(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Peak Inflation Claims Should Finally Peak

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Biden adminstration, core PCE, energy prices, Federal Reserve, food prices, food stamps, inflation, PCE, personal consumption expenditures index, student loans, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s how bad today’s official report on the Federal Reserve’s preferred gauge for U.S. inflation was: It looked awful even without taking the baseline effect into account. That is, it looked awful even if you don’t examine how the new (August) year-on-year increases compare with both their predecessors and those for the preceding year, and understand that the 2021-22 numbers are coming off 2020-21 results that were alarmingly high to begin with,

Yes, the annual increase in August in the headline version of the Fed’s favored price index for Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) dipped from 6.4 percent in July to 6.2 percent. But by last August, it had already climbed to 4.2 percent – more than twice the Fed’s target rate.

Worse, though, was the acceleration in the August annual core PCE read from 4.7 percent to 4.9 percent . These are the figures that leave out food and energy prices – supposedly because they’re volatile for reasons that have nothing to do with the economy’s underlying inflation prone-ness.

Inflation optimists had seized upon the June-July drops in the headline PCE (from seven percent to 6.4 percent and from five to 4.7 percent, respectively) as a major sign that price increases had peaked. The August statistics seem to throw frigid water on that conclusion.

Worse still was the speed up in both inflation indicators on a monthly basis. Headline PCE had actually fallen sequentially in July by 0.1 percent, but in August it rose by 0.3 percent. And that’s despite energy prices nosediving (by fully 5.5 percent on month) both because towering gasoline prices had forced many Americans to cut back on driving, and because the rest of the world economy is seeing dramatically reduced growth, which depresses energy demand.

Replacing energy as a major cost-of-living driver were food prices, which were up month-to-month by 0.8 percent. So unless you think energy prices will keep sinking like a stone, it’s become tougher to stick with the peak inflation claims.

But the biggest blow to the peak inflation case came from the monthly core results. Even omitting those volatile food and energy prices, core inflation jumped by 0.6 percent between July and August, after flatlining between June and July. And this new August monthly hike ties June’s for the year’s worst.

And I’d be remiss in closing without mentioning two recent Biden administration steps sure to buoy inflation still further – the student loan forgiveness plan (even – if it survives legal challenges – in its new scaled back form) and his big expansion of food stamp benefits (prompted at least in part, and ironically, due to those huge food price increases). Whatever you think of the merits of these programs, their net effect inevitably will put more income in consumers’ pockets and thus support spending while doing nothing to increase production. That is, as economists like to say, more money will be chasing the same amount of goods and services – an inflation-fueling formula no thinking person disputes.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How Labor Shortages Can Help U.S. Manfacturing – & the Entire Economy

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aerospace, aircraft parts, labor shortages, manufacturing, productivity, Reuters, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s some advice for Reuters reporters Allison Lampert and Rajesh Kumar Singh, and their editors Kevin Krolicki and Bill Berkrot: If you’re going to produce a story showing that labor shortages are decimating output in a certain part of the economy, make sure they really are decimating output in a certain part of the economy. Because in the case of the U.S. aircraft parts sector on which their piece this morning focuses, it ain’t.

How do we know this? First of all, it’s true that “In the United States, aerospace employment” is below its “pre-pandemic level” (though by my calculations, the Labor Department data show the fall-off has been 7.66 percent from immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020 through last July) and not 8.4 percent, as the article contends). And that’s indeed much worse than the record compiled in manufacturing overall – which is up 0.52 percent during that period.

Further, the workforces in aircraft engines and engine parts are down even more sharply – by 8.94 percent and 14.88 percent, respectively.

But output “grounded,” as the headline claims? Not exactly. In fact, according to the Federal Reserve’s manufacturing production figures, output in the broad aerospace products and parts category has surged by 28.44 percent between February, 2020 and last month. In the narrower aircraft and parts grouping, the growth has been 30.60 percent.

And these numbers are inflation adjusted, meaning that they’re not being artificially boosted by price increases. They represent the volume of stuff being turned out. And they leave in the dust the results for manufacturing overall (up 3.69 percent in real terms since just before the CCP Virus arrived in force).

Even more striking, the output rebound in aerospace has remained strong recently. In that broad category, it’s jumped 10.38 percent year-on-year in August. For aircraft and parts, the surge has been an even faster 30.60 percent.

How can this be? The answer should be obvious to anyone who knows even a smidgeon of economics. These industries have become much more efficient. And indeed, official figures show that labor productivity in aerospace products and parts soared by 15.50 percent between 2020 and 2021 (the latest figures available). The comparable figure for all manufacturing? Just 3.30 percent. (As known by RealityChek regulars, the government also tracks a broader measure of productivity, called total factor productivity, but the detailed industry figures aren’t out yet.)

And here’s what’s totally weird: Steps taken by companies in aircraft parts to compensate for scarce workers, and plans to take more, were reported in the Reuters piece.

There’s no doubt that businesses in manufacturing overall and in aerospace in particular would love to have more workers – largely because demand for their products is exceptionally strong. But as the output and productivity data reveal, they’re figuring out how to solve this problem – and impressively.

That’s not only not a bad news story – it’s a great news story. And if other industries (including in the service sector) could remotely duplicate this performance, responding to labor shortages by making technological and other forms of progress, rather than by pleading for more mass immigration and other productivity-killing crutches, the entire economy and its prospects would be in much better shape than at present.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence of Biden-Flation’s Toll

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American Rescue Plan, Biden administration, Covid relief, energy prices, Federal Reserve, food prices, hunger, inflation, monetary policy, progressives, recession, supply chain, Ukraine War, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Left-of-center critics of the Federal Reserve’s inflation-fighting efforts keep insisting that risking recession to tame prices would unnecessarily harm the most vulnerable Americans and their struggling working class counterparts. Instead,  many have claimed that living costs can be cut sufficiently by forcing greedy corporations to charge less through windfall profits taxes, price controls, and the like.

And they’ve bridled in particular at charges that the Biden administration’s American Rescue Plan (ARP) greatly worsened the problem by handing trillions of dollars of CCP Virus relief – and therefore purchasing power – to U.S. consumers well after economic growth had already rebounded strongly and unemployment had already nosedived.

Any development that can engulf the gargantuan American economy, like historically high inflation, almost by definition has many different causes. But anyone doubting the economic overheating role of the ARP should check out the graph below, which is found in this Reuters piece from over the weekend.

The article adds to the evidence that still-towering inflation rates are devastating low-income Americans by super-charging the prices of that most basic of basics: food. But the graph makes clear as can be how the ARP contributed to the problem.

As it shows, prices of food (the darker line) began taking off just about the time that the ARP’s strings-free child tax credit payments started to be sent out (July 15, 2021, to be precise) – and not just to the needy, but to considerably better off households as well. Not so coincidentally, the share of American families with children reporting to U.S. Census Bureau surveys being “sometimes or often” short of food (the lighter line) started taking off soon after. And also noteworthy – these food price rises began many months before Russia’s February, 2022 invasion of Ukraine began playing its own major food inflation role. 

