(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Dubious Labor Shortage Claims Keep Coming

Tags

BLS, Bureau of Labor Statistics, healthcare, Immigration, labor shortages, nurses, nursing, Reuters, wages, West Virginia, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Perhaps some day we’ll find out when it apparently became mandatory for journalists to write articles about supposed labor shortages in the American economy without once mentioning the word “wages.” For now, RealityChek will have to settle for citing yet another example of this phenomenon that contains an interesting twist: The reporter in question did look at some data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the U.S. Labor Department division that gathers and publishes employee compensation figures. But she still left out BLS numbers on wages and salaries.

According to Jilian Mincer of Reuters:

“Hospitals nationwide face tough choices when it comes to filling nursing jobs. They are paying billions of dollars collectively to recruit and retain nurses rather than risk patient safety or closing down departments, according to Reuters interviews with more than 20 hospitals, including some of the largest U.S. chains.

“In addition to higher salaries, retention and signing bonuses, they now offer perks such as student loan repayment, free housing and career mentoring, and rely more on foreign or temporary nurses to fill the gaps.”

And as indicated above, she is clearly familiar with the BLS as a reliable source of information on the American employment picture. Later in the article, she writes that “Nursing shortages have occurred in the past, but the current crisis is far worse. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates there will be more than a million registered nurse openings by 2024, twice the rate seen in previous shortages.”

But for some reason, she didn’t mention the BLS wage data – a crucial omission because everything we (think we) know about economics tells us that when anything, including labor, is scarce, its price (pay in this case) will rise until the greater rewards attract an adequate supply. Common sense supports this analysis, too. If employers are scrambling to fill jobs, it stands to reason they’ll offer better pay to make sure they and not their competition attract the needed workers.

And what the BLS data tell us is that no such scramble is taking place – or at least not enough of one to bid up wages. The last year for which detailed data for occupations (as opposed to sectors of the economy) is available is 2016. The numbers say that last year, the mean (average) national annual wage for registered nurses was $72,180 before inflation, and the mean hourly wage was $34.70.

Now let’s go back five years. The 2011 numbers? An annual mean wage of $69,110 and an hourly median wage of $33.23 per hour. So pay by these key measures wages rose by 4.44 percent over those five years and 4.42 percent, respectively. And again, that’s before adjusting for inflation. Does that sound like the hospitals and other healthcare providers that employ nurses are desperate for more?

Even stranger: Nursing pay has been rising more slowly than pay overall during this period. Between 2011 and 2016, mean annual wages for all occupations were up 9.73 percent, and mean hourly wages were up by 9.75 percent. That’s more than twice as fast! (See the same links that contain the national nursing figures.)

In fairness, Reuters’ Mincer looks at an additional nursing issue – the labor situation in rural areas, which she describes as especially dire. And it does seem to make some intuitive sense that small towns and farm communities would have special difficulties staffing medical facilities. But the numbers don’t seem to back up that story, either.

The author spent considerable space reporting on West Virginia. But the BLS numbers show that, between 2011 and 2016, both hourly and average nursing pay advanced by 4.50 percent. That’s only slightly more than the national rates of increase.

Yes, Mincer’s piece did talk a lot about healthcare providers offering “higher salaries, retention and signing bonuses [and] perks such as student loan repayment, free housing and career mentoring….” It’s entirely possible that she’s right. (The government doesn’t keep detailed occupational figures on these scores.) It’s also entirely possible that the data that is tracked by BLS is way off base. But when you’re claiming “labor shortage,” shouldn’t you at least mention that the most comprehensive facts available about base pay say nothing of the kind?

Moreover, buried in the article – indeed at the end of the quote immediately above – is a clue to the apparent paradox: Mincer’s observation that the healthcare industry is relying “more on foreign…nurses to fill the [employment] gaps.”

If true, that would make clear that lax immigration policies are still enabling nurses’ employers to suppress pay by easing any shortages in the domestic labor force by hiring immigrant nurses who will work for significantly lower pay than native-born workers. And it would suggest that the Cheap Labor lobby encompassing so many American businesses is still able to keep these wage-suppressing global labor pipelines open by peddling a steady stream of warnings about bogus labor shortages to gullible journalists.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Flunking the NAFTA Laugh Test

Tags

American Automobile Labeling Act, American Automotive Policy Council, auto parts, autos, Canada, domestic content, GDP, ImpactEcon, Jobs, light trucks, Mexico, Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, rules of origin, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Remember the wonderful David Letterman show feature “Stupid Pet Tricks”? I couldn’t help but think of it while reading various news reports and analyses claiming that the demise of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will bring apocalyptic consequences to three signatory countries: the United States, Canada, and Mexico. But my parents always told me never to use the (needlessly harsh) word “stupid.” So instead, I’ll call them, “Silly NAFTA Studies.” Examining two that have attracted major attention will make clear why.

First, let’s look at findings released in August by a Colorado consulting firm called ImpactEcon, and revised in October, that was mindlessly written up by The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, CNN.com, The Los Angeles Times, and many other big news organizations. According to this report:

“Overall, the results show that the US’s reversal of NAFTA leads to a decline in real GDP, trade and investment in the US, Canada and Mexico, with most of the losses resulting from Canada and Mexico’s reciprocation. The losses in low skilled employment are most significant, with employment declining by 256,000, 125,000, and 951,000 in the US, Canada and Mexico respectively. Production and specialization of production across the NAFTA region declines, particularly in those sectors with the highest levels of vertical specialization across NAFTA. The motor vehicles and services sectors in all three NAFTA countries decline, along with production of US meat, food, and textiles; Canadian chemicals and metals; and Mexican textiles, wearing apparel, electronics and machinery.”

Sounds awful, right? And especially dumb for President Trump, who won the votes of many American workers without glitzy high tech skills.

But buried here – glossed over in the press accounts – are results that should be screamingly obvious to anyone knowing anything about intra-NAFTA trade balances, the Canadian and Mexican economies, and in particular their heavy dependence on exporting to the United States: Canada and Mexico take much greater growth and employment hits from NAFTA’s termination than does America.

