(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Wage Inflation is Everywhere Except the Real Wage Figures

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Federal Reserve, inflation, inflation-adjusted wages, Labor Department, manufacturing, private sector, real wages, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning was a bad one for observers of the U.S. economy who keep insisting that wage inflation is either here or around the corner. That means it was also a bad morning for American workers. For the new Labor Department figures on wages adjusted for inflation showed no change – at best – in the historically sluggish constant dollar paycheck increases that employees have seen for most of the current economic recovery.

These new data figures bring the story up through April, when the Department says after-inflation hourly wages were unchanged on month in the private sector, and slipped 0.09 percent in manufacturing. In fact, both numbers represent deceleration from March – when real private sector wages increased sequentially by a downwardly revised 0.28 percent, and real manufacturing wages rose by a downwardly revised 0.19 percent.

Most analysts take the year-on-year numbers more seriously, because they exhibit less random fluctuation. But if anything, they make the wage inflation meme look even loonier. Since last April, price-adjusted private sector wages are up a grand total of 0.19 percent, and in manufacturing, actually down by fully 1.10 percent.

Between the previous Aprils, moreover, inflation-adjusted wages improved by 0.28 percent in the private sector, and by 0.55 percent in manufacturing. For good measure, the latest April yearly decrease in constant dollar manufacturing wages was the biggest since October, 2012’s 2.09 percent drop.

And throughout the current recovery, which is approaching its ninth anniversary, inflation-adjusted private sector wages have advanced by 4.01 percent, while their manufacturing counterparts have inched up only 0.37 percent.

It’s true of course that broader measures of American worker compensation reveal greater improvement. But that’s not to say “great improvement.” Or even close. It’s also true that the Federal Reserve can cite any number of reasons to raise U.S. interest rates after many years at rock-bottom levels. The new real wage figures, however, make clear that wage inflation isn’t yet one of them.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Wage Inflation Claims are Still Grossly Inflated

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benefits, compensation, ECI, Employment Cost Index, inflation, salaries, wages, workers, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you were examining whether American workers’ pay was finally beginning to rise at a rate consistent with a lengthy economic recovery and an apparently tight labor market, wouldn’t you focus on pay adjusted for inflation – which gauges whether these workers are keeping up with living costs? And wouldn’t you focus more on trends in the private sector (where wages, salaries, and benefits are set mainly by market forces, and therefore say something meaningful about the economy’s fundamentals) than in the public sector (where they’re set by government fiat)?

The alarm and enthusiasm (depending on your perspective) with which last week’s Labor Department figures on employment costs were greeted makes clear that both these best practices of economic analysis were widely ignored.

As the Department reported, the Employment Cost Index (ECI) – the compensation measure that includes all forms of pay and benefits – rose 2.71 percent on year in the first quarter of this year for “civilian workers.” That category includes the public sector, and was indeed the strongest such increase since 2008.

The numbers were even better in private industry: a 2.81 percent yearly gain. That’s also the best since 2008 (the third quarter’s 2.84 percent).

Adjust for inflation, though – that is, see the extent to which workers are staying ahead of living costs, not to mention the extent to which they are leading overall price rises – and the story looks very different.

According to the price-adjusted ECI issued by the Labor Department, during the first quarter of this year, compensation for civilian workers increased by 0.38 percent year-on-year. That’s actually lower than the annual increase for the previous quarter (0.48 percent). In fact, on a sequential (quarter-to-quarter) basis, the real ECI fell (by 0.29 percent).

That annual gain was indeed better than that for the first quarter of 2017 – when there was no increase in the inflation-adjusted ECI at all. But it wasn’t as good at the 0.87 percent improvement from the first quarter of 2015 to the first quarter of 2016. And it wasn’t even close to the 2.59 percent rise registered between the previous first quarters. So let’s recognize that, during the first quarter of 2018, the real ECI did nothing special – at best.

The story is just as unexciting – and contrary to accelerating wage inflation claims – in the private sector. Its real ECI increased by 0.39 percent annually during the first quarter, and also fell (by 0.19 percent) sequentially.

Between the previous first quarters, the real ECI flat-lined, too, after advancing by 0.97 percent the year before and 2.70 percent the year before that.

