(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Biden Trade Policy’s Off to a Flying Stop

Tags

China, inflation, Joe Biden, Katherine Tai, National Foreign Trade Council, offshoring lobby, tariffs, Trade, trade policy, trade war, Trump, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Any minimally intelligent discussion of the incoming Biden administration’s trade policy and the role of his pick for U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) needs to recognize at the start that Katherine Tai will make exactly none of the big calls on trade.

That’s not a knock on her specifically. But as nearly always the case (and the Trump administration was a major exception, as its trade envoy, Robert Lighthizer, was a prime author of specific, central initiatives), these decisions will be made way above her pay grade – almost certainly by the President himself or Treasury Secretary-designate Janet Yellen, or a combination of those two, along with the various special interests they need to please.

Even so, Tai will play an important message-bearing and policy defense role, especially in testimony before Congress, and in this vein, her first effort following her brief remarks following her nomination announcement got the Biden team’s record off to a start just ever so slightly above “same-old-stuff” level.

Most noteworthy, puzzling, and perhaps revealing was the choice of audience: the National Foreign Trade Council. For with its membership consisting of U.S. multinationals and big firms from highly protectionist economies like Germany and Japan, it’s long been a pillar of the corporate Offshoring Lobby.

Sure, many of these members have started to voice complaints about their China-related troubles in particular. But they’ve made equally clear that they have no clue as to realistic ways of solving them. In fact, their dogged opposition to unilateral, Trump-like U.S. tariffs as remedies (which have sharply curbed the access to the American market of their overseas production, and the availability of massively subsidized Chinese inputs for their domestic operations) has rendered them big obstacles to the remaining overhaul national trade policy needs.

It’s also true that everything known about Biden’s own long record on the matter, and his own statements during the campaign, makes clear the incoherence – and just as likely cynicism – of his own current stated approach (notably, stressing the imperative of working with – deeply conflicted and chronically fence-sitting — American allies to counter China’s trade and broader economic abuses).

Even so, given the pains Biden took to portray himself as “Middle Class Joe” whose trade initiatives and related decisions would prioritize American worker interests above all else, it needs to be asked why, from a purely political standpoint, his choice for trade negotiator chose an audience whose members have long pushed for exactly the opposite. Why not appear before a union audience?

Just as bizarre, Tai emphasized to these died-in-the-wool offshorers that “The President-Elect’s vision is to implement a worker-centered trade policy. What this means in practice is that U.S. trade policy must benefit regular Americans, communities, and workers.”

What did she and her superiors (who of course cleared her remarks) hope to accomplish with this declaration? Agreement? Or even the beginnings of theological conversion?

Weirder still: Her observation that “people are not just consumers — they are also workers, and wage earners” and, more pointedly, that when thinking about trade, it’s crucial to emphasize that “Americans don’t just benefit from lower prices and greater selection in shops and markets.” After all, her boss emphasized throughout the campaign that “President Trump may think he’s being tough on China. All that he’s delivered as a consequence of that is American farmers, manufacturers and consumers losing and paying more.”

It’s of course possible that Biden and his team could figure out a way to shield the entire U.S. domestic economy, from Chinese – and other countries’ – predatory practices without reducing the price competitiveness of these imports in the U.S. market. But it’s suggestive at the very least that after months on the campaign trail – and many decades in public life – the President-Elect has offered no specifics. And Tai’s speech did nothing to clear up this mystery.

(Not that there’s been any sign of noteworthy trade-related inflation during the “trade war” period – as shown, e.g., here – but one way greatly to boost the odds that tariffs don’t send prices upward would be to accompany trade restrictions with greater anti-trust enforcement that increases domestic competition, as I’ve argued here.)      

Tai advertised her and the broader Biden trade policy points as part of the former Vice President’s promise to “Build Back Better.” So far, though, the most charitable description of these is actually more like “Pretend More Assertively.”

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Some Big Trade News in Today’s GDP Revisions

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constant dollars, current dollars, GDP, gross domestic product, inflation, real GDP, real trade deficit, shutdown, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

And here I thought that the only big surprise in this morning’s U.S. government report on the nation’s economic output (the gross domestic product, or GDP) would come in the annual revisions – which update the data going back to the first quarter of 2015. After all, it’s long been obvious that the second quarter results would be dreadful, due to the CCP Virus-induced shutdown of so much of the U.S. economy.

The revisions were indeed pretty surprising, but the first set of estimates covering the second quarter of this year still contained one entirely (at least to me) unexpected finding: Despite the nearly 38 percent inflation-adjusted sequential crash dive of the economy (at annual rates), the real trade deficit didn’t fall much at all. Indeed, between the first and second quarters, the annualized decrease was only 3.71 percent (from $788 billion at annual rates to $780.7 billion).

The big virus-related effects came during the first quarter, when the annualized quarterly shrinkage was 34.13 percent annualized. Moreover, the price-adjusted trade shortfall had also plummeted by 37.33 percent at an annual rate between the third and fourth quarters of last year, as President Trump’s massive tariffs on China continued to be felt, and tariff front-running – which aimed at avoiding theatened and imposed new levies since the Trump trade wars began, and which inflated import totals over the short-term – subsided.

As for that huge first quarter sequential decrease in the price-adjusted trade deficit, it’s now the biggest such move since the 72.53 percent plunge between the first and second quarters of 2009, when the Great Recession was bottoming.

