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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: When Trade Reporters Can’t (Or Won’t?) Read Their Own Chart

02 Thursday Feb 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Bloomberg, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, global financial crisis, goods trade, Great Recession, imports, services trade, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I was going to focus this morning on the new U.S. official productivity data but then came across a chart about U.S.-China trade flows that was so ditzy that the data it portrayed completely belied a crucial part of the headline. So the productivity analysis will have to wait a bit. 

Here’s the chart, including the subtitle,”Despite heated rhetoric, trade with China shows no signs of slowing down,” which appeared in this version of a new Bloomberg report:

US-China Trade on Track to Break Records | Despite heated rhetoric, trade with China shows no signs of slowing down

But unless I’ve suddenly developed real vision problems, it’s clear that that’s exactly what the chart shows since 2014 as compared to the years before. Here’s the actual data on annual changes in the value of bilateral goods exports and imports courtesy of the same U.S. Census Bureau figures on which the Bloomberg reporters in question based their conclusion:

Between 2014 and 2021, two-way Sino-American goods trade added up to $656.38 billion. Since 2014, it rose by 10.85 percent.

Between 2007 and 2014, this total rose by 77.08 percent. That’s not a slowdown – and a big one?

Yes, the Bloomberg chart only goes through November, 2022 (the latest data available). But two-way U.S.-China trade advanced by just 7.75 percent between the first eleven months of 2021 and the first eleven months of last year, so December’s results won’t make much of a difference.

Has the CCP Virus distorted the picture? Of course it’s affected the trade flows by significantly slowing the economies of both countries. But the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession made a big difference, too. And although its impact on China’s economy didn’t remotely match the impact on America, the U.S. economy’s long recovery from that major slump was the weakest from a recession on record. And still bilateral goods trade (especially goods imports from China) surged.

Would counting services trade make a difference? No. Comparing changes in these sectors with those in goods sectors is complicated by the lag with which such exports and imports are reported officially. In fact, the latest numbers I could find go only through 2021. But as made clear by those 2021 figures supplied by the Congressional Research Service ($61.0 billion), and numbers from the U.S. Trade Representative’s office for the final pre-pandemic year 2019 ($76.7 billion), they’re far too small to change the trends notably.

It’s also crucial to observe that the headline claim about U.S.-China trade breaking records is fatally flawed, too. For it omits vital context.  Sure, in absolute terms, this commerce is at an all-time high. But much more important, as a share of the U.S. economy?  Not even close. In 2021, combined Sino-American goods imports and exports came to 2.82 percent of total U.S. output.  In 2014, just to use one comparison, this number was 3.37 percent.   

The big question raised by these discrepancies between the Bloomberg reporters’ claims and the facts is “Why were they ignored?” I’m not a mind-reader, but here’s my hunch: They stemmed from a desire – maybe witting, maybe not – to reinforce the economics and trade establishment tropes that (a) international trade is driven overwhelmingly by market forces; (b) that there’s nothing constructive or even significant governments can do (e.g., impose tariffs or tech controls) to intervene over any meaningful length of time; and (c) that because China’s become such an economic juggernaut (even with its current struggles) bilateral trade is nothing less than a force of nature that’s simply unstoppable in the larger scheme of things.

None of these contentions is crazy on its face. For example, as the pandemic has ironically demonstrated, literal forces of nature can play a huge role in impacting trade flows and their interpretation. (Unless the CCP Virus was produced by gain-of-function research?) So can non-policy-related influences like the Laws of Small and Large numbers, which tell us that big percentage changes are easier to generate from modest starting points than from less modest starting points.

But as of now, by the main measures, a major slowdown in U.S.-China trade unquestionably has taken place, and the possible policy implications shouldn’t be overlooked:  Since the erroneous conventional wisdom strongly supported the hands-off approach taken by pre-Trump administrations, this loss of momentum looks very much like an endorsement of the hands-on strategy pursued since. 

 

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Our So-Called Foreign Policy: A Welcome Biden Breakthrough on China Tech Policy Coming?

01 Wednesday Feb 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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China, export controls, investment, Michael McCaul, monitoring and enforcement, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Politico, tech, The Wall Street Journal

A key Republican in Congress recently said that the Biden administration is seriously considering a major and long overdue escalation of its efforts to hamstring a Chinese drive to achieve global technology dominance that gravely threatens U.S. national security. And a recent Wall Street Journal investigation has shown exactly why it’s so overdue.

Last week, Michael McCaul, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told Politico that (in reporter Gavin Bade’s words) “The White House is considering new action to block U.S. business with entire swaths of the Chinese tech economy — an investment blockade stricter than previously reported.

As McCaul himself put it, based on conversations he says he’s had with U.S. officials, the administration “is talking about a theory where they would stop capital flows into sectors of the economy like AI [artificial intelligence], quantum, cyber, 5G, and, of course, advanced semiconductors — all those things….They actually want to say, right, you can’t invest in any [Chinese] company that does AI. You can’t invest in any company does cyber” or other similar sectors.”