Some day, American workers may actually experience another genuine acceleration in their real compensation, and thus a genuine increase in their living standards. But looking at the most revealing version of the Employment Cost Index makes painfully clear that that day still lies in the future.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Beware the Fear-Mongering on the Trump Tariffs

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Bloomberg, border adjustment tax, China, inflation, manufacturing, metals, overcapacity, productivity, real value-added, steel, tariffs, trade law, Trump, U.S. Business and Industry Council, value-added taxes, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Well, there can’t be any doubt about it now. President Trump’s trade policy course changes – and especially his determination hike U.S. tariffs – are already harming American manufacturers and the broader economy. After all, this Bloomberg News post just told us so. Except if you examine it carefully, and add a little common sense info, there’s no reason to believe any of these claims – especially for the manufacturing sector.

According to this Bloomberg report, “Confidence gauges spanning small businesses, factories and the public at large are coming off the boil as U.S. tariffs on imported metals — along with threats and counterthreats over Chinese goods — roil the stock market and cast a cloud over what was otherwise a bright economic outlook.”

Manufacturers reportedly face especially serious threats:

“The Philadelphia Fed’s index of business activity six months from now dropped 7.2 points to 40.7 in April, the lowest level since July. Earlier this week, a similar report from the New York Fed showed its future business conditions index registered the steepest one-month drop since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Meantime, factories in both regions are reporting rising prices.”

And Bloomberg conveniently provided a chart displaying these reported “rising costs amid tariffs on imported metals.”

But the chart, and related macroeconomic data, actually represent compelling evidence that metals prices so far have had no discernible impact on U.S. manufacturing’s fortunes. Consider the following:

As the chart shows, the prices paid by inputs for factories in the Northeast sank significantly between 2014 and 2015. Steel prices fell especially sharply (largely because the Chinese government was fueling a massive global glut in this metal).

And according to official U.S. data, how did American domestic manufacturing fare? It grew in real value-added terms ( a measure of output preferred by many economists) by all of 0.90 percent.

The following year, according to the chart, prices these factories reported paying stayed very low, but began rising. Steel prices rebounded significantly, too. Manufacturing’s real value-added growth that year? About half the 2014-15 rate – 0.47 percent.

Those factory prices rose even faster the following year, and steel prices kept increasing. But the impact on America’s domestic manufacturing wasn’t exactly catastrophic. In fact, its annual real value-added growth nearly quadrupled – to 1.89 percent.

How on earth could this be? How about this as a starting point for an answer? Prices of steel or any other inputs aren’t the only influences on business performance. And they’re probably not the most important. For example, demand (aka “customers”) matter, too. In the United States, when those metals prices were dropping sharply between 2014 and 2015, price-adjusted economic growth turned in a solid 2.90 percent growth. The following year, when metals prices stayed unusually low, the real economic growth rate halved. And guess what also nearly halved? Manufacturing’s real value-added increase.

Even more interesting – between 2016 and 2017, when metals prices kept bouncing back, manufacturing’s real value-added jumped. Maybe in part because the economy’s overall growth rate increased by more than 50 percent, to 2.30 percent?

Looking at global growth (i.e., including foreign customers) yields similar conclusions. During that 2014-15 year of greatly reduced metals prices, pretty good U.S. growth but lousy manufacturing growth, the International Monetary Fund tells us that the global economy expanded by (a pretty poor) 3.10 percent. Chances are that feeble growth didn’t help America’s manufacturers, many of whom make much of their money by exporting.

Global growth only picked up to 3.20 percent the following year, but America’s growth tanked. The latter, then, seems to have mattered more to domestic manufacturers, as their own expansion rate fell by 50 percent. Between 2016 and 2017, however, when both the U.S. expansion and the global expansion sped up (the latter to 3.80 percent), American  manufacturing’s growth experienced that impressive takeoff. 

Now it’s true that the Trump metals tariffs could inflict greater harm on U.S. domestic manufacturers going forward, as they could impose on metals-users new costs that come on top of whatever global prices they need to pay at a given moment.  Nonetheless, it’s not like industry is exactly helpless to respond. For instance, it could start improving its productivity performance – which has been lousy on balance during this economic recovery. More productive sectors and companies of course can pass on input price increases without charging their customers more – and thereby undercutting their competitiveness.

