the Escalating Trade War!

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China, Huawei, i24News, Making News, tech, tech war, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return to the U.S.-Israeli TV network i24News tonight to analyze all the China trade war news that’s broken lately.  The network’s programs are normally available only to paying subscribers, but you can watch the segment, slated to start at 7:00 PM EST, if you sign up in time for a free trial at this link.

If that’s not possible, as soon as I get it, I’ll post a link that will enable you to watch a video of the appearance.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: China Tech War National Radio Interview Podcast Now On-Line!

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China, Gordon G. Chang, Huawei, Making News, tech war, The John Batchelor Show

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my Wednesday night interview on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated show on the status of the tech war currently being waged by the United States and China.  Click here for a timely conversation among John, co-host Gordon G. Chang, and me about a conflict that’s likely to shape the world’s technological future – with a special focus on the latest developments concerning the Chinese tech giant Huawei.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: America’s Asian Alliances Have Become More Dangerous Than Ever

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alliances, allies, Asia, China, deterrence, Japan, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, South Korea, tripwire

With all the uproar generated, at least among globalist foreign policy professionals, by President Trump’s various verbal attacks on America’s alliance arrangements, it’s easy to forget their most important purpose. It’s not to protect allies for their own sakes, much less to “uphold the liberal global order” or to “promote American values”  or to “preserve international stability.” 

Their most important purpose is to increase via the use of the allies’ military forces the odds that if a conflict breaks out in a particular neighborhood deemed crucial to America’s own interests, that the United States will prevail. The other aforementioned objectives can of course line up with this overriding military objective, and they can of course result from its attainment. But the alliances’ fundamental raison d’etre is to help the United States on the battlefield in a region whose freedom from foreign domination is considered crucial to America’s own security and/or prosperity.

Further, this military assistance once the shooting starts matters a lot because such support can go far toward preventing these regional conflicts from triggering the use of nuclear weapons, and thereby preventing possible nuclear attacks on American territory.

All of which is why recent trade tensions between Japan and South Korea – America’s two leading allies in East Asia – should be of such urgent concern. For the feud, which has just prompted South Korea to pull out of a military intelligence sharing agreement it had recently reached with Japan, could not be a clearer sign that none of Washington’s longstanding assumptions about such crucial military support from these two countries remains valid – if they ever were – and that these arrangements are now not only outdated, but dangerously outdated.

For the quarrel’s outbreak and intensification represent the most important evidence to date that both Japan and South Korea care little about providing such support in an effective way – which unavoidably requires them to work together. How can they cooperate, and thereby effectively reinforce U.S. military operations, if they literally won’t even talk to each other about current or emerging battlefield conditions and threats?

And if Japanese and South Korean assistance will remain marginal at best (a conclusion supported by the relatively modest size and capabilities of their own forces, which have long been unable to repulse regional aggression without American assistance, despite the huge size of their economies) then the odds of keeping any regional conflict non-nuclear – and keeping the U.S. homeland safe from North Korean or Chinese nuclear attack – become unacceptably low for the United States.

At one time, the United States could have eased this dilemma satisfactorily by spending still more money on conventional forces for the defense of countries that are alarmingly blasé about defending themselves – however dubious this option is on military grounds alone. (For how promising are efforts to protect countries that are so determined to avoid risks and costs?)

But because of the emergence and improvement of the nuclear forces of North Korea and China, respectively, even that option will no longer squares the circle adequately.  Which means that the alliances (including in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO – on the other side of the world) have reached the point of becoming net threats to U.S. national security, not net boosters.

Worst of all is American policy on the Korean peninsula.  It remains unchanged  from the days when North Korea arguably could be deterred by threatened U.S. nuclear weapons use from attacking with its own superior conventional forces because it lacked nuclear retaliatory capability.  As a result, it continues to station nearly 30,000 American troops right near the border of the aggressive and volatile North for the express purpose of creating a “trip wire.”  In other words, North Korea might now be able to destroy U.S. cities with its own nuclear bombs, or soon might be able to in response to American nuclear use. But Washington still recklessly seeks to prevent any such attack by the North in the first place by placing these troops in imminent danger and leaving nuclear use the only realistic option of saving them if hostilities ever did break out.  

