Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Other Scary Ukraine War Threat

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energy, energy prices, global financial crisis, globalism, hunger, Lehman Brothers, Lehman moment, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, Ukraine War, Vietnam War, vital interests, Western Europe

Take it from me – the words “Lehman” and “moment” are words that no one should ever want to see in the same sentence ever again. Yet they’ve been making a collective comeback lately (see, e.g., here, here, and here), signaling in the process that the determination of the United States and other countries to help Ukraine achieve its goal of expelling Russia from the territory it’s lost could backfire disastrously.

This specific risk has emerged not because the conflict could spread beyond Ukraine’s borders and embroil the big new concentrations of U.S. and other NATO military forces right next door – and therefore all too easily escalate to the nuclear level. It’s also emerged because of the growing economic hardship and potential political instability in major world regions created by the disruption of global energy and food trade triggered by Russia’s invasion and the sanctions it’s triggered.  

The phrase “Lehman moment” refers to the time when the national and global financial systems and economies nearly collapsed because so many of the world’s major banks and other lenders had engaged in such reckless practices, and because they were so interconnected that the failure of one – America’s Lehman Brothers – threatened to topple the whole house of cards that had been created.

Today’s Lehman moment is feared to be coming in Europe’s energy sector – also dominated by huge, closely connected institutions and also endangered by contagion. But this time the culprit hasn’t been greedy executives or asleep-at-the-switch regulators. It’s been the price of natural gas. The Russian invasion of Ukraine itself, the duration of the fighting, Russian supply curbs and threats of cut-offs have pushed it so high that many European utilities have been forced to buy the increasingly scarce fuel on the very expensive spot market and sell it to customers at the much lower prices stipulated by the contracts they’ve signed. (See here for a useful explanation of all of the above.)

As with the original Lehman moment, government bailouts are likely to save the day – at least for the foreseeable future. But the costs are shaping up to be astronomical, and even if they’re paid by all of the continent’s well- and less well-off countries alike, enormous national debts are sure to grow. Moreover, Europe’s near-term energy, and overall economic, future looks so grim because major shortages and towering prices this winter seem both inevitable and bound to bring on a serious recession and all the suffering and anxiety that accompany such downturns.

That sure sounds like a formula for even more political instability than Europe has already seen lately, including a loss of public faith in national and regional establishments and institutions of all kinds, and a further strengthening of the sort of political movements – on the right end of the political spectrum in particular – that globalists keep warning are grave dangers to the democracy and even the peace the continent has enjoyed until Russia’s attack on Ukraine.

Nor is Ukraine War-rooted turmoil confined to Europe. As the Biden administration has just warned, “protracted conflicts – including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine” have been developments that have “disrupted global supply chains and dramatically increased global food prices.” As a result, “world leaders [need] to act with urgency and at scale to respond…and avert extreme hunger for hundreds of millions of people around the world.”

Sub-Saharan Africa, one of the areas of greatest risk, has (rightly) never been seen as a high U.S. foreign policy priority. The other area, though, is the Middle East, which has become much less important even to America’s economic well-being because of the energy production revolution at home, but which continues to attract considerable attention from globalist U.S. leaders.

Hence the backfire risk – and a gigantic irony. Globalist backers of the current Ukraine strategy justify it as necessary to protect what they call a “rules-based international order” they believe has been essential for preventing great power conflict, as well as for promoting impressive degrees of prosperity and democracy around the globe. I’d give far more credit to the balance of nuclear terror that’s prevailed for nearly all of that period, but that’s not the main point.  The main point is that, along with great power conflict, the widespread international turbulence being fueled by the duration of the Ukraine War per se is another major geopolitical nightmare that globalism has striven to avert.  

It’s true that incurring great risks to protect specific, concrete interests the U.S. considers vital – like the security of Western Europe and, more recently, Taiwan (because of its leadership in manufacturing the world’s most advanced semiconductors) – by definition are worth running. This logic also holds for objectives like fostering and maximizing stability the world over, even though they’ve always been more dubious because they’re so much gauzier and less realistic. For whatever the damage possible from attempting to safeguard any of these interests, the term “vital” means that failure can generate even greater dangers – particularly national survival and independence.

But running such risks on behalf of Ukraine’s independence – which was never seen as remotely vital U.S. interest even at the height of the Cold War, which was habitually described as a Manichean struggle for the entire world’s future – is a different matter altogether, and indeed makes no sense at all.

During the Vietnam War, a U.S. Army officer is supposed to have told a reporter after one battle that “It became necessary to destroy the town to save it.” The Lehman moment references and mounting signs of tumult in several major regions long seen by Washington as bearing at least significantly and even vitally on America’s safety and well-being indicates how close U.S. Ukraine policy – even if it simply prolongs heavy but geographically contained fighting – is moving toward achieving that absurdly self-destructive goal.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Deaf Leading the Blind on U.S. China Policy

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Barack Obama, Biden, Blob, China, Donald Trump, Fareed Zakaria, George W. Bush, globalism, Mainstream Media, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, privacy, South China Sea, Taiwan, technology, Washington Post

Is “beyond clueless” or “beyond intellectually dishonest” the best way to describe Fareed Zakaria’s latest column for the Washington Post? It’s tough to tell. And you could ask the same of the editors at the Post‘s opinion pages, who clearly saw nothing wrong with letting this apologia for the United States’ thoroughly discredited (at least for those blessed with working and/or uncorrupted brains) pre-Trump China policies see the light of day.

Zakaria’s missive, from this past Thursday, suffers two glaringly obvious flaws. First, like America’s most influential leaders from both parties for decades before 2017 the author insists on the importance of Washington building and maintaining “a serious working relationship” with a regime that has developed (with oceans of reckless American assistance) into one of the world’s “two most powerful actors.”

And former President Donald Trump’s greatest sin (which Zakaria accuses President Biden of following)? Adopting a policy toward Beijing of “open hostility and criticism” that has caused the “collapse” of “communications channels for managing tensions,” and especially during crises or near crises such as that which appears to be developing over Taiwan.