At the same time, the metal-users’ loud complaints about the Trump tariffs point to a longstanding weakness of U.S. trade policy and especially the related body of trade law that the President has needed to rely on so far because the chief executive’s unilateral tariff-imposing authority is so limited. Because the trade law system, like U.S.-style legal systems generally, springs into action only when a specific complaint from private business is filed, its remedies are confined to that industry’s predicament. Not even the few trade cases initiated by the Obama administration or even the Trump administration have changed this pattern. (The sweeping tariffs on China sought in the President’s Section 301 intellectual property-centered action have come closest.) The tendency of such narrow-bore measures to enable foreign trade rivals to respond with divide-and-conquer tactics shows that two improvements should be made.

First, as proposed by my previous organization, the U.S. Business and Industry Council, industry-specific tariffs approved by the trade law system should be accompanied by similar protection for the “downstream” (i.e., user) industries. As a result, they would be much less likely to be victimized in the American market, anyway, by foreign competitors not saddled with higher input prices. 

Second, and even better, the administration should revive the Border Adjustment Tax that was part of the tax reform plan initially introduced by the House of Representatives’ Republican leaders. This measure, which would have worked much like the foreign Value-Added Taxes (VATs) used by most trading economies, would not only have provided the equivalent of protective tariffs for all U.S. goods and services facing import competition.  It would have boosted the competitiveness of all American exports in all foreign markets by providing the equivalent of a subsidy.   

Although President Trump initially (and weirdly) was cool to the Border Adjustment Tax, reportedly more recently he’s been changing his tune. Adopting this plan in particular could solve most of the economic as well as the political problems currently threatening his trade policies. 

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Wage Inflation Warnings Just Got a Lot Funnier – Unless You’re a Worker

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inflation, inflation adjusted wages, manufacturing, private sector, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s U.S. real wage data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics kept mocking the claims that the United States is teetering on the edge of a dangerous round of wage inflation. In fact, the statistics show that in February, real wage recessions (periods of two quarters of more when after-inflation hourly pay has dropped on net) actually continued.

The month-to-month January-February flat-line in inflation-adjusted private sector wages means that this form of compensation is down cumulatively by 0.28 percent since last May. Worse, January’s 0.19 percent sequential decrease was revised down to a 0.28 percent drop.

In manufacturing, after-inflation wages as of February were 0.19 percent lower than they were in January, 2016. Month-on-month in February, they dipped by 0.09 percent. At least January’s sequential decline of 0.46 percent was revised up – to a 0.37 percent decrease.

Since the onset of the current economic recovery, more than eight years ago, real private sector wages have improved by only 3.98 percent. But that performance is more than ten times better than that of manufacturing, where this pay has grown by only 0.28 percent during that period.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Case for Trump’s New Metals Tariffs

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alliances, allies, aluminum, China, inflation, manufacturing, overcapacity, steel, subsidies, tariffs, Trade, trade law, Trump, World Steel Association, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

President Trump has announced his decision to impose tariffs on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum – cue the trade war hysteria. And the national security hysteria. And the inflation hysteria. Here are some talking points I hope the administration will feel free to steal as it defends the decision in the days leading up to the release of the final tariff plan:

>Many countries have declared their intention to retaliate against the American tariffs with higher barriers to U.S. exports. Curiously, they are overlooking the Chinese government-subsidized overcapacity at the root of the long-time distortions in world steel and aluminum markets.

>Many of these countries want the problem tackled multilaterally. But the World Trade Organization (WTO) has failed to stem this overcapacity (or deal effectively with many other forms of Chinese trade and broader economic predation), and a G20 forum specifically addressing the steel issue has produced nothing since its founding in December, 2016.

>Although major steel-producing powers like the European Union have imposed their own steep tariffs on shipments from China, the global glut has continued. One reason may be that, since the global economic recovery took hold in 2010, according to World Steel Association data. the United States has been the major steel producer that has suffered by far the greatest loss of global production share by volume. (See this post of mine for the 2010 figures and the Steel Association’s latest report for the most recent – January, 2018 – figures.) And as of the most current World Steel Association data (2016), the United States is also the steel producer with the highest steel trade deficit by volume (21.7 million tons). 