The passage quoted above shows a major gulf between the projected job impacts.  But the differential effects on real growth rates are even greater – and more threatening to Mexico and Canada. (The researchers assume that all three countries return their tariffs to pre-NAFTA levels.)

Real GDP:

U.S.: -0.09 percent

Canada: -0.48 percent

Mexico: -0.88 percent

And keep in mind two other considerations: The Canadian and Mexican economies are much smaller than the U.S.’ So the jobs losses are much more important for them, relatively speaking. Moreover, Mexico is still a developing country with real political stability problems. Growth and employment shocks like this would spell big, and possibly fatal, trouble for its ruling classes.

In fact, the damage to Canada and Mexico is so great that the (closely related) policy conclusions couldn’t be clearer (except to economics reporters). First, America’s NAFTA partners simply can’t afford to retaliate against the United States if the treaty is terminated; and second, as a result, a walk-out by them is wildly improbable unless Washington’s demands are positively draconian.

The second silly study (and related press coverage) comes from the Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA) – the trade association of an industry that has moved massive amounts of production and jobs to Mexico (much of it from the United States), largely to serve the American market, not the Mexican market or third country markets.

So obviously, the group’s findings should be viewed skeptically. Additionally, however, MEMA assumes (along with the ImpactEcon findings and another study – from another offshorers’ organization – the American Automotive Policy Council), that higher NAFTA requirements for origin rules will leave external tariffs low enough to enable auto manufacturers to ignore the standards and keep shipping product with lots of content from outside the hemisphere all around the free trade zone. Worse, without higher enforcement tariffs, the auto industry might also supply American customers to an even greater extent from even lower-cost economies, like those in Asia.

It’s true that the Trump administration hasn’t discussed raising those tariffs to levels that would bite. It’s also true that these moves would violate all three NAFTA countries’ World Trade Organization commitments on bound tariffs, and similar promises they’ve made in their other trade deals. But the folly of preserving that status quo is so clear cut that it’s entirely reasonable to expect a Trump-ian learning curve. And the President does prize his reputation as a disrupter.

Moreover, all he needs to do is look at the situation for sport utility vehicles and other so-called “light trucks.” Since their non-NAFTA U.S. tariff remains at 25 percent, even staunch opponents of a major treaty rewrite conceded that factories will return stateside if this status quo ante comes back. And P.S.: These products are increasingly dominating American passenger vehicle markets.

A second substantive reason for discounting this study concerns the auto parts makers’ claim that “Raising the automotive content thresholds and forcing automakers to verify the North American origin of more electronics and other parts now sourced from Asia would cause some parts manufacturers to forego NAFTA benefits.”

As just mentioned, the second fear is warranted if tariffs for the origin rules stay where they are. But the point about forcing the companies to verify where their inputs come from? Vehicle makers have already required to provide exactly this information for NAFTA’s entire life by the American Automobile Labeling Act. And they clearly view NAFTA as a huge success. Many companies in the parts supply chain are much smaller, and detailed reporting could indeed become an unreasonable burden for them. But many parts makers are plenty big enough to assume this responsibility easily (unless they don’t know where they themselves manufacture?). Much more important: The information would greatly aid policymakers and the public in (finally!) evaluating the impact of trade agreements and related policy decisions with a critical mass of precision.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: September Sees Bigger Hurricane Toll for U.S. Manufacturing but Fractional Overall Production Gain

Tags

automotive, chemicals, Federal Reserve, Great Recession, hurricanes, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, manufacturing, non-durable goods, petroleum refining, recovery, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Federal Reserve’s new industrial production figures show greater hurricane-related damage to real U.S. manufacturing output in September than in August, with the losses in chemical industries using oil and gas feedstocks great enough to plunge all of domestic industry into a technical recession. Inflation-adjusted manufacturing production is now 0.14 percent lower than in February. Yet on month, overall after-inflation manufacturing output eked out a 0.10 percent gain.

Most seriously affected by the devastation of the energy-rich Texas and Louisiana Gulf coasts were organic chemicals (where monthly production plunged by 14.71 percent), and plastics materials and resins (down 8.16 percent) — both post-recession worsts. The volatile artificial and synthetic fibers and filaments sector, whose after-inflation sequential output was reported to have sunk by 11.25 percent on month in August saw that figure upgraded to an 8.44 percent decline and boosted its monthly real output in September by 5.83 percent – its best since last September (9.67 percent). Price-adjusted oil refinery production for August was slightly downgraded to a 2.52 percent fall-off (its biggest since January, 2010’s 2.75 percent), but September monthly production dipped only fractionally.

The non-durable goods supersector containing these chemical industries saw its constant dollar output slump by the greatest rate (0.89 percent) since January, 2015 (1.20 percent). Revisions for real manufacturing output as a whole were negative, with August’s reading slightly upgraded but July’s downgraded from a slight increase to a significant drop.

Good news came from the automotive sector, however, especially its first back-to-back monthly real production increases since the May-October period last year, and a strongly upgraded August gain (3.56 percent) that was the sector’s best since June, 2016 (3.89 percent). As of September, however, in inflation-adjusted terms, American manufacturing is 4.26 percent smaller than when the last recession began at the end of 2007 – more than nine years ago.

Here are the manufacturing highlights of the Federal Reserve’s new release on September industrial production:

>Although September’s manufacturing production figures showed hurricane-related damage to American industry to be considerably worse than in August, and indeed bad enough to plunge the entire sector into a technical recession, industry managed an overall 0.10 percent real monthly production increase during the months.

>Due to major constant dollar output drops in chemicals and especially sectors heavily reliant on oil and gas feedstocks from the storm-struck Texas and Louisiana Gulf coasts, domestic manufacturing output after inflation was 0.14 percent lower in September than in February – a seven-month stretch that conforms with the standard definition of a recession (two consecutive quarters of economic contraction).

