(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence that Trade Wars are Absolutely Winnable for America

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Apple, China, Financial Times, global supply chains, globalization, manufacturing, Paul Krugman, Rana Foroohar, tariffs, Trade, trade wars, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Throwaway lines are among my favorite aspects of opinion writing, largely because in a simple, usually brief, and almost by definition understated sentence or two they can thoroughly debunk or at least gravely weaken shibboleths that have reigned virtually unchallenged for decades. And Financial Times columnist Rana Foroohar had a doozy yesterday.

As is well known by anyone who’s been closely following the development of President Trump’s trade policies and the uproar they’ve triggered, some of the biggest fears surrounding the prospect of the “trade wars” they’re deemed all too likely to ignite concern the impact on global supply chains. As explained this morning by Nobel Prize-winning economist and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman;

“[C]orporations have invested trillions based on the assumption that an open world trading system, permitting value-added chains that sprawl across national borders, was going to be a permanent fixture of the environment. A trade war would disrupt all these investments, stranding a lot of capital.”

And since lots of capital would be stranded, lots of employment patterns worldwide would be disrupted, too – including in the numerous American manufacturing industries that have been thoroughly globalized and whose ability to assemble, further process, or produce goods in their U.S. facilities therefore depends on the smooth operations of these corporate networks.

Further, tariffs on imports from China allegedly would be especially damaging, since Chinese factories play such key roles in so many manufacturing supply chains, and since China’s prominence in globalized manufacturing in large part stems from so many special manufacturing strengths that the Chinese have developed – often by hook or by crook – in recent decades. If you need a compelling example, check out this early 2012 article on why Apple, among many others, has concentrated its industrial operations in the PRC.

At the same time, since Mr. Trump won the White House, not a few companies have either started relocated some production in the United States in response to actual or threatened tariffs, or made public remarks indicating that supplying the U.S. market from abroad would make no sense if trade barriers impeded their access. Other corporate leaders were saying even before Mr. Trump’s election that mounting protectionism and populism worldwide were bound to result in more localized manufacturing.   

So it’s become clear in recent years that however much they’ll complain about moving supply chains, business leaders scarcely view the challenge as impossible. Still skeptical? Recall how easy it’s been for them to send even the largest supply chains from inside the United States to outside American borders, or capitalize on the existence of overseas networks. And recall how quickly many of these transfers happened.

Just how fast they took place, and can still take place, is where Foroohar’s column comes in. In yesterday’s column, she echoed my point about supply chain movements that are either already underway or being contemplated:
“Over the long term, China and the US are headed towards regional supply chains for high-growth technologies of the future.” She continued – consistent with the conventional wisdom, “But in the short term, the interdependencies will be difficult to untangle.”

Then, however, came the kicker – which received no special emphasis from the author at all:

“Several executives who supply Fortune 500 companies have told me it would take months if not years for the biggest US companies to break completely free of Chinese components.”

To repeat: Months – and at the outside years – for many companies to marginalize China’s role in particular in global supply chains. And then remember the reward: Greatly diminishing China’s still-burgeoning influence over the American economy and over the broader global economy, and in the process blunting the growing threat it poses to U.S. security interests both in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world.

That sounds like an appealing – indeed, no-brainer trade-off – to me. For an American leader hoping to disrupt U.S. trade and globalization policy for long-term gain, and facing numerous raucous short-term complaints, it should be an especially effective pitch to make, and an urgent policy target to prioritize explicitly and pursue systematically. Anyone seen any politicians like that lately?

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: May US Manufacturing Output Figures Could Feed Optimism or Pessimism

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automotive, durable goods, Federal Reserve, Great Recession, industrial production, manufacturing, non-durable goods, recovery, {What's Left of) Our Economy

May’s Federal Reserve domestic U.S. manufacturing production figures presented a puzzling glass-half-empty-half-full picture. Overall sequential real output levels were down 0.63 percent – their worst such performance since July, 2013’s 1.06 percent decrease. Clearly playing a big role was a fire at a factory producing parts for especially popular pickup truck models, which helped depress after-inflation automotive production by 6.45 percent – its worst such performance since April, 2011’s 7.91 percent plummet.

Yet stripped of automotive’s woes, inflation-adjusted manufacturing output was still down 0.18 percent on month in May, and the month’s decline represented the third such fall-off in the last five months. Largely as a result, industry’s annual constant dollar production increase improved in May by just 1.85 percent – the slowest such rate since January’s 1.10 percent. The automotive decline helped drag down monthly production in the durable goods super-sector by 1.16 percent in price-adjusted terms – the biggest such decrease since July, 2013’s 1.42 percent. Real output in the smaller non-durable goods super-sector was off only 0.08 percent in May.

After-inflation manufacturing output is still down 3.85 percent since the start of the last recession – more than eleven years ago.

Here are the manufacturing highlights of the Federal Reserve’s release Friday on May industrial production:

>May’s Federal Reserve industrial production figures contained evidence for both optimism and pessimism about the U.S. economy and its domestic manufacturing sector.

>Optimists could reasonably blame much of the 0.63 percent sequential drop in real manufacturing output – the worst monthly decrease since July, 2013’s 1.06 percent decline – on a fire at a factory providing parts for popular U.S. pickup truck models.