>As a result, charges that American steel tariffs in particular will jeopardize the rules-based global trade system seem to be arguing that this system requires the United States to remain as the world’s dumping ground for government-subsidized steel.

>A much more constructive response from America’s trade partners would be finally getting serious about shutting down China’s overcapacity and placing market forces back in the saddle for global steel pricing. The Trump tariffs should be seen as a signal that the United States will no longer accept world steel trade patterns that treat the United States as the fall guy, and should therefore act as a spur to achieve genuinely meaningful multilateral results.

>The above gaming of global steel trade by so many American trade partners also explains the need for the kinds of sweeping measures made possible by the national security-oriented Section 232 of U.S. trade law, rather than the narrower curbs required by, say, the countervailing duty statutes.

>Fears have been expressed in the U.S. foreign policy community, and by the Trump administration’s Defense Department, that certain tariff schemes may needlessly harm America’s relationships with key security allies. Those voicing such concerns should also explain why countries that would permit these U.S. measures to undermine alliance relationships should be seen as reliable partners when overseas crises erupt.

>Tariff opponents contend that America’s use of an allegedly bogus national security rationale for the curbs will open the doors for other members of the WTO to use equally specious justifications for their own tariffs on numerous products. These opponents seem to forget that most of the world’s major economies, which rely heavily on export-led growth resulting from large trade surpluses, so far have encountered little difficulty in protecting their own domestic markets via a wide range of both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers.

>New national security rationales for new tariffs will be especially suspicious if used by the numerous American security allies that have been free-riding on U.S. defense guarantees for decades – and skimping on their own defense spending. These allies include Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Canada.

>Tariff critics also insist that the American economy will suffer major harm from foreign retaliation. They seem – oddly – convinced that U.S. trade partners that rely heavily on net exporting to the United States for their growth have nothing to fear from further the American trade restrictions that may result. Will these countries really launch trade attacks on one of their best customers?

>Tariff opponents focusing on economic impacts argue that the measures will increase the cost of a key American manufacturing input, and reduce the competitiveness of domestic steel-and aluminum-using industries. They seem to fear that these industries cannot become or remain globally competitive if such inputs are priced via free market mechanisms, rather than kept artificially cheap due to foreign government decisions.

>These economically focused tariff opponents also seem to believe that the current U.S. economy is one characterized by companies that enjoy considerable pricing power. Given inflation that has long undershot the Federal Reserve’s target, that’s a difficult argument to understand.

>In addition, those with an economic focus appear unconcerned about the prevalence and spread of government interventions in trade flows not only in steel, but in a wide variety of traded goods. If foreign governments conclude that they can subsidize and dump two key American industries out of existence, why would they stop with steel and aluminum? How can a growing presence of foreign government-subsidized goods (and services) help strengthen free markets in the United States and enable Americans to reap their maximum gains? And how can such growing foreign intervention help the global economy as a whole progress toward reaping the maximum gains of unfettered trade?

Over to you, Mr. President!

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Investors Shouldn’t Blame U.S. Workers for Inflation

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bonds, budget deficits, Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, inflation, interest rates, manufacturing, monetary policy, quantitative easing, recession, recovery, stock market, stocks, wage inflation, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Thanks to the U.S. government’s new inflation data, we can cross one often fingered culprit off the list of developments being blamed for the recent turbulence in American, and therefore global, financial markets – wage inflation. For by a crucial indicator, real hourly pay in the United States is not only failing to lead prices upward – it’s been trailing overall inflation recently and indeed has been in recession lately by one commonsense standard.

Of course, market turmoil (like most big developments) springs from several, overlapping reasons. The first is one I discussed last Friday, and which I consider the most important: Investors fear that the Federal Reserve and other world central banks will start tightening monetary policy faster than expected, in order to prevent (more of) the kinds of reckless investments that tend to mushroom when credit is super cheap, and that can often trigger financial crises like the near global meltdown roughly a decade ago. (Happy Anniversary!)