If a standard globalist President was occupying the Oval Office, it would be understandable that he or she would be responding to the Japan-South Korea feud and its alliance implications by wishing it away. But Donald Trump is an avowed America First President – and has demonstrated many instincts along these lines. Why is he waiting to long to take this latest, massive hint, and leave these increasingly unreliable countries to their own (considerable) devices?

Making News: On National Radio Tonight Updating the Trade and Tech Wars

Tags

China, Gordon G. Chang, Huawei, Making News, tariffs, tech, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return to John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show tonight.  The planned subjects:  both the latest twists and turns in the trade conflict between President Trump and China (which RealityChek readers were briefed on last week); and the latest developments in the bilateral “tech war” that’s revolving around Chinese telecom giant Huawei.

The segment is slated to begin at 10:15 PM EST, and by clicking here, you can listen on line to what’s sure to be a lively, informative discussion among John, co-host Gordon G. Chang, and me.  As usual, if you can’t make it, I’ll be posting a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing’s Recession Lengthens but Tariffs’ Role Stays Fuzzy

Tags

aluminum, China, Fed, Federal Reserve, industrial production, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, real output, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The modest momentum showed by domestic manufacturing in the previous two Federal Reserve industrial production reports disappeared in this morning’s edition of the monthly survey, as overall real manufacturing output in July fell month-to-month (by 0.36 percent) for the first time since April. Worse, the new data lengthened domestic industry’s recession, with inflation-adjusted production now off by a hair (0.004 percent) since April, 2018 – a stretch much longer than the two straight quarters of cumulative decline that qualify as a downturn for most economists.

This morning’s Fed numbers also provide some additional evidence that President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies have begun to erode manufacturing’s performance. But only some. Specifically, whereas in the first months following the imposition of metals tariffs in particular, metals-using sectors were handily beating the rest of manufacturing by every major metric, July’s industrial production numbers showed that their more recent relative performance continues to have been much more mixed.

As usual, nearly all of the best evidence concerns the impact of the tariffs on steel and aluminum, for reasons including their relatively long duration (April, 2018 was the first full month they were in place), and the ease with which metals-using sectors can be identified. And as usual, the table below presents the output data for these sectors since April, 2018, with the data for manufacturing overall used as a control group.

                                              April thru May      April thru June       April thru July

overall manufacturing:          -0.20 percent        +0.36 percent             0 percent

durables manufacturing:       +0.96 percent        +1.47 percent        +1.23 percent

fabricated metals products:  +1.34 percent         +1.89 percent        +0.95 percent

machinery:                            +0.86 percent        +0.57 percent         -0.57 percent

automotive:                           -1.88 percent         +0.60 percent        +0.43 percent

major appliances:                  -2.00 percent          -4.47 percent        -5.99 percent

aircraft and parts:                 +0.73 percent         +2.46 percent        +4.23 percent

These figures show that for three of the five major metals-using sectors tracked (fabricated metals products, machinery, and major appliances), constant dollar output has worsened compared with such production in manufacturing as a whole. Relative performance for automotive and aircraft and parts, however, has improved – as it has for the durable goods super-sector in which the metals users are located.

Keep in mind also that results for the major appliance sector also remain affected by a separate set of product-specific levies on large household laundry equipment that began in February, 2018.

In contrast with the metals tariffs, the first full month for China tariffs of any kind was August, 2018, and the set of goods involved was relatively small. Complicating matters further is the U.S. Trade Representative’s office’s practice of listing the dutied products according to a classification scheme that differs significantly from that used by the rest of the U.S. government to monitor most major indicators of economic performance – including industrial production.

