(What’s Left of) Our Economy: March U.S. Manufacturing Job Gains Lagged – For a Good Reason

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aerospace, aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, American Jobs Plan, automotive, Biden, Build Back Better, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, Employment, fabricated metal products, Jobs, Labor Department, lockdowns, machinery, manufacturing, non-farm jobs, pharmaceuticals, PPE, recession, recovery, regulation, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, tariffs, taxes, Trade, travel services, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s figures from the Labor Department show that U.S. domestic manufacturing was a bit of a jobs creation laggard in March – and that was good news. The reason? The employment gains for the rest of the economy were so enormous.

This latest monthly U.S. jobs report showed that non-farm payrolls (the definition of the U.S. jobs universe used by the Labor Department, which tracks these data), rose by 0.64 percent in March – to 144.210 million. Job-creation in the private sector advanced at a virtually identical rate.

Payrolls in manufacturing were up by a lower 0.43 percent – to 12.284 million. But they still increased by 53,000 – their best performance since September’s 55,000. It’s also possible that hiring in the automotive sector was held down by a global shortage of semiconductors – which has led to production cutbacks and even some layoffs.

The only disappointment in the new manufacturing jobs numbers concerned revisions – which were mostly negative. February’s initially reported 21,000 net employment gain is now estimated at 18,000. January’s 14,000 job loss (already downgraded from an initially judged 10,000) is now pegged at a still greater 18,000. But December’s improvement was upwardly revised again – from 34,000 to 35,000.

As a result, manufacturing has now regained 63.83 percent (870,000) of the 1.363 million jobs the sector shed during the peak CCP Virus lockdowns period of last March and April. That’s fewer relatively speaking than the recovery in private sector employment – 66.88 percent (14.172 million) of the 21.191 million jobs it lost during that period.

But because of continuing weakness in the public sector – which has recovered just 66.42 percent of its 22.362 million job loss last spring – manufacturing’s payrolls’ rebound is still ahead of the entire economy’s. In fact, manufacturing jobs now account for a higher (8.52 percent) of total non-farm employment than during the last full pre-pandemic data month (8.39 percent in February, 2020).

The biggest manufacturing jobs winners in March? Far and away the champ was the big fabricated metals products industry, which expanded employment by 13,700 – more than a quarter of the manufacturing total. Next came two smallish sectors – miscellaneous non-durable goods and printing and related support activities (up 7,400 and 5,900, respectively). Encouragingly, jobs increased by 3,500 in the big machinery sector – whose products are used throughout not only the rest of manufacturing but the entire economy.

The worst performers were transportation equipment – whose 3,000 lost March jobs included 1,000 in the automotive sector, which has been forced into production cutbacks and some layoffs due to the global semiconductor shortage – and furniture (down 1,300).

Unfortunately, these latest figures indicate that employment in many CCP Virus-fighting goods continues to lag. To be sure, their payrolls seem to be up from the last pre-pandemic levels whereas overall manufacturing jobs are down (by 4.02 percent). But given the nature of the emergency, and the shortages it revealed, it’s surprising they’re not higher still.

The relevant numbers only go through February, and in the broad pharmaceuticals sector, employment rose by 1,600 sequentially. And January’s initially reported 700 job loss has been upgraded to a decrease of only 100. But the sector’s payrolls have grown by a mere 2.60 percent since that last pre-pandemic month of February, 2020.

The performance of the pharmaceuticals subsector containing vaccines was considerably better. February payrolls expanded by 1,300 sequentially, and January’s gains are now estimated at 500, not 100. As a result, this vaccine-related sector’s employment levels are now 6.23 percent higher than in February, 2020.

The story, however, has been more discouraging lately in the manufacturing category containing personal healthcare-related protection devices (PPE) like facemasks, gloves, and medical gowns. Payrolls were flat on month in February, and the initially reported January job loss of 800 was only upgraded to a decline of 700. Still, payrolls in this sector have climbed by 7.98 percent since February, 2020.

Interestingly, despite the rebounding orders for Boeing’s popular but previously grounded 737 Max jetliner, the recovery of national and global travel, and the resumption of deliveries of its also-troubled 787 Dreamliner, none of these positive developments has shown up in the aerospace jobs numbers.