If credit becomes more expensive, then economic growth and corporate profits will struggle to maintain their current rates of increase, and stocks will become less attractive investments, all else equal. In addition, the very increase in interest rates almost certain to result from such central bank “tightening” heightens the appeal of bonds and dims that of equities.

To complicate matters further, another engine of higher rates might be a combination of the great increase in federal budget deficits likely from the new tax cuts proposed by the Trump administration and passed by Congress, and the big-spending budget deal reached by the lawmakers and the President. The consequent budget gap will boost federal borrowing needs (and all else equal, push up the rates Washington will need to pay lenders for all this new debt) at a time when the U.S. central bank has started selling the ginormous amount of government bonds it’s been purchasing and holding since late 2008 (a practice called “quantitative easing) in order to halt the Great Recession and speed up recovery . This version of tightening – which also stems from financial stability concerns – will raise the supply of bonds even further.

The second reason for the turmoil is investor concern that rising inflation will spur central banks to raise rates regardless of the above financial stability concerns – because excessive inflation can produce its own economic disaster. And in fact, the proximate cause of the current bout of market instability seems to be those very inflation fears, and in particular, the possibility of wage inflation.

Higher compensation costs could deal their own blow to stock prices by reducing corporate profits; or by sending upward price pressures rippling throughout the entire economy (as companies tried to pass higher costs on to their customers either elsewhere in the business world or in consumer ranks); or through some combination of the two. (Interestingly, the chances seem pretty low that companies could absorb higher wages through greater efficiency, as productivity improvement has been very slow at best recently.)

So that’s why today’s widely anticipated (to put it mildly) U.S. government inflation data is so important. The inflation figures were somewhat “hotter” than most investors were predicting. But it couldn’t be clearer that wage inflation has nothing to do with these higher prices.

The numbers that most observers – whether investors or not – are looking at are the year-on-year numbers, and they do seem to signal some wage inflation. From January, 2017 to last month, the Labor Department’s headline reading showed a 2.14 percent rise in prices nationwide, and a 1.85 percent increase in “core” prices (which stripped out from the headline food and energy prices because they’re considered so volatile in the short-term that they can generate readings regarded as somewhat misleading).

During that same year, wages adjusted for inflation for the overall private sector were up 0.75 percent – which means they rose faster than overall prices. Moreover, between previous Januarys, real wages actually declined fractionally (by 0.09 percent). So in principle, investors (and other economy watchers) have reasons to be nervous about wage inflation.

But a more recent time frame tells a very different story. For since last May, private sector wages have been down on net. Although the cumulative decline is only 0.19 percent, this means that on a technical basis, real wages are in recession. (I feel justified in using this term because when economists talk about growth, a decline for two consecutive quarters is defined as a recession. So a six-month cumulative downturn seems close enough.) Indeed, more accurately, real wages are still in recession, since this development was apparent last month, too.

And the latest month-to-month figures indicate that real wage pressure is weakening, not strengthening. From December to January alone, they dropped by 0.19 percent, after rising by that amount from November to December.

The picture looks even grimmer when you go back to the start of the current economic recovery – in mid-2009. Since then, real private sector wages have risen by only 4.07 percent. And that’s over more than eight years!

But private sector real wages are practically torrid when they’re compared with inflation-adjusted pay in manufacturing. Such compensation has been in technical recession for two full years, as it’s fallen by 0.09 percent since January, 2016. On a monthly basis, after-inflation manufacturing pay plummeted by 0.46 percent in January, its worst such performance since August’s 0.64 percent tumble. At least the December figure was revised up – though only from a 0.09 percent dip to a 0.09 percent increase.

Over the current economic recovery’s eight-plus years, real manufacturing wages have risen by a mere 0.37 percent – less than a tenth as fast as those of the private sector overall.

Yet although inflation – and especially wage inflation – doesn’t seem to warrant a quicker pace of Federal Reserve interest rate hikes (or even the current, “gradual” pace), a case can still be made for tightening on a financial stability basis. And those massive federal deficits, which will need to be funded by equally massive increases in bond supplies, seem here to stay for many years. So as has been the case for so long, assuming these moves do slow U.S. economic growth, American workers appear certain to pay many of the costs for disastrous policy mistakes they never made.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump Tariffs to Raise Washing Machine Prices? Good Luck with That!