>The worst September sequential real output losses were suffered by organic chemicals (14.71 percent), and plastics materials and resins (8.16 percent). These decreases were the biggest experienced by these industries since recessionary September, 2008 (24.92 percent), and December, 2008 (11.72 percent), respectively.

>Interestingly, an artificial and synthetic filaments and fibers sector whose (volatile) real production fell sequentially by an initially reported 9.10 percent saw that result now judged as an 8.44 percent drop (still its biggest since recessionary November, 2008’s 11.25 percent). Moreover, its September production is now pegged as rising by 5.83 percent – the best such on month increase since last September’s 9.67 percent.

>Similarly, although inflation-adjusted petroleum refinery output in September dropped sequentially by 2.52 percent (the biggest such fall-off since January, 2010’s 2.75 percent), the monthly August decrease was revised up from 1.93 percent to a minimal 0.06 percent.

>All the same, these results were enough to depress monthly constant dollar output in the enormous chemicals industry by a downwardly revised 2.31 percent in August and another 2.62 percent in September. The latter result was the sector’s worst such result since recessionary December, 2008’s 4.85 percent shrinkage.

>And in the larger non-durable goods supersector, although August’s monthly production was upgraded modestly to a 0.63 percent decline in real terms, real output decreased by another 0.89 percent – its worst such figure since winter-affected January, 2014’s 1.20 percent.

>Despite the fractional inflation-adjusted September production uptick in manufacturing overall, , and August’s upward revision from a 0.26 percent sequential decline to 0.20 percent, July’s results were changed from a 0.04 percent rise to a 0.35 percent drop – big enough to turn overall revisions negative.

>Nonetheless, the automotive sector produced some good news.

>It’s true that July real output for this industry, which has led manufacturing’s bounceback during most of the current economic recovery, was revised down from a 4.16 percent drop to 4.85 percent – its worst since winter-affected January, 2014’s 5.87 percent. But August’s month-on-month improvement – revised all the way up from 2.16 percent to 3.56 percent – was its best since June, 2016’s (3.89 percent).

>Moreover, although September’s sequential output rise was a mere 0.07 percent, it produced the first two-month stretch of automotive output improvements since the May-October stretch of 2016.

>As of September, however, domestic manufacturing still had not yet completed its recovery from the historic Great Recession. Real production was 4.26 percent lower than when that slump began, more than nine years ago, in December, 2007.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Wage Stagnation Mystery Deepens

Tags

inflation-adjusted wages, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, private sector, recovery, Trump, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If, like most of the policy and business establishments, you’re mystified by the continuing failure of American wages to rise healthily despite labor markets that seem unusually tight, you’ve stayed mystified this morning. The Labor Department has just reported that inflation-adjusted pay in September in the private sector and in manufacturing both fell sequentially for the second straight month. Moreover, the new data reveal that real manufacturing wages worsened year-on-year for the first time in three years.

The figures are still preliminary, but according to the Labor Department, after-inflation wages for the private sector dipped on month in September by 0.09 percent. That’s better than the 0.19 percent drop in August (which is still preliminary, and stayed unrevised), but it means that, as of now, U.S. workers on the whole have failed to keep up with the cost of living for two consecutive months. (The federal government doesn’t track wages in the public sector, because they’re set mainly by politicians’ decisions, not economic fundamentals.)

The annual numbers are every bit as discouraging. Real private sector pay was only 0.65 percent higher this September than last. The results between the previous Septembers? A 1.23 percent real wages rise.

As for the longer-term, price-adjusted private sector wages are up 4.56 percent since the current economic recovery officially began in mid-2009.

But as bad as these private sector statistics are, they nearly glow compared with manufacturing pay’s performance. Industry’s real wages fell 0.09 percent on month in September, too – but that decline followed an unrevised 0.91 percent monthly plunge in August that was the worst since November, 2011’s 0.95 percent nosedive.

Even worse, after-inflation manufacturing wages are now down 0.18 percent year-on-year. That’s their first annual deterioration since September, 2014 (0.29 percent). Moreover, between September, 2015 and September, 2016, real manufacturing pay improved by 1.40 percent.

And since the recovery officially began, more than eight years ago, manufacturing pay has stayed ahead of living costs by a grand total of 1.03 percent. Consequently, over the last year, as poorly as real private sector wages have fared, they’ve widened the performance gap with manufacturing wages. As of last September, the former had increased during the recovery by 3.88 percent, compared with 1.21 percent for the latter – or 3.21 times faster. As of this September, overall private sector wages have advanced 4.43 times faster than manufacturing wages.

This manufacturing wage stagnation should be of special concern to President Trump. It’s true that his months in office so far have seen an employment pickup in industry. But if the supposed mystery of wage lag isn’t solved pretty soon, when the next mid-year elections arrive, those “Blue Wall” voters in manufacturing-heavy states that helped put him in the White House last year could still be feeling pretty blue.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest Bogus Case for TPP Revival

Tags

Barack Obama, Canada, China, exports, George W. Bush, Mexico, non-tariff barriers, The Wall Street Journal, TPP, Trade, trade deficit, trade enforcement, trade laws, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The case for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal pushed by former Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, but killed by President Trump, was never serious. For example, America’s economy represented nearly two-thirds of the vaunted new free trade zone the Pacific rim deal would have represented. Many of its largest economies (notably Canada, Mexico, and Australia) were already connected with the United States by trade liberalization agreements. These and most other TPP members have depended heavily on amassing trade surpluses to generate growth, casting major doubt as to how widely they’d open their own domestic markets. And despite being widely touted as a counter to China’s growing economic and military influence in the region, the deal contained an immense back door for Chinese products in the form of sloppy rules of origin.

Now the Wall Street Journal editorial board has taken the bogus pro-TPP case another fact-free step further. It’s claiming to have unearthed evidence that Mr. Trump’s decision is already hurting American exporters. Except the only “evidence” presented is from a single Japanese study. And its findings consist not of developments that have already taken place, but of projections of what it thinks might take place.

