(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Another Big Demographic Blow to Those Chinese Century Forecasts

Tags

China, demographics, GDP, gross domestic product, national security, per capita GDP, population, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

China just came out with its final – for now – 2021 population growth figures, and they strengthen the case against the People’s Republic becoming rich and powerful enough to dominate the world before too long. Indeed, combined with stunning recent figures on Chinese performance on a key measure of prosperity, they add to the evidence that far from becoming a “Chinese Century,” the 21^st century is likeliest to become one of Chinese stagnation and even relative decline.

The demographic figures show that China’s population during 2021 increased by only about 480,000 – or 0.03 percent. For comparison’s sake, the U.S. population last year rose by about 392,600 – or 0.10 percent. That rate is widely viewed as alarmingly slow (see, e.g., here), but it’s triple that of China’s. Moreover, China’s population growth has been historically sluggish for the last decade. Its last decennial census revealed an increase of only 72 million between 2010 and 2020 – the smallest rise since the first such headcount in 1953.

Even worse, these developments are entirely consistent with recent authoritative predictions that, if not somehow reversed, China will experience a population bust for the rest of this century that will be nothing less than mind-blowing. Specifically, by 2100, it will fall by fully one half – and be just twice as large as the projected U.S. population (as opposed to being 4.24 times bigger today).

These population trends debunk the Chinese Century forecasts because of a related economic trend – China’s growth in per capita gross domestic product (GDP). This statistic gauges how much total economic output (GDP) a country is generating divided by each one of its inhabitants. If a country’s per capita GDP is growing, then its economy is growing faster than its population, and therefore the average individal is generating more wealth every year, and that therefore there’s more wealth (in theory) to spread among the population each year. If per capita GDP is shrinking, then there’s less wealth being created per person and therefore less available to share.

China’s per capita GDP isn’t shrinking. But according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it hasn’t been growing very rapidly, either, for the past forty years despite the country’s very fast overall growth. More important, when it comes to those Chinese Century forecasts, it’s been growing much more slowly than U.S. per capita GDP; the gap has widened greatly; and it’s forecast to continue widening for the next few years at least. And of course, China’s wealth per head as of 2020 was less than one-sixth of America’s to begin with.

If this forecast is correct, and China’s population and per capita GDP keep falling relative to their U.S. counterparts, the strategic and economic implications, as I’ve discussed, are game-changing. They mean that even measured by total size of economy, far from turning in China’s favor, or even narrowing, the U.S.-China gap would double in America’s favor. So the United States would have many more resources to devote to its millitary, or to improving its technological competitiveness, than its chief rival. (Whether Americans wind up spending this money wisely is another question altogether).

Economically, the implications mean that the United States would become a much more promising growth market than China, both in terms of the total sizes of their GDP and in terms of how much wealth the average Chinese and average  American could actually spend.

Interestingly, moreover, these trends played out between 2020 and 2021 alone. On a quarter-to-quarter basis, the United States has been growing faster than China. And America slightly widened its per capita GDP lead.

China of course remains a huge market in absolute terms, and its massive military buildup and impressive technological progress will enable it to keep mounting major and worsening threats to American security, ranging from an attack on global semiconductor manufacturing kingpin Taiwan to the cyberhacking of U.S. government agencies and private businesses (along with their customers). Nor is there any guarantee that Americans will avoid catastrophic policy mistakes or other problems.

But it’s hard to escape the notion that much of America’s China policy in recent decades (the Trump years excepted) was heavily influenced by defeatist attitudes on the part of its leaders (that is, those that weren’t in effect on Beijing’s payroll in one way or another). China’s latest Census results make clear that such gloom, which produced so many decisions that enriched and strengthened China because “There was no alternative,” is getting ever harder to justify.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Time for a Nuclear-Armed Taiwan?

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alliances, allies, Asia, China, East Asia, geopolitics, Indo-Pacific, Japan, national interests, national security, nuclear proliferation, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Porcupine Theory, semiconductors, South Korea, Taiwan, vital interests

Since early in the nuclear age, students of international relations scholar from time to time have advanced a dramatically heretical idea: that a world in which more than a few countries possessed nuclear weapons would be safer than a world in which such arms were limited to those countries that already had them. The  reasoning: Attacking nuclear-armed countries is a lot riskier for the aggressor than attacking non-nuclear countries, so the risk of wars breaking out would fall. If you think about the success of the little mammal with big quills, you can see why this notion has become known as the “Porcupine Theory”.