And as previously noted, most of the Made in China products tariff-ed so far have been intermediate goods (parts, components, materials, etc.) whose use by American manufacturers varies widely. Therefore, the impact of tariffs on these products undoubtedly varies widely, too. Moreover, the number of Chinese goods facing tariffs has increased dramatically since last August. Not only were the levies extended to an additional $200 billion worth of such imports from China in late September, 2018, but these duties were raised from ten percent to 25 percent in May, 2019. (See this time-line for the specifics.)

All the same, here are results for a handful of sectors reasonably certain to have faced tariff pressure since last August. Each column measuring real output changes since last August.

                                         August thru May     August thru June     August thru July

overall manufacturing:     -1.09 percent            -0.55 percent           -0.90 percent

ball bearings:                    -2.20 percent            -2.46 percent           -2.27 percent

industrial heating equip:   -4.11 percent            -5.16 percent           -5.21 percent

farm machinery & equip: -7.51 percent            -6.53 percent           -6.91 percent

oil/gas drilling platform: +4.03 percent            +2.22 percent           -0.17 percent      parts

A greater percentage of these sectors (three of four) generated worse performance versus manufacturing overall than was the case for the metals-using sectors. But the sample size is so small, and the the uncertainties so considerable, that these more downbeat results should still be viewed with the utmost caution. Ditto for claims that the Trump tariffs are killing U.S. manufacturing.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump’s Latest China Tariff Moves – & Why They’re Mistaken

Tags

China, consumer goods, consumers, Hong Kong, inflation, producer goods, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you’re confused by President Trump’s latest China tariffs moves, don’t feel bad. They’re really confusing!

Much clearer is their main implication: Once more, the President has needlessly let China off the trade war hook – and significantly reduced the odds of U.S. success no matter how it’s defined.

To summarize the chain of announcements and decisions that have produced the present situation: As of August 1, in various stages, the United States had imposed 25 percent tariffs on $250 billion worth of goods imports from China based on the latest data. And on May 5, Mr. Trump threatened to place tariffs of 25 percent on the rest of China’s merchandise shipments to the United States (about $300 billion worth).

That announcement was seen as especially significant because the previous tariffs mainly hit what businesses and economist call “producer goods” or “intermediate goods.” They’re the parts, components, and materials that companies use to produce final products, including consumer products. As a result, even when they do lead to higher consumer prices, the role played by these duties is difficult for consumers (i.e., voters) to identify, much less complain about to the politicians responsible.

In addition, as I’ve frequently noted (e.g., here), tariffs on these producer goods often don’t lead to any inflation, or much inflation, at all, for a variety of reasons and combinations of reasons. In many instances, retailers and other businesses simply lack the needed pricing power. As a result, they often seek to persuade their entire supply chain to preserve market share by eating some or all of the higher prices and accepting lower profits. Alternatively, various parts of the supply chain – including the final customer – can try to offset tariff-induced price increases by boosting productivity. That’s actually good for the economy in the long run, as improved efficiency not only enables companies to absorb cost increases while maintaining and even increasing margins. Such better productivity tends to spur the development of new efficiency-enhancing products, services, and technologies – a great way to boost living standards in a healthy, sustainable way.

Yet the May Trump $300 billion threat – which stemmed from the President’s unhappiness with the lack of progress in the trade talks with China – would have finally hit most consumer goods imports. Therefore, it would have created the risk that shoppers would blame the President for any price increases they did encounter. Even worse, the timing of the threat practically ensured that these higher prices would start appearing just as holiday shopping heated up – or typically heats up.

In late June, however, after meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping at a global summit in Japan, Mr. Trump agreed to a trade truce and to hold off on the $300 billion threat. Two weeks later, though the threat was back on the table, according to a Trump tweet.

On August 1, following a new round of apparently unsuccessful trade negotiations and the President’s belief that China had broken a promise connect with the late June trade truce to buy more American farm products, Mr. Trump specified that ten percent tariffs on the $300 billion worth of consumer goods-dominated imports from China would begin on September 1. Just four days later, his administration announced another “hawkish” trade war decision – officially designating China as a country that manipulated its currency to gain trade advantages (by keeping its products artificially cheap and therefore making goods and services from trade competitors artificially expensive in comparison). At the same time, the currency decision by law doesn’t automatically result in new tariffs, although it could eventually bring about some other penalties.