Everyone is of course entitled to an opinion – or a projection. And maybe Tokyo’s National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies knows something about such forecasts that has completed eluded the U.S. Government – which has a terrible record predicting the results of trade deals. But everyone is also entitled to ask why the Wall Street Journal didn’t look at what is already known about export flows between the United States and its would be TPP partners since the Trump decision.

According to the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Trade Dataweb, year-to-date 2016-2017, America’s goods sales to these countries have grown by 5.36 percent. That’s somewhat less than the 6.38 percent increase in total, global American merchandise exports during that period. But not a lot less.

Moreover, this small discrepancy is anything but unheard of. Since the current U.S. economic recovery began (a period during which the TPP was being considered in Washington and all the other capitals that sought the agreement), America’s global goods exports have topped their TPP counterparts in two years, and the reverse has been seen in three years. In two other years, merchandise exports to both groups fell – both times by greater percentages for TPP exports. Moreover, the differences in none of the seven full years for which data exist is substantial.

In other words, the numbers so far support the observations that many of the biggest TPP member economies comprising the smallish non-U.S. TPP trade area (along with smaller economies like Singapore, Chile, and Peru) already have reached trade agreements with the United States – and that optimism regarding a needle-moving U.S. export boost has never been justified.

Moreover, neither the Journal editorialists or any other TPP revivalists has grappled seriously with any of the other reasons for exports skepticism. These range from the prevalence in the non-U.S. TPP economies of the kinds of non-tariff trade barriers that American trade diplomacy has never eliminated or even significantly reduced, to the related likelihood that most of the TPP provisions concerning these barriers are unenforceable.

Nor have pro-TPP voices explained why other agreement provisions – such as a yet another dispute-resolution system that would override American trade laws, plus that back door for China and other non-TPP countries – wouldn’t have supercharged U.S. imports and further swelled an already bloated, trade deficit.

The Journal‘s editorial ends with the hope that “If the 11 remaining members hold out for a U.S. return, it’s possible that rational American self-interest will prevail over protectionist bluster.” But its fact-free missive makes clear that it’s the remaining TPP supporters in the United States that urgently need to display a learning curve.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Hurricanes Muddy September Manufacturing Jobs Results – & Obscure Huge Automotive Revisions

Tags

Bureau of Labor Statistics, chemicals, hurricanes, inflation-adjusted wages, Jobs, manufacturing, non-farm payrolls, petroleum refining, private sector, recession, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This year’s violent hurricane season contributed in September to American domestic manufacturing’s second sequential jobs in the last three months. Industries with extensive facilities on or near the Gulf coast and in the southeast took especially hard on-month hits, notably chemicals (-2,000), apparel (-1,900), and motor vehicles and parts (-3,200). Yet the heaviest single sector job decline came in printing and related activities (3,600).

September employment levels throughout manufacturing, however, also were greatly affected by enormous July automotive revisions, which prolonged a jobs recession in the sector that began in April, 2016. Initially credited with a 1,600 net job rise in July, automotive’s employment improvement was revised up to 5,300, and then dragged all the way down to a net job loss of 27,100. The overall July manufacturing job totals were downgraded from an initial 16,000 net increase to the 11,000 net loss revealed this morning.

Pre-inflation manufacturing wages in September matched the solid 0.45 percent sequential advance recorded for the private sector as a whole. But in manufacturing, this increase followed a 0.49 percent monthly wage drop in August – industry’s biggest since last November (which rounded down to 0.49 percent). Further, manufacturing’s annual current-dollar wage increase of 1.99 percent represents a striking slowdown from the previous year (2.95 percent). Manufacturing’s share of total nonfarm employment actually ticked up, though, in September and August – to just under 8.49 percent. In July, it matched its all-time low of 8.47 percent.

Here’s my analysis of the latest monthly (September) manufacturing figures contained in this morning’s employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics:

>U.S. domestic manufacturing lost jobs on net sequentially in September for the second time in three months, with much of the total 1,000 decline traceable to payroll drops in sectors with many facilities in or near the hurricane-affected Gulf coast and southeastern states.

>For example, significant monthly job hits were taken in the automotive sector (3,200), chemicals (2,000), and apparel (1,900).

>At the same time, the sector with the greatest on-month job losses in September was printing and related support activities (3,600). And the petroleum and coal products industry, another Gulf coast-heavy sector, only lost 100 net jobs from August to September.

>In addition, employment levels throughout manufacturing in September were strongly affected by immense revisions for monthly automotive job changes in July.

>The initial read on vehicle and parts payrolls that month reported a 1,600 monthly jobs gain. The next employment report revised this advance up to 5,300. But this morning, the Bureau of Labor Statistics data tables showed a 27,100 month-to-month net automotive job loss for July.

>As a result, overall monthly manufacturing payroll shifts for July changed dramatically, too – from an initially reported 16,000 improvement to a 26,000 surge to an 11,000 net decrease.

>In fact, these automotive revisions revealed the sector to be mired in a jobs recession that began in April, 2016. Since then, payrolls in the sector have fallen by a cumulative 4,300.

>Manufacturing wages rose a seemingly impressive 0.45 percent sequentially in September on a pre-inflation basis, matching the gain of the overall private sector.

>Yet in manufacturing, this progress was preceded by a 0.49 percent monthly current dollar manufacturing wage drop in August, the biggest such decline since a comparable figure in November. In the private sector, pre-inflation wages rose sequentially in August by 0.15 percent.

>Worse, the September plummet meant that pre-inflation manufacturing wages had risen only 1.99 percent year-on-year – one of the lowest figures of 2017. And this wage gain was much bigger than the 2.95 percent current dollar raise manufacturing workers received between the previous Septembers.

>Moreover, the recovery-era gap between pre-inflation wage increases in manufacturing and in the private sector overall has widened considerably over the last year. In September, 2016, private sector wages had risen 21.55 percent faster than manufacturing pay since the recovery began in June, 2009. This September, the difference was 25.28 percent.