I bring up the subject because I increasingly find myself wondering whether encouraging Taiwan to build a nuclear arsenal would be the best way for the United States to safeguard interests in the island’s independence that have become vital recently because Taiwan has become the world leader in manufacturing advanced semiconductors – which are so crucial to the national security and prosperity of every country, including the now lagging United States.

There can’t be any doubt that the burgeoning importance of Taiwan’s independence and the apparently burgeoning determination of China to reestablish control over what it views as a renegade province, have produced a situation that’s increasingly dangerous for the United States. China, after all, is a power whose conventional military forces may now be strong enough to defeat America’s if it decides to help Taiwan fight off a Beijing attack.

In principle, Washington could resolve to turn the tide by using its own weapons of mass destruction in a battle for Taiwan. But China’s own arsenal is now so powerful that the result could be a full-scale nuclear exchange that brings disaster to the U.S. homeland. In other words, as I’ve written for years, America arguably has lost escalation dominance in Asia, and may have no choice but to acquiesce in China’s takeover of the island and its world class tech capabilities.

Nonetheless, this dire threat so far hasn’t deterred U.S. leaders from moving closer to declaring their intent to defend Taiwan militarily (notably, e.g., as reported here), and ending the posture of “strategic ambiguity” that has so far helped keep the peace in the region. So no one can responsibly rule out push coming to shove in this intensifying crisis.

To date, the United States has opposed countries like Taiwan from crossing the nuclear weapons threshhold mainly because Washington has rejected the Porcupine Theory. In addition, however, this anti-proliferation stance, especially toward allies and quasi-allies like Taiwan, has stemmed from the nuclear weapons parity that the United States enjoyed vis-a-vis the old Soviet Union and today toward Russia, and the overwhelming superiority of its nuclear forces versus those of China and North Korea in Asia. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the Asian nuclear balance has deteriorated from the U.S. standpoint.

The United States has also always viewed its security alliances with Germany and Japan in particular to be essential to preventing their reversion to the disastrously militaristic ways of the 1930s and 1940s. Nuclear weapons controlled by these two countries were therefore completely out of the question. (Interestingly, a revealing difference of opinion between then President Barack Obama and then presidential candidate Donald Trump was sparked by these issues in 2016.)    

Reliability concerns, however, have also dominated Washington’s position on nuclear weapons spread outside the U.S. alliance network. Specifically, American leaders have always worried about these devices being acquired by unstable governments (which supposedly are less capable of securing them against terrorists and other extremists) and so-called rogue states (which supposedly would be more likely to use them or threaten their use).

A nuclear-armed Taiwan could resolve the prime dilemma for the United States by letting it off the hook for the island’s defense. After all, if China hasn’t yet pulled the trigger on a Taiwan without nukes, it makes sense to believe that it would be much less likely to attack the island if a conflict could bring Taiwanese nuclear warheads falling on Chinese soil.

It’s true that, as I’ve heard various observers argue, that the semiconductor problem may be exaggerated – because, for example, the United States could keep the relevant technology out of Chinese hands by bombing the factories and labs. In theory, the Taiwanese may have plans to blow up these facilities themselves. But it’s also true that these speculations could be way too optimistic – especially since the most crucial knowhow resides in the heads of Taiwanese scientists and engineers, who would need to be protected somehow against a Chinese roundup.

An American endorsement of a nuclear Taiwan could also bring benefits throughout Asia, signaling to Beijing that continuing its bellicose behavior could convince the United States to give a nuclear green light to Japan and South Korea.

Moreover, the longstanding main U.S. anti-proliferation rationales look a lot weaker today. Taiwan is clearly neither a rogue state nor a country with an unstable government. Ditto for Japan and South Korea, for that matter. Besides, precisely because of the weakening U.S. military position in East Asia, and consequently growing worries about Washington’s willingness to make good on its nuclear commitments, many observers believe that all three countries are already latent nuclear powers. (See, e.g., here.) That is, they could build nuclear weapons quickly whenever they wished.