As I’ve repeatedly suggested, such broad brush measures are vital for two main and closely related reasons. First, there are no Chinese entities (even those laughably classified as “private sector”) in any industry, including tech, that aren’t ultimately under the control of the Chinese government.

So it’s been utterly and dangerously foolhardy to believe – as U.S. administrations long have – that not just capital but knowhow and high tech products that Washington permits to be sent to specific Chinese entities aren’t likely to be made available to or used to benefit any other organization in China. And that includes the government and of course the military.

It’s true that Washington’s national security export control system isn’t totally unaware that such leakage may occur. Therefore, for instance, tech and product transfer requests with clear national security implications are typically approved only for customers that supposedly can be trusted to comply. Efforts to verify their trustworthiness are made as well.

But here we come to the second main reason that much more sweeping bans on doing tech business with China are needed: enforcement is excrutiatingly difficult at best. After all, the Chinese tech sector is enormous, which means that the financial and human resources needed for adequate monitoring would be equally enormous. Even worse, the highly secretive Chinese system boasts an impressive arsenal of tactics aimed evading the controls, and the aforementioned Wall Street Journal article indicates how spectacularly they can succeed.

A Journal investigation has found that “China’s top nuclear-weapons research institute has bought sophisticated U.S. computer chips at least a dozen times in the past two and a half years, circumventing decades-old American export restrictions meant to curb such sales.”

Indeed, because of its nuclear weapons-related work, this institute was one of the first such organizations put on U.S. export control blacklists – and that was back in 1997. So it’s clearly long been the subject of great ostensible American concern. Moreover, in 2020, in order to shrink the opportunities for cheating by the lab, the Trump administration  added “10 entities owned or operated by the academy as well as 17 aliases it uses to the entity list for procuring U.S.-origin items in support of Chinese nuclear-weapon activities.”

How, then, did it manage to obtain these semiconductors? Because in a system like China’s, which is not only highly secretive but totally lacking in independent regulatory systems and even apolitical rule of law, nothing is easier than concocting endless numbers of “aliases” and shell companies and fake arrangements of all kinds. Good luck to any American inspectors trying to keep up. Which is why total U.S. bans on investing in entire Chinese tech sectors would be so welcome.

At the same time, why stop at investment? Similar bans on broad classes of products and tech licensing deals are essential, too – and for exactly the same reasons. China operates nothing less than a vast, government wide mechanism for obtaining advanced tech capabilities from abroad by hook or by crook. Concentrating U.S. countermeasures on specific institutes or entities that can quickly change their identities is simply a fool’s quest. With the widest possible bans, Washington could reap the gains of an approach that’s the secret of success in much of life both inside and outside policymaking: keeping it simple.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Totally Unhinged Establishment Thinking on Taiwan

28 Saturday Jan 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Uncategorized

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Asia-Pacific, China, East Asia, foreign policy establishment, Indo-Pacific, investment, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, Seth Cropsey, Taiwan, tech, The Wall Street Journal, Trade

Because semiconductors are already central to America’s security and prosperity and will only become more important with each passing day, wouldn’t it be great if the United States wasn’t so dependent on Taiwan for supplies – especially of cutting-edge chips – given that the island is located just 100 miles from China?

According to Seth Cropsey, one of America’s most respected military experts and a former national security official, the answer is “No” – because if the United States became much more self-sufficient in semiconductor manufacturing, it wouldn’t have to care so much about…Taiwan.

His January 26 Wall Street Journal article is a wonderful example of a syndrome I’ve long written about (most recently here in the Taiwan context) – the tendency of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, and too many U.S. leaders who have listened to its members’ advice, to use foreign policy measures to solve problems much better dealt with through domestic policy moves whenever possible.

The advantages of using domestic policy should be screamingly obvious. As I’ve also previously pointed out (most recently at length here), American policymakers will almost always have much more control over developments within our borders than without. And when it comes to Taiwan-like situations, rebuilding the nation’s capacity to manufacture semiconductors per se carries absolutely no risk of war with a nuclear-armed China.

What’s particularly bizarre about this Cropsey op-ed is that he completely overlooks two eminently reasonable arguments for concentrating tightly on Taiwan’s security, at least for the time being. The first is one I strongly agree with – regaining the semiconductor prowess the United States needs will take many years. So until then, it’s imperative – and in fact in my opinion vital – that America take whatever steps are needed to prevent China from taking over Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province that it’s vowed to reabsorb by force if necessary. After all, it should be easy to see how Beijing either could win access to Taiwan’s crucial, world-leading production technology, or deny the United States (and the rest of the world) access to the huge volumes of chips that Taiwan’s factories turn out.

The second argument absent from his column – and which I don’t agree with – is that irrespective of the semiconductors, if China gained control over Taiwan, it would take a huge step toward becoming the kingpin of East Asia, perhaps the world’s most economically dynamic regions, and limit or cut off U.S. access to crucial markets and sea lanes.