>And indeed, the May overall manufacturing production swoon was led by a 6.45 percent on-month plunge in motor vehicle and parts output – the worst such performance since April, 2011’s 7.91 percent.

>But pessimists could note that even counting the automotive effect, the rest of domestic manufacturing posted a 0.18 percent dip in monthly inflation-adjusted output – the third such shrinkage in five months.

>Largely as a result, manufacturing’s annual growth rate in May was down to 1.85 percent – its weakest since January’s 1.10 percent. Between the previous Mays, real manufacturing production expanded by 1.87 percent.

>Automotive’s troubles also showed up in the results for the durable goods super-sector in which it’s found. Durable goods’ after-inflation production sank by 1.16 percent sequentially in May – its worst such performance since July, 2013’s 1.42 percent plummet.

>In addition, its 1.97 percent constant dollar May annual growth rate was durable goods’ slowest since January’s 0.94 percent. Between the previous Mays, price-adjusted durable goods production advanced by 2.18 percent.

>Inflation-adjusted output held up better in the smaller non-durables super-sector in May. Its monthly production slipped by just 0.08 percent.

>On-year in May, non-durables’ real production rose by 1.73 percent. As with durable goods, this growth rate is the slowest since January (1.28 percent), but the deceleration has been smaller. Moreover, this year’s May annual production rate for non-durables was better than that for the previous Mays (1.57 percent).

>Revisions for overall real manufacturing production were slightly negative. April’s previously 0.47 percent monthly increase was upgraded to 0.57 percent. March’s already downgraded 0.02 percent rise was downgraded to a 0.11 percent decline. And February’s downwardly revised 1.40 percent increase was bumped down again to 1.39 percent.

>Largely as a result, in price-adjusted terms, domestic manufacturing’s production is now 3.85 percent lower than at the onset of the Great Recession – more than eleven years ago, at the end of 2007.

>After-inflation durable goods output is now 0.10 percent below the levels it hit in December, 2007, and 0.13 percent less than in January, 2008 (its last actual peak).

>Despite their recent out-performance, the non-durables sector has fared much worse since the last recession hit. Its constant dollar output is down fully 8.35 percent from its previous peak, which came in July, 2007.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: CNBC Interview Now On-Line, Plus Background Info & Context

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China, CNBC, Made in China 2025, North Korea, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I’m pleased to announce that the video is now on-line of my interview yesterday on CNBC on President Trump’s new announced tariffs on imports from China. Click here to see it.

As is usually the case, though, the segment was way too short to deal with all the aspects and angles of this decision that deserve attention. So here’s some material I prepared for the segment producer at her request the night before the broadcast. Sharp-eyed RealityChek regulars will find some of these points familiar, but to me, that just goes to show that many of the questions that have surrounded Mr. Trump’s trade policies since his inauguration remain either completely unanswered, or largely unanswered – as do many of the potential pluses and minuses. These talking points are as follows: 

“1. Although the White House may announce the tariff list tomorrow, it remains far from certain that all, or any, of them will actually be imposed. The Section 301 law providing their statutory basis permits the U.S. Trade Rep’s office 30 days to put them in place after the order formally appears in the Federal Register. In addition, the President could delay the duties up to 180 more days (i.e., after the midterm elections) if he determines that significant progress is being made in trade talks with China, or that the delay would encourage such progress.

“2. Less formally, these windows could enable the President to delay the tariffs’ imposition in order to encourage China to remain cooperative on the North Korea crisis. Mr. Trump has most recently declared his determination to go ahead with the tariffs despite acknowledging China’s help vis-a-vis Kim Jong Un, but at times in the past, he’s linked decisions to ease up or postpone such tariff decisions because of China’s purportedly cooperative attitude. And on a related issue, just before his summit with Kim, he explicitly called his decision to lift the “death penalty” on China telecoms firm ZTE a favor to Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

“3. I personally believe that any linkage between China trade policy and North Korea policy would be a serious mistake, as it assumes that Beijing is helping the United States defuse tensions on the peninsula as an act of charity, rather than a course of action that is squarely in China’s interest. As a result, linkage could reward China for taking steps it would have taken anyway.

“4. The President deserves major credit for recognizing that diplomacy and engagement alone have not sufficed to stem the economic and national security threats presented by China’s wide array of predatory trade and investment policies, exemplified most recently by its Made in China 2025 programs.

“5. In particular, Mr. Trump has recognized that U.S. allies are simply not serious about making significant contributions to a multilateral effort to combat China’s trade and broader economic predation. Similarly, he understands that the WTO is completely inadequate to this task, and that unilateral American action has long been essential.

“6. But his policies can be faulted in several respects.

“a. Some of his China-related goals seem flatly contradictory. Chiefly, the President says he wants to reduce the massive bilateral trade deficit America runs with China. But he also wants China to reduce its recent harassment of U.S. and other foreign companies and make it easier for them to do business in China. If the Chinese agree on the latter, much of the increased American (and other) corporate investment in China will wind up producing goods for export to the United States, thereby increasing the deficit.