All the same, the revisions were indeed interesting – and important. For starters, that $788 billion annualized first quarter trade deficit was previously reported as being $815.5 billion. Meanwhile, the $780.7 second quarter after-inflation trade deficit is the country’s smallest quarterly gap since the $792.3 billion figure of the first quarter of 2017.

At least as interesting, the GDP revisions make the Trump administration’s trade record look a good deal better than previously reported, while leaving the results for the last two years of the Obama administration basically unchanged. That’s not obvious from the table below, which shows the old and new constant dollar trade deficit results for the last four full years in billions of dollars:

                 New                    Old

2019:       917.6                  953.9

2018:       877.7                  920.0

2017:       816.8                  858.7

2016:       763.6                  586.3

2015:       719.5                  540.0

But there’s a big problem with these statistics. They’re measuring apples versus oranges. The 2017-19 results have been presented by the Commerce Department in terms of 2012 dollars. The original 2015 and 2016 results, however, (which I found by going through pre-revisions GDP releases) were presented in 2009 dollars, but in their updated versions, they’re presented in 2012 dollars. In other words, the inflation adjustment factor is different. All the same, the Trump deficits, themselves, are notably smaller than they were previously reported.

To permit a legitimate comparison between the two administrations, it’s necessary to drop the inflation adjustment altogether, and present the annual trade deficit results in current (billions of) dollars. That’s what the next table shows:

                 New                   Old

2019:       610.5                 631.9

2018:       609.5                 638.2

2017:       555.5                 578.4

2016:       512.5                 521.2

2015:       526.6                 522.0

All three Trump results are, again, better than previously reported, although the difference is significantly smaller than for the inflation-adjusted figures. For the Obama years, the 2016 results are a little better, but the 2015 results are a little worse.

Even so, there’s still no doubt that the Trump trade deficits are higher than those of the last two Obama years. But as known by RealityChek regulars, sometimes individual data sets like this don’t tell the whole story. And with the trade figures, it’s important to compare them with the size of the whole economy. For this exercise, let’s keep it simple and stick with the new pre-inflation statistics. This table shows the current dollar trade deficit as a percentage of current dollar GDP:

2019:  2.85 percent

2018:  2.96 percent

2017:  2.84 percent

2016:  2.73 percent

2015  2.89 percent

Here a modest edge goes to those two Obama years, at least looking at the average. At the same time, the former President was conducting trade policy business-as-usual. Mr. Trump is conducting a major experiment in disruption that’s bound to create adjustment-related inefficiencies, at least in the short run. That is to say, the full results aren’t in. And a major question looming over the U.S. economy in this election year is how long it will be permitted to continue.

Glad I Didn’t Say That! The Epic Fail of Tariff Fear-Mongering

Tags

aluminum, China, consumer price index, consumers, core inflation, Glad I Didn't Say That!, inflation, manufacturing, metals, metals-using industries, Producer Price Index, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump

“Trump’s trade war may soon hit consumers’ wallets and paychecks.”

–NBC News, July 18, 2018

“Tariffs will surely lead to higher prices for imported goods and, to a lesser extent, prices for non-imported goods that use imported materials.”

–Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, July 18, 2018

“Tariffs are about to hit consumers, and it won’t be pretty.”

–CNBC, July 25, 2018

“Trade restrictions, by their nature, result in price increases for the goods in question. If the price of steel and aluminum goes up, manufacturers will be forced to pass those costs onto American consumers.”

–The Heritage Foundation, March 2, 2018

U.S. core consumer price* index year on year, November: +0.1 percent

U.S. core producer price index** year on year, November: +0.5 percent

*commodities less food and energy

**final demand goods less food and energy

(Sources: “Trump’s trade war may soon hit consumers’ wallets and paychecks,” by Ben Popken, NBC News, July 18, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/trump-s-trade-war-may-soon-impact-consumers-wallets-paychecks-n890576: “Tariff Troubles: Will Consumers Feel the Pinch?” Public Policy, Knowledge@Wharton, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, July 30, 2018, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/trumps-tariffs-will-impact-average-consumer/; “Tariffs are about to hit consumers, and it won’t be pretty,” by Jeff Cox, CNBC, July 25, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/25/tariffs-are-about-to-hit-consumers-and-it-wont-be-pretty.html; “3 Reasons Why Trump’s Tariffs Would Hurt American Workers,” by Tori K. Smith and Jay Van Andel, Commentary, The Heritage Foundation, March 2, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/trade/commentary/3-reasons-why-trumps-tariffs-would-hurt-american-workers. All compiled in “Christmas Miracle: Rising Wages and Low Inflation Promise a Very Merry Holiday Season,” by John Carney, Breitbart.com, December 11, 2018, https://www.breitbart.com/economy/2019/12/11/low-inflation-christmas/. “Consumer Price Index – November 2019, USDL-19-2144, News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, December 11, 2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cpi.pdf; and “Producer Price Indexes – November, 2019, USDL 19-2146, News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, December 12, 2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ppi.pdf)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Mainstream Media Never Trump-ism on Trade Gets Weirder and Weirder

Tags

China, consumers, inflation, Mainstream Media, retail, Reuters, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s like they can’t help themselves. Even when Mainstream Media organizations and reporters conduct detailed research showing that President Trump’s tariffs-heavy China trade policies aren’t hurting U.S. consumers in the slightest, they feel compelled to issue dire warnings about the possibility. If you doubt me, check out this Reuters piece from the day before Thanksgiving on how the levies are affecting America’s major retailers.