And yesterday came the latest turnaround: Mr. Trump decided to postpone tariffs on an estimated $160 billion of the $300 billion from September 1 to December 15. Not coincidentally, as his remarks on benefiting holiday shoppers made clear, many of the items on the postponement list included particularly popular gift items like toys and smartphones.

In addition, tariffs on some $30 billion worth of imports from China would be lifted permanently (at least for now!). But new duties on some $110 billion worth of imports from China are at this point slated to go into effect at the beginning of next month, and this group, too, is dominated by consumer goods.

Commentators focusing on the postponed goods called the latest Trump move a cave to China spurred by the President’s fears of a falling stock market, weakening U.S. economy, and angry consumers. Others, pointing to the products that will be slapped with new levies, and to the continuation of previously announced tariffs, insisted that Mr. Trump was keeping considerable pressure on the Chinese.

I lean toward the former interpretation, for these reasons. First, there’s no sign that the President’s forbearance has won any concessions from China. Second, the tight Trump focus on appeasing holiday shoppers can only signal weakness to Beijing, and feed its hopes that it can prevail in the trade and broader economic conflict by waiting for the President to be replaced by a more conventional, more pliable chief executive in 2020. Third, the delay announcement came just before a batch of absolutely terrible economic data was released by China. And given Beijing’s history of publishing overly bullish figures, it’s a safe bet that its economy is even weaker than most recently indicated. Fourth, Xi Jinping is under pressure not only economically, but politically, due to the rising unrest in Hong Kong.

Fifth, it’s true that from the standpoint of China’s longer-term prospects, maintaining the tariffs on its producer goods matters crucially. For this category includes most of the high tech and other advanced manufactures that represent any economy’s hope for continued technological progress, and therefore faster, healthier growth and a stronger military. But the consumer goods matter politically – because since they’re largely labor-intensive in nature, they’re mass employers. And China’s dictators view high unemployment as a mortal danger to their rule.

Sixth, although it’s clear that U.S. investors hate the trade war, the President needs to remember that, however much he likes to tout the stock market as a barometer of his economic performance, these markets and the real economy are by no means identical. We’ll be getting some key economic data tomorrow, when the Federal Reserve releases its new report on industrial (including manufacturing) production. But so far, the manufacturing numbers have shown that, after a soft patch in the winter, both inflation-adjusted output and capital spending are trending upward again. So unless these and other upcoming data break notably from their most recent patterns, recession – and even further slowdown – predictions will keep looking far-fetched.

Importantly, none of the above analysis means that I’ve changed my view that no China trade deal acceptable for U.S. interests is possible because of insurmountable verification obstacles. Instead, America’s only realistic option is to keep disengaging economically from China – both to reduce U.S. economic reliance on an increasingly hostile power, and to weaken further the only country capable of posing noteworthy national security threats. As a result, however, Washington should pass up no opportunity to inflict pain on China’s economy. And although no one would be shocked if he reversed course yet again before too long, that’s exactly the mistake that President Trump just made with his latest China tariffs delay.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Big Fade for Tariffs-Led Consumer Inflation

Tags

aluminum, China, inflation, Labor Department, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Well, that was fast. Last month, when the Labor Department’s consumer price data came out (for June), I observed that they revealed some tariff-led inflation – especially in goods categories that by all rights should be affected by the duties on steel and aluminum that President Trump imposed in March, 2018.

(More such evidence appeared in categories in which tariffs have been placed on Chinese imports. But as continually noted, because of several complications – e.g., shorter duration, great variations in metals-intensity, data classification issues – these results should be considered much less reliable than the metals tariffs statistics.)

Yet this morning’s new consumer price data, for July, shows a significant fade in tariff pricing pressures for the metals users. Part of the reason no doubt is the lifting of the metals tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada. But they were removed only in late May, so it’s difficult to believe that this decision deserves most of the credit.

