Our So-Called Foreign Policy: A Call to Return to Failed U.S. China Strategies

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alliances, allies, Barack Obama, Biden, China, Donald Trump, engagement, FOREIGNPOLICY.com, George W. Bush, Indo-Pacific, intellectual property theft, Michael J. Green, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Paul Haenle, tech transfer, TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership, World Trade Organization, WTO

When it comes to China-related issues in particular, supposed American experts who have long completely missed the mark have developed a head-exploding habit of assuming that they have anything useful to say on the matter going forward. Here’s a recent example.

Now these failed economic and foreign policy establishmentarians have hit new heights (or is is “depths”?) of chutzpah. As laid out in this article last week on FOREIGN POLICY magazine’s website, two typical figures are now attacking President Biden’s approach to the People’s Republic for taking too Trump-ian a turn, and blaming his alleged mistakes on learning the wrong lessons from the records of pre-Trump Presidents.

Whereas both the Biden and Trump teams, they write, have accused their predecessors of naively assuming that “engagement would lead to a democratic and cooperative China,” in fact, since the initial Nixon Era opening to Beijing, American leaders have fully understood that China’s democratization could never be a foregone conclusion, and have always “combined engagement with strategies to counterbalance China through alliances, trade agreements, and military power.” In other words, far from being disastrously pathetic failures, America’s pre-Trump China policies were actually as successful as was humanly possible,  And current leaders should emulate some of their principal choices. 

Even the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, they continue, which faced a China whose wealth and power had begun growing stunningly, had foreseen the possibility of Beijing turning more aggressive, and responded to warning signs exactly as events prescribed. Further, their decisions to stay on an engagement track as well were entirely shrewd and responsible. After all, major potential benefits could still plausibly be expected – because during those years, “the question of how China would use its growing power was open to shaping.”

Indeed, say authors Michael Green (a former Bush-ie) and Paul Haenle (previously both a Bush-ie and Obama-naut), a harder line at that time would have amounted to a policy of “strangling China” that also would have been opposed by major allies and the American people, “both of whom mainly saw China as a partner [and] would not have supported containment and decoupling.“

All that went wrong was that that darned current Chinese dictator Xi Jinping assumed power and, well, just ruined everything with his belligerently expansionist aims and actions, and his reversal of much Chinese economic liberalization. The 2008-09 financial crisis didn’t help, either, according to Geen and Haenle, because it convinced Beijing that “the West was declining and the East is rising.”

All the same, say Green and Haenle, the Biden administration should

>recognize that the two immediate pre-Trump presidents had the security side of China policy fundamentally right with their strategy of maintaining and strengthening U.S. alliances with major Asian countries (an odd recommendation since that’s what Mr. Biden is already trying to do); and

>on the economic side, “reconstruct some of the economic statecraft that underpinned U.S. strategies toward China in the past” – principally reviving the World Trade Organization (WTO) as “an important tool to hold China to account” for its predatory practices and joining the current version of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which can “bring the weight of almost two-thirds of the world economy to the table in demanding reciprocal agreements from China” and “force Beijing to play by the rules or lose hundreds of billions of dollars in trade as tariffs and market barriers among the rule-abiding economies went down.”

But these arguments only strengthen the case that Green, Haenle and their ilk should be kept as far away as possible from U.S. policymaking toward China.

Regarding security issues, their contention that Bush-Obama hedging was responsible and understandable ignores all the ways in which China had been undercutting U.S. national security interests long before the Age of Xi began in 2012. For example, it played a key role in creating Iran’s nuclear weapons program starting in the mid-1980s. It’s been a major supporter of North Korea’s economy – and therefore an enabler of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons development for decades. And it’s beefed up its military presence in the South China Sea – including island grabs that violate international law – for nearly as long.

And Green and Haenle seem to need some improved calendar-reading skills, as financial crisis-borne hubris to which they attribute much of Beijing’s recent bellicosity dates from 2008-09 – three to four years before Xi became China’s top leader. Against this backdrop, it’s glaringly obvious that, judged by actual results, the various hedging statements and even counter-measures mentioned by Green and Haenle counted for exactly squadoosh.

In addition, there’s compelling evidence that the Chinese thought so, too. As I reported in 2018, a former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (the Navy’s senior-most officer) has stated that his Chinese counterpart told him that “he thought the United States would have a more forceful reaction when China began” one of its key island-building phases during the former’s tenure – during the Obama years.

P.S. – this behavior doesn’t exactly jibe with the notion that Beijing was blown away by Bush-Obama alliance-rallying, either.    

If anything, the Bush and Obama China economic policies were worse, at least in terms of long-run security impact. Both presided virtually passively as

>China’s economic predation helped produce trade surpluses that put literally trillions of dollars at Beijing’s disposal to devote to its military buildup and prevent any guns versus butter tensions from emerging;

>China stole intellectual property seemingly at will, which supercharged weapons development, too; and

>U.S. multinational companies felt perfectly free to transfer cutting-edge defense-relevant technology to Chinese partners that were first and foremost agents of the Chinese state, and to teach perhaps hundreds of thousands of Chinese employees and students how to use this knowhow – and ultimately how to develop more on their own.

As for the authors’ economic recommendations, they’re simply laughable. The TPP, after all, contained a wide-open back door through which goods with lots of Chinese content could enter the proposed free trade – largely because none of the other TPP signatories wanted to disrupt production chains in which China plays a key role.