For example, aircraft employment in February (also the latest available figures) grew by only 1,000 on month and not only remains down 10.66 percent on year, but substantially lower than all of last year’s safety crisis- and the worst of the CCP Virus-plagued months. Similar trends hold for aircraft engines and engine parts, and non-engine aircraft parts.

The outlook for domestic manufacturing job creation still seem bright, as vaccinations are being administered rapidly, reopenings are spreading, igniting renewed overall economic activity, Boeing does seem to be emerging from its safety and manufacturing-related troubles, and the high, sweeping Trump tariffs keep pricing many Chinese goods out of the U.S. market, thereby creating new opportunities for American producers.

But that global semiconductor shortage, which will eventually affect much more than automotive output, may not end until late next year. It’s tough to know the overall impact of the Biden administration’s American Jobs Plan and other Build Back Better virus recovery proposals on the one hand, and the tax increases proposed to pay for them on the other, as well as the new regulations that will be involved – assuming even that they pass Congress reasonably intact. And vaccines production won’t be booming forever.

So no one concerned about domestic manufacturing’s health and prospects has any excuse not to peruse carefully all the industry-related data and news that are in store in the weeks and months ahead.

Glad I Didn’t Say That! Is China Calling Biden’s Bluff on U.S. Allies?

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alliances, allies, China, Glad I Didn't Say That!, Global Times, Joe Biden, multilateralism, Trade

“Rather than picking fights with our allies and undermining respect for America, Biden will work with our closest allies [to end China’s trade abuses], mobilizing more than half the world’s economy to better deliver for our workers.”

–The Biden presidential campaign, 2020

“If Washington wants to exploit its alliance system to deal with China, it is bound to be restrained by its allies. Many US allies have economic interests with China and they are not willing to confront China in an effort to strengthen alliances with the US.”

–– Chinese state-run publication Global Times, November 8, 2020 

 

(Sources:  “The Biden Plan to Ensure the Future is ‘Made in All of America’ by All of America’s Workers,” “Joe’s Vision,” Joe Biden for President, Official Campaign Website, undated, https://joebiden.com/made-in-america/ and “Drop illusions over China-US relations, but don’t give up efforts:  Global Times editorial, November 8, 2020, https://globaltimes.cn/content/1206128.shtml) 

Im-Politic: Is the U.S. Really a CCP Virus Outlier?

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, lockdowns, shutdowns, therapeutics, Trump, vaccines, Worldometers.info, Wuhan virus

It seems pretty clear that President Trump is in serious danger of losing Election 2020 in part because of his handling of the CCP Virus. Much less clear, especially as a second virus wave washes over not only the United States much of the rest of the world, is whether, as frequently charged , Mr. Trump’s record has been such an outlier. And if this allegation is still clear to you, consider the following data showing the rising numbers of infections in the world’s major high-income economies.

The period covered is, with the exception of France, October 2 (around the time when increases began significantly increasing) to yesterday (November 9). The numbers come from the well regarded Worldometers.info website:

United States: 140.20 percent

France: (Oct. 3): 18.75 percent

Spain: 74.62 percent

United Kingdom: 81.64 percent

Italy: 911.33 percent

Germany: 481.19 percent

Netherlands: 22.35 percent

Canada: 117.61 percent

Sweden: 380.20 percent

Japan: 53.07 percent

It’s important to note that these percentages could well change dramatically on very short notice – because some have already changed dramatically in the last few days. For example, through November 7, France’s increase was 411.74 percent. Through October 30, the Netherlands’ was 190.69 percent.

But it’s even more important to note that, especially taking these recent and potential fluctuations into account, America’s results are in the middle of the pack – and even closer to the lower end.

Although any evaluation of these statistics also needs to recognize that major, virus-relevant differences separate these countries (e.g., population density, climate, various demographics), they’re also separated, as widely noted, by substantially different approaches to CCP Virus mitigation. (Regarding population density in particular, that’s why I’m not mentioning very small, crowded European countries like Belgium and Switzerland and Luxembourg. In fact, I almost left out the Netherlands for this very reason.)

And in this vein, it’s more than a little interesting with worst recent records than the United States are Germany and Italy – where lockdowns of their economies and societies have been much more prompt and complete than in the United States.