“b. Tariffs on imports from China, all else equal, could well reduce the bilateral trade imbalance – especially if China opens its markets wider to U.S. exports, too. But the impact could be limited because shipments from other countries are likely to fill the gap to some extent.

“c. In addition, Mr. Trump should be paying more attention to the makeup of the trade deficit. In this regard, he has (erroneously) indicated that he would satisfied to see stepped up American exports of farm and energy products to accomplish much and even most of the deficit-reduction goal. But it’s much more important to narrow the gap in high value manufacturing industries, which make a much greater contribution to the American economy.

“d. The President is going to remain under attack on the tariff front from industries and sectors of the economy that might suffer losses, and these criticisms could well undercut GOP candidates in the upcoming midterm elections. He will also be criticized for taking measures the increase consumer prices. He could have preempted many of these criticisms in two main ways:

“First, earlier in his term, he should have strongly backed the border adjustment tax contained in the original Republican tax bill. This measure would have in effect both imposed a 20 percent tariff on imports and given a 20 percent subsidy to American exports. And since it would have been across-the-board, it would have provided protection and subsidies for both producers of finished goods (e.g., steel- and aluminum-using industries), and of the inputs for these finished goods.

“Second, he should be doing a much better job of persuading the American people that any change as disruptive as the new trade policies he’s begun to put into effect are bound to entail some short-term costs and sacrifices, but that the long-term benefits are well worth the candle. Tweets are not nearly enough. He needs a full-court PR press – Oval Office speeches, rallies, town hall meetings, the works.”

Another important point I wasn’t able to make: It’s true that, as the anchors and the other guest maintained, most economists think that trade deficits don’t matter to the health of a national economy. But as explained in the post linked here, this claim dangerously overlooks how trade deficits, and especially their increase, inevitably worsen the quality of the economy’s growth and makeup, and weaken the foundations of sustainable prosperity.    

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing Labor Productivity Growth is Looking Like an Endangered Species

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Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve, Jerome Powell, labor productivity, manufacturing, multi-factor productivity, non-farm business, productivity, recovery, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell stated yesterday that the U.S. economy is doing “very well.” Judging by the metrics that the central bank is supposed to focus on as a matter of law – inflation and the headline unemployment rate – that’s an eminently respectable claim. Based on another key measure of economic performance – labor productivity – it looks like whistling in the dark.

As known by RealityChek regulars, strong productivity growth is widely seen by economists as the best guarantor of sustainable future prosperity and rising living standards. And as also known, labor productivity is the narrower of the two such measures of economic activity tracked by the federal government.

But it’s the gauge that’s updated on the most timely basis, and the latest numbers – which came out last week – should be spurring alarm, not complacency.

These final (for now) results for the first quarter of this year both confirmed that output per person hour worked for the non-farm business sector (the broadest definition of the U.S. economy used in these studies) remains stuck in an historically slow-growth phase, and showed that labor productivity in manufacturing may be shifting into contraction.

The labor productivity performance of both these major sectors was revised down in the latest release from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Rather than having grown by 0.70 percent on an annualized basis sequentially in the first quarter, labor productivity for non-farm businesses is now estimated to have advanced by only 0.40 percent. And in manufacturing, a 0.50 percent annualized increase is now judged to have been a 1.20 percent decrease. That’s its third such drop in the last five quarters.

A glass-half-full analysis would point out that the new non-farm business figure was better than that for the fourth quarter of last year (0.30 percent), and that the manufacturing fall-off followed a 4.20 percent fourth quarter jump.

But the new BLS report also presented manufacturing revisions going back to 2008, and they make clear that its labor productivity performance during this period has been far worse than even previously thought. (And it was already really bad.)

Let’s concentrate on how the new statistics have changed the picture for manufacturing labor productivity during the current recovery, and compare those results with those for previous recoveries – since such analyses yield the best, apples-to-apples, results.

Before the new data came out, manufacturing labor productivity during this expansion was reported to have grown by a total of 9.69 percent. That was less than a third of the rate achieved during the recovery of the early 2000s – which was also known as the Bubble Recovery that helped trigger the financial crisis and ensuing recession, and which last only six years versus. The current recovery is approaching its ninth anniversary.

And during the nearly ten-year long expansion that began in the early 1990s, manufacturing labor productivity surged even more strongly – by 45.86 percent.

The new manufacturing labor productivity growth number for the current expansion? Only 8.28 percent! That’s a downgrade of more than 14.50 percent!

Moreover, although the non-farm business labor productivity growth rate for the current recovery wasn’t revised down nearly as much – from 9.70 percent to 9.62 percent. But this figure, too, pales next to those of previous recoveries. During the bubble expansion, non-farm business labor productivity rose by a total of 16.03 percent. During the 1990s expansion, the rate was 23.25 percent.

By the way, don’t put too many hopes in the broader productivity measure – multi-factor productivity – to come to the rescue. Those numbers haven’t been much better.

Some productivity students have been arguing that it’s only a matter of time, and that recent technological advances will soon start super-charging productivity growth after a slow start just as they did in an earlier era of transformative technological change – the 1920s.