As the article also emphasizes, between 2020 and 2022, “as pandemic restrictions eased, so did the appetite for congress and some states to fund hunger prevention efforts.” But continuing federal purchases for “pantries, schools and indigenous reservations” were needed in the first place largely because food – not to mention other necessities – kept becoming so much more expensive.

The lesson here isn’t that no pandemic assistance should have been provided at all. After all, genuine suffering was widespread in its early phases and no one knew how long they would last. And the Fed’s left-of-center critics are correct that ongoing CCP Virus-related and Ukraine War-related energy supply disruptions have greatly boosted prices recently, too.

But as noted here previously, the supply- and demand-side roots of inflation are very closely related (because businesses can be relied on to continue raising prices as long as they can find enough buyers, and to cut them when customers start balking). Moreover, although in economists’ lingo, some prices are “inelastic” (because they’re for goods and services that are essential enough to prevent purchasing cutbacks even after major price increases), when they rise high enough, they can still foster lower prices for other purchases that are deemed less important.

Therefore anything, like big government checks, that fills consumer pockets will strongly tend to spur inflation sooner or later. So when help does need to be provided, it should be much more precisely focused on relieving genuine privation than pandemic relief was.

Even more important: The inflationary effects of supporting household consumption can be offset – and are best offset – by policies to support more production. When the Fed’s left-of-center critics start addressing defects in that supply side of the economy, rather than trafficking in gimmicks sure to exacerbate them, their complaints about excessive central bank monetary medicine will deserve a much bigger audience. In the process, they’ll be able to deliver lasting assistance to those whose plight they rightly emphasize.        

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Two Needed Changes in U.S. China Policy

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auditing, Biden, Biden administration, China, currency, dollar, Donald Trump, fraud, investors, national security, SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission, stock market, stocks, tariffs, Trade, Wall Street, yuan, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although I’ve been pleasantly surprised by how much of former President Donald Trump’s China policies have been retained by President Biden (like the tariffs and tech-related sanctions and tighter export controls), two recent developments reveal how much room for improvement remains – on permitting Chinese entities to list on U.S. stock exchanges, and on those Trump tariffs.

Regarding the stock market issue, Washington incomprehensively keeps giving these entities (they shouldn’t be called “companies” or “businesses” becauuse they have nothing in common with organizations meriting those labels in largely free market economies) the kind of special treatment afforded to members of its stock exchanges from no other countries – including America itself.

Specifically, these Chinese entities continue to be able to raise vital capital in U.S. markets even though they haven’t yet been required to comply with the standards for opening their books fully that are mandatory for every single one of their domestic and foreign counterparts. Therefore, investors can’t make informed decisions, and regulators can’t discover much fraudulent activity.

It’s true that U.S. authorities have just struck a deal with Beijing that potentially gives them the access to Chinese records that they need. But that’s the problem. It’s still “potential.” And the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may still be bending over backwards to coddle China. Why else would it have agreed with its Chinese counterparts to keep the text of the deal secret? What devils lie in the always crucial details? Full disclosure here is especially important because of Beijing’s long record of violating signed agreements (see, e.g., here) and because the Chinese government’s statement describing its interpretation of its obligation differs significantly from Washington’s – which is virtually guaranteed to produce protracted further bickering.

This typical bobbing and weaving, in fact, raises the question of why the United States has engaged recently – or ever – in any negotiatons in the first place. After all, Washington has been seeking adequate access to the entities since 2007. China has resisted American demands by citing the important national security and other state secrets that unfettered audits might reveal. But as the SEC itself has pointed out (see the preceding link), more than fifty other countries have required their companies to turn over all records as a condition for listing. China clearly has the right to withhold any information it wishes. The U.S. response from the beginning should have been that if a Chinese entity’s operations are so critical to China’s national security, it doesn’t belong in the U.S. financial system, and able to win U.S. and other investment attracted by the Good Housekeeping seal provided by being listed,to begin with.

Washington’s position all along also should have been that there’s literally nothing to talk about. The United States should have declared listing to be a take-it-or-leave-it proposition for China, and that it will serve as judge, jury, and court of appeals (as it is in all cases). As of this past spring, America’s long failure to do so has permitted these entities to amass a market value of $1.3 trillion. And because all of them are always subject to all of Beijing’s whims, that means these valuable resources have been put at the disposal of the Chinese regime.

What to do now?  Ditch the diplomacy stuff and tell Beijing that unless each of its listed entities turn over to U.S. auditors every scrap of information demanded by date certain (meaning real soon), they all get kicked off Wall Street immediately.

When it comes to trade issues, the Biden administration’s mistake is much simpler – and easier to correct. The President deserves considerable praise for the September announcement that the Trump tariffs will be kept in place for the foreseeable future. But China’s predatory trade policies have not remained in place, and in at least one vital respect, have gotten worse – on the value of its currency, the yuan.

For many years, especially in the first decade and a half of this century, Beijing kept the value of the yuan versus the U.S. dollar artificially low. As known by RealityChek regulars, this practice gave goods made in China (including by offshoring-happy U.S.- and other foreign-owned multinational companies) big price advantages the world over for reasons having nothing to do with market forces. The result were equally artificial boosts to Chinese exports and artificial reductions of Chinese imports.

This year, China has doubled down (not literally!) on this tactic, depressing the yuan’s value versus the greenback by fully nine percent. So the American response should be obvious: The tariffs on each of the roughly $370 billion worth of Chinese goods intended each year for the U.S. market should be raised by nine percent also. And each future Beijing move to devalues the yuan another one percent or more should be matched by another equivalent U.S. tariff hike.

This American retaliation isn’t likely to fuel inflation at home, because of falling U.S. demand due to a slowing economy and a shift in consumer spending to services. So importing U.S. companies won’t have the pricing power to pass on their higher costs. But it will put further pressure on a Chinese economy whose other growth engines (like the real estate sector and the domestic consumer market) are faltering mainly because of the deflation of a ginormous Chinese housing bubble and dictator Xi Jinping’s politically inspired crackdown on his own tech companies and his over-the-top Zero Covid policies.

P.S. If China starts strengthening the yuan again, I wouldn’t lower the tariffs in response. For the aim of U.S. policy toward the People’s Republic now can’t afford to be an indulgence like fairness, but weakening this increasingly hostile and dangerous government, and maximum U.S. economic disengagement (often called “decoupling”). But I’d be amenable to some easing of economic pressure and decoupling if I saw major evidence of big, concrete improvements in Beijing’s economic and military policies – say over a five- or ten-year period for starters.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So What’s with U.S. Inflation Now?

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baseline effect, Biden, businesses, consumer price index, consumers, core inflation, CPI, energy prices, Federal Reserve, food prices, inflation, PPI, Producer Price Index, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Just my luck! I get invited to an exciting conference in Florida last week, and two days of it took place when the latest U.S. inflation figures, covering retail and wholesale prices for August, came out.

I was able, though, to note in a tweet after perusing them quickly, I couldn’t “do my usual monthly #CPI dive. But when I do, I bet I find that the baseline effect that had somewhat misleadingly boosted 2020-21 y/y #inflation #s is starting conversely to misleadingly dampen 2021-22 annual results somewhat.”