Yet encouraging Taiwan to go nuclear would hardly be risk-free. If and when openly announced, it could spur the Chinese to attack – to enable them to capture the island before its nuclear-ization was completed. A nuclear Taiwan would also be less deferential to American wishes. In fact, its semiconductor superiority has already enabled it to resist some U.S. demands related to plans for increasing microchip production and supply chain security cooperation between the two countries. (The same has held for South Korea, as reported in the linked article immediately above.)

More broadly, nuclear weapons acquisition by Japan and South Korea would certainly undermine America’s post-World War II status as kingpin of East Asia, and all the benefits it ostensibly creates for Americans in one of the world’s most economically important regions.

But even if those benefits were nearly as great as widely believed (and continuing U.S. difficulty opening Asian markets to American exports makes clear that they haven’t been), a nuclear-armed Taiwan would create much bigger benefits: dramatically reducing the odds that China acquires some of the world’s most important technology, and that the risk of a Chinese nuclear attack on the United States if Beijing resulting from a conflict over Taiwan.

The key, as suggested above, would be supporting nuclearization without provoking all-out Chinese aggression – suggesting that this goal deserves more attention in Washington than it’s receiving these days.

Those Stubborn Facts: Europe’s Still Wide Open to Chinese Investment

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China, EU, European Union, FDI, foreign direct investment, national security, Those Stubborn Facts

Number of European Union countries with systems for screening

foreign direct investment to protect national security & other key

interests: 18 of 27

 

Number of proposed investments examined: 265

 

Number of proposed investments blocked: 8

 

Share of examined investments that came from China: 8 percent

 

(Source: “Europe’s antitrust policy shouldn’t ignore China,” by Carisa Nietsche, Tech Crunch, December 28, 2021, Europe’s antitrust policy shouldn’t ignore China  | TechCrunch)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Are Apple Products “Designed in California…& Extorted by China?”

Tags

Apple Inc., Breitbart.com, China, Donald Trump, economics, forced technology transfer, free trade, globalization, infotech, John Carney, national security, privacy, surveillance, tech, TheInformation.com, Tim Cook, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

You have to give Tim Cook credit for sheer gall, at least if a recent report is true (as it appears to be, since it he hasn’t yet denied it). There was the Apple, Inc. CEO in 2018, at a forum in Beijing no less, in effect warning former President Donald Trump to ditch his plans to impose America’s first ever serious tariffs on Chinese goods, largely because “What I’ve seen over my lifetime is that countries that embrace openness, that embrace trade, that embrace diversity are the countries that do exceptional — and the countries that don’t, don’t.”

And not two years before, according to this account, Cook had promised China that over the next five years, the infotech giant would make a $275 billion effort to strengthen the People’s Republic’s technology and manufacturing base if China’s thug regime would back off a major crackdown it had launched on the company’s massive Chinese operations.

Moreover, as made clear in the December 7 article in TheInformation.com, Cook’s commitments not only have inevitably and massively affected U.S. and China trade and broader economic flows, and will continue to do so going forward. They’re likely to endanger America’s national security. After all, Cook, for reasons having squadoosh to do with free trade or free markets or economic fundamentals, evidently pledged to

>invest “many billions of dollars more” than what the company was already spending annually in China: in part on building new research and development centers”;

>help Chinese manufacturers develop “the most advanced manufacturing technologies” and “support the training of high-quality Chinese talents”;

>collaborate on technology with Chinese universities and directly invest in Chinese tech companies”; and

>collaborate on technology with Chinese universities and directly invest in Chinese tech companies”;

>use more components from Chinese suppliers in its devices”; and 

>give business to Chinese software firms”.

Since every economic and academic entity in China is ultimately under the thumb of the Chinese government, Cook’s submission to Beijng’s pressure has made enormous amounts of resources and knowhow available to a Chinese regime that has challenged American security interests in East Asia and around the world, and that powerfully threatens Washington’s ability to protect Americans’ privacy and political freedoms through its increasingly impressive hacking and other surveillance capabilities (including via the wildly popular TikTok video-sharing app).