I disagree for two reasons. First, leaving the semiconductors out of the picture, the chronic and huge trade deficits run up by the United States with the region show that doing business with East Asia has been a longtime major net loser for America’s domestic economy. Second, and also putting semiconductors aside, East Asia has relied for so long on amassing trade surpluses, especially with the United States, to achieve adequate growth that its countries (including China) simply can’t afford such decoupling.

As I just made clear, opponents of my position can cite valid concerns. But Cropsey never mentions them. Instead, he’s simply worried that the Biden administration’s focus on rebuilding America’s own semiconductor manufacturing mean that Washington “looks to be playing for time—not time to rearm and prepare for a fight, but to reduce Taiwan’s importance to the U.S.” and that this would harm U.S. interests because “An America that no longer needs Taiwanese semiconductors [would be able to]abandon its old friend.”

I admire Taiwan’s economic, technological, and political achievements as much as anyone. But even overlooking the enormous extent to which Taiwan’s massive investments in China’s technology industries (just like America’s) have shortsightedly helped create and magnify the very threat the island faces, the idea that honoring a friendship only for its own sake is remotely as important as minimizing the odds of a nuclear war is just loony. And nothing exempifies the nature of too much American foreign policy discussion for decades as well as a major newspaper’s belief that such arguments deserve to be taken seriously.

Making News: National Radio Podcast Now On-Line on Fingering the World’s Real Protectionists…& More!

26 Thursday Jan 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

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CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, economics, Following Up, global economy, Global Imbalances, globalization, Gordon G. Chang, Immigration, Jeremy Beck, labor shortages, NumbersUSA, protectionism, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast of my interview last night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show is now on-line.

Click here for a timely discussion – with co-host Gordon G. Chang – on the crucial issue of whether recent U.S. moves bythe Trump and Biden administrations represent a worrisome new lurch toward destructive trade protectionism, or efforts to defend and promote legitimate American – and sometimes global – interests.

In addition, on January 10, in his blog for the immigration realist organization NumbersUSA, Jeremy Beck quoted from my December 29 post debunking the numerous recent claims blaming the labor shortages that have popped up in many U.S. industries on policies that have enabled too few foreigners to join the American labor force. 

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why the U.S. Inflation Outlook Just Got Even Cloudier

13 Friday Jan 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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CCP Virus, China, consumer price index, consumers, core CPI, coronavirus, cost of living, COVID 19, CPI, energy prices, Federal Reserve, food prices, inflation, Jerome Powell, prices, recession, stagflation, stimulus, supply chains, Ukraine War, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If the big U.S. stock indices didn’t react enthusiastically to yesterday’s official American inflation figures (which were insensitively released the very day I had a minor medical procedure), that’s because they were too mixed to signal that consumer prices were finally being brought under control.

Lately, good news on inflation-fighting has been seen as good news for stock investors because it indicates that the Federal Reserve may at least pause its campaign to hike interest rates in order to slow economic growth significantly– and even trigger a recession. That’s because a weaker economy means consumers will have less money to spend and that businesses therefore will find it much harder to keep raising prices, and even to maintain prices at currently lofty levels. And all else equal, companies’ profits would take a hit.

So already softening inflation could convince the central bank that its efforts to date have been good enough, and that its goal of restoring price stability can be achieved without encouraging further belt tightening – and more downward pressure on business bottom lines.

Of course, stock investors aren’t always right about economic data. But their take on yesterday’s figures for the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which cover December. seems on target.

The data definitely contained encouraging news. Principally, on a monthly basis, the overall (“headline”) CPI number showed that prices actually fell in December – by 0.08 percent. That’s not much, but this result marks the first such drop since July’s 0.02 percent, and the biggest sequential decline since the 0.92 percent plunge recorded in April, 2020, when the economy was literally cratering during the CCP Virus’ devastating first wave. Further, this latest decrease followed a very modest 0.10 percent monthly increase in November.

So maybe inflation is showing some genuine signs of faltering momentum? Maybe. But maybe not. For example, that CPI sequential slip in July was followed by three straight monthly increases that ended with a heated 0.44 percent in October.

Moreover, core CPI accelerated month-to-month in December. That’s the inflation gauge that strips out food and energy prices because they’re supposedly volatile for reasons having little or nothing to do with the economy’s underlying inflation prone-ness.

December’s sequential core CPI rise was 0.30 percent – one of the more sluggish figures of the calendar year, but a rate faster than a November number of 0.27 percent that was revised up from 0.20 percent. Therefore, these last two results could signal more inflation momentum, not less.

In addition, as always, the annual headline and core CPI numbers need to be viewed in light of the baseline effect – the extent to which statistical results reflect abnormally low or high numbers for the previous comparable period that may simply stem from a catch-up trend that’s restoring a long-term norm.

Many of the multi-decade strong year-to-year headline and core inflation rates of 2021 came after the unusually weak yearly results that stemmed from the short but devastating downturn caused by that first CCP Virus wave. Consequently, I was among those (including the Fed) believing that such price rises were “transitory,” and that they would fade away as that particular baseline effect disappeared.