Well, now I’ve had the chance to examine the new Consumer Price and Producer Price Indices (CPI and PPI, respectively), and it turns out I’d have won that bet. And these findings provide ample reason for skepticism that peak inflation is over for Americans.

It may not be likely to spiral up further, as President Biden suggested last night on Sixty Minutes. But the August data indicate that, on an annual basis, just as a good share of the higher increases businesses charged consumers and each other earlier during the current burst of inflation stemmed from statistical quirks that produced artificially hot numbers, the last few months’ year-on-year results are artificially tame because of that statistical quirk working in reverse.

That is, consumer and business prices may stop accelerating, and may even decline slightly from where they are now. But in absolute terms, goods and services will probably remain painfully expensive and keep straining household and company budgets – at least until the Federal Reserve’s inflation-fighting moves or other developments kill enough economic demand (as intended) to destroy most of the pricing power companies presently enjoy.

Sharp-eyed RealityChek regulars will understand that, of course I’m talking about the baseline effect. Specifically, late last year and early this year, much of the  scary-looking multi-decade high yearly price increases could be attributed to the fact that the previous annual inflation numbers were rock-botton low because of the sharp economic downturn and its aftermath created by the CCP Virus’ first wave in the spring of 2020. Because price increases virtually stopped then (and in some months actually fell in absolute terms), the return to the recent norm in year-on-year inflation rates resulted in deceptively high inflation figures.

As chronicled here, e.g., the baseline effect then began fading – signaling that more of the still-worrisome official inflation data coming out of Washington was due to changes in actual economic conditions, and that consequently price increases would have more staying power.

Lately, though, as the second calendar year of high inflation has dragged on, the statistical distortions may be leading to excessive complacency. The reason? What modest dips have been recorded in annual inflation rates are now coming off baseline figures that were already close to historic highs, as opposed to being stuck near zero.

So this tells me that if goods and service providers have been able to raise prices over the past year by, for example, about eight percent on top of the seven percent increases they successfully pushed through the year before, they must be pretty confident that they can keep prices at or near these towering levels until the economy tanks for whatever reason.

And my reading of the numbers bears out this thinking.

Let’s start with the so-called headline CPI figure, which showed an 8.25 percent annual increase in August. That’s the best such performance since the 8.22 percent reported for April. But this latest April year-on-year figure followed a 4.15 percent headline CPI read between the previous April’s. August’s baseline figure was considerably higher – 5.21 percent.

The so-called core CPI read for August wasn’t quite as encouraging, mainly since this measure strips out food and energy prices due to their supposedly unusual volatility. And energy prices in particular are well off their peaks ovewhelmingly because of American drivers’ unwillingness to pay those $5 per gallon gasoline prices that prevailed in late spring into early summer, and because of the major economic slowdowns being seen in China and Western Europe.

Indeed, August’s annual 6.32 percent rise was the highest since March’s 6.44 percent. But the baseline effect means that such inflation was even worse than it looks, for the March annual result followed a core CPI increase of just 1.66 percent between March, 2020 and March, 2021. The August number followed a previous annual surge of 3.96 percent – more than twice as strong.

The “reverse baseline effect” has been even more dramatic for the Producer Price Indices. August’s annual wholesale inflation mark of 8.69 percent was the best for the entire year, and decidedly lower both than July’s 9.78 percent and way weaker than the recent peak of 11.67 percent reported for March.

That torrid March pace, though, followed a 2020-21 increase of 4.06 percent. The new August inflation rate comes on the heels of an 8.58 percent PPI worsening between August, 2020 and August, 2021. Even worse, that 2020-21 percent producer prices inflation rate was a striking example of catch-up. From August, 2019 to August, 2020, wholesale prices fell in absolute terms by 0.17 percent. That can only mean that powerful momentum still lies behind these producer prices.

The same story has played out for core producer prices. This August annual result – 5.61 percent – was also the year’s best. And not only was it much better than the peak number of 7.11 percent in March. It represented the fourth straight decrease.

But that March core PPI result followed a 3.15 percent annual increase in these prices between the previous Marches. The baseline figure for this August’s result was 6.19 percent – as with the headline PPI data, nearly twice as high.

This is why the strongest argument that peak inflation has been hit comes from the month-to-month numbers. For headline CPI, prices edged up sequentially in August by just 0.12 percent. Although that’s a slightly worse performance than July’s 0.02 percent monthly decrease, it’s a veritable nosedive from this year’s highest figure – June’s 1.32 percent.

If you believe, with fall and winter just around the corner and the Ukraine War still disrupting global oil and gas trade and supplies that the energy prices paid by U.S. consumers will keep falling at the August monthly rate of five percent, you’ll be optimistic about core CPI. If you have your doubts…not so much.

The monthly core CPI increases have fluctuated less than the headline, and generally have been lower in absolute terms. But August’s 0.57 percent sequential increase was actually stronger than July’s 0.31 percent, and not much slowing is evident this year in this inflation measure.

The monthly PPI figures look more peak inflation-y – especially since when businesses have to pay higher prices for the goods and services their operations need, they do their darndest to pass these higher costs on to consumers. At the same time, as I’ve noted in posts on tariffs and inflation, the converse can’t be counted on. Businesses generally won’t give consumers a price break even when their own costs decrease unless demand slacks off, too.

All the same, even though energy is mainly responsible, it’s important that in August, headline PPI weakened sequentially for the second straight month – sinking by 0.13 percent. As with core CPI, core PPI rose faster on month in August (0.23 percent) than in July (0.14 percent). But these last two figures were two of the year’s best.

Still, in line with my oft-stated position that data over longer time periods is more reliable than data over shorter time periods, I’m putting more stock in the annual figures – again, until and unless the economy slows significantly or tips into recession.  And they’re making clear that the nation faces a near-term future f historically and troublingly high prices, if not continually soaring prices,    

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Output Keeps its Head Above Water

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aircraft, aircraft parts, appliances, automotive, CCP Virus, computer and electronics products, coronavirus, COVID 19, electrical components, electrical equipment, fabricated metal products, Federal Reserve, furniture, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, machinery, manufacturing, medical devices, miscellaneous durable goods, petroleum and coal products, pharmaceuticals, real growth, recession, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, transportation equipment, wood products, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Yesterday’s figures from the Federal Reserve showed that U.S.-based manufacturing is still growing – by the barest of margins.

The data, covering August, revealed that domestic industry expanded in inflation-adjusted terms by just 0.09 pecent. Revisions were slightly negative.

As a result, after adjusting for prices, U.S. manufacturing output is 3.49 percent higher than in February, 2020 – just before the CCP Virus and assorted mandated and voluntary behavioral curbs sparked a short but scary downturn and touched off waves of distortion that persist to this day. As of last month’s Fed report, industry’s inflation-adjusted production had risen by 3.69 percent during the pandemic period.