Here are the price increases for metals-using industries between June and July, since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the duties were in place), and the year-on-year figures for this June and July. Also included, as always, are statistics for various control groups of goods, including so-called “core inflation” (which strips out volatile food and energy prices), and for the foods and beverages that are sold in metal cans outside of these containers:

                                 June-July      Since April, 2018      y/y June            y/y July

core inflation:      +0.29 percent      +2.79 percent     +2.13 percent   +2.21 percent

fresh fruits           +0.60 percent      +1.67 percent     +0.86 percent   +0.33 percent

  & vegs:

fresh fruits:             0 percent           -1.55 percent      -1.85 percent    -2.74 percent

fresh vegs:           +1.28 percent       +5.49 percent    +4.09 percent   +3.96 percent

processed             -0.68 percent        +0.04 percent    +1.70 percent   +1.45 percent

  fruits & vegs

canned fruits:       -1.56 percent        +2.30 percent    +3.93 percent   +2.87 percent

  & vegs

canned fruits:       -0.44 percent        +0.99 percent     +2.02 percent  +1.89 percent

canned vegs:         -2.33 percent       +3.28 percent     +5.28 percent  +3.13 percent

soups:                   -0.18 percent       +0.28 percent     +0.30 percent   +0.04 percent

malt bevgs           +0.72 percent       +3.13 percent     +1.69 percent   +2.58 percent

  at home:

alcoholic bevgs   +0.38 percent       +1.90 percent     +1.05 percent   +1.43 percent

  away from home:

non-frozen, non-  -0.05 percent       +2.99 percent     +2.71 percent   +2.33 percent

  carbonated non-

  alcoholic rinks:

carbted drinks:      -0.47 percent      +3.39 percent     +3.15 percent   +3.14 percent 

juices & non-        -0.23 percent      +3.11 percent     +2.86 percent    +2.62 percent

  alcoholic drinks

new cars/trucks:    -0.19 percent     +1.17 percent     +0.58 percent    +0.34 percent

motor vehicle        -0.51 percent     +2.07 percent     +1.91 percent    +1.42 percent

  parts:

appliances:            -0.83 percent      +2.00 percent    +2.56 percent    +0.62 percent

major                     -0.98 percent      +4.13 percent    +2.94 percent     -0.75 percent

  appliances:

laundry                     0 percent          +2.83 percent    -3.98 percent     -4.63 percent

  equipment:

non-electric         -1.78 percent          -5.14 percent    -1.94 percent    -2.94 percent

  cookware & tableware:

tools, hardware,  +0.62 percent        +0.83 percent    +1.06 percent   +1.35 percent

  outdoor equipment:

The waning of inflationary pressures can be seen by comparing the core inflation rate since the advent of the metals tariffs with the inflation rates of the metals-using industries.

The latest data show that prices rose faster than that core rate in only six of the sixteen metals-using categories shown. Moreover, in four of these categories (beer and other malt beverages consumed at home; non-frozen, non-carbonated, non-alcoholic drinks; carbonated drinks; and all juices and non-alcoholic drinks), the results need to be treated with caution, since these products are also sold in non-metal containers.

The previous month’s data showed that prices rose faster than core inflation in ten of these metals-using categories – with the results in three complicated by the use of non-metal containers.

That total in turn was up from the nine of sixteen instances of relatively strong inflation in metals-using industries in both February and March (with the non-metal container issue muddying the waters for four of those nine categories in February and three in March).

As for the China-related evidence, I’m hesitant to examine it for the time being not only because of the aforementioned data issues, but because U.S. policy has changed so dramatically in the last few weeks – with the President in early August threatening ten percent tariffs by September 1 for a $300 billion tranche of imports from China that would have been dominated by consumer goods, and then today postponing their imposition until December 15 (or until a satisfactory bilateral trade deal is struck).

Nonetheless, the metals tariff-related data shows that inflation for these levies so far has never been especially strong (except, for a time, in large household laundry equipment – which had faced separate, product-specific duties since February, 2018), and whatever strength it’s shown, hasn’t lasted very long. (In fact, even for those laundry machines, the table shows that their super-charged price hikes are now turning into super-charged price drops.)