But nothing could be clearer by now than the delusional nature of these procedure-obsessed and substance-free views (which of course despite Zakaria’s claim have continually been parroted by the Biden administration.) For by now it should go without saying that China’s top priority isn’t avoiding conflict with the United States. In particular, it lacks any interest in the President’s oft-stated  objective of creating clear “guard rails” and other rules of the road that result in a safe and orderly “competition” for goals like “winning the twenty-first century” whose definition seems just as vapid, utopian – and distracting – as his administration’s “liberal global order” references.

Instead, China’s top priority is specific and concrete: increasing its power (in all dimensions) and reducing America’s in every way possible. The reason? Eliminate the greatest obstacle to its plans to ensure its decisive control over every major trend shaping the globe’s future – whether the field is military prowess or technological advance or wealth creation or the evolution of society and culture (especially through privacy-threatening progress in cyber-hacking and facial recognition technology).

Not that the Chinese are eager for conflict or even any kind of frontal challenge or showdown – especially when prevailing is still anything but guaranteed. But the ultimate objective is prevailing, and the means entail building the domestic, regional, and global conditions needed to prevail, either without firing a shot or when clashes do break out.

And not that American leaders shouldn’t make sure to maintain those communication lines with Beijing. With both countries possessing vast nuclear arsenals, lowering the odds of accidental conflict is clearly imperative.

But communication, much less broader engagement, mustn’t become an end in and of itself. History too often has shown that they encourage the (1) U.S. acceptance of empty promises; (2) rationalization of failure to achieve or preserve particular valued objectives in the here and now for the sake of payoffs stemming from a sense of mutual obligation that could be entirely unilateral and imaginary, over a time frame that tends to keep lengthening; and (3) the substitution of wishful thinking about attainable goals for gaining and maintaining the ability to deter or successfully counter specific, dangerous Chinese initiatives.

The second glaringly obvious flaw in Zakaria’s column is its exclusive reliance on former Obama administration officials to support his analysis – which makes as much as sense as citing former Carter administration officials as inflation-fighting experts.

After all, it was under Trump’s immediate predecessor that the Chinese began running wild throughout the South China Sea, pushing aggressive territorial claims and literally building islands with military facilities capable of controlling those commercially vital waters – and according to one senior U.S. admiral at the time, precisely because Beijing concluded that Obama would keep sitting on his hands.

It was also Obama who continued enabling China to pursue the predatory economic policies that badly damaged numerous manufacturing industries vital to American national security, and who turned a blind eye to the massive transfer by U.S. and foreign companies of advanced, defense-related techology to the People’s Republic.

But at least Obama “upgraded” the George W. Bush-era “Senior Dialogue” and “Strategic Economic Dialogue” in order to merge “the economic and security tracks” to “break down the barriers inside both the U.S. and Chinese governments to more effectively tackle cross-cutting issues such as climate change, development, and energy security.” Which accomplished exactly what to advance and defend American interests?

And this is where Zakaria’s editors at the Post come in. Evidently none of them thought to say something like, “Hey, Fareed. Maybe quote someone on China policy whose advice isn’t widely seen as a proven failure?”

Maybe they’re just supposed to look for stray commas and dangling participles?  I suspect that the real reason is that they’re part of the same group-thinking, self-perpetuating globalist Blob that keeps working overtime to ensure that the American public is never exposed to any genuinely fresh ideas about promoting the United States’ security, prosperity, and optimal place in the world – and whose  decades-long record of squandering the nation’s blood and treasure on behalf of one grandiose goal after another is its only claim to success.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Nothing to See About This Biden-Wall Street-China Connection?

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Biden, Biden administration, BlackRock, China, Donald Trump, globalism, inflation, Obama administration, oil, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, solar panels, State Department, Strategic Petroleum Reserve, tariffs, Thomas E. Donilon, Trade, Wall Street

It’s a good thing that conspiracy theories are never, ever true. Otherwise, several recent developments in U.S.-China relations would rightly alarm anyone hoping that U.S. policy toward the People’s Republic would reflect efforts to further American national interests rather than selfish special interests.

Those dangerously loony conspiracy theorists would probably begin by noting that last month, the State Department announced Secretary Antony J. Blinken’s appointments to a Foreign Affairs Policy Board that since 2011 has “provided independent advice on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy” on issues that today include “strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China.”

The new Board is chaired (as originally reported by The Washington Free Beacon) by Thomas E. Donilon, who the wingnuts would no doubt immediately observe was the White House National Security Advisor during the Obama administration, which compiled a consistent record of coddling China on both the national security and the economic fronts. And as the Free Beacon post makes clear, out office, Donilon had been a leading voice for continuing to coddle China, too. 

They’d surely further point out that he’s sure found lucrative employment in the right place. For Donilon is now Chairman of the BlackRock Investment Institute, an arm of the finance company of the same name that happens to be the world’s largest asset manager. These conspiracy-mongers would likely explain that BlackRock has been one of Wall Street’s most enthusiastic boosters of sending huge amounts of capital from the United States and around the world into China. Indeed, it’s just become “the first foreign-owned company to operate a wholly owned business in China’s mutual fund industry,” in CNBC.com‘s words.

The strategy will of course net immense fees for BlackRock and the other finance giants pursuing it. And we’d probably hear from the loons that BlackRock has touted major benefits for the People’s Republlc other than making available to its dangerous totalitarian government oceans of new resources – specifically by helping China “to address its growing retirement crisis by providing retirement system expertise, products and services.”

Then these paranoiacs would presumably try to bolster their credibility by arguing that even lefty zillionaire George Soros has warned that BlackRock-like operations in China will “damage the national security interests of the U.S. and other democracies.”