But as I’ve posted (e.g., last month), that fade has been underway for months, and annual inflation remains powerful and indeed way above the Fed’s two percent target. The main explanations as I see it? The still enormous spending power enjoyed by consumers due to all the pandemic relief and economic stimulus approved in recent years, and other continued and even new major government outlays that have put more money into their pockets (as listed toward the end of this column).

(A big hiring rebound since the economy’s pandemic-induced nadir and rock-bottom recent headline unemployment rates have helped, too. But as I’ll explain in an upcoming post, the effects are getting more credit than they deserve.)

And when you look at the baselines for the new headline and core CPI annual increases, it should become clear that after having caught up from the CCP Virus-induced slump, businesses still believe they have plenty of pricing power left, which suggests at the least that inflation will stay high.

Again, here the inflation story is better for the annual headline figure than for the core figure. In December, the former fell from November’s 7.12 percent to 6.42 percent – the best such number since the 6.24 percent of October, 2021, and the sixth straight weakening. The baseline 2020-2021 headline inflation rate for December was higher than that for November (6.83 percent versus 7.10 percent), and had sped up for four consecutive months. But that November-December 2020-2021 increase was more modest than the latest November-December 2021-2022 decrease, which indicates some progress here.

At the same time, don’t forget that the 6.24 percent annual headline CPI inflation of October, 2020-2021 had a 2019-2020 baseline of just 1.18 percent. Hence my argument that businesses today remain confident about their pricing power even though they’ve made up for their pandemic year weakness in spades.

In December, annual core inflation came down from 5.96 percent to 5.69 percent. That was the most sluggish pace since December, 2020-2021’s 5.48 percent, but just the third straight weakening. But the increase in the baseline number from November to December, 2021 was from 4.59 percent to that 5.48 percent – bigger than the latest November-December decrease. In other words, this trend for core CPI is now running opposite it encouraging counterpart for headline CPI.

Finally, as far as baseline arguments go, that 5.48 percent December, 2021 annual core CPI increase followed a baseline figure the previous year of a mere 1.28 percent. Since the new annual December rate of 5.69 percent comes on top of a rate more than four times higher, that’s another sign of continued business pricing confidence.

But the inflation forecast is still dominated by the question of how much economic growth will sink, and how the Fed in particular will react. And the future looks more confusing than ever.

The evidence for considerably feebler expansion, and even an impending recession, is being widely cited. Indeed, as this Forbes poster has reported, “The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters indicates the highest probability of a recession over the next 12 months in the survey’s 55-year history.”

If they’re right, inflation may keep cooling modestly for a time but still remain worrisomely warm. And the Fed may react either by keeping interest rates lofty for longer than expected – as Chair Jerome Powell has already said – or even raise them faster. 

Nonetheless, although the recession that did take place during the first and second quarters of last year convinced numerous observers that worse was yet to come, the third quarter saw a nice bounceback and the fourth quarter could be even better. So if a downturn is coming, it will mean that economic activity will need to shrink very abruptly. Hardly impossible, but hardly a sure thing.

And if some form of economic nosedive does occur, it could prompt the Fed to hold off or even reverse course to some extent, even if price increases remain non-trivial. A major worsening of the economy may also lead Congress and the Biden administration to join the fray and approve still more stimulus to cushion the blow.

Complicating matters all the while – the kind of monetary stimulus added or taken away by the central bank takes months to ripple through the economy, as the Fed keeps emphasizing.  Some of the kinds of fiscal stimulus, like the pandemic-era checks, work faster, but others, like the infrastructure bill and the huge new subsidies for domestic semiconductor manufacturing will take much longer.

Additionally, some of the big drivers of the recent inflation are even less controllable by Washington and more unpredictable than the immense U.S. economy – like the Ukraine War’s impact on the prices of energy and other commodities, including foodstuffs, and the wild recent swings of a range of Chinese government policies that keep roiling global and domestic supply chains. 

My own outlook? It’s for a pretty shallow, short recession followed by a comparably moderate recovery and all accompanied by price levels with which most Americans will keep struggling. Back in the 1970s, it was called “stagflation,” I’m old enough to remember that’s an outcome that no one should welcome, and it will mean that the country remains as far from achieving robust, non-inflationary growth as ever.  

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: A Wall Street Kingpin Lays a Grand Strategy Egg

11 Wednesday Jan 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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America First, China, climate change, ESG, fossil fuels, globalism, globalization, Immigration, industrial policy, Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, productivity, supply chains, The Wall Street Journal, Ukraine War, Wall Street, woke capitalism

In several senses, it’s not entirely surprising that The Wall Street Journal recently allowed Jamie Dimon to share his thoughts on the domestic and especially global grand strategies the United States should pursue in the post-Ukraine War world.

After all, Dimon heads JPMorgan Chase, the nation’s biggest and most important bank. As a result, he clearly needs to know a lot about the U.S. economy. And as Wall Street’s biggest poohbah, he surely must know a lot about the state of the world overall – in particular since he’s had extensive contacts with the heads of state, senior officials, and business leaders of many countries.