Meanwhile, that robust China-Asia/Pacific trade and investment, plus the difficulty that Mr. Biden has run into in mobilizing support outside Europe against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is telling all but the willfully deaf that the United States will suddenly become able to increase the WTO’s effectiveness against China’s mercantilism. 

As Green and Haenle suggest, being able to learn from both mistakes and successes is one of life’s most valuable skills.  Sadly, all that their article demontrates is either that they can’t tell the difference, or that they stubbornly refuse to.

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Following Up: Why the U.S.-South Korea Summit Was Incredibly Weird II

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Biden administration, burden sharing, deterrence, Donald Trump, Following Up, North Korea, nuclear weapons, semiconductors, South Korea, tripwire, Yoon Suk Yeol

Yesterday’s post described how the mounting policy challenges that framed last week’s U.S.-South Korea summit drove one major globalist pundit to write a column that was nothing less than bananas policy-wise. With major tensions almost inevitably appearing between major goals sought by the two countries, he insisted both that these frictions exist only because of American selfishness and, as is globalists’ wont, that all good objectives actually are easily attainable simultaneously in this instance.

Today’s subject is thinking that in its own way is just as off-kilter. Worse, it’s positively dangerous because it’s official thinking from both of the above capitals, and its only conceivable effect can be to turn the already tinderbox-y Korean peninsula even more potentially explosive.

The reasons? It’s resulted in President Biden and his South Korean counterpart Yoon Suk Yeol just having sent – unwittingly to be sure – a twin message to scarily belligerent and nuclear-armed North Korea that (1) they have no faith in the strategy followed by their alliance for decades to deter aggression from the North; and (2) they haven’t yet come up with anything besides transparently symbolic moves to address the problem.

What other conclusions can legitimately be drawn from the official description of the summit’s accomplishments? According to the White House, among other decisions, the two governments agreed to give South Korea a role (but not the final say) in the process of deciding whether Washington would use nuclear weapons in a new Korean War; to deploy American nuclear weapons delivery systems “more visibly” in the peninsula’s vicinity; and to give South Korea’s military more training in preparing for and coping with “nuclear threat scenarios.”

Viewed in isolation, there’s nothing necessarily wrong with any of these measures. But no one should forget the context – because North Korea certainly hasn’t. The United States, as I’ve explained repeatedly, has already for decades not only vowed to use nuclear weapons to defend the South if necessary. To strengthen the credibility of this promise, it’s also stationed tens of thousands of American troops right up against the Demilitarized Zone dividing the two Koreas – that is, right in the invaders’ paths. The idea is that a U.S. President would face no real political choice but to use nukes to save them from total destruction by the North’s vastly superior conventional forces – and probably go on to vaporize the North – and that these prospects would prevent any attack in the first place.

Again, that’s been the U.S. plan for decades. It may as well be written in stone. (Although former President Trump expressed major reservations during his first campaign for the White House.) But last week, Mr. Biden and Yoon made clear their belief that it’s no longer deterring North Korea effectively enough. Why else would the new steps have been announced at such a high profile meeting?

At the same time, why would any thinking person believe that consulting more systematically with the South and sailing nuclear submarines in Korean waters more often will put the needed extra fear of God into North Korea? Similarly, how could these measures resolve the doubts about U.S. reliability that even staunch backers of the alliance in its longstanding form fear are developing in the South. Such qualms could either lead it to conduct foreign policies more independent of America’s (especially concerning curbing China’s technology development), or to create its own nuclear forces, or both.

The problem with the first two potential outcomes is that, as explained in a post last week, South Korea’s semiconductor manufacturing prowess has turned its security into a genuinely vital interest of the United States’; and that North Korea’s own steadily improving nuclear capabilities mean that fulfilling the defense commitment could soon expose the U.S. homeland to nuclear-armed missile strikes. 

A South Korea deterrent would greatly reduce this danger, particularly if it led Washington to remove from the South the “tripwire” ground units whose mission is to boost the odds that a Korean military conflict becomes nuclear, and thus probably suicidal for the North . But the consequent shrinkage of U.S. leverage over the North could leave a gaping hole in Washington’s efforts to contain China technologically.

Couldn’t Washington push wealthy South Korea to create a strong enough military to deter much poorer North Korea without going nuclear? In principle, yes, but the South’s very importance to American well-being have created the conditions for continued free-riding, because by definition, Washington couldn’t afford to impose consequences for its refusal. And a South Korea capable of defending itself without nuclear weapons would be just as capable of defying U.S. wishes on China and other foreign policy fronts as one armed with nukes.   

Perhaps most disturbing of all, the new tweaks to U.S. Korea strategy amount to a tacit but obvious admission of weakness – which countries of course should never telegraph, especially when faced with a seemingly volatile adversary like North Korea, and especially when their leaders clearly have no clue how to escape or resolve in any satisfactory way the dilemmas confronting them. 

Which is why I’m now worried that, for all the justified fears that before too long the United States and China could go to war – which could escalate to the nuclear level – the situation on the Korean peninsula is becoming a bona fide national security nightmare, too.   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Deceptively Calm January for U.S. Trade?

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Advanced Technology Products, ATP, Biden, Buy American, Canada, CCP Virus, China, Donald Trump, European Union, exports, Federal Reserve, goods trade, imports, India, Inflation Reduction Act, infrastructure, Japan, Made in Washington trade flows, manufacturing, monetary policy, non-oil goods trade, semiconductors, services trade, stimulus, Taiwan, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Ukraine War, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Pretty calm on the surface, pretty turbulent underneath. That’s a good way to look at yesterday’s official release of the U.S. trade figures for January. Many of the broadest trade balance figures moved little from their December levels, but the details revealed many multi-month and even multi-year highs, lows, and changes – along with one all-time high (the goods deficit with India).