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consumer price index, consumers, CPI, inflation, PCE, personal consumption expenditures index, prices, South Korea, tariffs, Trade, Trump, washing machines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s painfully clear that none of the journalists and offshoring lobby-funded think tank hacks who have parroted the threats by South Korean washing machine makers to raise their U.S. retail prices to offset tariffs imposed by the Trump administration last month has shopped for a washing machine lately. Nor have they looked at the price data for home appliances in America. If they had, they’d recognize that the South Koreans seem to be blowing so much smoke. For no one could possibly look at the U.S. washing machine market either first hand or statistically and conclude that any producer thinks they have much pricing power.

The first-hand evidence? Just check the ads in your daily newspaper. Or take a look at this post from about a year ago offering tips to appliance shoppers. For example, consumers are told that: 

>in-store sales people and on-line shopping sites will often sell a machine for less (and “sometimes a lot less” than the advertised price;

>”If you’ve had your eye on an appliance but wish it were just a smidgen cheaper, try putting it in your cart. Then walk away (so to speak). If you leave it there for a few days, a retailer might send you a coupon to entice you to close the deal.”

>”Never be afraid to ask salespeople, cashiers, and store managers if they can do a little better on the price. In fact, Consumer Reports says that nearly all people who haggle over appliances are successful at least once—and save an average $200.”

The statistics? They mock even more cruelly the idea that the tariffs will drive washing machine prices up. Let’s start off with the Federal Reserve’s favorite measure of inflation, the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) index. And as the broadest gauge, let’s use the “core” PCE numbers, which strip out food and energy prices because they’re considered volatile for reasons having little to do with the main determinants of price changes for the rest of the economy.

According to the Commerce Department, which tracks this data, between 2009 (when the current U.S. economic recovery began) and 2016 (the latest figures), core PCE rose by a cumulative 13.10 percent. But for durable goods (the category containing home appliances), prices during this period fell by 13.54 percent. And although there are no statistics for washing machines specifically, prices for “household appliances” plunged by 18 percent over those seven years. These trends don’t exactly scream “Pricing power!”

Moreover, let’s look at what happened with appliances prices after 2013, when the Obama administration imposed tariffs on subsidized and dumped South Korean-brand washing machines from South Korea and Mexico. After having fallen by 2.39 percent the previous year, they fell even faster – by 5.61 percent, 4.96 percent, and 5.03 percent annually over the next three years. And in each instance, the rate of decrease for appliance prices was much steeper than for prices for other durable goods.

The Labor Department’s different sets of inflation data do extend through 2017. They’re grouped under the heading “consumer price index” (CPI), and show that prices for major appliances decreased that year by 2.57 percent, and for appliances generally by 1.03 percent. That year, the CPI for urban consumers less food, energy, and shelter rose by 0.72 percent.  And according to this CPI, appliance and major appliance prices have been falling throughout the current recovery, too.  

There’s a first time for everything, and so it’s possible that Korean washing machine manufacturers really will carry through on their price increase vows. And of course, since it’s their business, they may know something I don’t. But the first-hand evidence and the data strongly indicate that the tariffs will simply require them to charge closer to fair market value for their goods, and that until much stronger pricing pressures emerge, this fair market value will remain pretty low and could well keep falling.

As a result, there’s a heavy burden of proof not only for taking them at their word, but for continuing to accept blithely the standard assumption that tariffs always hit consumers hardest – or will at all.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A New Set of Mixed Signals on Worker Pay

Tags

ECI, Employment Cost Index, inflation, Jobs, manufacturing, recovery, wages, workers, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Is the long-beleaguered American worker finally starting to see some significant compensation benefits from an unemployment rate that’s been falling toward historic lows? Some data that provides possibly the most important evidence came out this morning, and the answer is a firm “Maybe.”

I’m talking about the Labor Department’s Employment Cost Index (ECI) – but not the series that usually attracts the most attention, which isn’t adjusted for inflation. What’s not widely known is that Labor also puts out real ECI reports, and the latest paints to an unusually ambiguous “glass half empty-half full picture.” Not to mention how hazardous it always is to draw conclusions over short-term changes.