These optimists had better be right. Because if not, the only way to return American growth and living standards gains to their historic rates of improvements will be to flood the economy with credit in order to crank up spending. Feel free to scream if the date “2008” means anything to you.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Real Deal with the U.S.-Canada Trade Balance

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aerospace, Canada, China, crude oil, dairy, energy, Justin Trudeau, lumber, natural gas, subsidies, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Extra! Extra! Read all about it! The nation’s globalist political and media classes have gotten it right on a major U.S. trade policy issue!

I’m talking about the numerous complaints issuing from American politicians, journalists, talking heads, and purported academic and think tank experts about President Trump’s decision to make Canada the focus of so much of his trade-related ire.

Mr. Trump is right about Canada maintaining sky-high tariffs and lavish subsidies in certain sectors of its economy, like dairy and lumber. (I’d add aerospace to this list.) But the idea that Canada represents one of America’s biggest trade headaches, and has been taking advantage of the U.S. economy left and right due to poorly negotiated trade deals, is completely belied by the numbers. And P.S. – it’s not even necessary to point to America’s services trade surplus with its northern neighbor to debunk the numbers.

The keys are recognizing the immense role played by energy in bilateral goods trade. Commerce in crude oil and natural gas is almost never the subject of the U.S. trade deals and broader trade policy decisions that the President – for the most part – has correctly lambasted.

Energy’s predominance is most apparent when U.S.-Canada trade in goods is calculated according to the measures used most prominently by the American government – total exports, and general imports. In fact, these headline data show that the U.S. oil and gas shortfall has typically been twice the size of the overall American merchandise trade deficit with Canada – meaning that when it comes to other goods (like manufactures) the United States has been running a surplus.

For example, in 2009 (the year the current U.S. economic recovery began), according to these figures, the United States ran an overall $20.18 billion goods trade deficit with Canada, a $45.75 billion deficit in crude oil and natural gas, and a $30.02 billion surplus in manufacturing.

Last year, the overall U.S. merchandise deficit with Canada had fallen to $17.50 billion – largely because the energy deficit had sunk to $16.45 billion. And the American manufacturing surplus reached $41.07 billion.

As many trade policy critics have rightly pointed out, the total exports and general imports numbers aren’t the best data for measuring U.S. bilateral trade balances. (They’re fine for America’s global trade balances, though, as the discrepancies that emerge in the bilateral accounts cancel each other out on a worldwide scale.) Instead, the most accurate picture is provided by looking at domestic exports and imports for consumption – i.e., the trade flows that concentrate on exports that are actually made in America (as opposed to being transshipped through the United States from countries where they originated), and on imports that Americans actually purchase for their own use (as opposed to products being transported through the United States to their final destinations).

But although these statistics reveal a much larger U.S. merchandise gap, along with deficits in manufacturing, oil and gas predominate in these figures as well. In 2009, the domestic exports etc numbers show a total American goods trade deficit with Canada of $52.89 billion – nearly 87 percent of which was in oil and gas. The manufacturing shortfall, moreover, was tiny – only $200 million.

By 2017, according to this measure, the annual U.S. goods deficit had risen to $64.84 billion. But the oil and gas deficit – which had shrunk dramatically in absolute terms due to the U.S. energy production revolution – still comprised a little over 73 percent of this total. And the manufacturing deficit was only $4.28 billion (out of a U.S. global total of more than $937 billion).

I can understand why President Trump views Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as a pro-globalist showboat. I agree. But when it comes to trade, and turning it into an engine of growth and domestic job creation, Mr. Trump has much bigger fish to fry – starting with the thoroughly and increasingly predatory trade policies pursued by his “good friend,” Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Fake News Attack on the Trump Metals Tariffs

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aluminum, Catherine Rampell, competitiveness, fake news, manufacturing, metals, steel, tariffs, The Washington Post, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Pundits like the Washington Post‘s Catherine Rampell have every right to warn that President Trump’s metals (and other) tariffs will ultimately harm the U.S. economy more than it helps. What they have no right to do is peddle demonstrably false claims like her contention that because of the price hikes so far seen for steel and aluminum since these levies came onto the American trade agenda earlier this year, companies reliant on these materials for their final products “are now less competitive.”

I call these claims demonstrably false because every month, the U.S. government publishes detailed statistics on the nation’s trade performance, and the data through April contain absolutely no evidence that domestic metals-using industries are on the ropes – or anywhere close.

Let’s examine what seems to be the national chattering class’ and policy establishment’s favorite measure of industrial competitiveness: American exports. If the Trump tariffs have indeed been pushing U.S. metals-using industries close to the ash heap of economic history, then their overseas sales for the first few months of this year (the tariffs became likely when the Commerce Department officially recommended them in mid-February), should be much lower than they were the first few months of last year – or at least growing much more slowly.

In fact, just the opposite has been seen, at least when it comes to three major sectors of the economy that are especially heavy users of steel and aluminum – transportation equipment, non-electrical machinery, and fabricated metals products.

Over the first four months of this year (the latest data available), America’s global exports in these categories were not only 5.83 percent greater than over the same period in 2017. The year-to-date growth rate was some 7.2 times higher than that for 2017 (0.81 percent).