The combined goods and services deficit most strongly conveyed the impression of relatively calm trade waters. It rose sequentially for the second straight month, but only by 1.61 percent, from a downwardly revised $67.21 billion to $68.29 billion.

The trade shortfall in goods narrowed, but by even less – 0.69 percent, from an upwardly revised $90.71 billion to $90.09 billion.

More volatility was displayed by the services trade surplus. It sank for the first time in two months, from upwardly revised $23.50 billion (its highest monthly total since December, 2019’s $24.56 billion – just before the CCP Virs’ arrival stateside) to $21.80 billion. Moreover, this shrinkage (7.26 percent) was the greatest since last May’s 11.05 percent.

Meanwhile, total U.S. exports in January expanded sequentially for the first time since August. And the the 3.41 percent rise, from a downwardly revised $249.00 billion to $257.50 billion was the biggest since April’s 3.62 percent.

Goods exports in January also registered their first monthly increase since August, with the 6.02 percent improvement (from a downwardly revised $167.69 billion to $177.79 billion) the biggest since October, 2021’s 9.09 percent.

Services exports dipped on month in January, from a downwardly revised $81.32 billion to $79.71 billion. And the 1.98 percent decrease was the biggest since last January’s 3.05 percent. But the December total was the highest on record, and the seventh straight all-time high over the preceding nine months, so January could be a mere bump in the services export recovery road.

On the import side, total U.S. purchases from abroad advanced for the second straight month in January, with the 3.03 percent increase (from a downwardly revised $316.21 billion to $325.79 billion standing as the biggest since last March’s 9.64 percent.

Goods imports were up, too – from a downwardly revised $258.40 billion to $267.88 billion. The climb was the second straight, too, and its 3.67 percent growth rate also the biggest since March (11.00 percent).

Services imports in January were up for the first time since September, but by a mere 0.17 percent, from a downwardly revised $57.81 billlion to $57.91 billion.

Also changing minimally in January – the non-oil goods deficit (which RealityChek regulars know can be considered the Made in Washington trade deficit, since non-oil goods are the trade flows most heavily influenced by U.S. trade agreements and other trade policy decision. The 0.32 percent month-to-month decline brought this trade shortfall from $91.97 billion to $91.68 billion.

Since Made in Washington trade is the closest global proxy to U.S.-China goods trade, comparing trends in the two can indicate the effectiveness of the Trump-Biden China tariffs, which cover hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese products aimed at the U.S. maket.

In January, the huge, longstanding U.S. goods trade gap with China widened by 7.01 percent, from $23.51 billion to $25.16 billion. That third straight increase contrasts sharply with the small dip in the non-oil goods deficit – apparently strengthening the China tariffs critics’ case.

Yet on a January-January basis, the China deficit is down much more (30.82 percent) than its non-oil goods counterpart (14.07 percent). The discrepancy, moreover, looks too great to explain simply by citing China’s insanely over-the-top and economy-crushing Zero Covid policies. So the tariffs look to be significantly curbing U.S. China goods trade, too.

U.S. goods exports to China fell for the third straight month in January – by 5.05 percent, from $13.79 billion to $13.09 billion.

America’s goods imports from China increased in January for the second straight month – by 2.55 percent, from $37.30 billion to $38.25 billion.

Revealingly, however, on that longer-term January-to-January basis, these purchases are off by 20.50 percent (from $47.85 billion). The non-oil goods import figure has actually inched up by just 0.71 percent – which also strengthens the China tariffs case.

The even larger, and also longstanding, manufacturing trade deficit resumed worsened in January, rising for the first time in three months. The 2.83 percent sequential increase brought the figure from $113.61 billion – the lowest figure, though, since last February’s $106.49 billion.

Manufacturing exports declined by 3.01 percent, from $105.71 billion to $102.52 billion – the weakest such performance since last February’s $94.55 billion.

The much greater value of manufacturing imports rose fractionally, from $219.31 billlion to $219.36 billion – also near the lows of the past year.

In advanced technology products (ATP), the trade gap narrowed by 11.36 percent in January, from $18.45 billion to $16.35 billion. The contraction was the third in a row, and pushed this deficit down to its lowest level since last February’s $13.42 billion.

ATP exports were down 8.78 percent, from $35.16 billion to $32.07 billion – their lowest level since last May’s $31.25 billion. And ATP imports sank by 9.68 percent, from $53.60 billion to a $48.42 billion total that was the smallest since last February’s $42.44 billion.

Big January moves took place in U.S. goods trade with major foreign economies, though much of this commerce often varies wildly from month to month.

The goods deficit with Canada, America’s biggest trade partner, jumped by 39.02 percent on month in January, from $5.09 billion to $7.07 billion. The increase was the second straight, the new total the highest since last July’s $8.47 billion, and the growth rate the fastest since last March’s 47.61 percent.

But the goods shortfall with the European Union decreased by 10.83 percent, from $18.36 billion to $16.37 billion. The drop was the third straight, the new total the lowet since last September’s $14.44 billion, and the shrinkage the fastest since last July’s 19.97 percent.

For volatility, it’s tough to beat U.S. goods trade with Switzerland. In January, the deficit plummeted 42.07 percent, from $2.28 billion to $1.32 billion. But that nosedive followed a 77.84 percent surge in December and one of nearly 1,200 percent in November (from a $99.9 million level that was the lowest since May, 2014’s $45.3 million).