To remind, the ECI arguably is a better gauge of worker pay since it counts not only hourly wages but benefits. And as usual, we’ll focus on private sector workers. (I don’t bother with government workers, since their compensation largely reflects politicians’ decisions, not economic fundamentals.)

Optimists will note that the new fourth quarter, 2017 report shows that the private sector ECI rose sequentially by 0.48 percent. That’s the biggest such percentage increase since the fourth quarter, 2015’s 0.97 percent, and sure beats the heck out of the third quarter’s 0.10 percent dip.

But pessimists will note that that 2015 improvement vanished almost instantly. As for the annual change, the 0.48 percent rise was nothing special. It beat the third quarter’s 0.29 percent, but trailed the second quarter’s 0.68 percent.

Also supporting the pessimists’ case has been the inflation-adjusted ECI’s performance during the current economic recovery versus that for the previous expansion. (The real ECI data set only goes back to 2001).

Since the second quarter of 2009, constant-dollar private sector employment costs are up 4.20 percent. That’s actually better than the 2.36 percent achieved during the previous recovery. But that expansion lasted only six years (from the fourth quarter of 2001 through the fourth quarter of 2007). The current recovery is more than eight years old. Over its first six years, after-inflation employment costs were up just 1.70 percent.

Manufacturing’s real ECI performance was somewhat better. The fourth quarter’s 0.57 percent rise was the best sequential advance since the third quarter of 2015 (0.70 percent). But the 2017 annual increase – also 0.57 percent) was the highest only since the third quarter of 2016 (0.99 percent).

The most significant sign of progress in industry comes from the recovery-to-recovery comparison. During this expansion, price-adjusted employment costs for manufacturing have risen by 5.65 percent. That’s considerably faster than the 1.99 percent during the previous recovery, as is the current recovery’s advance during its first six years – 2.98 percent. So maybe these latest gains stand a better chance of lasting than those of their private sector counterparts?

But there’s no shortage of reasons for continued uncertainty. A bunch of minimum wage hikes across the country have kicked in this month, which should influence the next set of real ECI data. The new business tax cuts may help as well. And don’t forget the certainty of rising federal budget deficits, either with or without a big boost in infrastructure spending. Hanging over the future also, however, is the strong likelihood of continued Federal Reserve monetary tightening – and how interest rate hikes may be interpreted by businesses. All of which means that the next real ECI report – due out at the end of April – will merit unusually close scrutiny.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why the Trump-ers (So Far) Aren’t Wrong About the Dollar

Tags

bubbles, consumption, currency, debt, dollar, exchange rates, finance, Financial Crisis, growth, inflation, investment, protectionism, Steve Mnuchin, Trade, Treasury Department, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The economics, finance, and business worlds are kind of up in arms over U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin’s suggestion earlier this week that a weaker U.S. dollar would be good for the American economy.

I say “kind of up in arms” because Mnuchin’s remarks were more nuanced than generally reported; because financial markets in particular seem to be on steroids and have barely reacted; and because he took pains afterwards to profess his confidence that, despite its recent falling value, nothing fundamental had changed to undermine the greenback’s historic appeal to investors. Indeed, just a little while ago, President Trump stated that he “ultimately” wants to see a strong dollar. 

I say “up in arms” to some extent because, the President’s newest words notwithstanding, no American Treasury Secretary has ever said anything remotely like this in public for decades; because Mnuchin’s original words looked suspiciously consistent with what the establishments in these interconnected economic worlds abhor as the Trump administration’s protectionist instincts on trade policy (because all else equal, a weak dollar promotes U.S. exports and curbs U.S. imports); and because dollar strength (and the big U.S. trade deficits it’s encouraged) has long been a cornerstone of the global economy, and a major growth engine for the numerous countries that rely on selling to Americans to promote their own output and employment. (Hence many of them fiddle around with their own currencies’ values to make sure they can sustain these strategies.) Many strong dollar proponents also claim that a weaker American currency could dangerously stoke inflation (especially by boosting import prices) and deter investment inflows into the United States.