More grist for the conspiracy industry’s mills: Yesterday’s report in The Wall Street Journal that the Chinese government “is implementing changes to its rules governing publicly offered securities investment funds” that would “include requiring foreign-owned fund managers such as BlackRock and Fidelity to create Communist Party cells when operating in China.” Along with the failure of Donilon or BlackRock (or Fidelity, where I park most of my family’s financial accounts) to utter a peep of protest. Not to mention the silence of the Biden administration.

And the icing on this cake of delusion? Recent signs of a China policy shift by a Biden administration that had been surprisingly Trump-y on the subject given the President’s long history of supporting pre-Trump globalist policies of indiscriminately expanding trade and investment with China. Like the persistent talk of cutting tariffs on Chinese imports to help fight inflation. Like the suspension of new levies on Chinese solar panel imports that were transshipped through Southeast Asian countries to evade U.S. trade curbs. Like the sale of oil from America’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve to a Chinese entity (Unipec).

But obviously there’s nothing to see here. Because as I said, conspiracy theories are never, ever true.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why Biden’s Somalia Decision Looks Literally Insane

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Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, Al-Shabab, Biden administration, Biden border crisis, border security, Donald Trump, globalism, Immigration, jihadists, migrants, Open Borders, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, September 11, Somalia, terrorism, terrorists

With all the headline news about major crises ranging from the Ukraine War to inflation to the infant formula shortage to the likelihood that abortion rights will be rescinded, RealityChek readers and others can be forgiven for overlooking the Biden administration’s recent decision to send a small contingent of U.S. forces back to Somalia. In fact, everyone can be forgiven if you can’t find Somalia on a map.

But the redeployent is eminently worth discussing because it’s the latest example of how foreign policy globalists (like President Biden) have their priorities completely ass-backward when it comes to dealing with global terrorism.

These units are back in this failed state on the Horn of Africa – after being withdrawn by former President Donald Trump in late 2020 – not because Somalia is located strategically or boasts any resources or export markets that matter to the U.S. economy. They’re back because the country has long been a headquarters for the jihadist group and major Al Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabab, and this organization “has increased in strength and poses a heightened threat” recently, according to the White House. Additionally, as observed by new Biden Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre, Somalia’s dismal excuse for a government is failing to prevent Al-Shabab from gaining the ability to launch terrorist attacks on the United States.

No one can dispute the need to protect the American homeland from foreign terrorist threats. But what’s so perverse about this Biden administration move is that it’s taking place after the President has taken numerous steps since his January, 2020 inauguration – many very early in this term – to weaken the security of America’s own border and thereby faciliate the entry of those terrorists.

Even worse, this Open Borders-friendly position has coincided with (a) growing numbers of apprehensions at U.S. borders of migrants from Turkey and other non-Western Hemisphere countries (including in Africa) and (b) growing numbers of such apprehensions of individuals on the federal government’s terrorist watch list. (See the official U.S. interactive feature here and the equally official dropdown menus here, respectively.)  The absolute numbers of the latter are small, but how many jihadists did it take to knock down the Twin Towers?

And speaking of Afghanistan, Biden’s sensible but operationally botched withdrawal was never accompanied by stronger border security measures, either.  Quite the opposite.  

In other words, unlike the Trump administration, the Biden administration is refusing to focus its anti-terrorism strategy on what the U.S. government can reasonably hope to control (securing its own borders). Instead, in the case of Somalia, it’s not only returning to, but doubling down on, an approach I’ve criticized before that focuses on what Washington can’t possibly hope to control – using the U.S. military to keep chasing down jihadists in failed regions like the Middle East and countries like Somalia, whose deep-seated dysfunction is bound to keep generating them. Is the President seriously expecting different results from doing this same thing over and over again? That’s of course a definition of something no one should want any U.S. leader to display.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Will a Russian Victory Really Bring On a World at War?

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Antony J. Blinken, Biden, China, Council on Foreign Relations, East China Sea, globalism, Japan, Kim Jong Un, national interests, North Korea, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, South China Sea, South Korea, Taiwan, The Wall Street Journal, Ukraine, Ukraine-Russia war, Vladimir Putin, war, Xi JInPing

Not only do American leaders seem pretty united on the need for the nation to do much more to help Ukraine defend itself from Russian invaders. They and the (overwhelmingly globalist) American political and chattering classes seem largely in agreement on one of the main consequences either of permitting Russia to win, or permitting him to win without inflicting major, lasting damage on Russia’s economy – a return to a world in which aggressive dictators like Russia’s Vladimir Putin will feel much freer than they have for decades to attack their neighbors.

That fear definitely has a troubling ring of reasonableness – and all the more so since, unlike previous historical eras in which such attacks and invasions were much more common, some of the actors possess nuclear weapons.

But there’s something these warnings are overlooking. However vivid such dangers are in principle, it’s hard to identify actual places around the world where potential conquerors have been bidng their time until receiving just the kind of signal that a Russian success in Ukraine allegedly would send.

If you doubt the prominence of this argument for greater U.S. involvement in the conflict, you haven’t been paying attention. For example, in his first public remarks after the invasion, President Biden claimed that “Putin’s actions betray his sinister vision for the future of our world — one where nations take what they want by force.”

In a speech a month earlier, his Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken, asserted that one of the post-World War II global order’s guiding principles was a rejection of

“the right of one country to change the borders of another by force; to dictate to another the policies it pursues or the choices it makes, including with whom to associate; or to exert a sphere of influence that would subjugate sovereign neighbors to its will.

“To allow Russia to violate those principles with impunity would…send a message to others around the world that these principles are expendable, and that, too, would have catastrophic results.”

The conservatives on the Wall Street Journal editorial board, who don’t agree with the Biden administration on much of anything, similarly contended that “Whether the West admits it or not, the invasion is setting a precedent for what the world will tolerate in the 21st century.”

But check out this assessment of worldwide hot spots from the Council on Foreign Relations, often called the seat of America’s globalist foreign policy establishment. Where exactly are the Putins of tomorrow whose will to international power would be even be sharpened by a Russian victory in Ukraine?