This leaves the continuing major knock on the Trump record the exceptionally big absolute numbers of virus infections in the United States (including on a per capita basis) compared with those of peer economies and societies. It’s a big knock. But unless you think that large countries can or should be shut down until whatever public health goal their governments happen to set at a given time (bending the curve? slowing the spread? “crushing the virus”?), it shouldn’t be difficult to recognize that the appearance of a second wave immediately following the first reopenings in heavily locked down countries shows that putting the clamps on at best kept the virus temporarily dormant.

One possible conclusion to which these common problems being faced by such a diverse group of countries is one that the American character seems especially resistant to — that not all problems are readily solvable, or solvable at all, or even easily mitigated (at least until science figures out how to produce safe and effective vaccines and cures much faster). And if many of President Trump’s critics can be faulted for such assumption, he’s guilty of similar pollyannism due to his numerous claims that the virus is “under control” – even though nothing about its spread through Europe, in any case, indicated that enduring progress like this was possible at these stages.

That’s not to say that Americans shouldn’t prize their can-do spirit, or that governments are helpless in the face of such disasters – especially since, as far as is known, this disaster wasn’t government- or man-made. And it certainly doesn’t mean that better performance (in addition to better messaging) shouldn’t be expected and demanded. But it does point to the need to scale back expectations and demands, specifically to the realm of the doable, of tradeoffs and genuinely tragic choices, and of the priority-setting that naturally follows.

There’s no guarantee that national leaders will be rewarded for this kind of sober realism. But if this latest U.S. presidential election is any indication, there’s no guarantee that peddling overly rosy scenarios pays off with voters, either.

Glad I Didn’t Say That! So We’ll Need to Learn to Live with the Virus After All?

“[Trump] says that we’re learning to live with [the CCP Virus]….Learning to live with it. Come on. We’re dying with it, because he’s never said. See, you said, ‘It’s dangerous.’”

–Democratic Presidential Candidate Joe Biden, October 22, 2020

“Joe Biden vowed Wednesday not to campaign in the election homestretch ‘on the false promises of being able to end this pandemic by flipping a switch.’”

–Democratic Presidential Candidate Joe Biden, October 28, 2020

(Sources: “Donald Trump & Joe Biden Final Presidential Debate Transcript 2020,” Rev.com, October 22, 2020, https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-joe-biden-final-presidential-debate-transcript-2020 and
“Pandemic politics: Biden shuns ‘false promises’ of fast fix,” by Will Weissert, Aamer Madhani and Alexandra Jaffe, Associated Press, October 29, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-donald-trump-virus-outbreak-arizona-health-2041443d40a5689a1a03b19fb9b29aec)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Trade Wars Would’ve Been Much Easier to Win if Not for Boeing

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, aerospace, aircraft, aircraft parts, Boeing, manufacturing, metals tariffs, tariffs, Trade, trade wars, Trump

Today’s grim news about recent Boeing aircraft orders and deliveries is just the latest valuable reminder that any evaluation of the Trump record on manufacturing and trade policy has to take into account the entire aircraft and parts industry’s transformation from a slight to a bigtime industrial laggard. Moreover, Boeing’s weakness – which has nothing to do with the President’s trade or any other policies — seems likely to continue for the foreseeable future, at least according to Boeing. The company’s latest long-term forecast for the global aircraft market affirms that it will take years for aviation worldwide to return to pre-CCP Virus levels.

The degree of the pain inflicted by Boeing’s troubles – which also include major safety woes that started making headlines in early 2019 – on the whole of domestic industry, and how unrelated manufacturing’s overall Trump era performance has been to the President’s tariff-heavy trade policies, becomes clear from diving into the most detailed U.S. manufacturing output figures available: the Federal Reserve’s industrial production data.

For example, the Fed numbers show that, during the Obama administration, adjusting for inflation, manufacturing output increased by 14.65 percent. Real aircraft and parts production output growth was just slightly slower: 12.39 percent.

But from the start of the Trump years until the arrival of the pandemic (February, 2017 through February, 2020), whereas the manufacturing sector as a whole expanded by 3.60 percent in price-adjusted terms, the aircraft and parts industry shrank by 13.10 percent.