Perhaps more significant, the difference between the January-April, 2018 export growth rates for these metals-using industries and their January-April, 2017 growth rates was much greater than for American manufacturing as a whole. During the first four months of 2018, total U.S. manufacturing exports have grown 7.45 percent year-to-date. That’s higher in absolute terms than the export growth for the metals-using industries, but this export increase has been only 2.12 times faster than their export growth rate for January-April, 2017 (3.52 percent).

But what about my favorite measure of American competitiveness – trade balances and how they’ve changed? I focus on these two-way flows because the theory of comparative advantage at the heart of all justifications for the freest possible global trade makes sense only if these surpluses and deficits have consequences for global production patterns.

After all, comparative advantage holds that trade is the best possible way to create the best possible global division of labor – meaning that in a world of unfettered commerce, countries that trade products and services most successfully will inevitably wind up making those products and providing those services most successfully, and that all countries will benefit on net. And the countries that trade products and services most successfully are those that amass the biggest surpluses in those products and services. The opposite propositions logically hold the impact of running deficits in various sectors.

As it happens, the trade balance figures don’t show or presage any apocalypse for America’s metals-using industries, either. During the first four months of 2017, their cumulative trade deficit with the rest of the world increased by 10.56 percent on year. For the comparable period this year, the deficit’s year-to-date growth rate was faster: 11.64 percent. But clearly, this trade shortfall didn’t grow much faster.

The comparison with trade deficits for manufacturing as a whole is instructive as well. During January-April, 2017, this trade gap increased by 10.19 percent on year. During January-April, 2018, the figure was 10.85 percent.

So the metals-using industries’ trade deficit did grow faster during both periods than the shortfall for manufacturing as a whole. But the difference in the rate of acceleration has been trivial. In the metals-using sectors, the deficit during the first four months of 2018 grew 1.10 times faster than it grew during the first four months of 2017. For manufacturing as a whole, the deficit during the first four months of 2018 grew 1.06 times faster than during the same period in 2017.

I’d be the last to argue that this situation will never change. The Trump metals tariffs haven’t been imposed very long. Moreover, they’ve been phased in, so the full impact of their final (for now!), most sweeping version hasn’t yet been felt.  

Nonetheless, the effects could also be swamped by the benefits metals-using sectors have gained from the new corporate tax cuts and the regulatory relief offered by the Trump administration – two policies that industry as a whole has hailed enthusiastically as major boosters of competitiveness.

What should be unmistakably clear, though, is that claims that U.S. metals-using industries are already suffering from the Trump steel and aluminum are no better than Fake News – and deserve nothing more than scorn from all fair-minded readers.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Rules-Based Global Order – & Other Fairy Tales

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alliances, America First, burden sharing, China, currency, Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, globalists, Great Recession, hegemony, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, public goods, recovery, Robert Triffin, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, Triffin dilemma, Trump, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Can the foreign and domestic critics of President Trump’s latest trade policy moves finally get real – and start talking and acting like adults? I’m not referring to politicians and analysts who have pointed out problems with individual aspects of the President’s recent announcements of tariffs on various trade competitors. I’ve been one of these myself.

Instead, I’m talking about those who keep whining that Mr. Trump’s tariffs and his overall – inconsistently to be sure – emerging “transactional” approach to alliances and other international arrangements are endangering a rules- and institutions-based global order that has served both America and the rest of the world unmistakably well. No description of the post-World War II world could be less accurate and indeed more childish – not to mention more self-serving for the supposed U.S. allies and multinational business interests (and their Washington, D.C. hired guns) that have pushed this canards so insistently.

For the institutions and rules so touted by President Trump’s globalist critics were simply window-dressing created to obscure a much less aesthetically pleasing reality: The postwar (non-communist) world’s success has been based fundamentally on America’s power and wealth, and the  consequent U.S. ability to provide what political scientists call “public goods” for those aligned with it. Specifically, it almost single-handedly created the conditions on which success decisively depended: the military protection that countries recovering from war-time devastation could not provide for themselves, and the credit and export markets that were similarly beyond the capacities of their crippled economies. Just as important, during the early post-war decades, the United States could play this role for the most part without excessive security risks and economic costs.

Unfortunately, even the biggest, best-run public goods-providing country will find these arrangements unsustainable, especially on the economic front, and especially if its government is substantially accountable to its people. The essential dilemma was first identified by the Yale University economist Robert Triffin back in 1960, when American power was at or near its zenith.

Triffin’s warning was narrowly economic. He argued that the very free lending and especially spending by which such a country (which political scientists call a “hegemon”) fueled growth around the world would eventually massive international deficits and a global glut of its currency – which was serving as the world’s money – and erode global confidence that currency’s value. Either the hegemon could tighten up – and likely throw the entire world economy into a major downturn. Or it could keep over-lending and especially spending. In this case, its currency would lose enough of its perceived value to end its world-money role, and the world economy would degenerate into chaos. Or the rest of the world could keep stockpiling these excess dollars – which as the French in particular noted would result in the inflation caused by the greenback’s declining value being exported around the world.

Yet in America’s case, the ultimate engines of the paradox – at least in post-World War II America’s case – were foreign policy and domestic politics-related. The over-spending, and consequent deficits stemmed from the United States’ determination simultaneously to incur the expenses of maintaining huge military forces at home and abroad (along with dispensing considerable foreign aid), and of satisfying the American public’s growing demand for social services, without increasing taxes enough to finance these programs responsibly. At the same time, the dilemma was greatly intensified by the refusal of the foreign beneficiaries of these U.S.-provided public goods to pay many more of the costs of their own defense, or to open their markets wider to American exports.