What is somewhat surprising, then, is how little of Dimon’s analysis and advice is new or even interesting, and how much of it could well put America ever further behind the eight-ball.

Dimon’s article wasn’t completely devoid of merit. Since he’s dabbled in some (symbolic) woke-ism himself, it was good to see him seemingly take a shot at what’s become mainstream liberal as well as radical lefty dogma by urging the education of “all Americans about the sacrifice of those who came before us for democracy at home and abroad.”

Given the strong support by the Biden administration and by some finance bigwigs for influential for encouraging and even requiring lenders to take climate change risks into account when extending credit, it was encouraging to read his pragmatic position that “Secure and reliable oil and gas production is compatible with reducing CO2 over the long run, and is far better than burning more coal.”

Dimon showed that, unlike many on Wall Street, he supports some forms of industrial policy to make sure that “we don’t rely on potential adversaries for critical goods and services.”

And he endorsed the larger point that the neoliberal globalization-based triumphalism that undergirded the policies of globalist pre-Trump Presidents needs to be buried for good:

“America and the West can no longer maintain a false sense of security based on the illusion that dictatorships and oppressive nations won’t use their economic and military powers to advance their aims—particularly against what they perceive as weak, incompetent and disorganized Western democracies. In a troubled world, we are reminded that national security is and always will be paramount, even if it seems to recede in tranquil times.”

But on most of the biggest issues and just about all specifics, Dimon either punted or retreated into the same globalist territory that proved as profitable for Big Finance as it was too often dangerously naive for the nation as a whole.

For example, he wants Washington to “fix the immigration policies that are tearing us apart, dramatically reducing illegal immigration and dramatically increasing legal immigration.” Completely ignored is the depressing impact the latter would have on wages that have already been falling recently in inflation-adjusted terms, and on desperately needed productivity growth – as a bigger supply of cheap labor is bound to kill many incentives for businesses to improve their efficiency by innovating technology-wise or devising better management approaches.

And on China, Dimon’s clearly determined to talk his company’s book, insisting that “We should acknowledge that we have common interests in combating nuclear proliferation, climate change and terrorism.” and blithely predicting that “Tough but thoughtful negotiations over strategic, military and economic concerns—including unfair competition—should yield a better situation for all.”

But most important, Dimon fully endorses the foundations of the very globalist strategy that for decades perversely ignored the distinctive and paramount advantages the United States brings to world affairs and has thereby created many of the dangers and vulnerabilities with which the nation has been struggling.

The way Dimon seems to see it, there’s no reason to pay any attention to the extraordinary degree of security the America enjoys merely by virtue of its geographic isolation and powerful military; or to its extraordinary degree of economic self-sufficiency thanks to its immense and diverse natural resource base, its technological prowess, and its dynamic free market-dominated economic system. And evidently, it’s just as pointless to concentrate foreign and economic policy on the nation’s equally formidable potential to build on these advantages.

Instead, like other globalists, Dimon flatly rejects the idea that “America can stand alone,” or should seek to maximize its ability to do so. Instead, it should keep defining nothing less than “global peace and order” as “a vital American interest” – the standard globalist recipe for yoking the country’s fate to an agenda of more open-ended military interventions, more hastily approved and usually wasteful foreign aid, and more nation-building in areas lacking any ingredients of nation-hood.

Asa result, it would anchor America’s safety and prosperity on efforts to shape foreign conditions (over which is has relatively little control), rather than on efforts to shape domestic conditions (over which is has much more control). (For a much fuller description of this America First strategy and its differences with globalism, see this 2018 article.) 

In fact, and revealingly, Dimon’s piece was titled “The West Needs America’s Leadership.” If only he and other globalists would start thinking seriously about what America really needs. 

(Full disclosure:  I own several JPMorgan bond and preferred stock issues.)    

 

Those Stubborn Facts: Beijing’s CCP Virus Cover Up Continues

06 Friday Jan 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Those Stubborn Facts

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, cover up, COVID 19, public health, Those Stubborn Facts, transparency, Wuhan virus, Zhejiang province

China’s central government official tally of new CCP Virus cases yesterday: 9,548

Zhejiang province government tally of new daily CCP Virus cases as of Tuesday: c. one million

 

(Source: “Explainer: Is China sharing enough Covid-19 information?” by Huizhong Wu and Annirudha Ghosal, Associated Press, January 6, 2023, EXPLAINER: Is China sharing enough COVID-19 information? | AP News)

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: What a U-Turn for the U.S. Trade Deficit!

05 Thursday Jan 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, expansion, exports, Federal Reserve, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, inflation, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, pandemic, recession, services trade, supply chains, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As this morning’s stunning official U.S. international trade figures (for November) made clear, the CCP Virus pandemic really wasn’t over yet near the end of last year – at least when it came to China. The steep monthly drop in the November overall trade gap stemmed largely from the Chinese dictatorship’s erratic response to a new tidal wave of virus cases. Beijing at first ordered a series of new shutdowns in numerous major cities, and then abruptly tried reversing course following widespread protests from an outraged and pandemic-and lockdown-exhausted Chinese citizenry.