Reuters, to its credit, actually took the trouble to look at prices to gauge the impact of the Trump levies by examining actual prices – as opposed to economists and to analysts from think tanks and other groups bought and paid for by the corporate offshoring lobby, who toss out apocalyptic numbers based on bogus-at-best methodologies.

The findings, “based on a pricing study conducted for Reuters by retail analytics firm Profitero, which examined online prices from seven large retailers for 21,000 products”?

From the October and November, 2018 to the same months this year, for goods “in key holiday categories including appliances, electronics, toys and video games,” leading big box and other retailers overall have held prices “lower than the average rate of inflation during the same period….”

More specifically, at “Walmart, Walmart-owned Jet.com, Amazon, Target Corp, Best Buy, GameStop, and Staples,” electronics prices rose somewhat more than prices in the U.S. economy across the board, but prices for the other products rose at much lower rates, and toys and video games actually became less expensive in absolute terms.

Nor did Reuters try to hide these results, as the headline reads “Top U.S. retailers absorb tariff pressure ahead of holiday shopping season,” and the same point was made in the lead paragraph.

Nonetheless, the report felt compelled to warn that “America’s trade war with China threatens to push up product prices, which could hurt consumer spending this holiday season, a period which makes up nearly 40% of annual revenue for many retailers.”

Sure that’s true in a technical sense. But this sentence is also about as responsible and accurate as one stating that “disciplining a child threatens to alienate him or her” when there’s no sign of that outcome developing, and when in fact all the evidence shows the discipline working. And as for hurting consumer sales, that currently seems far-fetched as well, based on what’s known about the current holiday shopping season. How do I know this? I read it in another Reuters article.

Moreover, it’s legitimate to ask why Reuters didn’t draw the opposite conclusion from its research: The Trump administration and tariff supporters so far have been right in insisting that consumers could be shielded from tariff-induced inflation, and in fact would be, because retailers know full well that they lack the leverage needed to force prices up, and would need to offset them themselves – by eating the extra costs, offsetting them by becoming more efficient, or some combination of the two.

Yes, this would have entailed writing something positive about the President and his trade policies.  But noxious as that might seem to the Mainstream Media, it would have gad the added virtue of being true. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Offshoring Lobby Admits Americans are Standing Tall in the China Trade War

Tags

2020 elections, capex, Charles Koch, China, CNBC.com, consumers, Democrats, inflation, manufacturing, national security, recession, slowdown, Trade, trade war, Trump, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Another trade war myth bites the dust! And its demise is especially big news, given that its killers are some of the leading myth-makers.

Specifically, as reported by CNBC,com, top officials of a major lobbying campaign aimed at forcing President Trump to overturn his tariff-heavy trade policies, and in particular, to make nice with China, have openly admitted that the ace-in-the-hole they thought they held turned out to be joker. According to a CNBC posting yesterday, the political network funded partly by billionaire libertarian Charles Koch has concluded that their efforts to restore the pre-Trump, offshoring-happy, U.S. trade policy status quo have failed because it completely misread the American public’s willingness to pay an economic price for combating China’s trade predation.

This news comes on the heels of ongoing evidence that, contrary to widespread predictions from economists, think tank hacks, globalist politicians, and the Mainstream Media reporters who keep taking their cues from all these trade zealots, raging American inflation has not been ignited, business investment has not been paralyzed, domestic manufacturing has not suffered a death blow (though it’s been in a shallow recession for a year), and the economy has not plunged into recession (though growth has slowed).

The advertising-focused Koch drive sought to convince President Trump to back off his strategy of trade pressure by exploiting the selfishness of U.S. consumers in particular and the supposed vulnerabilities of the U.S. political system. The apparent central assumptions (and they’ll be familiar to anyone who’s been following Mainstream Media coverage of trade issues): Affluent, and indeed spoiled, Americans have much less tolerance for economic pain than their long impoverished Chinese counterparts; and China’s dictators will find it much easier to resist any public pressure that did develop than American leaders. Therefore, the Koch operatives reasoned, stoking fears that Mr. Trump’s tariffs would supercharge retail prices in particular and kill jobs by prompting retaliatory Chinese measures and slumping American capital spending would set off a political firestorm that the President would need to extinguish if he hoped to win reelection.

But at a briefing it held in New York City yesterday, a Koch official told reporters that “The argument that, you know, the tariffs are adding a couple thousand dollars to the pickup truck that you’re buying is not persuasive. It doesn’t penetrate with the people that are willing to go along with the argument that you have to punish China.”

Nor did the Koch campaign make this decision lightly. The CNBC.com piece noted that “the network came to this conclusion after conducting weekly focus groups on trade policies.” Also cited in the post was a recent national poll showing that “63% of registered voters believe tariffs will ultimately hurt the United States more than China, but 67% of the electorate is convinced it’s necessary to confront China over its trade practices.”

In other words, the American public is wiser and more farsighted than the U.S-owned businesses that have worked overtime to help strengthen the Chinese economy – including by voluntarily transferring to the Chinese the technology they need to upgrade their mechanisms of repression and modernize their military. And everyday Americans are much smarter than those companies that China has begun victimizing once Beijing concluded they’d outlived their usefulness, but that keep hoping against hope that enough boot-licking will save their corporate skins in the Chinese market. Because the American public evidently understands that U.S. prosperity and national security alike require reversing these China-enabling policies, and that slightly more expensive imports from China are a small price to pay for preserving and achieving these goals.