In the worst (but ever more plausible) case, in a future conflict with Beijing, Chinese weapons that kill U.S servicemen could be partly and/or indirectly financed and developed by Apple – and, as I’ve made clear, e.g., here and here, by the numerous other U.S. companies that have fueled China’s tech and therefore military prowess.

But also crucial to point out – the deal signed by Cook (far from the only target of China’s successful campaigns of forced tech and manufacturing production transfer over a period stretching back decades), also challenges a core idea of free trade theory in a way first pointed out by friend John Carney of Breitbart.com.

As Carney wrote more than two years ago, economists and others who were crticizing Trump’s tariffs were making an especially important mistake. They were assuming “that all of the goods that are imported from China are made there because China is the lowest cost manufacturer of those goods. If that were true, moving production out of China would necessarily increase costs of production and reduce efficiency.”

But as he proceeded to remind, China couldn’t be such a paragon of manufacturing value. If it were, why would Beijing have been relying for so long on such a wide variety of “mercantilist tactics to attract and retain manufacturing business from global businesses, including requiring companies to manufacture goods in China in order to access its domestic markets and imposing steep tariffs on imports for foreign-made goods”?

In fact, Carney continued, “China’s policies…impose what economists call ‘deadweight losses’ on the global economy by preventing companies from moving their supply chains to cheaper sources.” And tariffs can serve as an essential counter-weight. 

Apple is nothing if not public relations-obsessed, and several years ago responded to public concern about all its production in the People’s Republic with an ad campaign stressing that its products are “designed in California.”  At least for accuracy’s sake, the company should now add “and extorted by China.”  And the news should greatly energize Washington’s efforts to stop U.S. companies from strengthening and enriching this burgoning menace.               

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Shocking New Findings on How Corporate America Keeps Strengthening China’s Military

Tags

AI, artificial intelligence, Biden adminisration, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, China, export controls, Georgetown University, innovation, Intel, investment, national security, Nvidia, Orbcomm, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, Silicon Valley, software, tech, venture capital, Xilinx

Recent weeks have seen an impressive burst of new information about how U.S.-owned businesses are fueling the technological and military strength of China, a country whose armed forces American soldiers, sailors, and airmen and women could be fighting on the battlefield before too long.

The first source of this information comes from Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) in an October report called Harnessed Lightning: How the Chinese Military is Adopting Artificial Intelligence.

The study focuses on China’s own efforts to develop artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities and incorporate them into its military operations and systems, and goes into fascinating detail about how much money is spent on these efforts, and how many Chinese entities of all kinds are involved in the campaign. The authors also make clear – just in case it wasn’t screamingly obvious already – how widespread these applications can be, and their incredible potential to revolutionize warfare and hand victory to the power possessing the best knowhow.

But as one of the team explained in a summary magazine article two days ago:

“Our research also highlights that U.S. companies are inadvertently powering Chinese military advances in AI. The overwhelming majority of advanced computer chips at the heart of China’s military AI systems are designed by U.S. firms like Intel, NVIDIA and Xilinx, and manufactured in Taiwan. We found that suppliers actually depicted NVIDIA-branded processors in photos of their products, providing clear evidence of the role U.S. technology plays in powering China’s advances. One company, which won a contract to supply chips for the PLA Strategic Support Force, even bought the domain ‘nvidiagpu.com.'”

Moreover, much more than simply semiconductors are involved. So is machine-learning and intelligent text-processing software, along with systems for “real-time monitoring” of “millions of global shipping and related users” with the help of 108 satellites from the American company Orbcomm.

My only objection: It’s inconceivable that these U.S. firms don’t fully understand the national security implications of their activities. The report itself notes that

“Because most institutions that supply AI-related equipment are new and not subject to end-use controls, the Chinese military is frequently able to access or acquire technology from abroad, including from the United States. Some Chinese suppliers make a business out of sourcing foreign data or components and reselling them to sanctioned Chinese defense companies or PLA [People’s Liberation Army] units.”

But the U.S. businesses must be aware that any of their products sold to any Chinese entity are going to be made available to the Chinese military simply because that’s the way China has operated since the Communists have been running the place. So this rationale can be easily laughed off.