Also dramatically up and down have been the goods trade shortfalls with Japan and Taiwan. For the former, the deficit plunged by 30.33 percent in January – from $7.09 billion to $4.94 billion. But that drop followed a 20.58 percent increase in December to the highest level since April, 2019’s $7.35 billion.

The Taiwan goods deficit soared by 52.44 percent in January, from $2.80 billion to $3.68 billion. But this rise followed a 33.65 percent December drop that was the biggest since the 43.18 percent of February, 2020 – when the CCP Virus was shutting down the economy of China, a key link of the supply chains of many of the island’s export-oriented manufacturers.

Finally, the goods deficit with India skyrocketed by 106.55 percent in January, from $2.41 billion to that record $4.99 billion. That total surpassed the $4.44 billion shortfall the United States ran up with India last May, but the more-than-doubling was far from a record growth rate. That was achieved with a 146.76 percent burst in July, 2019.

Since the widely forecast upcoming U.S. recession seems likely to arrive later this year (assuming it arrives at all) than originally forecast, the trade deficit seems likely to continue increasing, too. But that outcome isn’t inevitable, as shown by the deficit’s shrinkage in the second half of last year, when America’s economic growth rebounded from a shallow recession.

The number of major wildcards out there remains sobering, too, ranging from the path of U.S. inflation and consequent Federal Reserve efforts to fight it by cooling off the economy, to levels of net government spending increases (including at state and local levels), to the strength or weakness of the U.S. dollar, to the pace of China’s economic reopening, to the course of the Ukraine War. 

On balance, though, I’ll stick with my deficit-increasing forecast, since (1) I’m still convinced that the approach of the next presidential election cycle will prevent any major Washington actors from taking any steps remotely likely to curb Americans’ borrowing and spending power significantly for very long; and (2) I’m skeptical that even the strong-sounding Buy American measures  instituted by the Biden administration (mainly in recently approved infrastructure programs and semiconductor industry revival plans, and in the green energy subsidies in the Inflation Reduction Act) will enable much more substitution of domestic manufactures for imports – least in the foreseeable future.          

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Is America Really Back with Anyone?

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allies, America First, Biden, Biden administration, developing countries, Donald Trump, Gallup, globalism, liberal global order, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, polls, public opinion, Ukraine, Ukraine War

As RealityChek regulars might have noticed, I haven’t been writing about too many polls lately. The reason? As I explained at the end of last year (here and here) , most were badly off-base on crucial issues that shaped the results of the U.S. midterm elections – especially abortion.

But some new Gallup findings (on a non-political issue) merit an exception. Not that this survey, like way too much polling on foreign policy, hasn’t suffered major problems of its own. All the same, since the claim that “America is back” has been foundational to President Biden’s approach to world affairs, it’s striking that Gallup on Friday reported results suggesting that fewer Americans believe this than they did during the Trump administration.

I write “suggest” because the wording of the relevant question is pretty vague. “In general,” respondents were asked, “how do you think the United States rates in the eyes of the world — very favorably, somewhat favorably, somewhat unfavorably or very unfavorably?”

Of course, this could mean anything from “as a reliable ally” to “as a great place to live,” to “the world’s strongest (or wealthiest) country.” If true, though, whatever the criteria, these Gallup data indicate deep public’s skepticism that Mr. Biden has achieved one of his central foreign policy goals: reversing a dangerous erosion of America’s international popularity stemming from the “America First-style policies pursued by his predecessor.

As the President sees it, this boneheadedly selfish posture threatened to destroy the network of international institutions and above alliances that – consistent with the globalist approach to world affairs he has always supported – considers crucial ingredients for foreign policy success.

But Mr. Biden hasn’t convinced many Americans of these related propositions, reports Gallup. During time in the White House so far, between 48 and 49 percent of American adults said that their country is viewed either “very favorably” or “somewhat favorably” “in the eyes of the world,” with the “verys” coming in at just seven percent in early 2021, 2022, and 2023 alike.

The total unfavorablys ranged from 50 to 51 percent in these years, with the “very unfavorablys” standing at 14 percent, 16 percent, and 17 percent in 2021, 2022, and 2023, respectively.

Although not terrific, these numbers are hardly a disaster, either. But the funny thing is that they’re a good deal worse than the results recorded during the presidency of America First-y, selfish, xenophobic etc Trump.

In Trump’s first year as President (2017), the share of respondents stating that the United States was viewed either “very” or “somewhat favorably” by the rest of the world totaled only 42 percent – a big drop from the 54 percent reported in the final year of Barack Obama’s administration (2016). But in the next three Trump years, the overall favorably percentages rose to 55, 58, and 60 percent.

Moreover, the “very favorably” responses in 2018, 2019, and 2020 stood at seven, 12 and 13 percent, respectively. – also higher than those of the Biden years.

Also awfully interesting: During Trump’s four years in office, the share of American respondents telling Gallup that they believed foreign leaders “had respect” for him increased from 29 percent to 37 percent. The third reading for Biden’s administration showed that 37 percent of respondents also believed that foreign leaders respected him. But that 2023 result is down from 58 percent in early 2021, at the outset of his presidency.

In addition, these Gallup statistics need to be seen in some noteworthy context. For on top of that evidence that Americans aren’t impressed with the payoff of Mr. Biden’s globalist campaign to repair a national reputation supposedly shredded by Trump, there’s considerable evidence that the rest of the world isn’t, either.