>In absolute terms, during the recovery, current-dollar manufacturing wages are up 15.90 percent in toto and overall private sector wages are up 19.92 percent.

>The latest inflation-adjusted wage data for manufacturing and overall private sector wages go through August, and further darken the pay picture in industry.

>That month, real manufacturing wages plunged by 0.91 percent sequentially – their worst such performance since November, 2011 (0.95 percent). Inflation-adjusted hourly pay for the overall private sector worsened, too – but by just 0.19 percent.

>And since the recovery began more than eight years ago, whereas overall private sector wages have risen by 4.66 percent on a price-adjusted basis, pay has improved by a mere 1.12 percent for manufacturing workers.

>Employment figures tell a similar story. Since hitting its last low point, in February and March of 2010, manufacturing has regained 994,000 (43.35 percent) of the 2.293 million net jobs it had shed since the last recession officially began, in December, 2007.

>Manufacturing employment is still down since that recessionary onset nearly ten years ago, too – by 1.299 million, or 9.45 percent.

>Since its latest employment nadir, in February, 2010, the overall private sector has boosted employment by 17.065 million. That’s nearly twice as many jobs as it lost (8.780 million) during the recession.

>Since the recession began, overall private sector is up by 8.285 million – a 7.14 percent gain over those nearly ten years.

>Somewhat more encouragingly, manufacturing jobs as a share of total non-farm jobs (the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ American jobs universe), rose slightly in September and August (to just under 8.49 percent) from the record low it had matched in July (8.47 percent).

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Trade Deficit Falls Slightly in August as Strong Exports Outweigh Record Manufacturing Shortfall

Tags

Canada, Census Bureau, China, European Union, exports, goods trade, imports, Japan, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, Mexico, non-oil goods trade deficit, oil, recovery, services, South Korea, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

In August, the combined U.S. goods and services trade deficit declined by 2.67 percent sequentially to hit $42.40 billion – its lowest monthly level since September, 2016’s $38.47 billion. The improvement came even though several typical major engines of trade deficit growth worsened.

A new record was set for the chronic and huge manufacturing trade deficit, with its $82.15 billion August total topping the previous high (last November’s $80.75 billion) by 1.73 percent. The manufacturing-heavy China goods gap, meanwhile, grew to its highest monthly level ($34.89 billion) since September, 2015 ($36.29 billion). And the pre-inflation oil trade deficit, which has decreased dramatically in recent years, staged its strongest monthly rebound (jumping by 60.59 percent) since June, 2016 (60.84 percent). Pointing to a hurricane effect: the biggest monthly drop in current dollar oil exports (11.53 percent) since August, 2015 (12.62 percent).

Boosting the August trade performance was the new all-time high hit for services exports ($66.11 billion), the best overall monthly exports figure ($195.32 billion) since December, 2014 ($197.18 billion), and the best monthly goods exports reading ($129.21 billion) since April, 2015 ($129.72 billion). America’s goods trade deficits with Mexico and South Korea, both of which have been criticized by President Trump, increased sequentially in August (by 25.49 percent and 15.20 percent). And the longstanding Japan merchandise deficit grew by 13.49 percent on month.

But merchandise trade shortfall with Trump trade target Canada plummeted by 61.43 percent month-to-month, and the goods gap with the European Union fell by 7.92 percent. The latest figures on the growth-slowing impact of the Made in Washington trade deficit show that it’s weakened slightly (from slowing the U.S. economic recovery by 17.40 percent as of the first quarter of this year to cutting inflation-adjusted growth by 17.30 percent in the second quarter). The new August trade figures indicate that it might decline modestly again once third quarter GDP and September trade data are released.

Here are selected highlights of the latest monthly (August) trade balance figures released this morning by the Census Bureau:

>America’s combined goods and services trade deficit declined by 2.67 percent on month in August to its lowest level ($42.40 billion) since September, 2016 ($38.47 billion), as a new monthly record manufacturing trade shortfall and poor China and hurricane-related oil results were more than offset by strong export performances, including a new all-time high for services exports.

>The August manufacturing trade deficit of $82.15 billion was 1.73 percent greater than the previous record total of $80.75 billion, set last November.

>August manufacturing exports grew by a solid 6.82 percent on month, to $93.51 billion. But the far larger amount of imports rose by 5.07 percent, to $175.67 billion.

>Year-to-date, the manufacturing trade deficit is running 5.56 percent ahead of last year’s record pace. Manufacturing exports for the January-August period are up 4.04 percent, and imports have increased nearly as fast – 4.72 percent.

>Fueling these manufacturing trade results in August was a 3.99 percent month-to-month widening of America’s manufacturing-heavy trade deficit with China. The $34.89 billion total was the largest monthly figure since September, 2015’s $36.29 billion.

>U.S. goods exports to China improved sequentially in August by an impressive 8.75 percent, but merchandise imports, which are much greater, increased by 5.08 percent.

>Year-to-date, the merchandise deficit with China is 6.24 percent higher than last year’s total – which was the second largest annual figure ever.

>The pre-inflation U.S. oil trade deficit, which has nosedived in recent years thanks to the energy production revolution, rose in August from $3.02 billion to $4.85 billion. That 60.59 percent monthly increase was the biggest such rise since the 60.84 percent surge registered in June, 2016.

>Pointing to the effects of this year’s violent hurricane season, oil exports in August recorded their biggest monthly decrease (11.53 percent) since August, 2015 (12.62 percent).

>On a year-to-date basis, however despite the longer-term improvement, this oil shortfall is outpacing last year’s by a stunning 36.01 percent.

>The hurricane impact on oil was also suggested by the excellent export data produced by other major sectors of the economy.

>Services set a new overseas sales record in August, and reached their second all-time monthly high in the last three months. August’s $66.11 billion bested June’s $65.90 billion by 0.33 percent.