And of course, as Breitbart.com‘s John Carney keeps pointing out, the economy’s overall weak rate of inflation means that even when tariffs have pushed prices up, many other forces have been pushing other prices down.  (Further, these low overall inflation rates almost by definition mean that price pressures from the existing China tariffs can’t be impressive, either.)

That’s not to say that Mr. Trump’s trade policies therefore can’t be hurting the U.S. economy in other ways (although the evidence to date here is also pretty feeble). And it’s entirely possible that the widely tariff-mageddon could still hit Americans on a variety of fronts if the trade war with China in particular lasts long enough. But inflation claims have always been central to the Trump trade critics’ case, as made clear by how quickly #tariffsaretaxes became a hashtag, and how it’s persisted. And if the critics have been wrong on this crucial score, why should anyone be confident in any of their other predictions?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Decoupling is Still the Biggest – & Still Growing – U.S.-China Trade War Story

Tags

China, exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Amazing as it sounds given the rush of developments and headlines over the last week, one big U.S.-China trade-related story remains largely overlooked, even though it keeps getting more and more important: Mainly because of President Trump’s tariffs and retaliatory duties from Beijing, the American and Chinese economies not only continue decoupling from each other. The decoupling so far has been unmistakably good for the United States. More specifically, U.S. economic growth has less and less to do all the time with trade with China, whether we’re talking exports or imports.

The story begins with the importance of two-way U.S.-China trade to the American economy as a whole. Since the Trump tariffs began, in the spring of 2018, it’s shrunk dramatically in the goods category. (Timely info on bilateral services trade isn’t available – and it’s a relatively small share of total trade anyway.) The table below shows goods exports and imports between the two countries as a share of the U.S. economy (gross domestic product, or GDP) in pre-inflation dollars – the measure most commonly used and followed. As you can see from those left-hand column numbers, since the current U.S. economic recovery from the last recession began (in the middle of 2009), this figure rose steadily through 2014, and has nosedived rapidly this year. (The 2019 figures measure growth since the first and second quarters of 2018, respectively – i.e., over most of the course of the trade war so far.)

And of special significance, as this shrinkage has gathered steam, the United States has turned in most of its strongest recent growth numbers. This development can be seen by comparing the left-hand column with the middle column (showing annual current-dollar growth rates). Or look at it this way: Two-way bilateral trade was last in this neighborhood as a share of the economy in 2009 – as an historically deep recession was ending. Nowadays, however, growth is solid by the last decade’s standards.

This relationship is even clearer from the right-hand column, which shows the relationship between China trade as a share of the U.S. economy and U.S. growth rate. Specifically, under the Obama administration, as this trade was rising as a share of GDP, the latter strongly exceeded the former only once (that is, approached the results of the Trump years) in 2014. (That is, the number on the left of the colon was significantly higher than the “one” on the right.) But during all of the Trump years, these results have hit that lofty level – and then some.

2-way China trade/GDP   GDP change   ratio of China trade/GDP to GDP change

2009:      2.53                        -1.79                                    n/a

2010:      3.05                         3.76                                  1.24:1

2011:      3.24                         3.67                                  1.13:1

2012:      3.31                         4.21                                  1.27:1

2013:      3.35                         3.63                                  1.08:1

2014:      3.38                         4.42                                  1.31:1

2015:      3.29                         3.98                                  1.21:1

2016:      3.09                         2.69                                 0.87:1

2017:      3.25                         4.30                                 1.32:1

2018:      3.21                         5.43                                 1.69:1

1Q 2019:  2.51                       4.64                                 1.85:1

2Q 2019:  2.61                       4.04                                 1.55:1

Then there’s the notion that the U.S. economy usually happens to grow fastest when its trade deficits overall (including with China) balloon – supposedly meaning that these trade shortfalls at least reflect strong economic performance, and that any policies meant to reduce them are dangerously misguided. But the latest U.S. data continue to debunk that notion completely.