The most revealing sign is the international reaction to the President’s efforts to rally global support against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Long-time security allies, even in neighboring Europe, continue free-riding, with this widely followed scorecard revealing that overall U.S. aid to Ukraine still exceeds that provided by all European Union countries combined. Developing countries, meanwhile, keep displaying indifference – at best – despite Mr. Biden’s repeated insistence that global security, prosperity, democracy, and the liberal global order are all stake.

In other words, as opposed to taking seriously the evident Biden assumption that popularity matters decisively in international affairs, practically every other country is acting as if its own particular national interests are paramount. That can only reasonably be read as a major hint that this administration should stop harping so much on America being back (especially for others’ benefit) and revive more of an America First mindset.

Making News: Back on National Radio Tonight on Defending the U.S. Against Protectionism Charges

Tags

Biden, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, Donald Trump, global economy, Global Imbalances, globalization, Gordon G. Chang, Inflation Reduction Act, Making News, protectionism, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to be back tonight on the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor.” Our subject – the crucial question of whether recent U.S. moves bythe Trump and Biden administrations represent a worrisome new lurch toward destructive trade protectionism, or efforts to defend and promote legitimate American – and sometimes global – interests.

No specific air time had been set when the segment was recorded this morning, but the show – also featuring co-host Gordon G. Chang – is broadcast beginning at 10 PM EST, the entire program is always compelling, and you can listen live at links like this. As always, moreover, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

And keep on checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Im-Politic: Where Republicans Should Definitely Listen to Trump

Tags

abortion, conservatives, Donald Trump, election 2024, entitlements, establishment Republicans, GOP, Im-Politic, Medicare, Populism, Republicans, Social Security

And now for a sentence I’m stunned to be writing (but maybe shouldn’t be stunned to be writing): Donald Trump has once again shown that he’s one of the most interesting politicians in America – and in a good way.

The reason: In just the last few weeks, the former President has just staked out moderate and commonsensical positions on two critical issues that are frontally challenging a hardening, politically foolish and substantively counterproductive Republican/conservative consensus.

I’m stunned to see this because last month, I wrote that his continuing, off-putting – and, I emphasized, apparently irremediable – personal behavior and poor judgment  meant that he no longer deserved even to lead the conservative populist movement, much less win the Republican 2024 presidential nomination.

But I shouldn’t be so stunned because Trump has been opposing decades of Republican and conservative dogma since he first threw his hat in the ring in 2015. Trade and immigration policies are the obvious examples – and due to his efforts, the GOP is no longer the mouthpiece of the Open Borders-friendly corporate cheap labor lobby and of the China-coddling corporate offshoring lobby.

At the same time, Trump’s achievement in this respect has been even broader. As I’ve written, the unusual combinations of policies he supported contained the promise of not only redefining American conservatism (by uniting its traditional focus on allegedly excessive taxation and regulation with those aforementioned populist approaches to trade and immigration) but of bringing some long Democratic-voting constituencies into a new national political coalition broad enough to govern effectively. These include both households with members of industrial unions and working class minorities.

So it’s been all the more dispiriting that, in particular, the former President hasn’t been able to overcome his tendency to embrace even the most odious or simply dodgy figures as long as they profess admiration for him, and to blurt out the first often ill-considered opinions that pop into his head.

Nonetheless, there was Trump the day after New Year’s, writing on his own social media platform that “It wasn’t my fault that the Republicans didn’t live up to expectations [in the last midterm elections]….It was the ‘abortion issue,’ poorly handled by many Republicans, especially those that firmly insisted on No Exceptions, even in the case of Rape, Incest, or Life of the Mother, that lost large numbers of Voters.”

And as known by RealityChek regulars, evidence indeed abounds that contributing mightily to the Democrats’ better-than-expected November showing was a sharp, widespread reaction against (a) the sweeping Supreme Court ruling striking down the previously cited Constitutional right to privacy that legalized abortion nationally in most cases (approved to be sure by several Trump-appointed Justices); and (b) to the consequent stated determination of many Republican abortion foes to lengthen the list of draconian state bans.

Then, last Friday, Trump warned in a video message, “Under no circumstances should Republicans vote to cut a single penny from Medicare or Social Security.” He added, “Cut waste, fraud and abuse everywhere that we can find it and there is plenty there’s plenty of it,” Trump says. “But do not cut the benefits our seniors worked for and paid for their entire lives. Save Social Security, don’t destroy it.”

The former President was referring both to statements by Republican members of Congress supporting the idea of winning changes in eligibility for these hugely expensive but politically popular entitlement programs before agreeing to lift the federal debt ceiling, and to similar criticisms of entitlement spending expressed during the last campaign.

And as noted in the above-linked Politico article, support for Social Security and Medicare versus establishment Republican calls for significant change has been a long-standing Trump position.

Once again, I don’t believe that Trump has the personal discipline to stay on these most recent constructive messages and to avoid committing damaging own-goals. But these new statements add another big question about the future of Republicanism and conservatism:  How genuinely Trump will leaders who have shown signs of championing “Trump-ism without Trump” actually be?       

Im-Politic: A CCP Virus Lesson Learned and a Mystery Still Unsolved

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Biden, CCP Virus, CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, hospitalizations, Im-Politic, mortality, National Center for Health Statistics, vaccines, Washington Post, Worldometers.info, Wuhan virus

As the third anniversary of the CCP Virus’ arrival in the United States approaches, new data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have upended a widely held belief about the U.S. government’s response, even as other recent statistics have left another conclusion firmly in place.