The resulting turmoil and confusion depressed the Chinese economy – including the export-focused sectors that had led the country to serve as the “world’s factory.”

At the same time, the renewed disruption of China-centric global supply chains only accounted for a little less than half of the November U.S. trade balance’s sequential improvement. And at least as strikingly, the combined goods and services shortfall cratered even though by most accounts the U.S. economy’s growth accelerated late last year. More surprising still, growth appears to have sped up in November – and during the rest of the quarter – even as imports fell off the table.

As known by RealityChek regulars, it’s been rare for the deficit to tumble when the gross domestic product (GDP – the standard measure of the economy’s size) increases, and largely because American expansion typically means that both U.S. consumers and businesses are stepping up their historically robust importing. Much more common are deficit drops mainly due to the economy sagging and this importing tailing off.

As the U.S. recession during the first half of last year came to an end, America’s trade performance racked up a short winning streak during which the trade gap shrank and – even better – exports increased and imports decreased. That’s “even better” because an economy that’s importing less and exporting more is one that’s growing less because of borrowing and spending and more because of producing.  Early in the third quarter, though, the return of growth seemed to start reproducing the standard pattern during which rising imports boosted the deficit.

November’s results sharply reversed that latest trend – to put it mildy. The overall deficit sank month-to-month in November by a whopping 20.93 percent. That’s the biggest fall-off since February, 2009’s (26.85 percent), when the economy was still mired in the Great Recession triggered by the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08. And the $61.51 billion level (down from October’s $77.85 billion) is the lowest monthly figure since the $59.11 billion in September, 2020, when the economy was recovering from the first CCP Virus wave.

Total exports were off sequentially in November, but only by two percent, from $256.996 billion to $251.864 billion. That was the third straight decline, the biggest since January’s 2.01 percent, and the lowest monthly figure since April’s $244.230 billion. But given the sluggishness of the rest of the global economy, and the unusually level of the U.S. dollar then (which undermines the price competitiveness of U.S.-origin goods and services at home and abroad), this decrease seems pretty modest.

The bigger move by far was in total imports, which plunged by 6.41 percent, from $334.843 billion to $313.374 billion. The decrease was the biggest in percentage terms since the 13.16 percent nosedive of April, 2020, when the pandemic and its economic effects were at their worst in the United States.

The China effect was certainly a huge contributor. The U.S. goods gap with the People’s Republic (country-specific services data take much longer to release) slumped by fully 26.23 percent, from $28.87 billion to $21.30 billion. This $7.57 billion difference represented 46.33 percent of the $16.34 billion monthly improvement in the total trade deficit in November. For good measure, the sequential plunge was the greatest since the 38.93 percent nosedive of February, 2020 (when China was still struggling with the first virus outbreak), and the monthly total the lowest since April, 2020’s $22.30 billion.

And goods imports from China fell sequentially in November by $7.70 billion, from $44.57 billion to $36.88 billion. That decrease of 17.27 percent was steepest since the 31.47 percent collapse in February, 2020, and the monthly total the most modest since March, 2020’s $19.64 billion.

But as a result, more than half of the spectacular monthly drop in the November combined goods and services deficit came from other trade flows, as did 64.13 percent of the month’s total import decline of $21.47 billion.

More evidence that the monthly trade shortfall’s decrease was spurred by much more than China’s troubles: The U.S..global non-oil goods trade gap, the closest proxy to U.S.-China goods trade, was off by $15.21 billion on a monthly basis in November (more than twice the amount of the $7.57 billion decline in the U.S.-China deficit). And non-oil goods imports tumbled by $19.87 billion month-to-month in November – some two and a half times the amount of the $7.70 billion drop in goods imports from China.

In other noteworthy November trade developments, the U.S. goods deficit drooped by 15.44 percent on month, from $99.40 billion to $84.05 billion. That figure is the lowest since December, 2020’s $83.20 billion and the decrease the biggest relatively speaking since the 20.79 percent in Great Recession-y February, 2009.

The long-time surplus in services, the biggest sector of the U.S. economy, and a cluster of industries hit especially hard by the pandemic and its resulting economic damage, rose 4.60 percent, from $21.55 billion to $22.54 billion.  That monthly total was the highest since February, 2021’s $23 billion.

The November slippage in goods exports of 3.03 percent, from $176.16 billion to $170.82 billion, was the largest in percentage terms since the 3.34 percent of September, 2021.

Goods imports dropped 7.51 percent, from $275.56 billion to $254.87 billion. That total was the lowest since October, 2021’s $243.85 billion and the percentage decline the greatest since the 12.79 percent in pandemic-y April, 2020.

Services exports inched up by just 0.26 percent sequentially in November, but the $81.05 billion total was the eighth straight record, and the monthly advance the tenth in a row.

The huge, chronic trade deficit in manufacturing sank from $134.73 billion in October to $115.72 billion, with that November level the best since February’s $106.49 billion – when the last economic downturn had begun. And the sequential retreat of 14.11 percent was the greatest since the 23.09 percent in Great Recession-y February, 2020.