Since the virus struck (from February through the latest available – August – numbers)? Manufacturing output is down by 6.39 percent after inflation, and aircraft and parts production is off by 10.81 percent.

As for the trade war impact, from March, 2018 (the first full month of President Trump’s metals tariffs and a good place for marking the start of the broader trade wars) until February, 2020 (the last month before the virus began significantly affecting manufacturing and the entire domestic economy), overall manufacturing production grew by a bare 0.83 percent. But that poor performance was clearly dragged down by the nation’s aircraft and parts factories – which turned out 10.74 percent less in terms of constant dollar product value.

Aircraft and parts were major industrial also-rans, too, during the comparable 23-month period preceding the first full month of the Trump metals tariffs. Their real production slumped by 4.11 percent, as manufacturing’s overall production rose by 4.07 percent.

The bottom line, then, couldn’t be clearer. The President was wrong in insisting that trade wars for big deficit countries like the United States are “easy to win.” But the facts also demonstrate that the victories the nation has won in these conflicts – which have been significant – would have been come much easier had the aerospace sector and its long-time leader Boeing not turned into such major losers.

Making News: Podcast Now On-Line of Last Night’s NYC Radio Appearance

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court packing, FBI, filibuster, Frank Morano, Kamala Harris, Making News, Mike Pence, rock music, Supreme Court, The Other Side of Midnight, Trump-Russia, Vice Presidential debate, WABC AM, Yankees

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my appearance last night on Frank Morano’s “The Other Side of Midnight” program on New York City’s WABC-AM radio station. For a – really – wide-ranging discussion encompassing tonight’s Vice Presidential debate, the Supreme Court, rock music, the economy, the latest revelations about FBI misdeeds, and of course the Yankees, click here and then on the “Staten Island” link. My segment beings at about the 20:30 mark.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: On New York City Radio in the Wee Hours Tonight!

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to appear tonight (technically, Wednesday morning) on Frank Morano’s “The Other Side of Midnight” program on New York City’s WABC-AM radio. The segment, slated to start at 1:30 AM, will deal with the Vice Presidential debate and no doubt lots of other headline issues (along with some breaking New York City sports news!).

You can listen live by clicking this link, and then pressing one of the Play buttons on top. If you can’t stay up that late, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Another Better-Than-It-Looks Monthly U.S. Trade Report

Today’s new official U.S. trade figures (for August) once more teach the crucial lesson – which has only grown more crucial during this economically unprecedented CCP Virus era – that the real story can only be gleaned by going deep into the weeds (including deeper than I normally go here at RealityChek). And that lesson goes double for judging policies that were put into effect before the virus struck – including President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies.

This insight is especially important – and good news – for Mr. Trump, since the transforming U.S. trade policy has been one of his signature issues, and the various records and multi-year highs set in August in many of the wrong categories superficially bear out claims like this one from Politico:

“The monthly U.S. trade deficit in goods hit a record high in August, despite President Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign promises to reduce it dramatically by negotiating new trade deals and getting tough on unfair foreign trade practices, a Commerce Department report showed on Tuesday.”

Particularly embarrassing, it would seem, for the President (though generally ignored so far by his critics) – the recent ballooning of the trade deficit for manufacturing, whose fortunes Mr. Trump has rightly identified as key to the U.S. economy’s future, and whose workers’ votes are central to his reelection hopes.

Yet as with last month’s trade report (for July) the deficit details make clear how highly concentrated the deterioration in the manufacturing and overall trade balances have been; how little these adverse developments have to do with the trade measure championed and put into effect by the President’ and how much they have to do with the stop-start nature of the virus-era economy.

Let’s start with the manufacturing deficit. The August total of $102.37 billion actually represented a 2.16 percent dip from July’s $104.63 billion level. Unfortunately, that July result was an all-time worst, and the August level comes in right behind it at Number Two.

To add insult to injury, the combined July and August manufacturing trade gaps ($207 billion) represented a 19.06 percent ($33.19 billion) jump from the $173.84 billion combined May and June total.