The table below shows annual pre-inflation percentage GDP growth in the left-hand column, starting in 2009 and ending with the figures for the years ending in the first and second quarters of this year. The middle column shows the annual percentage growth rate of the American goods deficit with China, and the right-hand column shows the ratio between the two.

          GDP change                      China goods trade deficit growth          ratio

2009:     -1.79                                                -15.36                               -8.58:1

2010:      3.76                                                  20.35                                5.41:1

2011:      3.67                                                    8.13                                2.22:1

2012:      4.21                                                    6.72                                1.60:1

2013:     3.63                                                     1.14                                3.18:1

2014:     4.42                                                     8.20                                1.86:1

2015:     3.98                                                     6.53                                1.64:1

2016:     2.69                                                   -5.58                                   n/a

2017:     4.30                                                    8.25                                1.92:1

2018:     5.43                                                  11.75                                2.16:1

1Q 19    4.64                                                 -11.92                                  n/a

2Q 19    4.04                                                   -8.44                                  n/a

The above results for one of the Obama years shows robust U.S. economic growth as the goods trade deficit with China surged. But that year was 2009-10 – the first recovery year, when all U.S. trade snapped back sharply following an especially deep recessionary dive (as made clear in the 2008-09 results). Once the economy settled into a more sustainable mode, the supposed relationship breaks down completely.

And the results for the latest Trump years demonstrate strong growth occurring side-by-side with major reductions in the U.S.-China goods trade deficit.

Faring no better is the claim that many U.S.-based industries need inexpensive Chinese inputs (parts, components, materials) for their products in order to remain globally competitive. The following table shows the annual rates of change for the nation’s goods imports from China and its economic growth (or contraction, as in the case of 2009). Otherwise, how could the economy have registered its strong performance over the last year even as goods imports from China have been falling at double-digits percentage rates?

               US goods imports from China                  GDP change

2009:                  12.26                                                  -1.79

2010:                  23.14                                                    3.76

2011:                    9.43                                                    3.67

2012:                    6.57                                                    4.21

2013:                    3.48                                                   3.63

2014:                    6.37                                                   4.42

2015:                    3.14                                                   3.98

2016:                  -4.30                                                   2.69

2017:                   9.26                                                   4.30

2018:                   6.82                                                   5.43

1Q 19:              -13.11                                                   4.64

2Q 19:              -10.89                                                   4.04

And the idea that access to the China market is vital for the American economy?

               US goods exports to China                     GDP change

2009:                    -0.34                                              -1.79

2010:                   32.25                                               3.76

2011:                   13.29                                               3.67

2012:                     6.41                                               4.21

2013:                   10.16                                               3.63

2014:                     1.57                                               4.42

2015:                   -6.29                                               3.98

2016:                   -0.24                                               2.69

2017:                  12.29                                               4.30

2018:                   -7.43                                               5.43

1Q 19                -19.56                                               4.64

2Q 19                -18.20                                               4.04

According to the above figures, that claim didn’t even hold during the Obama years. (See, e.g., 2014 and 2015). And as with imports, the economy has grown impressively during the Trump years despite record declines in sales to China.

U.S. growth at acceptable rates as trade with an ever more belligerent China shrivels is of course good news from a national security standpoint. But given China’s long record of economic predation and other interventionist policies that inevitably distort markets for goods and services, it’s good news from a purely economic standpoint, too – whether it makes headlines or not.

Following Up: Latest National Radio Interview on the China Trade War Now On-Line!

Tags

China, Following Up, Gordon G. Chang, manufacturing, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Xi JInPing

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my interview Wednesday night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show.  So click here for a timely discussion among John, co-host Gordon G. Chang, and me on the latest escalation(s) of the U.S.-China trade conflict.  (I come in at about the 3 minute-30-second mark.) And of course feel free to listen if you’ve already heard it!

BTW, see if you can spot the sentence in which I inadvertently called the U.S. manufacturing trade deficit with China a surplus.  And the reason why Chinese leader XiJinping’s advisers aren’t likely to let him listen to the segment.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.