Certainly not on the Korean peninsula or in the East China Sea. North Korea no doubt has designs on neighboring South Korea, but they’ve existed for decades. Ditto for China and Taiwan. It’s true that Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping might be emboldened by an inadequate U.S. and international response to Putin’s war. But not from any relief that global norms of behavior that had been holding them back had weakened, or that a Russian victory had set some a kind of precedent – with binding power? Because they take the idea of rule of law more seriously in their treatment of foreigners than they do in their treatment of their own people? Please.

Other than these Asian conflicts – which also include China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, but which also long predate the Ukraine war – where are the aggressors-in-waiting who may feel freer to attack their neighbors? Should we include the other East China Sea dispute, where China is involved, too – even though U.S. allies Japan and South Korea are also contesting each other’s claims to some miniscule islands?

More important, where are the global hot spots where current or potential territorial rivalries could explode into conflict that would imperil global peace and security – including America’s? Nagorno-Karabakh (on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan, unless you’ve been following this tiff closely)? As Mr. Biden would say, “Come on, man.”

I’m sure that there are flashpoints in sub-Saharan Africa that could eventually embroil entire regions in warfare. But it’s as cold-blooded as it is true that these are regions so chronically dysfunctional (and therefore largely disconnected from the wider world) that even complete chaos has no potential to spread much further – or inspire conqueror wannabees in regions of greater concern.

Closer to home for the United States, according to the Congressionally founded U.S. Institute of Peace, some small countries in Latin America have been quarreling with neighbors over territory since 1990, and if they did ignite conflict, refugees would of course come streaming to U.S. borders. But only once – in 1995 – did one of these feuds result in war (between Ecuador and Peru). And I’m glad I don’t have to make the argument that revanchists in either country are chomping at the bit to get a symbolic green light from a Russian victory in Ukraine.

The big takeaways here clearly are (1) that the world isn’t a tinderbox likely to burst into a series of truly dangerous international conflicts depending on the outcome of Russia’s war on Ukraine; and (2) that the potential conflicts that can affect the United States consequentially are and have long been driven by their own dynamics (including current and longstanding American approaches to these situations).

So as has been the case since Russian policy toward its neighbors became more belligerent, what should be driving the U.S. response should be examinations concerning the nature of concrete, specific U.S. interests that are or are not at stake. Claims that Ukraine’s continued independence and full sovereignty are all that stand between today’s relative calm among countries (if not in terms of civil conflicts) and an entire globe engulfed in war deserve the same fate as previous alarmist concotions like the domino theory – getting tossed onto what former President Reagan memorably called the “ash heap of history.”

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden’s Dangerously Loose Lips on Nuclear Weapons Policy

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alliances, allies, Baltics, Biden, Biden administration, China, deterrence, globalism, no first use, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, semiconductors, South Korea, Soviet Union, Taiwan, Trump, Ukraine

As usual, headline news is coming so fast and furiously from so many different direections that lots of major developments get neglected (including by me). One of the most important pretty stunningly shows once again that those American leaders who most loudly proclaim themselves to be champions of the globalist approach to foreign policy, and of the U.S. security alliances they view as one of its greatest achievements (both for the United States and the globe at large) have once more been flirting seriously with ideas certain to destroy those alliances.

Specifically, I’m referring to recent reports (e.g., here) that the President Biden is considering endorsing a “no first use” (NFU) policy for America’s nuclear weapons arsenal.

The shift hasn’t yet been approved. A rethink hasn’t even been officially announced. And some of the anonymous sources who leaked this news to reporters (no doubt from inside the Biden administration, and no doubt as a trial balloon) claim that what’s being contemplated is changing to something similar to NFU but not identical to it.

But of course, trial balloons are floated precisely to evoke reactions to something that someone awfully high up in government (or whatever organization is doing the floating) thinks is a swell idea, and who’s confident that his or her boss thinks or would think so, too. Moreover, the difference between NFU and the variant being considered seems pretty academic at best.

Most important about this possible new Biden approach to national security is that it reveals this administration to be every bit as cynical and therefore unserious about the globalism and alliances it pretends to prioritize – and about its indignant and sanctimonious portrayals of the more skeptical views of critics like former President Trump as proof of their dangerous ignorance – as the Obama administration.

For as I explained five years ago when Obama entertained NFU right after slamming Trump literally as a foreign policy and specifically nuclear weapons know-nothing, even mulling such a new nuclear doctrine could undermine the very alliances that globalists like him exalted.

And the reason is simple: First use of nuclear weapons is the policy that for decades has enabled the United States to deter attacks on the allies credibly in the first place – and that has held these arrangements together. For long ago, Washington dismissed as impractical trying to match adversaries like the old Soviet Union, China, and North Korea in conventional forces. The first two could draw on populations that would always exceed America’s, and even when it came to relatively small antagonists like the latter, fielding such forces was considered too expensive to be sustained financially and politically.

Nuclear weapons, however, were relatively cheap, and American leaders judged that declaring their intent to respond to purely conventional attacks on allies by these countries by launching the nukes if non-nuclear forces proved inadequate would put the fear of God even in a nuclear superpower like the Soviet Union. And first use would even more effectively deter countries with tiny or non-existen nuclear forces of their own, like China and North Korea for decades.

Even when Beijing and Pyongyang built nuclear forces big and capable enough to call this U.S. bluff successfully at least in theory (because they could now wreak impressive nuclear destruction on the American homeland, too), American leaders put their trust in NFU. And if indeed protecting allies was the overriding priority of U.S. foreign policy, this judgement was at least defensible.

A NFU policy, though, or even trial balloons, could bring disastrous consequences. Either would risk emboldening the enemies of the United States and its allies by signaling that Washington would at the least hesitate to play its most formidable military card. Just as important, it’s hard to imagine a worst recent time than the present for indulging in such speculation. After all, not only does the United States no longer enjoy overwhelming nuclear edges over China and North Korea. But China and Russia have displayed ever greater interest in establishing or reestablishing effective control over small neighbors like Ukraine and the Baltic states and of course Taiwan.