Ironically, the poll indicates that the Koch campaign (along with similar efforts) has succeeded in one respect: It represents some evidence that Americans believe that their country is more vulnerable to a trade war than China – even though the Chinese economy is much more trade dependent, and even though, as noted above, the United States keeps growing (albeit more slowly), and its overall inflation remains subdued by any reasonable standard.

Maybe that’s why the Koch network says it’s far from giving up, and is considering delivering the same message with different tactics. Two seem especially promising to these Friends of China:

>“putting together a team of almost 100 business leaders to call on the Trump administration and lawmakers to end the trade war with China”; and

>educating “100,000 activists in at least 35 states about the potential negative impact of using tariffs to battle China. Those volunteers will then be expected to start reaching out to their congressional leaders. The network hopes these activists can convince lawmakers on Capitol Hill to stand up against the administration’s current trade policy. The latest phase of the Koch campaign is expected to cost the network millions of dollars.”

Of course, short of a major economic downturn, if the Koch network has already established that the public is rejecting its advertising-carried China fear-mongering, it’s unclear why President Trump would be more responsive to the 100 business leaders than he’s been to date? And why would most Members of Congress not already backing China coddling pay more much attention to the 100,000 activists?

That’s a question that also needs to be asked by some other major actors in the U.S.-China trade war: the majority of current Democratic presidential candidates, who clearly believe that there’s lots of voter China-related trade whining that they can turn into votes, and ultimately into victory over Mr. Trump; and Chinese dictator Xi Jinping himself, who just as clearly believes that if the President is defeated, he’ll be back to dealing with Uncle Sucker on trade – and so many other fronts.

Making News: Quoted in National News Service…& More!

Tags

Breitbart News Tonight, consumers, IndustryToday.com, inflation, Making News, McClatchy News Service, Miami Herald, tariffs, trade war

I’m pleased to announce two recent media appearances and present the link to a podcast.

First, it was great to see the McClatchy News Service quote my views yesterday on whether President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policy is likely to boost U.S. consumer prices greatly.  Here’s the link, and since McClatchy is a national news organization, the piece has been published in major dailies like the Miami Herald.

In addition, on Tuesday, IndustryToday.com re-posted my August 25 RealityChek post explaining China’s unexpectedly (at least to me!) hard line in its trade conflict with the United States.  Here’s the link.

Finally, the podcast is now on-line of my Tuesday night interview on Breitbart News Tonight on the state of the economy – and whether a recession is coming soon.  Click here, and scroll down till you see my name under the August 27 programs.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump’s Latest China Tariff Moves – & Why They’re Mistaken

Tags

China, consumer goods, consumers, Hong Kong, inflation, producer goods, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you’re confused by President Trump’s latest China tariffs moves, don’t feel bad. They’re really confusing!

Much clearer is their main implication: Once more, the President has needlessly let China off the trade war hook – and significantly reduced the odds of U.S. success no matter how it’s defined.

To summarize the chain of announcements and decisions that have produced the present situation: As of August 1, in various stages, the United States had imposed 25 percent tariffs on $250 billion worth of goods imports from China based on the latest data. And on May 5, Mr. Trump threatened to place tariffs of 25 percent on the rest of China’s merchandise shipments to the United States (about $300 billion worth).

That announcement was seen as especially significant because the previous tariffs mainly hit what businesses and economist call “producer goods” or “intermediate goods.” They’re the parts, components, and materials that companies use to produce final products, including consumer products. As a result, even when they do lead to higher consumer prices, the role played by these duties is difficult for consumers (i.e., voters) to identify, much less complain about to the politicians responsible.

In addition, as I’ve frequently noted (e.g., here), tariffs on these producer goods often don’t lead to any inflation, or much inflation, at all, for a variety of reasons and combinations of reasons. In many instances, retailers and other businesses simply lack the needed pricing power. As a result, they often seek to persuade their entire supply chain to preserve market share by eating some or all of the higher prices and accepting lower profits. Alternatively, various parts of the supply chain – including the final customer – can try to offset tariff-induced price increases by boosting productivity. That’s actually good for the economy in the long run, as improved efficiency not only enables companies to absorb cost increases while maintaining and even increasing margins. Such better productivity tends to spur the development of new efficiency-enhancing products, services, and technologies – a great way to boost living standards in a healthy, sustainable way.

Yet the May Trump $300 billion threat – which stemmed from the President’s unhappiness with the lack of progress in the trade talks with China – would have finally hit most consumer goods imports. Therefore, it would have created the risk that shoppers would blame the President for any price increases they did encounter. Even worse, the timing of the threat practically ensured that these higher prices would start appearing just as holiday shopping heated up – or typically heats up.

In late June, however, after meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping at a global summit in Japan, Mr. Trump agreed to a trade truce and to hold off on the $300 billion threat. Two weeks later, though the threat was back on the table, according to a Trump tweet.