Among the broadest manufacturing sub-sectors tracked by the Fed, the biggest August winners were:

>petroleum and coal products, whose 3.54 percent constant dollar monthly output surge was its best since the 11.49 percent jump of March, 2021, when the industry was bouncing back from the damage inflicted by that winter’s Texas blizzards. Revisions were mixed. July’s originally reported after-inflation drop of 0.94 percent upgraded to one of 0.25 percent. June’s preliminary figure, revised up last month from a real decrease of 1.92 to one of 1.50 percent revised back down to a 2.80 percent decline. But May’s initially reported 2.33 percent constant dollar sequential monthly shrinkage of 2.61 pcerent now standing as a fall of 1.30 percent.

Since immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, inflation-adjusted production by these companies is up by 1.45 percent, versus the 1.27 decrease calculable last month;

>aerospace and miscellaneous transportation equipment, which rose month-to-month by 2.08 percent in real terms for its best such performance since February’s 2.52 percent. Revisions were slightly positive. June’s initially reported 1.54 percent improvement is now pegged at 1.55 percent. June had advanced from a fractional increase to a 0.14 percent dip to a 0.20 percent increase. But May’s results have deteriorated here, too – from an initially reported 0.85 percent decrease to a 1.25 percent drop.

In price-adjusted terms, this cluster is now 24.07 percent larger than in February, 2020, versus the 21.30 percent calculable last month;

>miscellaneous durable goods, a diverse sector containing the personal protective equipment and other medical gear used to widely to fight the CCP Virus saw inflation-adjusted production grow by 1.71 on month in August, its best such performace since last December’s 1.85 percent. Revisions, however, were negative. July’s initially reported 1.23 percent increase was revised down to one of 0.89 percent. June’s results have been downgraded from an advance of 2.25 percent to one of 0.87 percent to the 0.67 percent reported yesterday. And May’s improvement, first estimated at 1.17 percent, is now just to have been 0.63 percent.

Consequently, real production in miscellaneous durable goods has now increased by 13.92 percent since February, 2020, just before the pandemic’s arrival in force, versus the 13.38 percent calculable last month; and

>computer and electronics products, where constant dollar output climbed by 1.27 sequentially for their best month since May, 2021 (2.44 percent). Revisions were slightly negative, July’s results were downgraded from a decrease of 0.65 percent to one of 0.68 percent. June’s initially reported 0.21 percent was upgraded to a 0.67 percent gain before dropping back to one of 0.46 percent. And the initially reported May monthly rise of 0.50 percent is now recorded as a decrease of 0.11 percent.

After-inflation growth in this broad sector is now reported at 6.11 percent since that last CCP Virus data month of February, 2020 versus the 5.93 percent calculable last month.

Not so coincidentally, August’s two worst manufacturing production losers among the biggest manufacturing sub-sectors were closely related to the nation’s hard-pressed housing sector:

>furniture and related products, which suffered it sixth straight monthly price-adjusted production decrease. Moreover, the 2.13 percent shrinkage was the worst since February, 2021’s 2.77 percent. Moreover, revisions were overall negative. July’s initially reported retreat of 1.57 percent was revised up to one of 0.80. percent. But the June losses have been downgraded from one of 0.55 percent to one of 1.33 percent and then to one of 1.87 percent. And May’s initially reported 0.94 percent increase is now judged to have been a 0.96 percent decrease.

The furniture cluster is now 7.30 percent smaller after accounting for inflation since February, 2020, versus the 5.56 percent calculable last month’

>wood products, whose inflation-adjusted production slip of 1.70 percent was its second month-to-month decrease in a row and its worst since April’s 1.89 percent. Revisions were mixed. July’s initially reported 0.72 percent increase is now pegged as a -0.03 decline. June’s initially reported 0.73 percent rise has been revised down to one of 0.42 percent and yesterday to a 0.62 loss. But May’s results have been upgraded from a 2.64 plunge to a decrease of just 0.28 percent.

Whereas last month’s Fed release showed this sector to be 6.79 percent bigger since just before the pandemic began roiling and distorting the economy, this month’s estimates this increase to have been just 2.67 percent;

>automotive, whose roller-coaster ride continued with real output sinking by 1.44 percent in August. Worse, July’s initially reported 6.60 percent monthly production burst was cut by more than half – to an increase of 3.24 percent. June’s initially reported 1.49 percent decrease was first upgraded to one of 1.27 percent but now stands at 1.31 percent. And May’s initially reported 0.06 percent on month real output dip is now judged to have been a decrease of 1.96 percent.

As of last month’s Fed report, inflation-adjusted vehicle and parts production was recorded as being up by 4.73 percent since February, 2020. Now it’s pegged as being off by 0.20 percent; and

>electrical equipment, appliances (also related to housing), and components, whose inflation-adjusted production contraction (1.01 percent) was its second straight. Revisions, though, were overall positive. July’s initially reported 1.41 percent fall-off is now estimated as one of 1.44 percent., but June’s results have been upgraded a second consecutive time – from an advance of 1.34 percent to one of 1.42 percent to yesterday’s 1.45 percent. And although May remained an output loser, the decrease has been upgraded from an initially reported 1.83 percent to one of 1.68 percent (which was still its worst results since December’s 2.48 percent slump).

All told, though, this cluster’s price-adjusted shrinkage since that last pre-pandemic data month of February, 2020 fell to just 4.53 percent, versus the 4.83 percent fall-off calculable last month; and

>fabricated metal products, another volatile industry. After-inflation production was off by 0.95 percent sequentially in August, after improving by a figure of 1.79 percent that was revised down from an initially reported 2.05 percent but was still the best such result since February’s 2.49 percent jump. Other revisions were mixed, with June’s initially reported decrease of 0.83 percent revised down first to one of 1.40 percent and now to one of 1.59 percent, and May’s initially reported drop of 1.16 percent now pegged at just 0.98 percent.

As of last month’s Fed report, fabricated metals products’ constant dollar output had closed to within 0.14 percent of its immediate pre-CCP virus level. Now it’s off by 1.42 percent.

Better news came from the big and diverse machinery sector, which is a bellwether for both the rest of manufacturing and the rest of the entire economy, since so many industries use its products. It grew in real terms sequentially in August by 0.91 percent – its best such result since April’s 1.97 percent. Revisions were mixed. July’s initially reported 0.50 percent increase is now estimated to have been 0.68 percent. June’s results, first downgraded from a 1.14 percent decrease to one of 2.16 percent were revised back up to one of 1.75 percent. And May’s initially reported drop-off of 2.55 percent is now recorded as one of 3.20 percent – the worst since the 18.64 percent nosedive of April, 2020, during the height of the pandemic’s first wave.

Machinery has now grown by 5.07 percent during the pandemic period, versus the 2.82 percent calculable last month.

Interestingly, except for the still-shortage-plagued semiconductor industry, August was a banner output month for the sectors that consistently have made headlines during the pandemic.

Real output of microchips and related products did decrease by 0.57 percent, but the decline was the first in three months. Revisions were negative, though. July’s initially reported 1.16 percent rise has been downgraded to one of 0.77 percent and following a major upward revision from 0.18 percent growth to 2.09 percent, June’s real output now stands at 0.88 percent. But after a massive downgrade from 0.52 growth to 2.24 percent shrinkage, May’s performance is now recorded as a just a 0.72 percent loss.

After-inflation semiconductor production is now up 17.46 percent since pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, versus the 21.98 percent calculable last month.