The upended belief: that President Biden has handled the pandemic much better than former President Trump. Recently released figures from the CDC say it ain’t so – at least when it comes to the virus’ death toll.

According to the agency’s National Center for Health Statistics, in 2020, the number of American deaths attributable to the CCP Virus was 350, 831. According to its latest report on the leading causes of mortality in the United States, Covid 19 took 416,893 lives in 2021. That’s an 18.83 percent increase.

In other words, in 2020, when Trump was President and his policies toward the pandemic were widely considered an unmitigated disaster (except for the Operation Warp Speed policy that produced vaccines in record time), the virus killed many fewer Americans than in 2021, when Joe Biden’s administration has gotten much better marks.

But maybe these results are skewed by the fact that the Trump Covid year only lasted eleven months (because the first recorded American CCP Virus death didn’t occur till February 29, 2020, and the Trump administration ended on January 20, 2021)? Nope. Even when you make the needed changes, and peg the start of the Biden administration in February, 2021, you get the same 18.83 percent gap (with monthly deaths under Trump coming in at 31,893 and under Mr. Biden at 37,899).

The big bump up in deaths under Biden are even stranger when you consider that when the pandemic hit the United States, it was a truly novel coronavirus, meaning that it was difficult to figure out what it even was, much less how rapidly it could spread (thanks in part to China’s refusal to share reliable information), let alone how to treat it. So healthcare providers (and public health agencies) literally were flying blind. Moreover, there was absolutely no vaccine. And relatively few had the chance to develop natural immunity.

It’s true that the vaccine rollout took some time to complete (partly because, again, it was a novel challenge), and that once it was widely available, many Americans refused to be jabbed. But according to this source, by July 30, half of the population was fully vaccinated, and by year-end, this level had hit 62 percent.

Biden supporters can point to the fact that. in fall, 2021, the seven-day daily average of CCP Virus-attributable deaths peaked at 2,093 (on September 22). That was 37.47 percent below the peak under Trump (a seven-day average of 3,347 on January 17, 2021). (These figures come from the Washington Post‘s Covid tracker feature.) But again, there was no vaccine available at all in fall, 2021, under Trump. And natural immunity was much more widespread during President Biden’s first year.

Of course, deaths aren’t the only metric needed to evaluate the effectiveness of CCP Virus responses. Hospitalizations are important, too. A flood of severe virus victims can strain the healthcare system to the breaking point, both making each of them harder to treat effectively, and leaving fewer personnel and resources available for dealing with other serious medical problems.

So it’s more than a little interesting to observe that, according to the Post‘s virus tracker, the peak of reported Covid-related hospital admissions under Trump came on January 6, 2021, at 139,752. During President Biden’s first year, it was 101,865 on December 31, 2021. That’s 27.11 percent fewer. But again, the Trump peak came during a vaccine-less period. Moreover, that Trump peak was the peak for that winter’s wave. That Biden peak wouldn’t arrive until January 19, 2022, when reported hospitalizations hit 161,789 – 15.77 percent higher than the worst Trump figure. And these Biden-era hospitalizations reached such levels even though this was the time when the virus’ Omicron variant became dominant in the United States – strain that was the most infectious, yet the least severe, yet.

But the conclusion that’s been left in place is that, whoever the President, the United States’ virus response has been much less effective than that of many other countries in terms of saving lives.

As of today, the Worldometers.info website reports that the CCP Virus has killed just under 6.69 million globally. The death toll in the United States: Just under 1.12 million. So the United States has suffered 16.74 percent of the world’s virus-related deaths even though it represents just 4.25 percent of the world’s population. That’s a discrepancy so big that it can’t possibly be explained to any meaningful extent by national differences in how virus-related deaths are defined.

A new U.S. Congress convenes next month, and supposedly lots of investigations will be launched – especially by the new Republican majority in the House. Let’s hope that a serious probe of the nation’s clearly bipartisan failure to cope adequately with the CCP Virus is at or near the top of the list.  

Im-Politic: Americans Really Do Seem Split Down the Middle Politically

Tags

Congress, Democrats, Donald Trump, Election 2014, election 2016, election 2018, election 2020, election 2022, elections, House of Representatives, Im-Politic, incumbents, Republicans

As everyone is supposed to know, the United States has become a 50-50 country politically. As argued by this well known analyst,

“The two parties have been neck and neck since long before this midterm. Despite wild gyrations in the economy, the terrifying rise of antidemocratic politics on the right, and yawning policy differences between Democrats and Republicans, recent national electoral results keep coming in remarkably close, as if decided by a coin toss.”

And for a change, this time the conventional wisdom seems to be right – at least when it comes to elections for the House of Representatives. I just examined the results of these races going back to 2014 (the final election before the advent of what seems to be the ongoing Trump Era in American politics), and the evidence is strong that they keep becoming more competitive.

My yardstick is a margin of victory of five percentage points or fewer. And my sources are the New York Times tabulations. Here are the totals for the last six House political cycles:

2014: 28

2016: 16

2018: 48

2020: 39

2022: 38

Although the sample size is small, there’s a clear inflection point. But what’s a little surprising is that it wasn’t 2016, when Donald Trump shocked the nation, the world, and himself by winning the White House.

Instead, it was 2018 – which could mean that his impact on national politics didn’t start becoming clear until Americans had seen him as President for two years.

The above numbers indicate that this trend crested in 2018, but I’m not at all sure for one big reason: That year saw major (40-seat) gains for the Democrats.