The breakdown of these arrangements in 1971 bore out Triffin’s warnings, but although major adjustments were made globally, the rest of the world continued relying heavily on American security guarantees and markets. And in fairness, a bipartisan American foreign policy establishment addicted to intangibles like “global leadership” and genuinely worried that its European and East Asian allies could not manage their own security affairs in particular responsibly, staunchly resisted any fundamental changes to the status quo.

Fast forward to the mid-2000s, and the exact same fundamental problem reemerged. Further, a Triffin-like situation was greatly worsened by two new developments. First, the Federal Reserve decided to enable reckless over-spending by American consumers by keeping interest rates at peacetime lows not seen for many decades.

Second, American trade policy swelled the international deficits by taking a new, offshoring-focused turn starting with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s, and culminating with multinational companies’ decisions to focus tightly on supplying more and more American business and consumer demand from China, not from the United States.

Not so coincidentally, this trade policy shift was accompanied by the creation of an international organization – the World Trade Organization (WTO) – that was the first such body ever authorized to create both binding rules for any international policy sphere, and to utilize enforcement mechanisms in which the United States enjoys no special standing (as opposed, for example, to the United Nations Security Council, where the United States and other permanent members possess an individual veto over decisions).

A better recipe could not be created for empowering China (and the rest of the world’s major export-dependent economies) to view the United States as an even more attractive dumping ground for surplus production; for undermining America’s internationally recognized right to respond unilaterally; and for consequently enabling footloose multinational companies to supercharge the trade deficits by sending an astonishing amount of the nation’s production capacity to China and other super-low cost countries that could not or would not import remotely as much as they could or would export.

The end result: Rather than the United States winding up exporting inflation and (along with free-riding allies and trade competitors) bringing down a global monetary order, America exported financial instability, triggering the worst worldwide financial crisis, the deepest international economic downturn since the Great Recession, and the weakest U.S. economic recovery on record. And revealingly, to the cheers of the bipartisan American foreign policy and economic policy establishments, the first post-financial crisis president, Barack Obama, kept America’s grand strategy firmly on course.

Although it’s still unclear whether Mr. Trump is choosing an effective combination of trade and alliance policy tactics, his initiatives so far raise even more important questions. Chiefly, is he simply trying to achieve greater security and economic burden-sharing? And even if his aims at present are restricted to securing better deals, is he prepared to scrap American participation in current alliances and other international institutions altogether if U.S. tariffs and other America First-type threats don’t seem to be working?

Nonetheless, the President has opened the door to elevating America’s thinking about its global environment toward the adult levels that ultimately will be needed to prevent today’s lopsided unsustainable international arrangements from disastrous crackups. If his critics want to increase the odds that the best choices will be made, they’ll need to grow up, too.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing Job Creation Softened a Bit in May; Wages (Literally) Went Nowhere

Tags

Employment, inflation-adjusted wages, Jobs, manufacturing, non-farm jobs, private sector, recession, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I was on some travel yesterday and couldn’t put out my usual same-day, post. But here’s my analysis of the latest monthly (May) manufacturing figures contained in that morning’s employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics:

>U.S. manufacturing job creation shifted into a somewhat lower gear in May, with its 18,000 sequential gain the smallest such improvement since last September’s 6,000. Revisions left the last February through April monthly totals unchanged on net.

>Worse news, moreover, came on the manufacturing wages front. Pre-inflation hourly pay flat-lined on month in May – its worst such results since last November’s similar performance. In addition, April’s previously reported 0.15 percent monthly manufacturing constant dollar wage gain was revised down to 0.15 percent.

>By contrast, overall current dollar private sector wages saw their best monthly improvement (0.30 percent) since December’s 0.38 percent.

>As a result, May’s year-on-year manufacturing wage improvement before inflation totaled only 1.85 percent. Between the previous Mays, pre-inflation manufacturing wages advanced by 2.12 percent.

>These increases also lagged those for the overall private sector, where current dollar wages rose by 2.71 percent on year in May. That was the best such performance since January’s 2.77 percent. And it exceeded the 2.46 percent private sector wage gain between May, 2016 and May, 2017.

>Consequently, the wage gap between manufacturing and the overall private sector widened significantly between last May and this. As of last May, during the current economic recovery, pre-inflation private sector wages had increased 21.24 percent faster than manufacturing wages. This May, the difference was up to 28.13 percent.

>Despite May’s somewhat weaker manufacturing employment growth, the sector’s share of total non-farm employment (the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ U.S. jobs universe) remained at just under 8.53 percent. Last May, manufacturing accounted for just under 8.49 percent of total non-farm employment, meaning that during the last year, manufacturing payrolls have grown slightly faster than American payrolls in general.

>In fact, manufacturing’s May year-on-year job creation (259,000) was a tremendous improvement from the figure between the previous Mays (78,000) and the best annual gain since May, 1998’s 262,000.