Aircraft and parts surged by 3.11 percent sequentially in August after inflation, these industries’ strongest such performance since the 8.61 percent burst in January, 2021. Revisions were mixed, as July’s initially reported 1.02 percent real monthly output rise to one of 1.52 percent, but June’s initially reported 0.26 percent advance revised down to one of 0.18 percent and then back up to just 0.24 percent, and May’s initially reported 0.33 percent advance now judged to be have been a 0.47 percent retreat.

Even so, constant dollar aircraft and parts output is up by 30.60 percent since February, 2020, versus the 26.67 percent calculable last month.

In pharmaceuticals and medicines, real production was up month-to-month in August by 1.62 percent, these sectors’ best such performance since last August’s 1.96 percent. Revisions here, too, were mixed. July’s initially reported 0.29 percent increase was bumped up to growth of 0.30 percent. June’s results stayed at a 0.32 percent increase after being downgraded from 0.39 percent. But May’s initial growth figure of 0.35 percent now stands at 1.20 percent after some ups and downs.

Since just before the CCP Virus’ arrival in force, pharmaceuticals and medicines output (including vaccines) is now up 16.56 percent in real terms, versus the 14.69 percent calculable last month.

And medical equipment and supplies firms (including those that make anti-CCP Virus products) boosted their price-adjusted production in August by three percent in constant dollar terms – their best such performance since January’s 3.15 percent. Revisions were negative on net. July’s initially reported inflation-adjusted improvement of 1.90 percent was downgraded to an increase of 1.58 percent. June’s original 3.12 percent real growth figure has now been revised down twice – to 1.01 and 0.67 percent. May’s initial estimate of 1.44 percent real growth is now pegged at 1.36 percent.

Yet real production in this sector is now 17.81 percent higher than in immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, versus the 16.15 percent calculable last month.

At this point, it’s easy to make the case that the headwinds facing domestic manufacturing are stronger than the tailwinds. There’s not only continued tighter inflation-fighting and growth-slowing monetary policies being pursued by the Fed along with mounting evidence that America’s overall economic growth will remain slow at best. There’s the end of the mammoth government deficit spending that’s also supported that growth for so long, and especially during the CCP Virus emergency. And don’t forget the continually darkening outlook for the global economy – and for the export markets on which U.S.-based industry relies significantly (nearly 18 percent of its gross output in 2021 by my calculations).

U.S.-based industry has been resilient since the pandemic arrived, but it wasn’t able to escape the undertow of the domestic and overseas economic downturns it generated. That seems like as good a forecast as any for domestic manufacturing output over the next few months, too.   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Getting American Competition Priorities Right

Tags

American Affairs, anti-trust policy, competition, globalization, monopoly oligopoly, National Conservatism Conference, tariffs, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Greetings from Miami, Florida, where I’m attending the final day of the third annual National Conservatism conference. (I spoke on Sunday.) I’ll be posting soon about my general impressions of this event, and the broader effort it represents to develop a new school of right-of-center policies and politics. But since today’s early afternoon sessions aren’t my speed, I’m back in the (cavernous!) hotel room because I thought folks would be interested in seeing a lightly edited version of the remarks I delivered.

The subject – the often weird and arguably counterproductive views long held by most U.S. leaders, along with the national policy and business establishments, about the different priorities deserved by promoting economic competition at home, and economic competition from abroad. In addition, I should note that the conference organizers plan to post videos of this and other presentations very soon, and I’ll send out an alert when it’s up. For more background, see this article in the journal American Affairs from 2019, when I first made versions of the following observations and arguments:

There seems to be broad agreement at this conference that the U.S. economy should undergo some kind of transformation from one that’s extremely open to the world economy – to all of its opportunities and benefits as well as all of its risks and dangers – to one that’s less open (because those risks and dangers don’t seem to have been accounted for adequately).

I’m sure that there’s also broad agreement that a major obstacle stands in the way – that very considerable degree of recent and current openness, which becomes clear from examining data like the strong rise of trade (both exports and imports) as a share of the nation’s economic output, the similarly strong rise of two way both outgoing and incoming investment, and the amount of U.S. net debt held by foeign lenders. It’s also clear from what we’ve been learning lately about how dependent the nation has become on other countries for lots of goods that are crucial economically and militarily and healthcare-wise.

Almost completely overlooked though is another major obstacle – an apparent belief that’s powerfully fueled all that openness, and helped create the costs and vulnerabilities that have been neglected for o long. It’s the apparent belief that foreign competition is better for the economy than domestic competition.

I say “apparent” because this view isn’t often voiced. But something like it must be broadly accepted, especially by those who have been making national economic policy. Because for decades, until very recently (the year 1980 is a good starting point) U.S. leaders have worked especially hard to open the American economy wide to foreign competition (through numerous international trade agreements) while simultaneously permitting levels of domestic competition to fall quite significantly in a great many industries.

And it’s difficult to understand how a much more self-reliant American System can be created if the prioritization of foreign over domestic competition isn’t reversed. That is, if there’s a strong consensus – as there seems to be – that vigorous competition is needed to maximize the benefits of capitalism (notably, to spur technological progress, better product quality, more affordability, greater choice of stuff to buy), then the emphasis should be placed on boosting domestic, rather than foreign, competition.

For those seeking to limit the U.S. economy’s exposure to the global economy, the rationale for stressing an increase in foreign competition seems to have two sources that are two sides of the same coin – at least as best as I can figure out, since again, the case for actively preferring it is seldom made explicitly. The first is that since competition is good, the more the merrier. Therefore boosting foreign competition is an obvious way to get more competition.

The second reason for emphasizing foreign competition is that it’s simply not possible to generate needed levels of competition without foreign competition.

But regarding the first rationale – just how much more competition does foreign competition create for the U.S.? If we’re a fourth of global output, does that mean that foreign competition can triple the level of competition? Or twice as much, or 72 percent more, or whatever? Maybe. What I can say confidently, though, isthat no one has even asked that question, let alone answered it. But the assumption seems dubious given that much the three-fourths of that global economy outside the U.S. is less advanced than we are, not more.

And as for foreign competition filling some unavoidable domestic competition gap – that may be true for many other countries. But it’s far from true for the United States. After all, we have advanced technology. We have manufacturing. We have services. We have energy and minerals. We have agriculture. We still have dynamic, innovation-fostering economic and social systems. .In other words, to borrow from that Michael Jackson song, “We are the world.” We have satisfactory supplies of petty muc every type of product and service that the rest of the world boasts all together.

That is, we have a matchless degree of self-sufficiency and capacity for self-sufficiency – despite having spent much of the last half-century or more trying our best to squander this priceless advantage. We don’t have tropical fruit. Or coffee. Or chocolate. But I think we can figure those challenges out.

It’s true of course that the transition toward a less globalized American economy isn’t a short-term proposition. And it probably will never result in 100 percent self-sufficiency – at least not in the foreseeable future.

For example, precisely because we’ve permitted so many major gaps to emerge in our productive economy, we face enough alarming shortages to require some temporary degree of cooperation with other countries before they’re filled. Semiconductor manufacturing is a prime example. In turn, these shortfalls also extend to the professional workforces needed to reestablish domestic production. So some flexibility on immigration and visa policy will be needed, too – at least until we get our own science and technology workforce back up to speed.