The same cynical reaction is justified for claims that U.S.-owned firms don’t know that the capital they’re steering into the Chinese tech sector will also benefit the Chinese military. And these capital flows are both impressive and coming both from finance companies and from the huge semiconductor manufacturer Intel – which is hoping to receive billions in U.S. government subsidies and tax breaks to help restore its competitiveness in microchip production largely (of course) to bolster national security.

As reported by The Wall Street Journal this morning, Intel is “is among the active investors, backing a Chinese company now called Primarius Technologies Co., which specializes in chip-design tools that U.S. companies currently lead in making.” RealityChek regulars, moreover, know that Intel has been investing in other defense-related Chinese entities for years.

Not that American investment firms aren’t also doing their part to strengthen China’s tech prowess and therefore military capability and potential. Including the Intel deal, the Journal found, American companies “participated in 58 investment deals in China’s semiconductor industry from 2017 through 2020, more than double the number from the prior four years….”

And on top of these transactions, according to the Journal, “the China-based affiliates of Silicon Valley venture firms Sequoia Capital, Lightspeed Venture Partners, Matrix Partners and Redpoint Ventures have made at least 67 investments in Chinese chip-sector companies since the start of 2020….” In all, the sums involve run into the billions.

And in case you still doubt that these U.S. firms fully understand how valuable their investments are to a country that’s increasingly hostile to America, the Journal article quotes the head of one of these Chinese recipients as saying that his operation is working with the Chinese regime and other partners “to help our country get rid of its dependence on foreign high-performance chips.” Since the United States is still ahead in this sector, a China that no longer relies on American high tech products is going to be a China that’s caught up – and possibly grabbed the lead.

What’s the U.S. government doing about this dangerously unacceptable situation? It’s true that Washington has long maintained a system of export controls aimed at preventing China and other worrisome countries access to critical, militarily relevant goods and knowhow. But as the CSET study documents, this system is being completely overwhelmed – in part because of sorely inadequate funding and staffing, and in part because it’s never switched from a case-by-case approach to the kind of much broader denial strategy that’s clearly needed for a systemic threat like that posed by China.

There’s legislation in the works to plug some of the holes, and according to the Journal, the Biden administration seems supportive. Let’s just hope that the government gets its act together sometime before weapons powered by American technology and funded by American investors start killing American servicemen and women somewhere in East Asia.

BTW, thanks to friend Bill Holstein for calling my attention to these two items. 

 

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: U.S. Tech Dependence on Taiwan is Even Worse Than You Think

Tags

China, defense, defense manufacturing, electronics, Eric Lee, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, supply chain, Taiwan, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, tech, The Diplomat

As known by RealityChek regulars, I’m really worried about the threat of a Chinese takeover (militarily or political) of Taiwan. That’s overwhelmingly because the island is home to the world’s leader in producing cutting-edge computer chips (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, or TSMC), and these devices will be the brains of future cutting-edge militaty systems and thus vital to U.S. national security as far into the future as anyone can see.

Sure, U.S.-owned companies like Qualcomm, Apple, and Nvidia still design lots of the world’s most advanced semiconductors. But they don’t produce them, and if you can’t manufacture these items (and no U.S.-owned firms can achieve this goal either at their domestic or foreign factories), you have nothing to actually stick into your missile defenses and jet fighters and radar arrays and communications networks.

It turns out, however, that I didn’t know the half of it about Taiwan’s electronics industry and America’s safety and independence vis-a-vis China. As made clear in this report today in The Diplomat, these Taiwanese companies – all located thousands of miles from the United States but only 100 miles from the People’s Republic – are major players in a wide range of both semiconductors and related electronics components that are used in advanced weapons and military systems right now, and that are certain to be keys to their successors.

Even concerning products for which the Pentagon has done a reasonable job helping to maintain adequate U.S.-based output, Chinese control of Taiwan would result in Chinese access to Taiwanese counterparts that are at least as effective – and whose manufacturers in fact perform some of the production for some of the American-owned firms concerned.

Just as bad: “Reasonable job” is a good description of Washington’s performance in terms of ensuring enough manufacturing of these sophisticated electronics during peacetime. But as Diplomat author Eric Lee observes, war-time or the run-up to a conflict could be a different story altogether. Therefore, the reliance on Taiwanese output for any needed surge production a potentially “vulnerable chokepoint for American forces.”