The following two House elections saw much smaller shifts – indeed, these shifts (13- and 7-seat losses for the Democrats, respectively), were in the neighborhood of the 2014 and 2016 results (a 13-seat loss and a six-seat gain for the Democrats). But the number of close races by my criterion was much greater.

Moreover, despite the smaller shift produced by last month’s voting, nearly as many 2022 House races were decided by margins of a single percentage point or less (nine) than in 2018 (ten).

These results are even more surprising given that elections where lots of seats change hands mean that relatively large numbers of incumbents lose. Since all else equal, beating incumbents is difficult, you’d expect more elections during those years to be nail-biters. So a relatively large number of races were extremely close in a year that was pretty good for incumbents further strengthens the “50-50” argument.

The nail-biter count of course isn’t the only lens through which to view House, or any other, elections. Other major influences are the numbers of incumbent retirements and therefore open seats; the effect of presidential popularity and other coattail factors; voter turnout and how it tends to vary between presidential election and non-presidential election years; the overall condition of the country and how it’s perceived; and the importance of local issues in these most local of all national elections.

But even considering these considerations, increasing numbers of close races does seem to be a recent trend. So if you’re a politics junkie, and you think you’ve been staying up ever later on Election Night before knowing the final results or having a pretty good idea of them, it’s not your imagination.

P.S. As of this morning, two House races are still undecided. And they look like nail-biters!

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Two New Must-Read Reports on U.S. Trade Policy

Tags

African Americans, Ana Swanson, China, Donald Trump, globalization, imports, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, intellectual property, ITIF, Jobs, manufacturing, mercantilism, minorities, non-market economy status, protectionism, Section 337, The New York Times, Trade, trade law, U.S. International Trade Commission, USITC, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Good things just came in twos on the U.S. trade policy front, in the form of two separate reports that spotlighted a major, vastly under-appreciated result of America’s approach to the international economy for many decades, and that proposed an excellent new idea for shielding U.S.-based workers and businesses from Chinese (and some other foreign) predatory trade practices.

The first study was released November 14 by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) and alertly covered by Ana Swanson of The New York Times. The USITC researchers usefully reviewed the academic literature on trade policy’s impact on various U.S. population groups and found that overall, and came to two major conclusions. First, “in the face of trade shocks [like the soaring levels of imports from China that followed Washington’s decision in the 1990s to expand greatly bilateral economic ties], Black and other Nonwhite workers [fared] worse than their White counterparts.” Second, “import competition had a large and disproportionately negative effect on wages of minority workers.”

The reasons, the USITC stressed, were many and varied, and included discrimination in hiring and firing practices and the generally lower education levels of minority groups, which has tended to concentrate them in labor-intensive manufacturing sectors that have been vulnerable the longest to penny-wage competition from China and other developing countries. But one conclusion that shone through was the historic importance of manufacturing generally – including the kind of heavy manufacturing found in the Midwest, to minority prospects for economic progress.

And these conclusions will come as no surprise to RealityChek regulars, as the harm done to minority communities by a trade policy that I’ve long argued has been offshoring- and import-friendly has been the subject of two posts from several years back. (See here and here.) But as the X indicated, and the USITC report emphasized, too many gaps remain in the data currently available and too much of what can be accessed is too poorly structured to create a genuinely satisfactory picture. So how about USITC folks getting on the horn to their Census Bureau counterparts to get cracking?

One other point worth mentioning (which the USITC understandably didn’t include): The first recent President who tried at all to change the trade policies that apparently have hit U.S. minorities hardest was one Donald Trump – who’s still being widely pilloried as a white supremacist.

The second, more forward-looking report was released Monday by the Infomation Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, and recommended a creative way to use U.S. trade law to shut out of the American market products whose competitiveness has benefited from “unfair trade practices in non-market, non-rule-of-law economies such as China.”

The trade law provision ITIF would employ is called Section 337. The reason? Unlike other U.S. trade law measures, rather than authorize the imposition of tariffs on imports that are sold to Americans at below-market prices (dumping) or enjoy certain kinds of subsidies, or profit from intellectual property theft (the main alleged trade crimes addressed by American trade law), in certain circumstances Section 337 authorizes completely banning U.S. imports from foreign entities shown to have profited from such practices.

ITIF proposes to increase greatly the number of these circumstances, especially for cases not involving intellectual property, for transgessions by China and other economic rogues.

Perhaps most important, in cases involving such outlier countries, it would eliminate the (already weakened) requirement that a plaintiff domestic company or industry has been injured by predatory trade practices. (In the U.S. trade law system, plaintiffs not only need to demonstrate that an outlawed practice exists, but that it has seriously harmed them.) As ITIF argues,

“It should be irrelevant if the domestic company is harmed in the here and now. The point is that the unfair practices should not be rewarded, period. The other point is that all too often, especially in technologically complex industries, by the time harm is determined it is too late: The company has suffered irreversible decline in its competitive position. Adjudicating blame becomes a coroner’s inquest over dead U.S. companies.”

Two other crucial ways ITIF would lower barriers to winning Section 337 cases involving non-market economies: First, it would spur U.S. trade law to cover foreign governments that provide predatory support for their entities, as well as specific foreign entities themselves. This improvement matters a lot because in so many instances (for example, in every single instance of Chinese transgressions), American businesses and workers are facing an entire national system aimed at creating advantages having nothing to do with free market forces. As a result, U.S. plaintiffs typically wind up facing a defendant with ultimately much deeper pockets, and the high costs of American trade lawyering and the uncertain chances of success deter many from going this route to begin with.