Manufacturing exports were down 4.71 percent on month, from $110.44 billion to $105.24 billion, and manufacturing imports plummeted by 9.88 percent, from October’s $245.17 million (the second worst monthly total ever, behind March’s $256.18 billion), to $220.95 billion.

On a year-to-date basis, however, the manufacturing deficit of $1.3902 trillion has already passed last year’s annual record of $1.3298 trillion, and is running 15.49 percent ahead of the 2021 pace.

Even by CCP Virus-era standards, the November U-turn taken by the trade deficit has rendered the U.S. economic outlook awfully fuzzy. Economists seem pretty confident that the economy is headed for a recession soon, but the latest prominent forecast shows that growth heated up notably between last year’s third and fourth quarters. So if a downturn really is imminent, it’s going to come incredibly abruptly.

That should improve the trade deficit further. But what if the Federal Reserve chickens out and decides to halt or just pause its strategy of cooling inflation by slowing growth significantly because…it becomes clear that the tightening it’s already pursued has begun slowing growth? What if all the money Washington has put into consumers’ pockets continues to fuel robust spending – which tends to pull in more deficit-widening imports? But if so, how come growth has been so much better in the second half of the year even as Americans’ purchases from abroad now look like they’re tanking?

And will China finally get control over the pandemic, and return its economy to some semblance of normalcy?

The answers to those questions seem to be way above any mortal’s pay grade.  And although I’m in the “recession’s coming” camp, so far, the economy doesn’t seem to care.  As a result, I’ll be following the incoming trade and other economic data unusually closely – and with unusual humility.      

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: China’s Not Getting Biden’s (Vague) Message

01 Sunday Jan 2023

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Asia-Pacific, Biden, Biden administration, China, Indo-Pacific, Japan, national interests, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, Taiwan, Taiwan Strait, Vladimir Putin, Xi JInPing

Everyone old enough to read this post is way more than old enough to remember all the optimism that emanated from the last summit between President Biden and Chinese dictator Xi Jinping – because it took place just under two months ago.

In particular, as the White House stated, Mr. Biden

“reiterated that [the bilateral] competition should not veer into conflict and underscored that the United States and China must manage the competition responsibly and maintain open lines of communication. The two leaders discussed the importance of developing principles that would advance these goals and tasked their teams to discuss them further. “

In other words, Xi said that he bought in to this idea of a responsibly managed Great Power competition. And this conclusion quickly became the conventiona wisdom about the summit. As The New York Times argued, despite

“the deeply divergent views behind their disagreements, including over the future of Taiwan, military rivalry, technology restrictions and China’s mass detentions of its citizens….with the stakes so high, both Mr. Biden’s and Mr. Xi’s language represented a choice not to gamble on unrestricted conflict but to bet that personal diplomacy and more than a decade of contacts could stave off worsening disputes.”

And the U.S. Institute of Peace, a Congressionally-sponsored “independent” think tank, closely paraphased the President’s main claim: “Despite the differences between both countries, there appears to be a growing openness to the use of diplomacy to manage the relationship.”

Yet it’s already clear – from China – that these contentions aren’t aging so welll. Just consider what’s happened in the last month alone:

>In mid-December, China began stepping up naval and air drills near a chain of southern Japanese islands, including sending a carrier battle group that simulated an attack on this Japanese territory.

>Several days later, the Chinese teamed up with Russia’s Pacific fleet for a week of joint exercises that Moscow said [quoting Reuters here] “included practising how to capture an enemy submarine with depth charges and firing artillery at a warship.”

>On December 21, a Chinese fighter jet flew within 20 feet of a U.S. Air Force reconnaisance plane flying over the South China Sea.

>On Christmas Day, 47 Chinese military aircraft flew across the median line over the Taiwan Strait and into air space claimed by the island. Reportedly, the incursion was the largest in months.

>And on December 30, Xi and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, held a videoconference in which Xi promised “in the face of a difficult and far from straightforward international situation,” Beijing was ready “to increase strategic cooperation with Russia, provide each other with development opportunities, be global partners for the benefit of the peoples of our countries and in the interests of stability around the world.”

China predictably blamed U.S. provocations and Japan’s recently announced and dramatic military buildup for this dangerous sequence of events, but the more important point by far is this: The Biden administration continues its long-time habit (see, e.g., here) of speaking in terms of processes and procedures that can only reenforce the impression of America defining its interests in the Asia-Pacific region in dangerously vague ways, and China obviously keeps thinking of its objectives in much more specific, concrete ways. In other words, it’s time for much straighter talk from the United States.   

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: A Republican Strategy Guru Who Ain’t

19 Monday Dec 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

China, Marc A. Thiessen, Mike Gallagher, national security, neoconservatives, North Atlantic treaty Organization, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, priorities, Republicans, Russia, semiconductors, strategy, Taiwan, Ukraine, Ukraine War

Neoconservative pundit Marc A. Thiessen has just written that neconservative Congressman Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin is the type of Republican who he thinks should “guide the Republican Party into the next era and shape conservative public policy, from national security to health to education to the economy.”