Nor is the situation likely to improve anytime soon, even if Congress does get off its duff and finally pass an acceptable version of legislation aimed at incentivizing much more advanced semiconductor manufacturing at home. For the necessary factories (known as “fabs”) cost billions of dollars and take years to construct. Indeed, as Lee notes, their price tag for one that’s state-of-the-art is about the same as for one of America’s biggest aircraft carriers. Further, as he points out, however much the U.S. government may be willing to provide semiconductor makers with subsidies of various kinds, TSMC by itself will be spending much more. So it’s likely to remain superior in the production of the most powerful chips.

Lee advances an intriguing idea for at least improving the situation – creating a “U.S.-Taiwan Senior Level Steering Group for Supply Chain Security and Defense Industrial Cooperation.” Its mission: more closely coordinating and integrate U.S. and Taiwan defense and technology sectors in order to jointly develop and produce the defense systems of the future and their most valuable components.

At the same time, this step would create its own risks. For China views Taiwan not simply as an asset it would very much like to possess. It’s seen as a renegade province that must be bought back under Beijing’s rule, not according to any particular schedule to be sure, but by force if necessary. That’s largely why the United States has shied away from officially recognizing the island as an independent country, let alone forming an alliance. As a result, how could the cooperative venture Lee proposes be formed without establishing such a relationship? And even if Washington threaded this needle in its own mind, would the Chinese recognize view the difference as meaningful, and simply accept the new status quo? Or would they conclude that a red line had been crossed and attack?

No one can outside Chinese leadership circles can say for sure. And maybe El Supremo Xi Jinping doesn’t yet know himself. What is completely clear, though, is that U.S. failure to maintain leadership in one of the most important industries of the future yet developed has left Washington – and the American public whose interests it’s supposed to safeguard – with only lousy and dangerous policy alternatives, and slightly less lousy and dangerous altenatives.

P.S. In the interests of full disclosure, you should be aware that I hold a not-trivial long position in TSMC stock. And thanks to friend and electronics manufacturing specialist Chris Peters for flagging this Diplomat article for me.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Brazen U.S. Corporate Collusion with China

Tags

aerospace, Belt and Road, China, globalization, Honeywell, human rights, manufacturing, multinational companies, multinationals, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, steel, tech, tech transfer, The Wall Street Journal, Uighurs, Xinjiang

Usually, it’s not a terrific idea to begin a piece of writing with a phrase like, “If you want to see something that’ll make you sick to your stomach….” But I think you’ll agree that this recent article from The Wall Street Journal justifies an exception. For its portrayal of the China operations of U.S.-owned multinational manufacturer Honeywell depicts a big company actively helping the dangerous thug dictatorship in Beijing endanger often-intertwined American security and economic interests, and evidently doing so without even a peep of protest from Washington – including during the Trump years.

Journal reporter Trefor Moss’ piece dealt with the question, “How can an American company thrive in China at a time when tensions between the two countries are running high?” His answer: Under Honeywell’s long-time head of China operations, it pursued a strategy of fully immersing “the company in Chinese business and culture—and [not shying] away from helping Chinese companies achieve strategic goals set by Beijing.”

This approach was worrisome enough when this executive, Shane Tedjarati, launched Honeywell China down this path in 2004. By that time, Beijing was not only gutting America’s domestic manufacturing base with a wide range of predatory trade and broader economic practices. But it had also compiled a record of challenging American national security interests through policies like supplying countries like Iran and North Korea with technologies vital to developing weapons of mass destruction and the missiles needed to deliver them.

Now that the People’s Republic has since at least early 2018 been seen as a threat to critical American interests in the Indo-Pacific region requiring a “whole-of-government” response, and that President Biden has declared that “We’re in competition with China and other countries to win the 21st Century. We’re at a great inflection point in history” and that “we’ll maintain a strong military presence in the Indo-Pacific…not to start a conflict, but to prevent one,” activities like Honeywell’s in China look alarmingly like colluding with an enemy.

What else can be made of Tedjarati’s position as “a visiting professor at Shanghai’s China Executive Leadership Academy, an elite school that provides leadership training to the Communist Party’s rising stars.”