>Over the longer-term, however, manufacturing remains a significant job-creation laggard. Since it’s latest employment bottom, in February and March, 2010, it’s regained 1.22 million (53.21 percent) of the 2.293 million jobs lost during the recession and its immediate aftermath.

>The overall private sector lost 8.780 million jobs from the year-end 2007 onset of the recession through February, 2010. Since then, it’s created 19.086 million net new jobs.

>Moreover, since the recession’s onset, the private sector has boosted its employment by 8.88 percent. But manufacturing payrolls are still down 7.81 percent from their December, 2007 levels.

>Manufacturing has been an even worse real wage laggard. The latest inflation-adjusted data go through April, and show that manufacturing couldn’t even match the monthly flat-line in private sector wages. In manufacturing, pay between March and April dipped by 0.09 percent.

>Year-on-year, private sector after-inflation wages inched up only 0.19 percent in April, but even that negligible growth handily beat manufacturing’s 1.10 percent decline. Between the previous April’s inflation-adjusted manufacturing wages improved by 0.55 percent.

>Indeed, both the private sector and manufacturing continue to experience technical real wage recessions (periods of cumulative shrinkage lasting at least two quarters). But in the private sector, such pay is off only 0.09 percent since last May. In manufacturing, real wages are down by this amount since January, 2016.

>And whereas private sector wages are up 4.17 percent in real terms during the current economic recovery (which is nearly nine years old), their manufacturing counterpart gained only 0.37 percent – less than a tenth as much.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: On Those Latest Trump Tariffs

Tags

aluminum, border adjustment tax, China, European Union, FDI, foreign direct investment, intellectual property theft, Made in China 2025, metals, overcapacity, steel, subsidies, tariffs, tax reform, Trade, Trump, value-added tax, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Never let a good set of talking points go to waste! Earlier this morning, one of the broadcast networks asked if I was available for a segment on the latest Trump administration tariff announcements, and wanted to get an idea of where I came down. Even as I was typing up the following, though, I was told that the plan had changed, and that the program in question had decided to go with a Member of Congress instead.

Yet since they’re still relevant to this latest phase of U.S. trade policy, I thought you might find them useful in this slightly edited form.

1.  If the Europeans and other major economies retaliate vs the new U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs, they’ll make clear their indifference to the government-subsidized Chinese output has flooded global markets with both these metals, and seriously distorted trade flows.  In recent years, these foreign governments have paid lip service to the need to curb Chinese overcapacity, but many have enabled it by transshipping Chinese metals (mainly steel) to the US market or stepping up their own exports to the US to relieve the pressure China has put on their own producers.

2.  As a result, (as I’ve previously documented) during the current global economic recovery, the US is the only major steel producing country that has seen its share of world output fall significantly. 

3. Moreover, (as I’ve also shown), the higher input costs resulting from the new metals and other tariffs pale beside the benefits recently received by U.S.-based businesses (including metals users) due to tax reform and regulatory relief.

4. Re both the steel and China tariffs, I wish that Trump had backed a superior alternative:  the Border Adjustment Tax contained in the original version of the House GOP tax bill.

The BAT would have functioned like a value-added tax (a levy imposed by virtually every other country) — imposing a tax on imports heading for the U.S. market, and providing a subsidy for U.S. exports.  Since the BAT would have been across-the-board, no U.S. industry (e.g., metals-using manufacturers) could have argued that it was going to be disadvantaged because its products would have received the same benefits.

Moreover, the BAT was backed not only by House GOP leaders with staunch pro-free trade records.  It was also supported by many major multinational manufacturers.  In addition, it would have been perfectly legal under the WTO, since it so closely resembles the value-added taxes so many other countries have had in place for decades.  But President Trump – for reasons that remain unclear – never came on board.

5. In the absence of the BAT, though, the metals tariffs are essential for correcting major distortions in global trade flows caused by Chinese overcapacity, and the China-specific tariffs are essential for offsetting the impact of Chinese trade predation (including rampant intellectual property theft and extortion) on high tech industries, exemplified by the “Made in China 2025” program.

6. Nonetheless, re China specifically, I have criticized some of the Trump response as being internally inconsistent.  If for example the United States convinces the Chinese to treat U.S. companies operating in China more equitably, U.S. corporate investment in the PRC could well increase, and the trade deficit that Mr. Trump wants to shrink is likely to grow, as much US investment in China creates products exported to the US.

7. More generally, I’m deeply skeptical that any Chinese promises to halt or reduce these forms of protectionism can be verified — because the Chinese bureaucracy operates so secretively, the Chinese national manufacturing complex is so vast, and because the United States will never be able to send over to China enough officials to monitor compliance effectively.

8. As a result, rather than seeking to improve Chinese behavior, I believe U.S. policy toward the PRC should aim first and foremost to reduce the extensive linkages between the two economies.  In this vein, ever more sweeping U.S. moves and proposals to curb Chinese direct investment in key industries in America is a good first step.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Higher Trade Deficit Pulls Down First Quarter U.S. Growth Rate

Tags

exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, real GDP, real trade deficii, recovery, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The second read on the inflation-adjusted first quarter gross domestic product (GDP) revealed that the slight growth slowdown (from a 2.30 percent annualized increase to 2.16 percent) was driven by a higher trade deficit figure ($650.9 billion annualized) than initially reported ($645.9 billion annualized). This figure – though still lower than the fourth quarter’s $653.9 billion – remained the second highest price-adjusted quarterly trade shortfall since the $703.2 billion total reported for the third qurter of 2007 – just before the onset of the Great Recession.