And maybe the best de-globalized American economy shouldn’t even aim to hermetically seal the economy, or even close. After all, recognizing that foreign competition isn’t superior to domestic competition by no means requires dismissing the former as totally worthless. Similarly, the prioritizing of domestic competition doesn’t mean that all corporate concentration at home should be broken up.

Instead, what’s important for fostering a less globalized economy is realizing that it’s not necessarily, much less mainly, foreign competition that’s needed for economic success. It’s competition, period. And since the United States is eminently capable of supplying so many of its economic needs and wants on its own, without many of the downsides of foreign competition, why not reorient our national economic strategy to recognize the proper relationship between trade and competition policy, view them through different lenses, and base them on different default positions?

So before even considering new international trade agreements, Washington should ask whether the added increment of foreign competition and its expected benefits are worth the national security costs, the economic costs, and the social pathologies produced by the latter?

And for industries that do need a competitive kick in the pants, let’s first ask if that kick can come from some new domestic anti-trust-type action.

Before approving more mergers and acquisitions at home, Washington could ask if the firms involved could realize the greater scale economies and other gains they’re seeking by limiting their foreign competition.

If de-globalizing the American economy is the name of the game, then recognizing and overcoming the usually implicit but broad basis in favor of foreign over domestic competition looms not just as an important step. It will be an essential step.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Apple Products Now Designed in China, Too

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Apple, China, design, engineering, Federal Trade Commission, globalization, Made in America, manufacturing, offshoring, research and development, technology, The New York Times, Tripp Mickle, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although Apple has long relied on factories in China to turn out its incredibly popular electronics products, the company has clearly sought to counter charges that it’s been a world champion outsourcer that’s contributed to U.S. industrial hollowing out and general economic weakening. How? By touting its products as “Designed by Apple in California.”

And that’s mattered in more than a public relations sense because it’s been that U.S.-located design – and engineering – that’s long comprised the vast majority of the value of Apple products. Even better, it’s also long been the case that almost none of the wealth generated by iPhones and iMacs and the rest have gone to China. Those factories in the People’s Republic, owned by contract manufacturers, have largely been snapping the sophisticated parts together according to Apple’s appealing designs and sophisticated blueprints.

Now, though, according to excellent reporting by The New York Times‘ Tripp Mickle, it’s clear that Apple’s going to have at least put a big asterisk on its slogan. He’s updated trends that I identified literally decades ago in my book The Race to the Bottom and have followed since (see, e.g., here) making clear that not only is much of the Apple’s most advanced manufacturing (of parts and components) now performed in China, but so is a large and surging share of that engineering and design.

According to Mickle’s sources,

“More than ever, Apple’s Chinese employees and suppliers contributed complex work and sophisticated components for the 15th year of its marquee device, including aspects of manufacturing design, speakers and batteries, according to four people familiar with the new operations and analysts. As a result, the iPhone has gone from being a product that is designed in California and made in China to one that is a creation of both countries.”

Mickle continues: China’s “engineers and suppliers have moved up the supply chain to claim a bigger slice of the money that U.S. companies spend to create high-tech gadgets.”

As a result, just as American leaders have belatedly been awakening to the dangers of heavy reliance on China for critical goods, both because of Beijing’s burgeoning power and challenges to U.S. global technological leadership and the national security created by this stature, Apple has been boosting its dependence on the People’s Republic – and helping to enrich and empower this hostile dictatorship. 

Some of Mickle’s specifics:

>”This year, Apple has posted 50 percent more [high wage] jobs in China than it did during all of 2020, according to GlobalData, which tracks hiring trends across tech.”

>”When China closed its borders in 2020, Apple was forced to overhaul its operations and abandon its practice of flying hordes of California-based engineers to China to design the assembly process for flagship iPhones. Instead of subjecting staff to lengthy quarantines, Apple began empowering and hiring more Chinese engineers in Shenzhen and Shanghai to lead critical design elements for its best-selling product….”

>In 2007, Chinese suppliers accounted for a mere 3.6 percent of an iPhone’s value. Now this figure is more than 25 percent.

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has just begun to enforce new regulations aimed at ensuring that products labeled “Made in America” really are produced domestically.  It’s time for Washington to require Apple to start telling the truth about its operations, too.     

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Official Data Show U.S. Trade Remains on a Winning Streak

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China, exports, goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade flows, manufacturing, semiconductors, services trade, Taiwan, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The official U.S. trade figures for July that came out this morning continued June’s encouraging pattern of smaller deficits amid continued (if subdued) American economic growth – but with a twist. The previous trade report showed that the overall goods and services shortfall shrank because exports rose healthily while imports slipped just slightly.

The July release showed a smaller trade gap due largely to lower imports. Exports improved, too, but just negligibly.

Yet the bottom line remained the same: an economic expansion that’s gotten a little healthier, because the nation is earning its way in the world to a modestly greater extent.

The specific numbers: The total trade deficit sank month-to-month by 12.65 percent in July – from $80.88 billion to a level of $70.65 billion that was the lowest for a single month since last October’s $68.16 billion. The drop, moreover, was the fourth straight – the longest such stretch since the six-month period between May and November, 2019 – months before the CCP Virus pandemic arrived state-side in force.

The only negative here: That June number was revised up a big 1.59 percent from the initially reported $79.61 billion.

Monthly shrinkage was also reported for goods trade – which comprises the lion’s share of total U.S. trade. Here in July the gap also declined for the fourth straight month – by 8.23 percent, from $99.26 billion to $91.09 billion, and the level was the lowest since October ($98.26 billion), too. And as with the overall deficit, this winning streak was the longest since that May-November span in 2019.

Meanwhile, the long-time U.S. services surplus – which has deteriorated dramatically during the pandemic era due to mandated and voluntary behavioral curbs that hammered industries like travel and tourism – widened by 11.19 percent sequentially in July, from $18.38 billion to $20.44 billion. The monthly increase was the third straight, the level was the highest since last December’s $21.66 billion, and the monthly jump the biggest since last November’s 12.22 percent.

A degree of skepticism may be in order, though, because the June services surplus was revised down a huge 7.47 percent.

Total exports edged up 0.20 percent on month in July, from $258.76 billion to $259.29 billion. However meager, the increase still produced the sixth straight monthly record and the sixth straight increase – matching the performance of Februay-August, 2021. But a sizable revision should be noted here, too, as June’s total was downgraded by 0.73 percent.

Goods exports dipped in July for the first time since January – by 0.16 percent, from an upwardly revised record $183.29 billion to $182.99 billion. But the figure is still the second ever and impressive considering the sluggish growth in which the global economy is mired and the multi-decade highs achieved by the U.S. dollar against most global currencies – which harms the price competitiveness of U.S.-made products.

Yet services exports climbed 1.10 percent, from a downwardly revised $75.47 billion to a record $76.30 billion. This increase was also the sixth in a row, and although June’s results were revised down by a substantial 2.94 percent, it remains the second best monthly performance ever.