Or of Honeywell’s sale of industrial automation equipment to one of the state-owned Chinese steel companies that for years been glutting global markets with dumped and artificially cheap product that’s hammered America’s own sector?

Or of its “open” support for the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese global infrastructure plan widely seen as a way for Beijing to expand its worldwide influence, and that’s got the Biden administration concerned enough to be mounting a U.S. response?

Or of these Honeywell actions (which didn’t make the Journal piece) “[T]he company repeatedly, between 2011 and 2018, sent drawings of parts of US military aircraft to suppliers in foreign countries, including China, asking for price quotes, according to a Department of State charging letter. The manufacturer voluntarily disclosed the violations.

“The engineering prints showed layouts, dimensions and geometries for manufacturing castings and finished parts for military aircraft and engines, as well as other hardware and weaponry. Drawings for parts within the Lockheed Martin F-35 and F-22 stealth fighters, Boeing B-1B supersonic bomber and Pratt & Whitney F135 turboshaft engine were included.”

For good measure, Honeywell has also supplied protective equipment to Chinese security forces operating in western Xinjiang province, where Beijing has been harshly persecuting the Muslim Uighur minority group.

Honeywell did pay a (tiny) fine for its seven years of sharing those drawings. But overall, according to Moss, Tedjarati told him that “No U.S. or Chinese officials have ever told him the company should do, or should avoid doing, specific things in China.”

Honeywell has by no means been the only U.S. multinational to enrich China and strengthen it militarily and technologically for decades. (See, e.g., here and here.) But it may have just won the award for the most brazen. And until these kinds of operations are halted completely, it’ll be hard to describe America’s China policy with the word “serious.”

Full disclosure:  I have no financial positions whatever in Honeywell, other than possibly through index funds or exchange-traded funds, and other such vehicles, and have no plans to acquire any.

Making News: Video of China Panel Presentation Now On-Line

Tags

China, conservatives, economics, Intercollegiate Studies Institute, Making News, national security, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my participation in a late July panel discussion on “China, Geonomics, and Great Power Competition.” Here’s the link.

The event was especially interesting because it was held as part of a conference put on by the conservative Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI), and because for decades intellectually honest conservatives have been torn over the question of how and even whether to respond to China’s wide-ranging economic predation. (As with liberals, other conservatives have simply served as corporate-funded backers of coddling China.)   

On the one hand, many have recognized that growing national economic power (which China has amassed largely through its tariffs, technology blackmail, intellectual property theft, and other practices having nothing to do with free trade or any form of free markets) tends to translate into growing national military power. Therefore, some limits on doing business with the People’s Republic have always been considered justified (e.g., no arms sales). On the other hand, even these conservatives’ fundamental opposition to limits on economic activity has bred a decided reluctance to endorse any but the most threadbare curbs – which folks like me have viewed as pathetically inadequate (for reasons I lay out).

As ISI has explained, the purpose of the overall conference was to “hash out what a conservative approach to the economy should look like today” – which reflects its admirable willingness to reexamine longstanding dogmas. So IMO, the Institute deserves a lot of credit for including China policy on this list, and I’m grateful to have been included in this piece of the process. P.S.  I attended most of the rest of the conference, and found the treatment of other issues fascinating. If ISI posts the entire event at one link, I’ll pass it along as soon as I can find it.   

In the meantime, keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments. 

Those Stubborn Facts: How the U.S. Lost the Global Semiconductor Manufacturing Tech Lead

Tags

capex, capital spending, China, infotech, innovation, Intel, investment, manufacturing, microchips, national security, Samsung, semiconductors, South Korea, Taiwan, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, tech, Those Stubborn Facts

“North America-” (i.e., U.S.-) Owned Firms’ Share of Global Semiconductor Capital Spending, 1990: 31 percent

“North America-” (i.e., U.S.-) Owned Firms’ Share of Global Semiconductor Capital Spending, 2019: 28 percent

“Asia-Pac/Others*- Owned Firms’ Share of Global Semiconductor Capital Spending, 1990: 10 percent

“Asia-Pac/Others*-Owned Firms’ Share of Global Semiconductor Capital Spending, 2019: 63 percent

*Excludes Japan. Includes Taiwan, South Korea, and China

(Source: “A Path to Success for the EU Semiconductor Industry,” by Michael Alexander and Thomas Kirschstein, Roland Berger, February 12, 2021, https://www.rolandberger.com/en/Insights/Publications/A-path-to-success-for-the-EU-semiconductor-industry.html)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S.-China Decoupling Help…From China!