So it looks like for all the tariffs (and new trade deals with China, on the one hand, and Canada and Mexico on the other – in the form of the U.S. Mexico Canada Agreement that revised the North American Free Trade deal), domestic manufacturing has settled back into its pre-Trump pattern. That is, as it’s been bouncing back strongly during the third quarter this year from the dramatic CCP Virus-induced slump suffered during the second quarter, it’s sucking in supertanker-loads of imports. Meanwhile, as widely reported, it looks like retailers are rushing to replenish their inventories of imported consumer goods to prepare for the holiday season.

Closer examination, however, reveals that most of the widening of the manufacturing trade deficit over the last two data months stems from three sectors tracked in these monthly trade reports: automotive (vehicles and parts combined), civilian aircraft, and cell phones. And as explained last month on RealityChek, the trade developments in these industries are unrelated to Trump or anyone of his predecessors’ trade policies.

After all, the automotive sector shut down almost completely early in the virus period, and has reopened just as suddenly. The U.S. aerospace industry – until recently the nation’s biggest trade surplus winner – has been hobbled first by Boeing’s safety woes and then by the virus-induced collapse of air travel. And Mr. Trump exempted cell phones from his otherwise steep and sweeping China tariffs.

In May and June, the combined trade deficits of these industries came to $28.29 billion. In July and August, this figure shot up to $47.10 billion. The $18.81 billion difference accounts for 56.67 percent of the $33.19 billion of the soaring manufacturing trade deficit during this period.

The same sectors had an even greater effect on the surge in the overall U.S. goods trade deficit. In fact, between May and June on the one hand, and July and August on the other, the $18.81 billion worsening of this trio’s total trade deficit actually exceeded the $17 bilion growth of that entire goods trade deficit.

As for the trio’s impact on the combined goods and services trade deficit during this period, their worsening situation produced nearly all (98.22 percent) of its May-June to July-August increase.

But in terms of trade policy, the most important flows to measure are the non-oil goods flows. As known by RealityChek regulars, by leaving out trade in energy and services, they represent that portion of U.S. trade most affected by trade agreements and similar decisions.

Between May -June and July-August, this “Made in Washington” trade deficit expanded by $18.80 billion. So all else equal, it, too, would have stayed almost exactly the same had automotive and aerospace not experienced their own special, non-trade policy-related difficulties, and had Mr. Trump tariffed those cell phones.

None of this is to say that as the U.S. recovery got underway, these sectors wouldn’t have seen worsening trade deficits anyway. But their whoppingly outsized contributions to the bigger trade shortfalls indicate that the worsening of their own trade flows wouldn’t have been nearly as stunning. Instead, their trade pictures would have roughly resembled the continuing stabilization and improvement seen in the rest of manufacturing.

At the same time, extra special caution these days is warranted in predicting whether these developments will last, and not just because the economy still seems far from reaching a new post-CCP Virus normal. The White House could well change hands next month, too, and with it, decisive control over economic recovery policy in general and trade policy in particular. But there still seems to be a good chance that the best way to gauge the underlying effectiveness of U.S. trade policy, the manufacturing sector, and the economy in general, will be to keep a close on not only on all the big virus and political moving parts, but on those industry- and tariff policy-specific details.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So Much for That Pre-Virus Trump Manufacturing Recession?

Tags

(What's Left of) Our Economy, Barack Obama, election 2020, Federal Reserve, GDP, gross domestic product, gross output, industrial production, Joe Biden, manufacturing, manufacturing recession, real GDP, real value added, tariffs, Trade, Trump, value added

A funny thing happened when the U.S. Commerce Department released its latest report on gross domestic product (GDP) by industry last Wednesday: Most of the evidence that American domestic manufacturing suffered a recession – even a mild one, as widely reported – before the CCP Virus struck disappeared.

The new figures also reveal that President Trump’s manufacturing record before most of the U.S. economy was literally ordered closed due to virus-related fears looks even better than previously thought in comparison with that of the Obama administration – in which the President’s Democratic rival for the White House, Joe Biden, served as vice president.