>Total U.S. exports improved by 0.42 percent, to $195.32 billion, and thereby hit their highest level since December, 2014’s $197.18 billion.

>Goods exports rose even faster sequentially in August, by 0.44 percent to $129.21 billion. The result was their strongest month since April, 2015 ($129.72 billion).

>Having set reform of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a priority, President Trump no doubt noticed that the U.S. merchandise trade deficit with Mexico surged by 25.49 percent on month in August, to $6.18 billion. U.S. goods exports to Mexico were 5.73 percent higher in August than in July, but import growth was 9.68 percent.

>The year-to-date merchandise deficit with Mexico is so far 11.72 percent higher than in the first eight months of 2016.

>America’s merchandise trade deficit with South Korea, which has just this week agreed to substantive talks on modifying its bilateral trade deal with the United States, increased by 15.20 percent sequentially in August, to $2.22 billion.

>U.S. goods exports to South Korea actually sank by 8.21 percent on month – the biggest such decrease since January’s 21.51 percent. America’s merchandise imports from South Korea fell, too, and for the second straight month – but by only 0.70 percent.

>America’s merchandise trade deficit with South Korea is down so far this year by fully 28.07 percent on a year-to-date basis. But since the bilateral trade deal went into effect, in March, 2012, it’s nearly tripled.

>The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with Japan increased notably (13.49 percent) as well on month in August, to $6.55 billion.

>America’s goods exports to the world’s third biggest single national economy decreased by 5.52 percent month-to-month, while its goods imports rose by 4.02 percent.

>Year-to-date, this merchandise deficit with Japan is running 12.54 percent ahead of last year’s level.

>Better news came in merchandise trade with America’s other NAFTA partner, Canada. The U.S. deficit – which has been volatile recently – plummeted by 61.43 percent in August, to just $410 million.

>American goods exports to Canada improved by 12.50 percent. Imports climbed, too, but by only 9.06 percent.

>Year-to-date, though, the U.S. merchandise trade shortfall with Canada is running nearly three times ahead of last year’s rate.

>Improvement in August was also seen in American merchandise trade with the European Union (EU) – the world’s largest economic unit. On a monthly basis, the U.S. deficit narrowed in August by 7.92 percent, to $12.39 billion.

>U.S. goods exports to the EU advanced by 9.08 percent on month, while imports were up only 2.52 percent.

>Year-to-date, moreover, the American merchandise deficit with the EU is running 0.72 percent behind last year’s rate.

>The latest data for the growth drag on the still weak U.S. economic recovery of rising trade deficits are only from the second quarter. But by both major measures, they show that trade’s bite into the expansion is easing, but remains deep.

>Since the recovery began, in mid-2009, to the end of the second quarter of this year, the increase in the trade deficit has reduced cumulative after-inflation output during the expansion by 9.24 percent, or $247.30 billion. That’s down from the 10.04 percent, and $255.9 billion, as of the first quarter.

>The toll on the expansion attributable to U.S. trade policy is diminishing, too, but has been much higher. This Made in Washington deficit strips out of inflation-adjusted American trade flows energy and services – two sectors where trade policy and related decisions have had only marginal effects so far. The remainder of U.S. trade flows – of goods except oil – are heavily influenced by policy.

>Since the recovery’s onset, the rise of this Made in Washington deficit has cost the recovery $462.8 billion in lost growth in absolute terms – or 17.30 percent of the cumulative total. That’s down from a growth bite of 17.40 percent worth ($443.3 billion in absolute terms) for the first quarter.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Big New Hit to Free Trade Theory

Tags

Adam Smith, Bruce R. Scott, comparative advantage, David Ricardo, economics, economists, factors of production, free trade, Great Britain, machinery, manufacturing, Portugal, protectionism, Ralph E. Gomory, Steve Keen, technology, textiles, The Wealth of Nations, Trade, William J. Baumol, wine, {What's Left of) Our Economy

OK, time for some good news – at least if you’d like the economics community to come up with more realistic views of trade policy and its impact on the national and global economy. As made clearest by a (sadly overlooked) journal article by Steve Keen of Kingston University in London, some noted academic economists have identified fatal-looking flaws in comparative advantage theory – the 18^th century concept that ever since has anchored mainstream scholarly thinking about the entire discipline, along with justifying the virtues of the freest possible trade flows.

As Keen writes, comparative advantage identified benefits flowing from economic specialization, and was first advanced by British economist Adam Smith in his seminal The Wealth of Nations to explain the superiority of laissez-faire, free market practices within industries. His compatriot David Ricardo extended the concept to relationships between industries and countries. The core idea in its trade theory version is that all countries and their peoples will reap maximum gains if they limit themselves to those tasks that represent their own best efforts – even if they’re laggards by international standards in that particular sector.

I first encountered a compelling objection to comparative advantage in the early 1990s, in the form of a sharp observation by Harvard Business School professor Bruce R. Scott. As he noted, Portugal, one of two countries in Ricardo’s classic description of comparative advantage’s virtues, basically hewed to the Ricardian prescription, specialized in turning out relatively simple products (in this case, wine) – and remained a poor country for centuries. The second country was Great Britain. It specialized in higher value goods (epitomized, in that era, by textiles), and became the world’s greatest and richest empire.

More fundamentally, Portugal specialized in activity that could generate good levels of growth in the short-term, but whose long-term wealth creation potential was limited by low levels of productivity growth, capital and technology intensiveness, by limited potential for innovation, and by deficiencies in other closely related indicators of dynamism. Great Britain specialized in activity whose positive spinoffs were bound to be far greater.

Other major Ricardo blind spots have been pointed out since then – for example, his skepticism that capital would ever easily move across borders. But his central insights have continued commanding pervasive respect among professional economists. Just as important, they’re still revered by political leaders and opinion molders who find these theories convenient for portraying their often self-interested trade policy preferences as indisputable truths, or who learned in a freshman economics class that they’re gospel.