In addition, a NFU policy or talk thereof could frighten allies into bailing on the United States and cutting the best deals they could with Moscow or Pyongyang or Beijing while they still had the chance. Alternatively, because sizable American forces remain right at or near the front lines at all three of these flashpoints, the absence of a first use policy could result in them getting caught up in unwinnable battles even if a U.S. President wanted to stay on the sidelines.

Finally, when we’re talking about Taiwan, of course, we’re talking about the place that now makes the world’s most advanced semiconductors – products that are central to both future American prosperity and national security. So as is not the case with Russia’s neighbors or even South Korea (an impressive semiconductor manufacturer in its own right), adopting NFU could result in the loss of a genuinely vital U.S. interest.

I’ve long favored fundamental changes in U.S. alliance and overall foreign policy and national security strategy. But that’s not the point here. If you like alliances, it’s really pretty simple: At a minimum, you either keep first use, or you greatly beef up U.S. conventional forces, or you convince the allies to fill whatever non-nuclear military force gaps you face, or you do all three or some combination of them. If you adopt NFU and fail to take offsetting steps on the conventional force front, be ready to kiss these arrangements goodbye.

From all accounts (see, e.g., here) the allies themselves recognize this. So does China. What’s scary is that even if the supposed adults-in-the-room and master strategists in the Biden administration eventually realize the stakes involved (as their Obama predecessors eventually did), they may have greatly undermined the nation’s safety – along with boosting the risks of conflict the world over.

Im-Politic: A Labor Shortage Story Short on the Facts

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Bloomberg.com, Boris Johnson, Brexit, editing, European Union, globalism, Im-Politic, Immigration, Joe Mayes, journalism, labor shortages, media bias, Open Borders, truck drivers, truckers, trucking, United Kingdom

Is Bloomberg.com trying to make yours truly look good? It certainly seems that way. Exactly two days after I wrote that American journalism has long been suffering from an editing crisis (and subjecting readers and viewers to a flood of ineptly reported and reasoned articles, posts, and broadcast segments), this news site ran a piece illustrating perfectly two of this so-called profession’s biggest (and intimately related) flaws: pushing narratives largely by ignoring information that provides crucial context.

The lead paragraph tells you all you need to know where Joe Mayes’ September 22 story was going (and where he and his editors believed it should go): “The red lines of Boris Johnson’s Brexit project are starting to crack as voters face growing shortages of food and fuel, as well as a marked rise in living costs.”

As the second paragraph elaborated, “Despite riding to power on a Brexit campaign that pledged to cut immigration from the European Union, the prime minister [Johnson] and his cabinet are now preparing for what would be a significant and politically damaging U-turn: Tapping those same EU workers to plug the labor shortages crippling parts of the U.K. supply chain.” And “the most immediate and pressing concern”? “A major shortage of truck drivers.”

What could be more revealing – and embarrassing for supporters of the United Kingdom’s 2016 decision to leave the European Union (in large part to gain more national control over immigration inflows)? Immigrants from the same EU are now being recognized even by the Leaver-in-Chief as that country’s last hope for staving off starvation, freezing to death this winter, and raging inflation.

No question Brexit was a landmark decision, and no doubt there were plenty of valid reasons to be skeptical (as the close 2016 referendum results indicate). But this Bloomberg piece plainly suggests that the countries that have decided to remain in the EU literally have truckers to spare the British.

Which insinuates that the Brexiteers deserve to have insult added to injury. Except this story line is a crock. As an internet search that took me mere minutes revealed, there’s lots of info out there making clear that truck driver shortages are a global problem – that is, they’re not limited to countries that left the EU. Indeed, this industry website reports that trucking companies in Europe are expecting a 17 percent driver shortfall this year.

Further, the survey it’s based on found that any number of steps could be taken by trucking companies and governments in shortage-afflicted countries to increase driver supply without importing foreigners. Like raising pay. Like lowering the training age to encourage more young people to replace retiring truckers (a big problem in a sector with an aging workforce). Like creating safer parking areas, which would be especially helpful in attacting more women into the business. (They currently make up only two percent of drivers globally, according to the survey.)

In fact, finding such ;material is so easy that it raises the question of whether the main problem (and all the others I’ve spotlighted on RealityChek – e.g., here) doesn’t reflect simply a competence crisis. It also reflects a bias crisis, with the target being any measures or information that clash with longstanding globalist orthodoxies – in this case, Open Borders- friendly policies on the immigration and labor shortage fronts.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Could U.S. Protectorates in Asia Finally Become Real Allies?

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Afghanistan, alliances, allies, Asia, Asia-Pacific, AUKUS, Australia, Biden, China, credibility, Donald Trump, extended deterrence, globalism, Indo-Pacific, Japan, nuclear umbrella, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, South Korea, submarines, Taiwan, transactionalism, United Kingdom, vital interests

Lots of stuff going on lately in security affairs in the Asia-Pacific region (which foreign policy congoscenti have been calling the Indo-Pacific region, reflecting India’s new prominence). And I’m not just talking about the new agreement (which goes by the awkward acronym “AUKUS”) by which Australia will acquire nuclear-powered submarines provided by the United States and the United Kingdom (acing out the furious French in the process), and gain access to lots of advanced militarily-relevant American technology, like artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

I’m also talking about long overdue signs that key U.S. allies in the region are starting to take the threat they face from growing Chinese aggressiveness as seriously as the United States has been taking it. The interesting policy questions are (1) why they seem finally to be waking up and (2) what if anything the United States can or should do to convince Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in particular to assume more of the burden of defending themselves, thereby enabling America to take a less risky, less costly role in the region.