Combined goods and services imports were down for a second straight month – by 2.86 percent from a downwardly revised $339.64 billion to $329.94 billion. This total was the lowest total since February’s $320.53 billion and the back-to-back decrease was the first such fall-off since the March-May, 2020 period – the peak of the CCP Virus’ first wave.

Goods imports also fell for a second straight month – by three percent, from $282.55 billion to $274.08 billion. And this back-to-back decrease was the first since March-May, 2020 as well.

Services imports in July experienced their first decline since January, weakening by 2.15 percent, from $57.09 billion to $55.86 billion. Even better: The June figure was revised down by a hefty 1.38 percent.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the non-oil goods deficit is a good global barometer for U.S. trade policy’s performance, because the oil and service trade flows it leaves out have rarely been the focus of U.S. trade agreements or other initiatives. This “Made in Washington” deficit tumbled for the fourth straight month too – by $100.29 billion to $89.96 billion.

As with some of the other trade flows, this deficit was the lowest since last October ($84.37), and the monthly fall-off was 10.93 percent. Moreover, the four straight months of improvement were the longest such stretch since June-October, 2007 – when the economy was approaching its worst downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Made in Washington exports in July increased for the sixth straight month, too – by 0.96 percent, from $151.841 to $153.301 billion. These overseas sales also set their sixth consecutive record, and the winning streak was the longest since the eight-month period between June, 2020 and January, 2021 – during the recovery from the virst virus wave.

These non-oil goods imports in July sank for the fourth straight month, and the 3.52 percent sequential drop brought the level to its lowest – $243.26 billion – since February’s $242.25 billion. This winning streak was the longest since the five-month stretch between peak pandemic-y December, 2020 to May, 2020.

Manufacturing’s huge and chronic trade gap narrowed on month in July, too, and for the second straight time. The drop was 6.12 percent, from Jue’s $130.05 billion to $122.09 billion, and this level was the lowest since February’s $106.49 billion.

Manufactures exports fell back from June’s record $114.78 billion to $109.50 billion. The 4.60 percent retreat left these sales at their lowest level since April’s $109.36 billion.

Manufactures imports fell faster – by 5.41 percent, from $244.83 billion to $231.59 billion. This total was also the lowest since April ($233.50 billion).

On a year-to-date basis, manufactures exports are up by 16.10 percent (from $643.07 billion to $746.62 billion. But the much greater amount of manufactures imports have surged by 18.38 percent (from $1.37285 trillion to 1.62524 trillion).

As a result, the year-to-date manufacturing trade shortfall has already hit $876.62 billion – a 20.12 percent jump from last year’s $729.78 billion, and as early as next month’s trade report, industry’s deficit could pass the trillion-dollar annual level for the fifth year in a row.

The also huge and chronic U.S. goods trade deficit with China decreased for the first time since April, dropping 6.90 percent from $36.95 billion (the highest figure since November, 2018) to $34.40 billion.

American goods exports to China advanced month-to-month in July by 5.04 percent, from $11.68 billion to $12.27 billion. And the much greater volume of imports slumped by 4.03 percent, from $48.63 billion (the third highest monthly total on record) to $46.66 billion.

But on a year-to-date basis, the China goods deficit has worsened by 26.42 percent. Since its growth rate is now faster than the 21.75 percent of the Made in Washington gap (its closest global proxy), it looks as if the impact has faded of the sweeping Trump tariffs (which the Biden administration has just announced it will keep in place).  

One likely reason: the 8.41 percent devaluation of China’s currency, the yuan, versus the U.S. dollar engineered by Beijing so far this year.

And a final July U.S. trade development worth noting: the 25.10 percent monthly burst of the goods deficit with global semiconductor manufacturing technology leader Taiwan to a new record $4.74 billion.

American merchandise imports of microchips and other products from the island grew by 15.71 percent on month in July, from $7.33 billion to an all-time high of $8.48 billion. But U.S. goods exports (which include much semiconductor manufacturing equipment) were up as well in July. The 5.64 percent increase produced the second best monthly total ever ($3.74 billion – behind only March’s $3.89 billion).

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Job Creation Enters the Goldilocks Zone

Tags

aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, chemicals, computer and electronics products, dollar, Employment, exchange rates, exports, fabricated metal products, Federal Reserve, food products, inflation, Jobs, machinery, manufacturing, non-metallic mineral products, pharmaceuticals, recession, semiconductors, surgical equipment, textile product mills, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For now, the term “Goldilocks” seems to be an increasingly popular and accurate way to describe the U.S. economy. (See, e.g., here.) As in the Three Bears-y it’s not running too hot (and therefore unlikely to prompt the Federal Reserve to step up its inflation-fighting efforts enough to trigger a recession). And it’s not running too cold (and prompting the Fed to accept current inflation levels for fear of sparking a really deep slump).

So it wasn’t entirely surprising that yesterday’s official U.S. manufacturing jobs figures were pretty Goldilocks-y themselves.

They showed that domestic industry boosted its payrolls on month in August by 22,000 – the smallest amount since May’s 19,000, but still representing growth. Further, the revisions of the solid June and July gains were modestly positive. The former received its second downgrade – from an initially reported 29,000 to 27,000 to 25,000. But the latter was upgraded from 30,000 to 36,000.

As a result, manufacturing employment is now 0.52 percent greater than in February, 2020 – the last full month before the CCP Virus pandemic struck the United States in full force and, along with lockdowns and voluntary behavioral curbs, generated a brief but historic depression. As of last month’s jobs report, manufacturing employment had grown by 0.32 percent during this period.

That’s a slower employment recovery than that staged by the overall private sector (0.68 percent). But U.S.-based industry shed fewer jobs proportionately than the rest of the private economy during that pandemic nosedive.

Moreover, because government employment is still down 2.82 percent since the virus arrived, manufacturing’s job creation has been way ahead of the performance of the non-farm sector (the federal government’s definition of the American jobs universe). That measure’s headcounts have advanced only 0.16 percent.

These results have left manufacturing at the same 9.85 percent of total private sector jobs as last month (and up from its 9.83 percent share in February, 2020), and at the same 8.41 percent share of all non-farm jobs as last month (and up from its 8.38 percent share just before the pandemic economy began).

Another indicator of manufacturing’s relatively strong recent jobs performance – at 12.852 million, its workers’ ranks are at their highest level since November, 2008’s 13.034 million. Last month’s initially reported 12.826 million manufacturing workers were the highest figure only since August, 2019’s 12.827 million.

August’s biggest manufacturing jobs winners among the broadest sub-sectors tracked by the U.S. Labor Department were:

>fabricated metals products, which added 4,700 workers on net last month. And this big sector has been on a hot streak lately. July’s results were revised up from a gain of 4,200 to one of 4,600, June’s unrevised 600 job loss is now judged to be an increase of 200, and May’s robust figures have only been revised down from 7,100 to 6,600.

These companies’ payrolls have now advanced to within 1.64 percent of their immediately pre-pandemic level, versus the 2.04 percent deficit calculable last month;

>computer and electronics products, which contains shortage-plagued semiconductor sector, added 4,500 employees sequentially in August, and revisions were strong. July’s initially reported 3,400 gain is now estimated at 3,900. June’s results rebounded from a downgrade of 2,300 to 2,000 to an upgrade to 2,900. And May’s final (for now) upwardly revised 5,300 increase stayed unchanged.