Keen’s big addition to comparative advantage critiques has to do with unfettered free trade’s likely effect on an economy’s diversity and growth potential. As he notes, Ricardo’s case for liberalizing trade flows hinges on a completely unrealistic assumption about its impact on a national productive base, and hence on national output and incomes. The assumption: that countries will wind up better on net if they abandon those activities that don’t meet the comparative advantage test, and refocus their efforts on activities that can pass it, and that such a transition is feasible in the first place.

In other words, Portugal would scrap all of its textile factories (and presumably all its other industries as well), and become for all intents and purposes a mono-economy devoted to wine. Great Britain would abandon whatever wine-making and other non-textile work it was engaged in, and turn into a big cloth-making facility. What of the other necessities of national and individual life, at least those that are in theory trade-able? They would be imported – and paid for by the earnings from exports of the national champions.

Simply articulating this scenario reveals how completely fanciful it is. For example, what about supplying needs before the envisioned transitions are completed? How long will they last? And even over decades under a free trade regime, could the global economy possibly be expected to turn into the kind of exquisitely complex but perfectly functioning mechanism that could enable a large number of mono-economies from securing the full range of traded goods and services that are either needed or simply wanted?

Keen, however, identifies what he reasonably seems to view as a more fundamental problem: The sectors of the economy in which Ricardians want countries to specialize are relatively strong because they efficiently use various factors of production (chiefly, according to Keen, machinery). The Ricardian transition entails other parts of the economy switching to that strong sector (again, wine-making and textile-making in Portugal and Great Britain, respectively), and essentially becoming just as good as wine-making – largely because all the kinds of machinery used in that economy can easily, and indeed seamlessly be redeployed in the strong sector.

If this assumption was valid, as Keen observes, then it would be reasonable to suppose that each rejiggered national economy could produce even more output, and generate higher incomes for its population, than before. But as the author also observes, this outcome makes no sense because “machinery is specific to each industry, and the crucial machines in one industry cannot simply ‘move’ to another without loss of productivity.” And if you believe, as is the case with mainstream economics, that rising productivity is a key – and over the long run, the biggest key – to rising incomes, then you should recognize this Ricardian transition also as a recipe for worsening national impoverishment.

That is, in the kind of mono-economy Ricardo hoped would eventually comprise the global economy, most of the populace would be struggling with inappropriate capital stock and other assets to earn a living engaged in activity with which it boasted little, if any, experience.

Why did Ricardo overlook something so obvious? In Keen’s words, it’s an example of “a confusion of monetary capital (which Ricardo, as a stockbroker by trade, knew intimately) with the physical machinery in factories (about which he knew very little). Yes, monetary capital moves easily in search of a profit—today, even internationally. But machinery is specific to each industry….”

However, Keen continues, “The archetypal machines for cloth and wine manufacturing in Ricardo’s time included the spinning jenny and the wine press. It is stating the obvious that one cannot be turned into the other, but stating the obvious is necessary, because the easy conversion of one into the other was assumed by Ricardo, and has been assumed ever since by mainstream economic theory.”

Here’s another example of the same delusionality that will be familiar to everyone who’s followed the U.S. trade policy debate for the last few decades: the claim by supporters of current trade policies that trade-related production and job losses are no big deal because America’s real edge in the global economy going forward is, say, services. So the best response is to train all those displaced auto workers to become nurses (and, pace Keen, to use all that surplus auto production machinery to write software).

Just as interesting, Keen points to a small but growing body of research touting the advantages of industrial and other economic diversity – the opposite of Ricardo’s aim. A broad-based manufacturing and technology base has of course long been supported by critics of current trade policies for national security reasons (to ensure the ability to produce an adequate range of defense assets), and to avoid potentially dangerous dependence on foreign supplies of civilian goods as well.

Similarly, it’s been contended that too many linkages exist among manufacturing industries, and between manufacturing and many kinds of services, to assume that entire sectors can be lost without major collateral damage.

Keen’s piece, however, also spotlights evidence that the world’s least successful national economies tend to possess narrow – at best – productive bases and to generate a comparably narrow range of exports, and that the most successful turn out a wide variety of goods for both domestic and foreign markets.

Keen’s theoretical critique of Ricardo is by no means the only one that’s come from the ranks of economists themselves. In 2001, William J. Baumol (a former President of the American Economic Association no less) and Ralph E. Gomory, one of the nation’s leading technology authorities, produced this study purporting to show that explicitly promoting national industries and technologies via various forms of government intervention (including tariffs) can produce better results for individual countries that toeing the free trade line.

But the Baumol-Gomory case has (so far) failed to dent confidence in Ricardian trade theory notably. And certainly the Mainstream Media never displayed much interest. In that vein, of possible import is the appearance this week on Bloomberg.com of this follow-up of sorts to Keen-like analysis. More steps on a  journey of a thousand miles?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Growth’s Quality is Better, but Remains Far from Good

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business spending, Financial Crisis, GDP, gross domestic product, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, personal consumption, real GDP, recession, recovery, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As indicated in yesterday’s post, the final (for now) returns are in on America’s economic growth for the second quarter, and as RealityChek regulars know, it’s a new occasion to look at the crucial and sorely neglected subject of the quality of American growth. What the figures show is that, despite some tiny signs of progress, nearly a decade after a terrifying financial crisis caused by bloated spending on personal consumption and housing, the U.S. economy is still heavily dependent on growing via bloated spending on personal consumption and housing.

First, let’s review the situation on a stand-still basis. For the second quarter, the share of inflation-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) comprised by personal consumption came in at 69.60 percent. This figure – for the first full quarter of the year during which Donald Trump has been president – was slightly above the 69.56 percent for January-March quarter, and an all-time record.

The second component of what I’ve called the “toxic combination” is housing spending, which stood at 3.49 percent of real GDP. That’s lower than the 3.58 percent share for the first quarter, and (thankfully) well below the record of 6.17 percent set at the height of the previous decade’s housing bubble, in the third quarter of 2005.