For the time being, unfortunately, the United States is going to have to stay deeply involved in the defense of these countries, and to keep accepting a degree of nuclear risk that I’ve long described as unacceptable, and still consider unnerving. I’ve changed my mind, however, because the globalist and free trade-happy U.S. foreign policy establishment and the tech companies that write so many of its members’ paychecks boneheadedly let South Korea and especially Taiwan seize global leadership in the manufacture of the world’s most advanced and powerful semiconductors.

These devices are simply too valuable to the American economy as a whole and to its continuing military superiority to take the chance that the relevant Taiwanese and South Korean facilities and knowhow fall into Chinese hands. As for Japan, it continues to produce many of the materials and equipment on which cutting-edge semiconductor production relies, so it’s got to be kept safe from the likeliest threat it faces from China – which is some form of blackmail. (See this recent Biden administration report, and especially pp. 45 ff.)

As a result, until the United States gets its semiconductor act back together, the American nuclear umbrella needs to remain over Japan and South Korea – which means that America could well be sucked into a nuclear war with China and especially North Korea if hostilities break out. And such “extended deterrence” may need to be extended to Taiwan (which Washington is not yet as tightly committed to defend).

That’s why it’s not good that not only the Australians will be getting nuclear-powered (but not – so far – nuclear-armed) submarines. Because of their superior capabilities, these which will add quantitatively and qualitatively to the forces China would need to think about when contemplating, say, moves to increase its sway over the regional sealanes through which so much of the world’s trade flows.

It’s also good that South Korea has decided to build (so far non-nuclear) ballistic missiles that can be launched from its own submarines (in response to North Korea’s progress toward the same capabilities). Deserving of applause as well are Japanese and Taiwanese plans to boost defense spending – and acquire some impressive weapons along the way. Japanese officials are even talking seriously about what steps Tokyo can and should take to help defense Taiwan if the stuff hits the fan with China – although nothing like a clear decision had been made.

Defense spending levels in all three countries are still measly, especially considering what dangerous neighborhoods they live in. And it’s not as if time is necessarily on their side. But something new seems astir, and I’m not convinced that China’s worsened behavior is entirely responsible. Some credit undoubtedly goes to the Trump administration. Since his initial White House campaign, the campaign, the former President insistently asked why Americans should risk their own security for that of allied freeloaders, and foot so much of the bill. And throughout his presidency, he kept so much pressure on that the Asia allies clearly worried that the Uncle Sucker days were over, and that Trump’s complaints reflected much and possibly most American public opinion. (See, e.g., here.)

President Biden deserves some credit here, too – but I would argue in part in spite of himself. Mr. Biden of course is a card-carrying globalist who for the entirety of his long career in public life has agreed wholeheartedly with the need to maintain strong U.S. alliance relationships. Hence it was no surprise that during the 2020 campaign and immediately after his inauguration, he took great pains to assure U.S. allies that the United States would “be back” after years of Trump-ian neglect. And indeed, earlier this year, Mr. Biden showed every sign of coddling continued Asian defense free-riding.

But ironically, the biggest Biden spur to more Asian defense burden-sharing might be his botched withrawal from Afghanistan. In other words, whereas the Asians (and other allies) were worried mainly that Trump would cut them loose because he was unwilling to protect them if they didn’t change their deadbeat ways, it’s entirely possible that they fear Mr. Biden won’t be able to ride to their rescue – at least not in any effective way.

I know that there’s little evidence of such mistrust in official Asian rhetoric so far. And of course, one of the President’s main stated reasons for leaving Afghanistan in the first place was to free up more American energies and resources to focus on China. But some unofficial Asian voices seem less sure, and it would be surprising to see any governments pushing the panic button in almost any circumstances. And could it be a total coincidence that the aforementioned spate of Asian defense decisions came in the wake of the Afghanistan pullout?

I seriously doubt it.  And as a result, if Mr. Biden wants to turn America’s Asian protectorates into genuine allies, he should continue his own strategy of stepping up exports of advanced weapons to them (and to many of their neighbors, depending on each one’s solidarity), signaling his willingness to go even further (as with this excellent decision) and employ some of the Trump-ian “transactionalism” that’s had so many globalists clutching their pearls for so long. 

But instead of threatening American withdrawals if they don’t pony up more defense-wise, the President should promise them more hardware if they do.  Casually floating the idea of OKing the acqusition of nuclear weapons by various allies wouldn’t hurt, either.

And he should stop pretending that none of this activity is directed against China. Not only does such rhetoric signal credibility-shaking skittishness. It contradicts yet another example of transactionalism that should become part of the Biden strategy: Making clear to China that staying on its current belligerent course will be a great way to guarantee that it’s ringed with ever more neighbors that are armed to the teeth.        

Making News: New National Interest Article on Why the Foreign Policy Establishment Was Always Overrated

Tags

academia, Afghanistan, alliances, Blob, Bretton Woods, China, Cold War, foreign policy establishment, forever wars, global financial crisis, globalism, Iran, liberal global order, Mainstream Media, Making News, Max Boot, Richard Haass, Soviet Union, The National Interest, think tanks

I’m pleased to announce that The National Interest has just published my latest article for an outside publication: an essay on why recent defenses of America’s bipartisan globalist foreign policy establishment (AKA, “The Blob”) wouldn’t hold any water even if this powerful, durable in-crowd hadn’t botched practically everything about Afghanistan. Here’s the link.

Also, a new twist today: Unfortunately, I thought some of the edits undermined the flow of the piece. I’m going to try to get at least some of them corrected. But in the meantime, to show careful readers what they were, I’m presenting below the draft as I sent it off. Let me know if you think I have some grounds for grousing. (P.S. I’m just fine with their title and love the subhead’s reference to the “poisoned well”!)

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Why the Blob Really Has Been Unimpressive

by Alan Tonelson

So the Blob is starting to fight back. The bipartisan globalist national foreign policy establishment is being blamed both for President Biden’s hellaciously botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, and (including by the Blob-y Mr. Biden himself), for pushing the transformation of a necessary anti-terrorist operation into a naively grandiose nation-building project.