I’m far from convinced, especially on the national security front that’s the focus of this column, since Gallagher’s expressed views seem like a formula for exactly the kind of global over-extension that’s backfired so disastrously on America in the past (Google “Vietnam” or “Middle East.”)

This Wisconsin Republican’s main problem is one that’s dogged not only neocons and their constant exhortations for the United States to play or resume playing globocop indefinitely, but many other American leaders, including those on the Left – who favor similarly open-ended U.S. involvement in all manner of foreign crises and problems but either on the cheap, or with all manner of aesthetically and morally pleasing substitutes for military power, or coercion of any kind.

It’s a failure or an refusal to base American strategy and security and prosperity on the only basis practical even for a superpower – as an effort to (a) secure or defend goals that will promote U.S. interests on net in specific, concrete ways –  like protecting countries or regions with important locations, or that possess needed resources; and (b) propose feasible approaches to generate the wherewithal needed to achieve those goals.

Put simply, a successful U.S. foreign policy needs to set priorities of some kind, and in an interview with Thiessen, Gallagher explicitly rejected these premises, at least when it comes to two current headline overseas challenges.

According to Gallagher,

“[T]his idea that, ‘Well, we can be tough on China, but we have to strike some grand bargain with [Russian President Vladimir] Putin in Europe because our resources are limited.’ I just think that reflects a naive view of the way the world is working right now.”

He did explain that

“for those of us who want to continue to support the Ukrainians and deliver a massive loss to the Russians … we have to do a better job of tying the threat posed by Russia to the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party. And it’s really teasing out the fact that for at least a decade, if not longer, these countries, who at times have interests that diverged and at times were outright hostile, at least in the present day, have locked arms to wage a new Cold War against the West….”  

As for “the ultimate aim of China in particular”? That’s “to destroy the capitalist system led by the United States and make way for the ultimate triumph of world socialism with, you know, Chinese characteristics.”

I have no quarrel with Gallagher’s assumption of deep and dangerous Chinese hostility to the United States. And he has, in my view correctly and cogently, identifed several branches of China’s strategy that seek to weaken America from within, like propaganda spreading (which – I assume – he understands requires strong, overwhelmingly domestic policy responses).

But the other stuff – if you think about it logically, it simply doesn’t matter. That is, whether or not the Chinese and Russians are in cahoots, and however sweepin their aims, because different countries’ and regions’ importance to the United States varies dramatically (since they’re all so different in their characteristics), it’s inevitable that some of the targets of this “new [joint] Cold War” that they’re supposedly waging will significantly affect America’s fortunes, and some won’t.

And what Gallagher doesn’t come to terms with is 

>(a) all the evidence cited by opponents of current U.S. Ukraine policy (like me), that Ukraine’s fate is irrelevant to America for reasons ranging from its tragic location right next to Russia and its lack of any assets needed by America to the continued refusal of the United States and its allies to admit it into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (which implicitly acknowledges Ukraine’s  marginality); and

>(b) all the evidence that Taiwan is of vital importance – because of its matchless ability to manufacture the advanced semiconductors that are keys to ongoing U.S. security and prosperity, and therefore to America’s ability to keep fending off Chinese ambitions to control the island and this knowhow.

In Gallagher’s defense, he’s a strong proponent of the much bigger defense budgets that the United States would need to field the forces and weapons needed to resist both Russia’s Ukraine aims and China’s Taiwan aims.

But that higher spending will take many years to shore up American battlefield capabilities further, and Gallagher himself believes that the United States can’t defend Taiwan now, and doesn’t foresee success for another five years.

Worse, in the meantime, it’s being reported, including by a bipartisan Congressional commission, that “[t]he diversion of existing stocks of weapons and munitions to Ukraine and pandemic-related supply chain issues has exacerbated a sizeable backlog in the delivery of weapons already approved for sale to Taiwan, undermining the island’s readiness.”

So current American priorities could well be exactly backwards, and even if not, contrary to Gallagher’s blithe prior assertion, American resources are now in fact severely limited.

To top if all off, Gallagher also told Thiessen that by 2025 (if the Chinese haven’t already invaded), the President then should declare that “defending Taiwan [is] our most urgent national security priority….” But what about Ukraine? By then it’ll be No Big Deal? Or it’s safe to assume that conflict will be over? Nothing from Gallagher on that. But he did add that “by the way, I don’t think [keeping Taiwan secure] would cost that much money.”

Thiessen introduced Gallagher as someone who “has a bachelor’s degree from Princeton, a master’s degree in security studies from Georgetown University, a second master’s in strategic intelligence from the National Intelligence University and a PhD in international relations from Georgetown — all of which mean he’s deeply overqualified for any national security position.”

To me, what he’s really done is unwittingly reveal some of the institutions you want to avoid like the plague if you hope to develop a U.S. foreign policy strategy worthy of the name.

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