On August 1, following a new round of apparently unsuccessful trade negotiations and the President’s belief that China had broken a promise connect with the late June trade truce to buy more American farm products, Mr. Trump specified that ten percent tariffs on the $300 billion worth of consumer goods-dominated imports from China would begin on September 1. Just four days later, his administration announced another “hawkish” trade war decision – officially designating China as a country that manipulated its currency to gain trade advantages (by keeping its products artificially cheap and therefore making goods and services from trade competitors artificially expensive in comparison). At the same time, the currency decision by law doesn’t automatically result in new tariffs, although it could eventually bring about some other penalties.

And yesterday came the latest turnaround: Mr. Trump decided to postpone tariffs on an estimated $160 billion of the $300 billion from September 1 to December 15. Not coincidentally, as his remarks on benefiting holiday shoppers made clear, many of the items on the postponement list included particularly popular gift items like toys and smartphones.

In addition, tariffs on some $30 billion worth of imports from China would be lifted permanently (at least for now!). But new duties on some $110 billion worth of imports from China are at this point slated to go into effect at the beginning of next month, and this group, too, is dominated by consumer goods.

Commentators focusing on the postponed goods called the latest Trump move a cave to China spurred by the President’s fears of a falling stock market, weakening U.S. economy, and angry consumers. Others, pointing to the products that will be slapped with new levies, and to the continuation of previously announced tariffs, insisted that Mr. Trump was keeping considerable pressure on the Chinese.

I lean toward the former interpretation, for these reasons. First, there’s no sign that the President’s forbearance has won any concessions from China. Second, the tight Trump focus on appeasing holiday shoppers can only signal weakness to Beijing, and feed its hopes that it can prevail in the trade and broader economic conflict by waiting for the President to be replaced by a more conventional, more pliable chief executive in 2020. Third, the delay announcement came just before a batch of absolutely terrible economic data was released by China. And given Beijing’s history of publishing overly bullish figures, it’s a safe bet that its economy is even weaker than most recently indicated. Fourth, Xi Jinping is under pressure not only economically, but politically, due to the rising unrest in Hong Kong.

Fifth, it’s true that from the standpoint of China’s longer-term prospects, maintaining the tariffs on its producer goods matters crucially. For this category includes most of the high tech and other advanced manufactures that represent any economy’s hope for continued technological progress, and therefore faster, healthier growth and a stronger military. But the consumer goods matter politically – because since they’re largely labor-intensive in nature, they’re mass employers. And China’s dictators view high unemployment as a mortal danger to their rule.

Sixth, although it’s clear that U.S. investors hate the trade war, the President needs to remember that, however much he likes to tout the stock market as a barometer of his economic performance, these markets and the real economy are by no means identical. We’ll be getting some key economic data tomorrow, when the Federal Reserve releases its new report on industrial (including manufacturing) production. But so far, the manufacturing numbers have shown that, after a soft patch in the winter, both inflation-adjusted output and capital spending are trending upward again. So unless these and other upcoming data break notably from their most recent patterns, recession – and even further slowdown – predictions will keep looking far-fetched.

Importantly, none of the above analysis means that I’ve changed my view that no China trade deal acceptable for U.S. interests is possible because of insurmountable verification obstacles. Instead, America’s only realistic option is to keep disengaging economically from China – both to reduce U.S. economic reliance on an increasingly hostile power, and to weaken further the only country capable of posing noteworthy national security threats. As a result, however, Washington should pass up no opportunity to inflict pain on China’s economy. And although no one would be shocked if he reversed course yet again before too long, that’s exactly the mistake that President Trump just made with his latest China tariffs delay.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Big Fade for Tariffs-Led Consumer Inflation

Tags

aluminum, China, inflation, Labor Department, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Well, that was fast. Last month, when the Labor Department’s consumer price data came out (for June), I observed that they revealed some tariff-led inflation – especially in goods categories that by all rights should be affected by the duties on steel and aluminum that President Trump imposed in March, 2018.

(More such evidence appeared in categories in which tariffs have been placed on Chinese imports. But as continually noted, because of several complications – e.g., shorter duration, great variations in metals-intensity, data classification issues – these results should be considered much less reliable than the metals tariffs statistics.)

Yet this morning’s new consumer price data, for July, shows a significant fade in tariff pricing pressures for the metals users. Part of the reason no doubt is the lifting of the metals tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada. But they were removed only in late May, so it’s difficult to believe that this decision deserves most of the credit.

Here are the price increases for metals-using industries between June and July, since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the duties were in place), and the year-on-year figures for this June and July. Also included, as always, are statistics for various control groups of goods, including so-called “core inflation” (which strips out volatile food and energy prices), and for the foods and beverages that are sold in metal cans outside of these containers:

                                 June-July      Since April, 2018      y/y June            y/y July

core inflation:      +0.29 percent      +2.79 percent     +2.13 percent   +2.21 percent

fresh fruits           +0.60 percent      +1.67 percent     +0.86 percent   +0.33 percent

  & vegs:

fresh fruits:             0 percent           -1.55 percent      -1.85 percent    -2.74 percent

fresh vegs:           +1.28 percent       +5.49 percent    +4.09 percent   +3.96 percent

processed             -0.68 percent        +0.04 percent    +1.70 percent   +1.45 percent

  fruits & vegs

canned fruits:       -1.56 percent        +2.30 percent    +3.93 percent   +2.87 percent