It’s time, the argument goes, to marginalize – or at least view more skeptically – this hodgepodge of former diplomats and Congressional aides, retired military officers, genuine academics, and think tank hacks that has shaped American diplomacy in two critical ways: by being used as the main personnel pool for staffing presidential administrations and House and Senate offices on rotating bases, and for serving up informal advisers for these politicians; and by dominating the list of sources used by overwhelmingly sympatico Mainstream Media journalists to report and interpret the news, and thus define for the public which foreign policy ideas are and aren’t legitimate to discuss.

“Don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater!” Blob-ers are responding.

“The foreign policy establishment did get it wrong in Iraq, where the U.S. overreached,” allowed Richard Haass, who as President of the Council on Foreign Relations would arguably win a contest for Blob-er-in-Chief. “We got it wrong in Libya, we got it wrong in Vietnam. But over the last 75 years, the foreign policy establishment has gotten most things right.”

Washington Post pundit (and neoconservative apostate) Max Boot similarly has declared that “we can confidently say that, overall, the foreign policy establishment has served America well over the past 76 years.”

In other words, look past not only Afghanistan and Libya and Iraq and Vietnam but also the failure to anticipate the September 11 terrorist attack; and the long-time cluelessness about the emergence of security and economic threats from China (following the stubborn, decades-long determination to antagonize China after 1949); and a peacekeeping debacle in Somalia; and the Bay of Pigs fiasco; and the blind loyalty to an Iranian Shah hated by nearly all his subjects. Focus instead on all the – presumably more important – successes. (I’m excluding the numerous Blob-y decisions to back all manner of dictators, primarily in the developing world, and ignore human rights considerations because whatever their ethical flaws, only the Vietnam and Iran policies undermined American interests significantly.)

Paramount among them: victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War; the protectorate-alliances, foreign aid, and open trading system that keyed this triumph – in the process pacifying and democratizing Germany and Japan – fostering recovery in these former enemy dictatorships as well as the rest of Western Europe; and ushering in decades of record prosperity in these regions.

One obvious rejoinder: Today’s Blob and its most recent forerunners merit zero credit for those achievements because almost none of its members simply weren’t around or in power then. Meaning maybe America simply needs a more competent Blob?

At the same time, there’s inevitably been personnel continuity in the Blob’s ranks over time (think of recently deceased centenarian George Shultz, and the 98-year old Henry Kissinger, both still influential well into their golden years). Moreover, today’s establishment was largely groomed in Blob-y institutions, claims to be acting in that original Blob-y tradition, and has clearly remained stalwart in its advocacy of tireless international activism, and support for what it calls the liberal global order and its constituent institutions created by the older Blob generation. As a result, including those decades-old developments in judgements of today’s Blob is eminently defensible.

And in retrospect, what’s particularly revealing but neglected about these achievements is the extent to which they stemmed from circumstances almost ideally suited for foreign policy success, rather than from Blob-er genius. Globalists of the first post-World War II decades unquestionably faced serious domestic political obstacles to breaking with the country’s historic aloofness to most non-Western Hemispheric developments.

But they also enjoyed enviable advantages. Especially important was global economic predominance, which blunted much criticism on the home front by permitting subsidization of both the security and well-being of enormous foreign populations without apparent cost to American living standards or national finances.

It’s no coincidence, therefore, that as this advantage eroded, and the core Blob tactic of handling problems literally by throwing money at them and refusing to choose meaningfully between guns and butter became more problematic, the Blob’s record worsened – and undercut the intertwined domestic political and economic bases of active and passive public support for its strategies.

In fact, post-Vietnam, it’s difficult to identify any important foreign policy decision that Blob-y leaders have gotten right, or even handled reasonably well, with the exception of the first Persian Gulf War. (Ronald Reagan’s dramatic military buildup certainly helped spend and innovate the Soviets into collapse, but it was opposed by much and possibly most of the Blob, which favored continued containment and the simultaneous pursuit of arms control and detente.)

Just as important, this Blob’s very profligacy meant that many of its biggest post-Vietnam failures were economic in nature. Two leading examples – the messy collapse of the early World War II international monetary system and structural inflation and long sluggish growth that followed; and the 2007-09 global financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession.

Both crises were brought on fundamentally by global financial imbalances stemming from the Blob-ers’ stubborn refusal to support even minimal budget discipline on the foreign policy side; and from their failure to require reciprocal market access for traded goods either in the early post-World War II Bretton Woods monetary system or into its patchwork successors. And both revealed the Blob’s obliviousness to the intertwined imperatives of maintaining the national economic power needed to pay for their preferred policies responsibly; and of defining U.S. interests realistically enough to avoid needless costs and addiction to debt, inflation, or both.

Do today’s attacks, then, mean that the Blob’s demise is in sight? Not nearly likely enough. After all, it’s survived its decades-long string of blunders with its status pretty much intact. It’s bound to be keep being replenished by the same elite universities whose relevant faculty members are overwhelmingly Blob-y themselves. There’s no sign that their corporate funders are backing away from the think tanks that keep its many of its members employed when they’re out of public office. And its record will surely keep being reported principally by a news media that’s thoroughly Blob-y itself. That – frighteningly – leaves a foreign policy catastrophe inflicting lasting damage on the nation as America’s best hope for replacing the Blob even with simply a more genuinely diverse source of experience and expertise.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Will the Foreign Policy Experts – Finally – Start Learning Some Geography?

Tags

Afghanistan, Biden, Blob, Bloomberg.com, CNN.com, Europe, geography, globalism, Jeremy Shapiro, Luke McGee, Mainstream Media, Marc Champion, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Robert D. Kaplan, The Economist

I’m thrilled to report that I may have jumped the gun in my post last Wednesday in scoffing at the possibility of President Biden’s botched Afghanistan withdrawal – and the broader U.S. failure in that Forever War – would resulting in any major changes in America’s needlessly risky and costly globalist approach to foreign policy.