Nonetheless, because personal spending has become so strong, the total toxic combination in the second quarter came to 73.09 percent of after-inflation GDP. That’s a bit below the 73.14 percent share for the first quarter but, more important, it’s just slightly less than the record 73.29 percent of real GDP set by the toxic combination set in the second quarter of 2005. So it’s difficult to argue that one of the biggest lessons of the financial crisis and ensuing recession has been learned.

The picture looks somewhat better lately when the economy’s main growth engines are examined – that is, when we analyze the economy on a dynamic, not a stand-still basis. During the second quarter of 2017, the toxic combination of personal and housing spending generated 64.03 percent of after-inflation growth. That’s less than half their share during the first quarter (140.65 percent – these numbers can be more than 100 percent because of the GDP components that subtract from growth).

It’s also a considerably smaller growth role than such spending has generally played since very early in the economic recovery. In fact, here’s how much constant dollar growth the toxic combination spurred, by year, from 2011 (when the economy was returning to normal following a deep slump and strong but largely incomplete initial snapback) to 2016: 97.50 percent, 60.36 percent, 79.17 percent, 80.16 percent, 98.25 percent, and 138.26 percent.

Even better, the growth role played by business spending – which creates productive assets like factories and labs, and also includes spending on research and development – could be on the upswing. The figures for the first two quarters of this year have been volatile, and in the wrong direction: 69.62 percent and 27.06 percent respectively.

But these numbers together so far have reversed the trend from 2011 to 2016 – when the share of growth accounted for by business spending plummeted from 53.75 percent to turning into a small growth drag.

The stand-still numbers, however, show that the U.S. economy remains so heavily skewed toward personal and real estate spending that only a major – and doubtless unprecedented – surge of business spending can start turning matters around. And the economy will remain far too fragile and crisis-prone till it does.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade was a Marginal Growth Engine in the Second Quarter

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Bureau of Economic Analysis, Commerce Department, exports, GDP, goods, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, real GDP, real trade deficit, recovery, services, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The final (for now) solid 3.03 percent annualized real GDP growth figure for the second quarter benefited slightly on a sequential basis by a drop in the inflation-adjusted trade deficit to $613.6 billion – the lowest such level since the third quarter of 2016 ($557.3 billion). Trade’s role as a quarterly growth engine, however (adding 0.21 percentage points) decreased to its smallest on a relative basis since the third quarter of 2014 (when its fueled 0.28 percentage points of 5.11 percent annualized growth).

New quarterly constant-dollar records were all achieved for total exports and goods exports, and for all import categories. For total imports and goods imports, these records were their fifth straight. Real services exports increased sequentially at their fastest annualized rate (6.2 percent) since the first quarter of 2013 (7.1 percent). But services imports hit their eleventh straight quarterly record ($498.2 billion).

Trade’s subtraction from cumulative recovery-era real growth remained considerable in the second quarter, but shrank sequentially both in toto (from 10.04 percent in the first quarter to 9.24 percent) and in terms of the Made in Washington deficit that tracks trade flows heavily influenced by trade policy (from 17.40 percent to 17.30 percent).

Here are the trade highlights from Thursday morning’s GDP report from the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis:

>The final read on second quarter economic growth produced an unusual mix of results given all the attention focused on President Trump’s stated resolve to reform U.S. trade policy. On the one hand, a sequential drop in the inflation-adjusted trade deficit to $613.6 billion (its lowest level since the $557.3 billion in the third quarter of 2016) helped lift annualized quarterly growth to 3.03 percent – the best such result since the first quarter of 2015 (3.20 percent).

>On the other hand, trade’s positive contribution to growth was its smallest on a relative basis (adding 0.21 percentage points) since the third quarter of 2014 (0.28 percentage points out of 5.11 percent annualized real growth).

>On a stand-still basis, new quarterly records were set for nearly all after-inflation categories of trade flows, including across the board on imports.

>Real total exports increased by 3.48 percent sequentially at an annual rate, from $2.1623 trillion annualized to $2.1811 trillion – their second straight all-time high.

>Real goods exports also hit their second straight quarterly record, improving by 2.17 percent annualized, from $1.4923 trillion annualized in the first quarter to $1.5004 trillion.

>Real services exports rose quarter-to-quarter at their fastest annual rate (6.01 percent) since the first quarter of 2013 (6.86 percent). But their $682.3 billion total fell short of the record of $684.9 billion set in the second quarter of 2015.

>Real combined goods and services imports in the second quarter rose sequentially at their slowest annualized rate (1.48 percent) since the second quarter of 2016 (0.39 percent). But their $2.7948 trillion figure was still their fifth straight quarterly record.

>Real goods imports set their fifth straight quarterly record, too. They rose by just 1.33 percent on an annual basis (the slowest pace since the third quarter of 2016’s 1.23 percent) to hit $2.7948 trillion annualized.

>As for real services imports, they set their eleventh straight quarterly record ($498.2 billion) – even though they advanced by a mere 2.18 percent annualized (the slowest such pace since the 1.01 percent annual growth in the second quarter of 2016).

>The new GDP figures showed that trade kept subtracting from America’s cumulative growth during te current economic recovery, but that the growth drag lightened by both major measures.

>As of these final second quarter results, the increase in the inflation-adjusted trade deficit since the second quarter of 2009 (when the recovery officially began) has sliced $247.3 billion from the real gross domestic product’s improvement – a growth drag of 9.24 percent.

>As of the first quarter, this growth drag was 10.04 percent, or $255.9 billion.

>The bite into growth from the Made in Washington trade deficit’s increase was much greater, but diminished as well.

>The post-second quarter, 2009 widening in this trade deficit – which strips out trade in energy and services and focuses on import and export flows heavily influenced by trade policy – cost the economy $462.8 billion, resulting in a growth drag of 17.30 percent.

>The Made in Washington trade deficit’s growth drag in the first quarter was 17.40 percent, or $443.3 billion.