This sector now employs just 0.96 percent more workers than in February, 2020, versus the 0.41 percent rise calculable last month. But it’s important to recall that computer and electronics firms’ headcounts fell only minimally during the first sharp pandemic downturn;

>the very big chemicals industry, which boosted hiring by 3,500 on month in August. Revisions were somewhat negative but still left good growth in their wake. July’s initially reported improvement of 3,700 was downgraded to 2,900. June’s initial huge upgrade from 1,200 to 4,500 fell back to an increase of 3,900 and May remained at 5,100.

Since February, 2020, chemicals companies have increased employment by 6.09 percent, versus the 5.84 percent calculable last month;

>machinery, which is such a manufacturing- and economy-wide bellwether because its products are used by so many industries. Its firms’ payrolls climbed by 2,800 sequentially in August. Revisions, moreover, were encouraging. July’s initially reported 3,400 improvement was revised down slightly to 3,300. But June’s totals have now been upgraded from 1,000 to 1,600 and now to 2,400. And May’s initially reported monthly drop of 3,200 is now pegged at one of just 800.

Machinery employment is now off by just 1.15 percent since immediate pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, versus the 1.47 percent calculable last month; and

>non-metallic mineral products, whose monthly jobs advance of 2,800 in August was its best such performance since February’s 3,100. July’s initially reported gain of 1,000 was revised up to 1,100. June’s initially reported 400 loss has stayed at an upgraded 700 gain. And May’s totals have settled at an increase of 2,100 as opposed to the 1,900 first reported.

Thanks to its strong August and positive revisions, the non-metallic minerals workforce is now a mere 1.05 percent smaller than in February, 2020, vs the 1.85 percent calculable last month

Manufacturing’s biggest August jobs losers among this same group of broad categoies were:

>food manufacturing, whose August monthly 2,400 jobs decline was its worst such performance since last August’s 2,600. In addition, revisions were negative overall. July’s initially reported 1,800 jobs advance was downgraded to 1,600. June’s initially reported jump of 4,800 has been revised down a second time – to 3,400. And after an upgrade from an increase of 6,100 to one of 7,600, May’s result is now pegged at a 7,000 gain.

Whereas food manufacturing’s employment was calculable as having grown since February, 2020 by 2.86 percent as of last month, now the figure is 2.64 percent; and

>textile product mills, whose payrolls fell by 1,000 in August for their worst such performance since July, 2020’s 2,500 decline. Revisions in this small industry were negligible. July’s initially reported dip of 300 is now judged to be a gain of 100. June’s initially reported decrease of 700 stayed unchanged after being revised up to one of 600, and May’s initially reported 100 monthly job loss has stayed unrevised.

Textile product mill employment has now shrunk by 6.44 percent since February, 2020, versus the 5.51 percent calculable last month.

As always, the most detailed employment data for pandemic-related industries are one month behind those in the broader categories, and their July performances were generally in line with that month’s continued overall manufacturing hiring.

The recent employment upswing in that shortage-plagued semiconductor industry continued in July, as the month’s payroll increase of 2,300 was the best such performance since June, 2020’s 3,000. Revisions were positive, too, with June’s initially reported advance of 1,700 now estimated at 1,900 and May’s total staying at a slightly upgraded 1,000..

Semiconductor employment is now 4.56 percent higher than in February, 2020, on the eve of the CCP Virus-era economy, versus the 3.22 percent calculable last month. And it should be kept in mind that semiconductor companies kept hiring modestly on net during the worst of the pandemic.

The workforces of these companies are now 4.36 percent larger than in February, 2020, versus the 3.69 percent calculable last month.

Most of the aerospace cluster in July kept regaining the unusually large numbers of jobs lost during the pandemic period due largely to the steep CCP Virus-related travel downturn.

Aircraft production companies hired another 2,400 workers that month – their best such performance since June, 2021’s 4,400. June’s initially reported 1,500 employment increase was downgraded to 1,200, but May’s net new job creation remained at an upgraded 1,600.

In all, aircraft manufacturing payrolls advanced to within 8.69 percent of their immediate pre-pandemic levels, versus the 9.64 percent shortfall calculable last month.

In aircraft engines and engine parts, firms added 900 employees on net in July, and although June’s initially reported 800 increase was revised down to 700, May’s results remained at a 900 improvement after being upgraded fom 700.

Aircraft engines and engine parts-makers now employ just 8.94 percent fewer workers than in immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, versus the 9.81 percent deficit calculable last month.

Non-engine aircraft parts and equipment makers stayed jobs laggards, though, as they shed 600 workers in July – their worst such performance since last December’s 900 loss. June’s initially reported jobs gain of 600 was upgraded to a 900 increase, and May’s initially reported growth of 300 remained unrevised for a second straight month. But payrolls in this industry are now 14.88 percent below their February, 2020 levels, versus the 14.62 percent calculable last month.

Most healthcare manufacturing, however, experienced an off month hiring-wise in July.

In surgical appliances and supplies (which includes all the personal protective equipment and other medical goods so widely used to fight the CCP Virus), 700 net new jobs were created in July. June’s 800 net job loss stayed unrevised July, as did May’s slightly upgraded monthly increase of 500.

Since February, 2020, this sector’s headcount is up by 4.36 percent, versus the 3.69 percent calculable last month.

Yet the large pharmaceuticals and medicines industry lost 500 jobs in July – although this dip followed a downwardly revised 4,000 employment surge in June that was still the best monthly result for the sector going back to the 1990 start of this data series. Moreover, May’s upwardly revised employment increase of 1,200 remained the same.

Still, whereas employment in this sector was up by 11.58 percent since the pandemic’s economy-shaking arrival as of last month’s jobs report, that increase had slipped to 11.32 percent as of this month’s release.

And the medicines subsector containing vaccines lost 200 jobs in July, and revisions were slightly negative. June’s initially reported 1,100 increase was downgraded to one of 900, and May’s slightly upgraded 700 monthly gain stayed unchanged.

Vaccine manufacturing employment has still climbed by 25.89 during the CCPVirus period. But as of last month, this figure was 26.29 percent.

For the foreseeable future, industry’s employment prospects seem likely to be buffeted by the same crosswinds it’s been dealing with for many months now – on the one hand, ongoing (but possibly fading) supply chain issues, high (but possibly fading) inflation, and a Federal Reserve evidently bent on cooling price increases even if it slows economic growth considerably; on the other hand, demand for manufactures by consumers and businesses that keeps displaying impressive strength.

And let’s not forget a U.S. dollar that’s the strongest in decades, and that should be undermining domestic manufacturing because it still relies so heavily on exports, and the greenback’s rise damages the price competitiveness of everything made in America.

Yet U.S.-based manufacturers keep hiring – usually a sign of confidence – and I’ll keep assuming that since it’s their fortunes that are most directly on the line, I’ll view their prospects as pretty bright, and even Goldilocks-y, too.