The quarterly records for all major import and export figures remained intact in the new data, but all of the latest export totals came in slightly lower, and all of the latest import figures came in slightly higher. At the same time, the sequential slowdowns in the growth of total imports and goods imports (79.17 percent and 86.21 percent, respectively) remained the greatest since the first quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2009, respectively. The latter date came at the depths of the Great Recession.

The new GDP figures showed that trade’s drag on cumulative growth during the current recovery remained substantial – and the first quarter total (9.41 percent) was slightly higher than the initially reported 9.23 percent. As a result, though, this trade drag was down somewhat from the 9.82 percent it hit as of the fourth quarter of last year. But the subtraction from cumulative constant dollar economic growth was still an impressive $535.09 billion.

Here are the trade highlights from this morning’s second report on first quarter GDP growth from the Commerce Department:

>The Commerce Department’s second read on gross domestic product (GDP) in the first quarter of this year revealed that a higher quarterly inflation-adjusted trade deficit than initially estimated helped bring about the slightly lower growth figure contained in the new report.

>The increase in the quarterly trade deficit estimate (from $645.9 billion annualized to $650.9 billion annualized) contributed to the real quarterly growth estimate being reduced from 2.30 percent to 2.16 percent.

>The first quarter figure was lower than the fourth quarter’s $653.9 billion. But it still represented the second highest such trade shortfall since the $703.2 billion reported in the third quarter of 2007 – just before the Great Recession struck.

>Because of this quarterly decline in the after-inflation trade deficit, trade still added to constant dollar economic growth in the first quarter. But the contribution fell from a 0.20 percentage point contribution to 2.30 percent annualized growth to a 0.08 percentage point contribution to 2.16 percent annualized growth.

>Levels of all major categories of real American exports and imports remained at record levels in the latest GDP data. But all of the export figures came in slightly lower than initially reported, and all the import figures came in higher.

> Real total exports are now judged to have been $2.2529 trillion in the first quarter on an annualized basis, not $2.2563 trillion. As a result, the sequential increase on an annualized basis was 1.04 [ercent, not 1.19 percent.

>The new real total export total nonetheless remained the category’s fifth straight quarterly record.

>Real goods exports are now judged to have been $1.5696 trillion in the first quarter on a annualized basis, not $1.5722 trillion. As a result, the annualized sequential increase was 1.32 percent, not 1.49 percent.

>But this too was a fifth straight quarterly record.

>Real services exports are now judged to have been $687.4 billion annualized in the first quarter, not the $688.3 billion previously reported. As a result, the annualized sequential increase was 0.47 percent, not 0.60 percent. The new total, however, was a new record as well.

>The first quarter’s total real import figure has now been revised up from $2.9022 trillion on an annualized basis to $2.9038 trillion. As a result, the sequential increase is now 0.70 percent, not 0.64 percent. The new total is still a second straight quarterly record.

>The goods imports total is now estimated at $2.3993 trillion annualized, up from $2.3985 trillion. annualized represented this category’s second straight all-time quarterly high. As a result, the sequential growth is 0.56 percent, not the 0.52 percent previously reported, but the level is still a second straight quarterly record, too.

>Real services imports for the first quarter are now estimated at $502.9 billion annualized, not the $502.1 billion previously reported. As a result, their sequential growth is now 1.35 percent, not the 1.19 percent previously reported. But this new total is a record, too.

>At the same time, both the total imports and the goods imports growth rates still represent the biggest sequential slowdowns in years.

>Even the slightly higher inflation-adjusted total import growth reported for the first quarter (0.70 percent) was 79.17 percent lower than the fourth quarter’s 3.36 percent. That’s still the biggest such change since the first quarter of 2011 (81.87 percent).

>The slightly higher inflation-adjusted goods import growth reported for the first quarter (0.56 percent) was 86.21 percent lower than the fourth quarter’s 4.06 percent. That’s still the biggest such change since the first quarter of 2009 (87.63 percent) – near the low point of the Great Recession.

>With the modest increase between the initially reported first quarter annualized real trade deficit and today’s figure, trade’s drag on the current economic recovery became even larger.

>As of the latest data, the increase in the after-inflation trade deficit has reduced total real growth since the recovery’s onset in mid-2009 by 9.41 percent, or $284.6 billion. The initial first quarter read produced a figure of 9.23 percent, or $279.6 billion.

>Yet this growth drag is still a bit less than the fourth quarter’s 9.82 percent (or 287.6 billion.

>The growth drag of the increase in the Made in Washington trade deficit – which focuses on the non-oil goods trade flows most heavily influenced by trade agreements and other trade policies – has been much greater during the recovery.

>As of the first quarter, this Made in Washington recovery drag stood at 18.26 percent of cumulative real recovery growth ($535.09 billion). That’s a small improvement over its drag as of the fourth quarter of last year – 18.38 percent of cumulative recovery growth, or $538.81 billion.