Second, current U.S. trade law implicitly assumes that the damage inflicted by foreign trade predation is limited to a plaintiff company or industry. But given all the linkages among industries nowadays, that view is way too narrow, and can leave the entire economy exposed to much wider-ranging and long-term damage.

To remedy both problems, ITIF would also entitle Washington to take up their causes by permitting any U.S. government agency to file a trade case against a non-market economy.

I’ve got a few bones to pick with these ITIF recommendations. For example, damaging trade predation is by no means confined to China. Many economies that it would let off the hook, especially in East Asia, operate national systems of protection and predation, too. At the same time, as the report suggests, this approach could induce the kind of international cooperation that would increase by orders of magnitude the price China – clearly a culpit in a class by itself – would pay for what ITIF rightly calls its “economic aggression.”

Moreover, the new trade law regime wouldn’t encompass “multinational firms operating in China.” That’s an awfully big loophole, not only because it’s these companies (including U.S.-owned companies) send stateside lots of products that benefit from China’s mercantilism, but because taking advantage of these predatory practices has been a prime reason for moving their factories to China to begin with (as well as lying behind their support for admitting China into the World Trade Organization, and thereby providing these exports with a vital layer of international legal protection against effective, unilateral responses from Washington).

But in the name of making sure the perfect doesn’t prevent the good, I can support this policy, too (at least as a start). And because ITIF’s proposals would go far toward adjusting the decades-old U.S. trade law system to recent global economic reality, I hope both major paties in Washington get behind it ASAP.

Im-Politic: Has Biden Become the Democrats’ Biggest (Though Not A Real Big) Asset?

Tags

2022 election, abortion, Biden, Capitol attack, Capitol riot, Congress, Democrats, Donald Trump, election 2022, FBI, generic ballot, Im-Politic, January 6, January 6 committee, Mar-a-Lago search, midterms, midterms 2022, Republicans

As next month’s U.S. midterms elections approach, some of the polling results are growing weirder and weirder. Principally, even as the Republicans have recovered virtually all of the lead they lost in the so-called Generic Congress Ballot (which tries to measure which major party voters would like to see control the House and Senate), President Biden’s approval ratings have rebounded pretty impressively. 

These trends (which of course could turn on a dime in this era of frequent bombshell news) are weird because the conventional wisdom holds that presidents’ popularity is an important determinant of how their party fares in the midterms. So all else equal, if Mr. Biden is being looked on more favorably by voters, Democratic candidates for Congress should be benefiting. But they’re not.

In other words, contrary to the signals being sent by so many Democratic politicians this election year (see, e.g., here), the President is far from the biggest problem troubling his party. Indeed, he might now be its biggest asset.  

Specifically, according to the widely followed average of polls compiled by the RealClearPolitics.com website, the GOP edge in the Generic Ballot today stands at 3.3 percentage points. That’s its highest level since June 24, when it was 3.4 percentage points.

Although this shift and these leads may seem small, keep in mind that during Mr. Biden’s term, the results have stayed within a distinctly narrow range. For example, the Democrats’ biggest lead was 6.7 percentage points, registered on June 21, 2021. The Republicans’ biggest lead – 4.8 percentage points – came this past April 28.

As for President Biden, his popularity is still underwater as of today – by 11.6 percentage points. But that’s up considerably from his worst showing – the 20.7 percentage gap reported by RealClearPolitics on July 21.

What I find especially notable are the changes in the Generic Ballot and Biden approval since three events that should have put the Republicans in scalding water: the Supreme Court’s decision striking down the right to an abortion, the beginning of public hearings held by the House of Representatives on the January 6^th Capitol attack, and the FBI’s search of former President Donald Trump’s home in Mar-a-Lago, Florida.

The abortion decision, which I speculated could seriously harm Republicans politically, was reported thanks to a leak to Politico.com on May 2. On that day, the GOP held a four percentage point Generic Ballot lead, and President Biden’s negatives exceeded his positives by 11 percentage points. As indicated above, the Biden gap doubled over the next two months, but his ratings have regained nearly all that lost ground.

After May 2, the Republicans’ Generic Ballot fortunes worsened so dramatically that the Democrats had built a 1.3 percentage point lead by September 21. Since then, however, these results have flipped markedly, so it seems reasonable to believe that the abortion decision has faded in importance for the midterms, even as Mr. Biden has become more popular.

The same conclusion looks warranted for the January 6^th Committee’s work. On June 9, when it held its first hearing, the Republican lead was 3.4 percentage points (just like its aforementioned June 24 margin), and President Biden’s approval ratings were 15.3 percentage points underwater. But thereafter, of course, both numbers trended in the Democrats’ direction until…they didn’t. On a relative basis, however, recently the President has been outperforming his party’s Congressional candidates.

And with the Mar-a-Lago search having taken place on August 9, the subsequent revelations about Trump’s handling of classified documents reveal a similar polling pattern.

The bottom line here isn’t that the Democrats are doomed to a wipeout next month, or that Mr. Biden has recently turned into Mr. Popularity. Instead, it seems to be that as unenthusiastic about the President voters clearly remain, they like what they see of Democrats in Congress today, and the slate of candidates offered by the party this year, even less.

At the same time, my belief that the abortion decision in particular has hurt the GOP politically isn’t completely dead yet. It’s still possible that it could wind up exacting an opportunity cost on the party’s 2022 performance. That is, even if the Republicans win both the House and Senate, it might still be plausible to contend that their margins might have been even greater had the Court stayed its hand.

But that case can’t be proven until the ultimate poll results come in – on Election Day itself.