  & vegs

canned fruits:       -0.44 percent        +0.99 percent     +2.02 percent  +1.89 percent

canned vegs:         -2.33 percent       +3.28 percent     +5.28 percent  +3.13 percent

soups:                   -0.18 percent       +0.28 percent     +0.30 percent   +0.04 percent

malt bevgs           +0.72 percent       +3.13 percent     +1.69 percent   +2.58 percent

  at home:

alcoholic bevgs   +0.38 percent       +1.90 percent     +1.05 percent   +1.43 percent

  away from home:

non-frozen, non-  -0.05 percent       +2.99 percent     +2.71 percent   +2.33 percent

  carbonated non-

  alcoholic rinks:

carbted drinks:      -0.47 percent      +3.39 percent     +3.15 percent   +3.14 percent 

juices & non-        -0.23 percent      +3.11 percent     +2.86 percent    +2.62 percent

  alcoholic drinks

new cars/trucks:    -0.19 percent     +1.17 percent     +0.58 percent    +0.34 percent

motor vehicle        -0.51 percent     +2.07 percent     +1.91 percent    +1.42 percent

  parts:

appliances:            -0.83 percent      +2.00 percent    +2.56 percent    +0.62 percent

major                     -0.98 percent      +4.13 percent    +2.94 percent     -0.75 percent

  appliances:

laundry                     0 percent          +2.83 percent    -3.98 percent     -4.63 percent

  equipment:

non-electric         -1.78 percent          -5.14 percent    -1.94 percent    -2.94 percent

  cookware & tableware:

tools, hardware,  +0.62 percent        +0.83 percent    +1.06 percent   +1.35 percent

  outdoor equipment:

The waning of inflationary pressures can be seen by comparing the core inflation rate since the advent of the metals tariffs with the inflation rates of the metals-using industries.

The latest data show that prices rose faster than that core rate in only six of the sixteen metals-using categories shown. Moreover, in four of these categories (beer and other malt beverages consumed at home; non-frozen, non-carbonated, non-alcoholic drinks; carbonated drinks; and all juices and non-alcoholic drinks), the results need to be treated with caution, since these products are also sold in non-metal containers.

The previous month’s data showed that prices rose faster than core inflation in ten of these metals-using categories – with the results in three complicated by the use of non-metal containers.

That total in turn was up from the nine of sixteen instances of relatively strong inflation in metals-using industries in both February and March (with the non-metal container issue muddying the waters for four of those nine categories in February and three in March).

As for the China-related evidence, I’m hesitant to examine it for the time being not only because of the aforementioned data issues, but because U.S. policy has changed so dramatically in the last few weeks – with the President in early August threatening ten percent tariffs by September 1 for a $300 billion tranche of imports from China that would have been dominated by consumer goods, and then today postponing their imposition until December 15 (or until a satisfactory bilateral trade deal is struck).

Nonetheless, the metals tariff-related data shows that inflation for these levies so far has never been especially strong (except, for a time, in large household laundry equipment – which had faced separate, product-specific duties since February, 2018), and whatever strength it’s shown, hasn’t lasted very long. (In fact, even for those laundry machines, the table shows that their super-charged price hikes are now turning into super-charged price drops.)

And of course, as Breitbart.com‘s John Carney keeps pointing out, the economy’s overall weak rate of inflation means that even when tariffs have pushed prices up, many other forces have been pushing other prices down.  (Further, these low overall inflation rates almost by definition mean that price pressures from the existing China tariffs can’t be impressive, either.)

That’s not to say that Mr. Trump’s trade policies therefore can’t be hurting the U.S. economy in other ways (although the evidence to date here is also pretty feeble). And it’s entirely possible that the widely tariff-mageddon could still hit Americans on a variety of fronts if the trade war with China in particular lasts long enough. But inflation claims have always been central to the Trump trade critics’ case, as made clear by how quickly #tariffsaretaxes became a hashtag, and how it’s persisted. And if the critics have been wrong on this crucial score, why should anyone be confident in any of their other predictions?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Tariffs-Led Consumer Inflation Grows…from Non-Existent to Slight

Tags

aluminum, Bureau of Labor Statistics, China, consumer price inflation, consumer prices, core inflation, inflation, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, tradewar, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

After a several-month lapse, I finally had a chance to review in detail the latest batch of official U.S. consumer price data, which came out yesterday. The big takeaway seems as follows: Whereas through April there was no evidence that President Trump’s tariffs per se were pushing up consumer prices, now there’s some. But the evidence certainly doesn’t paint a picture of the American shopper’s living standards tumbling steeply because of Mr. Trump’s various trade wars.

As usual, let’s examine the metals-using industries, since the Trump tariffs on steel and aluminum have been in place for a relatively long period (April, 2018 was their first full month) and for reasons to be explained below, because it’s much easier to identify these sectors than those presumably impacted by the China tariffs.