Tags

China, decoupling, Didi, Didi Chuxing, finance, investing, IPOs, national security, privacy, stock markets, tech, Wall Street, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s an absolutely stunning and potentially crucial development that I sure didn’t anticipate: The Chinese government is emerging as one of the most powerful forces working to decouple the American and Chinese economies.

In fact, Beijing’s recent crackdown on Chinese entities (remember: since China has no free market economic or financial system, these organizations shouldn’t be called “companies” or “businesses”) could rival the tariffs and the technology curbs imposed by the Trump administration and continued by President Biden as a means of (1) reducing America’s dangerous economic reliance on this increasingly hostile rival, and (2) cutting the long-time outflow of valuable U.S. capital and knowhow that inevitable enriches and strengthen the People’s Republic.

This turn of events is so unexpected, because, as I’ve written, finance looms as the one policy front on which decoupling had made the least progress.  Worse, despite the obvious and more subtle threats posed by this trend to individual investors (described insightfully here by investment analyst and friend Steven A. Schoenfeld), not to mention to American security, prosperity, and privacy, the flow of U.S. capital to the People’s Republic kept swelling. So far this year alone, a record $12.5 billion has been raised for Chinese entities on U.S. stock markets in 34 listings – way up from $1.9 billion worth of new listings in 14 deals during the same period last year. And many more seemed on the way.

But don’t think that these numbers come anywhere close to revealing China’s presence in U.S. finance. The kinds of initial public offerings (IPOs) mentioned just above have been appealing to Chinese entities and to the regime because with the U.S. exchanges the world’s biggest by far, passing muster with them is like a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. Therefore, it’s inevitably encouraged investors the nation and world over to pile in. As a result, the total market capitalization of these entities stood at no less than $2.1 trillion as of two months ago.

In recent days, however, China has made clear that some national security concerns of its own, along with dictator Xi Jinping’s determination to bring these gigantic, highly advanced organizations closer to heel, were now outweighing the prospect of continuing to attract more oceans of U.S. and other global investment. Just two days after ride-sharing giant Didi Chuxing raised a record $4.4 billion in a June 30 Wall Street debut, Beijing’s internet regulators ordered it to stop signing up users. This past Monday, China ordered that its app be removed from Chinese app stores (as recounted here).  The announced justifications: the need both to protect national security, and users’ personal data. 

But since China’s leaders are not exactly known as champions of personal privacy, the former was surely the real reason, along with the desire to reassert control. Last weekend, in messages presumably endorsed and even placed by Chinese authorities on the Twitter-like platform Weibo, Didi was actually accused of transferring the data it collected overseas.

Since then, moreover, the crackdown has gone beyond Didi. On Monday, China also announced a cyber-security review of two entities also listed in U.S. markets, and The Wall Street Journal reported that Chinese regulators had suggested that Didi postpone its IPO. The following day, Beijing “issued a sweeping warning to its biggest companies, vowing to tighten oversight of data security and overseas listings just days after Didi Global Inc.’s contentious decision to go public in the U.S.”

This news, along with the beatings taken by the share prices of these U.S. listed companies and major counterparts in trading worldwide, have prompted widespread speculation that the Chinese IPO wave in American finance is over, a least for the time being. And almost right on cue, reportedly today a Chinese entity decided to drop its own U.S. IPO plans because of Beijing’s new stance. 

Wall Street of course isn’t happy – huge underwriting and trading fees stand to be lost. But China’s evident change of priorities represents a golden opportunity for U.S. leaders to jump in and lend a helping hand. They should make the regulatory moves needed to keep Chinese entities out of U.S. markets for good going forward, and speed up efforts to kick out those remaining. And as is not the case with other decoupling policies, American officials seemingly can be certain that China’s powerful flunkies in the Washington, D.C. swamp won’t be trying to gum up the works.