But two crucial points are Missing in Action in the tumult sparked by Mnuchin’s remarks. One should be obvious but can’t be repeated often enough, especially in these current overwrought times: You can have too much and too little of a good thing. An overly weak dollar would cause major problems for the U.S. economy. So would an overly strong dollar. Therefore, the key is not to assume either extreme (especially in the absence of any evidence that they’re around the corner) but to figure out a dollar level that achieves the best combination of benefits.

The second has been much less much widely recognized even in calmer periods, but it’s closely related to my longstanding point about the importance of the quality of American growth. As I’ve written frequently, growth based largely on production and the growing incomes it generates place the economy on the soundest foundation. This approach may not always produce the fastest growth, but it fosters the growth that tends to last longest, and that’s least likely to inflate bubbles that then collapse into economic and financial crises).

Such disasters, as we should have learned, stem from growth largely based on borrowing and consuming – i.e., on shopping sprees that eventually can’t be paid for responsibly, and can only continue by racking up enormous debts. And other than legitimate (though clearly overblown nowadays) concerns about inflation, that’s a main reason why folks in finance – and everyone on their payroll in the U.S. government and the rest of Washington – like the strongest possible dollar. Until the merry-go-round stops, they make tons of money by lending to those borrowers.

Here’s where the dollar’s value comes in. A strong-ish greenback tends to result in that borrowing and consuming brand of growth. A weak-ish dollar tends to result in the healthier kind of growth. And as indicated by this chart showing the change in the dollar’s value (also called the exchange rate) against other currencies, only looked at over the shortest possible period could the dollar nowadays be called weak or even weakening. Over a much longer period, it’s obviously still well in “strong territory.” 

And it’s no coincidence, as I’ve also written, that although the U.S. economy seems to be making some slight progress toward creating healthier growth, it still has way too long a way to go – especially given that the current recovery from the crises and the painful recession that followed is now more than eight years old.

The lessons, then, look clear. If you only care about the fastest growth possible regardless of its makeup or the longer-term consequences, and/or if you think finance should be the dominant part of the American economy, you’ll join the chorus of critics scolding Mnuchin for even hinting that some further dollar decline wouldn’t be a disaster for the nation. If you’d like the economy to steer clear of near-meltdowns like the one experienced just about a decade ago, you’ll be applauding what still looks like a subtle call from him for a somewhat weaker dollar.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Real Wage Growth Keeps Disappointing

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inflation, inflation-adjusted wages, Labor Department, manufacturing, private sector, real wages, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The economics world is becoming ever more puzzled by the sluggishness with which American wages have been rising during the current economic recovery despite very low rates of official unemployment. Judging by the new June inflation-adjusted wage figures released today by the Labor Department, all the usual suspects are going to be wondering about wages lag for some time to come.

The new data left unrevised both the finalized (for now), April figures, and the still preliminary May results.

For the former, constant dollar wages were flat month-to-month and up 0.28 percent year-on-year, and for the latter, they increased by 0.28 percent on month and 0.56 percent on year.

The June numbers? In the same neighborhood, with a monthly advance of 0.19 percent and a yearly improvement of 0.84 percent. For some context, real private sector wages increased nearly twice as fast between the previous Junes – by 1.62 percent.

Manufacturing, once the economy’s wages leader, kept its recent laggard status. Its (now final) April and (still preliminary) May results were unrevised, too – which in this case contained some good news. The former monthly increase of 0.55 percent, the best since August, 2015’s 0.66 percent, stayed intact. So did the annual increase – which was identical. At the same time, May’s 0.28 percent monthly decline is still on the books, too, as was the year-on-year change – which was zero.

As with after-inflation wages in the private sector overall, after-inflation manufacturing wages performed slightly better in June. They inched up by 0.09 percent on month and rose 0.37 percent on year. But the latest annual increase was much slower than that between June, 2015 and June, 2016 – 1.32 percent.

And nothing makes clearer the long-time stagnation of overall private sector and manufacturing wages than seeing their inflation-adjusted change during the economic recovery – which marked its eighth birthday last month. For the private sector, they’re up a total of 4.46 percent. For the manufacturing sector, the rate has been less than a third as fast – 1.32 percent. Which raises the question, “What comes first: the end of the recovery or the end of wage stagnation?