The table below presents the relevant figures for major metals-using industries sequentially for the latest data month (June), since the duties’ onset, and year-on-year for the two latest data months. In addition, the results for control groups (like for overall core inflation, and for foods sometimes packaged in metal cans in their fresh forms):

                             May-June        Since April, 2018       y/y May           y/y June

core inflation:   +0.22 percent      +2.39 percent        +1.99 percent   +2.13 percent

fresh fruits         -1.67 percent      +0.31 percent        +1.85 percent   +0.87 percent

  & vegs:

fresh fruits:        -2.06 percent      -2.85 percent         -0.95 percent     -1.85 percent

fresh vegs:         -1.24 percent     +4.10 percent        +5.20 percent    +4.09 percent

processed          +0.39 percent     +1.61 percent        +1.28 percent    +1.70 percent

  fruits & vegs

canned fruits:     -0.38 percent     +4.47 percent        +4.04 percent    +3.93 percent

& vegs

canned fruits:     -0.09 percent     +2.11 percent        +1.00 percent    +2.02 percent

canned vegs:     +1.26 percent     +6.04 percent        +5.49 percent    +5.28 percent

soups:                +0.26 percent     +2.59 percent        +0.37 percent    +0.30 percent

malt bevgs          -0.62 percent     +1.77 percent        +0.84 percent    +1.84 percent

  at home:

alcoholic bevgs  +0.20 percent     +1.34 percent        +2.17 percent    +1.46 percent

  away from hom:

non-frozen, non- -0.21 percent     +1.96 percent        +3.09 percent    +3.03 percent

  carbonated non-

  alcoholic rinks

carbted drinks:     -1.95 percent    +3.33 percent        +5.75 percent    +2.71 percent

  juices & non-     -0.96 percent    +2.49 percent        +4.16 percent    +2.86 percent

  alcoholic drinks

new cars/trucks:  +0.17 percent    +1.13 percent        -1.61 percent    +0.74 percent

motor vehicle      +0.07 percent    +2.60 percent       +1.94 percent    +1.91 percent

  parts:

appliances:          +0.21 percent    +2.93 percent       +2.43 percent    +2.56 percent

major                   -1.40 percent    +3.95 percent        +3.80 percent    +2.94 percent

  appliances:

laundry                -0.70 percent    +4.00 percent        -1.55 percent      -3.98 percent

  equipment:

non-electric         +0.73 percent –   4.07 percent        -5.22 percent      -1.94 percent

  cookware & tableware:

tools, hardware,   +0.06 percent   +0.12 percent       +0.88 percent     +1.22 percent

  outdoor equipment:

The most revealing comparison is that between the post-tariffs (April, 2018) rate of core inflation (which excludes the historically volatile categories of food and energy) and the inflation rates for the metals-using sectors. And they show that for the 15 metals-using industries tracked, prices rose faster than core inflation in ten – a sign of tariff-led price-hiking.

At the same time, as previously noted, the figures for three of these 10 groups – soups, carbonated drinks, and juices and non-alcoholic drinks – need to be viewed cautiously, because their packages are hardly restricted to metals. Thus my conclusion that the tariff effects have been modest.

And another interesting conclusion emerging from these statistics: the price of laundry equipment is dropping dramatically after surging following the imposition in February, 2018 of a separate set of levies on large household clothes washers and driers. These prices are still way up (by 13.75 percent) since the tariffs began. But the May and June data show unusually rapid price drops. And these decreases are much greater than the slight reduction in these tariffs that began this year.

As for the China tariffs, definitive conclusions remain difficult to draw for several reasons. Chiefly, the first full data month for the relevant duties (for consumer products) is only last October. The goods on the U.S. Trade Representative’s list for those levies are categorized with a classification system different from that used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in measuring inflation – so the match-ups are far from exact. And the scale of tariff price effects can differ dramatically from product to product because China’s presence in a particular market can vary so greatly.

Another complicating factor (though clearly trade war-related): Some of the China categories have also been affected by the metals tariffs (e.g., auto parts). Further, the appliance categories have been impacted by the separate household laundry equipment duties.

Nonetheless, here’s the China data for May-June, since last October, and year-on-year for this June and last June. As with the metals tariff table, they include figures for control categories like the core inflation rate:

                            May-June       Since Oct.    June y/y 2017-18     June y/y 2018-19

core inflation: +0.22 percent  +1.59 percent   +2.13 percent           +2.26 percent

food:                -0.02 percent   -0.12 percent   +1.43 percent           +1.91 percent

frozen/freeze-  -0.42 percent  +0.52 percent    -0.23 percent            -0.09 percent

  dried prepared foods:

fish/seafood:    -0.74 percent  +0.89 percent   +1.43 percent           +1.66 percent

processed fish/ -0.98 percent         0 percent   +0.39 percent            +2.13 percent

  seafood:

frozen fish/      -1.32 percent   -0.61 percent    -0.91 percent            +1.68 percent

  seafood:

fruits/vegs:      -1.24 percent   +0.03 percent   +0.25 percent             +1.04 percent

fresh fruits/    +1.67 percent    -0.63 percent   +0.62 percent             +0.87 percent

  vegetables:

fresh fruits:      -2.06 percent   -2.49 percent   +1.87 percent             -1.85 percent

fresh vegs:       -1.24 percent   +1.54 percent    -0.82 percent           +4.09 percent

processed        +0.39 percent   +2.49 percent    -1.04 percent           +1.70 percent

  fruits/vegs:

frozen fruits/   +1.84 percent   +0.54 percent    -3.88 percent           +0.24 percent

  vegetables:

non-carb/          -0.21 percent   +0.61 percent   -0.37 percent           +2.71 percent

  non-frozen juices/drinks:

personal care    -0.27 percent    -0.59 percent   -0.30 percent            -0.60 percent

  products:

household         -0.11 percent    +0.13 percent  -7.87 percent            -0.03 percent

  furnishings:

recreation         -0.34 percent     -2.49 percent   -8.22 percent           -5.60 percent

  goods:

men’s                -1.24 percent     -2.94 percent   -0.69 percent          +1.53 percent

  sportswear:

women’s           -2.01 percent     -1.25 percent   -1.33 percent           -0.03 percent

  sportswear

computers,        -1.91 percent    -4.09 percent    -3.70 percent          -5.86 percent

  peripherals, etc.:

window/floor    -1.19 percent    -5.03 percent   +0.43 percent          -2.75 percent

  coverings:

furniture &       +0.82 percent   +2.64 percent   +0.02 percent         +3.15 percent

  bedding:

appliances:       +0.21 percent     -0.37 percent  +1.15 percent         +2.56 percent

major                 -1.40 percent    +0.33 percent  +5.62 percent         +2.94 percent

  appliances:

laundry              -0.70 percent     -0.22 percent +13.12 percent         -3.98 percent

  equipment

misc                 +1.19 percent      -0.84 percent    -1.05 percent        +2.28 percent

  appliances:

non-electric      +0.73 percent      -2.78 percent    -2.64 percent         -1.94 percent

  cookware/tableware:

tools/                +0.06 percent     +1.27 percent    -0.74 percent          +1.06 percent

  hardware &

  outdoor equip:

household          -0.14 percent     +1.14 percent  +0.60 percent          +1.52 percent

  cleaning products:

televisions:        -1.23 percent    -14.25 percent  -19.09 percent        -19.65 percent

misc video         -1.98 percent      -1.19 percent    -2.53 percent          -2.17 percent

  equipment:

pets &               +0.08 percent     +2.72 percent   +0.67 percent         +2.84 percent

  pet products:

sporting           :+0.39 percent     +2.79 percent   +0.07 percent         + 0.66 percent

  goods:

photo equip       +0.24 percent     -2.04 percent    -6.29 percent          +2.72 percent

  & supplies:

sewing              +0.41 percent     +8.21 percent   +7.54 percent          +4.63 percent

  machines/

  fabrics:

motor               +0.14 percent      +2.09 percent   +0.29 percent          +1.91 percent

  vehicle parts:

tires:                 +0.15 percent     +2.09 percent     -1.56 percent          +2.03 percent

stationery/        +0.59 percent     +4.95 percent    +1.16 percent           -1.31 percent

  gift wrap:

Even given the above uncertainties, the bases for claims that the China levies are creating a tariff-mageddon for American consumers look awfully weak, though they’re not nonexistent. Chiefly, since the tariffs’ onset last October, only eight of the 30 affected products saw prices rising faster than core inflation.

At the same time, more product categories seem to be displaying such characteristics. This conclusion seems clear from the two sets of year-on-year statistics. Between June, 2017 and June, 2018, prices were stronger in only three of the 30 categories (including products for which prices were falling at a slower rate). Between the following Junes, their number grew to eight.

Similarly, forgetting about comparisons with the core, 23 of the 30 groups experienced higher inflation rates during the June, 2018-June, 2019 period (largely post-China tariffs) than during the June, 2017-June, 2018 period (entirely pre-China tariffs).

Of course, Mr. Trump’s trade policy, especially regarding China, has never been about economics alone. The administration has repeatedly emphasized that national security is at stake as well. But these new consumer price figures make clear that the economic costs paid by Americans have so far been meager. And especially with overall inflation so weak, they hardly look like reasons for the President to ease up on the trade front.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Are Soaring Prescription Drug Prices Really a Thing?

Tags

2020 elections, Bureau of Labor Statistics, core inflation, Democrats, healthcare, inflation, prescription drugs, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Prescription drug prices keep skyrocketing outrageously – at least, that’s what’s constantly reported.  And much of the evidence looks especially impressive:  Politicians who normally agree on nothing have vowed to rein them in – including President Trump and Democrats of all stripes, including many of the party’s presidential candidates.

So imagine my surprise when I checked into these claims by examining the consumer price data issued by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics each month. They show that these prices have actually fallen on net since December, 2017 (by 0.43 percent).

Moreover, these figures also show that prescription drug prices have fallen during the past year (through May, by 0.99 percent), and that they’re dropping even though the rate of overall inflation and core inflation (which strips out volatile food and energy prices) has been rising (year-on-year by 1.80 percent and two percent, respectively).

Nor has there been a notable increase in prescription drug prices during this calendar year. From January through May, they’ve risen by 0.16 percent. But that’s still considerably less than the overall inflation rate (0.98 percent) and the core rate (0.51 percent).

That’s not to say that there hasn’t been a prescription drug price problem. For example, from May, 2017 to May, 2018, their prices rose by 3.71 percent – much faster than the overall inflation rate (2.74 percent) and the core (2.22 percent).

Moreover, during the last 27 months of the Obama administration, prescription drug prices increased by 11.14 percent, versus 2.67 percent for overall inflation, and 4.78 percent for core inflation. During the first 27 months of the Trump administration, however, these numbers are 2.07 percent, 4.59 percent, and 4.37 percent.

Americans still pay lofty prices for prescription drugs, and especially compared with consumers in other wealthy countries. It’s also important to point out that drug pricing is complicated. (Here are some of the reasons.) And I confess to having no idea why this pricing has been weak lately, and whether the decline will continue.

But when one of the country’s leading measures of inflation is saying that prescription drug prices have been going down, that should be pretty newsy. Even if “everyone knows” they’re soaring.