I’m not saying that the two-decade Afghanistan fiasco and its humiliating final chapter will spur a search for real alternatives in the foreseeable future, or even that significant new strategies will ever be put into effect – at least not without a much bigger disaster reflecting the same kinds of mistakes. But it’s nonetheless remarkable not only that any unconventional idea has appeared – especially given the determination of the strongly globalist Mainstream Media to suppress them – but that the one that has surfaced challenges the root assumption of globalism.

Specifically, some establishment voices are, inchoately to be sure, pointing out that for all the worries understandably expressed by Americans about new threats to their security appearing in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Europe faces much greater threats. The reason, moreover, is that it’s located much closer to Afghanistan than the United States.

In other words, geography counts, and America’s position halfway around the world from this troubled region and its utterly dysfunctional Middle East neighborhood, and separated from them and from its leading adversaries by wide oceans, is a leading contributor to its security that creates options enjoyed by no other major power.

Further, by implication – given that these points are being made in the context of the United States concluding that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan is acceptable after all – one of the most important of these options when many forms of trouble arise in any number of locales abroad is simple non-involvement.

The importance of America’s unique geography and its advantages may seem screamingly obvious. But as I’ve explained in detail (see, e.g., here and here), it has not only been ignored by generations of globalist American leaders and thinkers literally since Pearl Harbor. It’s been actively rejected.

Instead, the prevailing foreign policy conventional wisdom has consistently held that peace and security around the world make up a seamless whole, and that war and aggression and even instability anywhere across the globe are matters of urgent concern to the United States and must be squelched or resisted ASAP lest they mestastasize and directly endanger the American homeland.

Some of these “Geography matters”-type statements have been made by members of America’s most prominent and influential proponents of universal and open-ended foreign policy activism – the so-called Blob. This Washington, D.C.-centered bipartisan agglomeration of globalist former diplomats and Congressional aides, retired military officers, genuine academics, and think tank hacks shapes American diplomacy in two critical ways.

First, it represents the main personnel pool drawn on to staff presidential administrations and House and Senate offices on rotating bases, and also serves as key informal sources of advice for these politicians. In other words, it’s a central portion of what’s often called the “permanent bureaucracy” (and by some, the “Deep State”), whose combination of experience (which of course has unmistakable value), sheer staying power, and skill at projecting an air of authority (which clearly have much less intrinsic value) enables it often to steer policy independent of what elected officials favor – and especially to keep the status quo alive through inertia-reenforcing foot-dragging and even sabotage.

Second, the Blob powerfully influences what so many Americans read, hear, and see about foreign policy by dominating the list of sources used by Mainstream Media journalists (who are predominantly sympatico by virtue of shared elite educations and clubby intertwined social networks) to report and interpret the news. The resulting permeation of reporting and analysis with Blob-y globalist perspectives goes far toward defining for the public which foreign policy ideas are and aren’t legitimate to discuss.

That’s why I was so gobsmacked when Blob mainstay Robert D. Kaplan wrote in the (ardently globalist British magazine) The Economist that

“America is a vast and wealthy continent densely connected by navigable rivers and with an economy of scale, accessible to the main sea lines of communication, yet protected by oceans from the turmoil of the Old World.

“And that geography still matters, despite technology having shrunk the globe….”

As a result, Kaplan added that “geography helps explain why America can miscalculate and fail in successive wars, yet completely recover, unlike smaller and less well-situated countries which have little margin for error.” Moreover, logically speaking (and these are my views, not Kaplan’s), the very geography-grounded security that enables the United States to recover quickly from (at least most) foreign involvements that produce disastrous consequences means that it was never significantly vulnerable to the perceived threats that led to that involvement to begin with.

Similar opinions have been offered by former senior U.S. official Jeremy Shapiro, who argues that post-Afghanistan, the United States “can and will work effectively with allies, but only when its vital interests are at stake. It sees those interests in the competition with China. Increasingly, however, in places such as central Asia, the Sahel, and perhaps even Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, it does not.”

By contrast, he observed, “Europeans have more direct interests at stake in those places.”

Further, some Mainstream Media journalists have followed suit – providing further evidence that such once utterly heretical notions are now being bandied about in some Blob-y circles.

For example, Bloomberg.com‘s Marc Champion has contended that

“The U.S. left Afghanistan on Tuesday humbled and with few of its goals achieved after 20 years of war. For America’s European allies, the humiliation may just be starting.

“Connected to Afghanistan by land, unlike the U.S., for Europe the return of the Taliban presents more concrete threats. Those include not just terrorism but also mass migration and the heroin trade.”

More vividly, a recent CNN.com post was headlined, “Europe left exposed as Biden walks America away from the world stage.” It seems reasonable to infer that if the headline writer – and his editors – regarded America as exposed, too, they’d have mentioned that danger explicitly. Indeed, correspondent Luke McGee went on to report that “Multiple European officials and diplomats told CNN of their shock at Biden’s assertion that the only US interest in Afghanistan was to neutralize the terrorists who attacked the US in 2001 and prevent further attacks on American soil.

“They now fear the humanitarian and political consequences of mass migration from a country run by militants who’ve historically harbored terrorists and that is connected to mainland Europe by land” – unlike, I’d remind again, the United States.

Again, I’m not saying that an intellectual revolution in U.S. foreign policy is on the horizon. But as suggested above, only a few weeks ago, I couldn’t have imagined seeing so many examples of any of the above in so short a timespan.

On balance, I’m still convinced that the Blob will wind up stamping out such dissent, at least within its own ranks – if only because at the end of the day, so few would be employable in a truly post-globalist America. But many Blob-ers are also savvy enough to recognize a potentially sinking ship. So I feel pretty confident in predicting that the longer lousy headlines and optics keep emanating from Afghanistan, the more of these globalists will start appreciating the virtues of America’s geography.