Focusing on this pre-virus data is anything but grasping at straws – unless you think the CCP Virus and its impact will last forever. For manufacturing’s fortunes have been closely connected to President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies throughout his time in office because manufacturing is so thoroughly exposed to foreign competition both at home and abroad. And as this article (which featured unusual balance) made clear, recent evidence that industry had slumped last year – even before the virus’ arrival and the deep downturn it caused – was widely viewed as a major sign not only that the “trade war” was failing, and undermining Mr. Trump’s .broader determination to revive the sector.

Yet the new GDP by Industry numbers (which take the story through the second quarter of this year, and incorporate revisions going back to the first quarter of 2015 and which were part of a broader release of four different measures of manufacturing production) generally revised that recession away. So presumably, judgments about the effectiveness and impact of the Trump tariffs and similar trade decisions during normal economic times should turn much more positive.

Understanding that the federal government uses four different measures of manufacturing production is the key to understanding why those manufacturing recession claims now look largely mistaken, and why some uncertainty remains. The four measures are: gross output and inflation-adjusted (real) gross output, and value added and real value added. The latter two measures try to eliminate the double-counting in the gross output numbers that economists generally agree results from including in its results both the parts and components and other manufactured inputs of final products, along with the final products themselves.

As of now, the only one of these gauges that still shows a pre-virus Trump-era manufacturing recession (defined as two straight quarters of declining output) is current dollar (pre-inflation) gross output. According to these data, this downturn began in the second quarter of 2019 and continued through the end of the year – and of course into this year. But a recession doesn’t show up in any of the other measures, and its absence in the new real gross output figures is especially important, since that’s the measure that the Federal Reserve uses to measure manufacturing production in its closely followed monthly industrial production reports.

At the same time, those real gross output figures still leave one manufacturing production uncertainty remaining. For even though the Commerce Department’s tables, and their quarterly numbers, show no pre-virus Trump era recession by this measure, the Fed’s monthly numbers do. Specifically, they report three consecutive quarters of manufacturing production decrease last year – from the first through the third.

Yet the quarterly figures reported by the Commerce Department show that real gross output in manufacturing fell between the first and second quarters of 2019, but rose between the second and third before dropping again between the third and fourth. Even odder: Although these Commerce numbers show a weakening manufacturing output picture for the fourth quarter of last year, the Fed figures show a brighter one.

As for the comparison between administrations, here’s what the new numbers show for the two most comparable pre-virus periods (because they’re closest together in the same business cycle) – the last three years of the Obama administration and the first three years of the Trump administration. And they demonstrate that, whether due to Mr. Trump’s policies or not, industry performed considerably better during his watch. The Trump numbers are all the more impressive since 2019 was marked in part by major production woes at Boeing that greatly undercut the output numbers for the huge U.S. aerospace industry and its vast domestic supply chain.

last 3 Obama years first 3 Trump years

Gross output: -6.50 percent +12.71 percent

Real gross output: +1.40 percent +4.63 percent

Value added: +5.41 percent +11.72 percent

Real value-added: +2.33 percent +9.00 percent

This year, of course, has been terrible for domestic U.S. manufacturing. Between the first and second quarters, in real gross output terms it decreased by 1.03 percent at an annual rate between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of 2020, and by 9.47 percent between the first and second quarters.

Interestingly, put together, those are about the same as the declines suffered by the entire U.S. private sector (1.11 percent and 9.14 percent, respectively), even though manufacturing employment during this that period held up notably better than its overall private sector counterpart. During the first and second quarters of this year, the private sector lost 9.92 percent of its jobs, compared with 6.25 percent for manufacturing.

The GDP by Industry figures for the third quarter won’t be out until well after the election (December 22), so voters won’t be able to judge the full Trump manufacturing output record during the CCP Virus period. But from what’s known so far, it looks like something the President can point to during the rest of the campaign as a promise kept.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Big Decisions Coming on Asia

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Asia, Asia-Pacific, Central America, China, containment, currency manipulation, deterrence, East Asia-Pacific, Japan, Mexico, New Journalism, Norman Mailer, nuclear deterrence, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, South Korea, Taiwan, tripwire, U.S. Army, Vietnam, Walker D. Mills, Western Europe

Whenever I think about what to blog about, I ask myself a question that I first heard one of my all-time writing idols raise many years ago when he faced similar decisions. The occasion came during a college writing seminar where the guest lecturer was none other than Norman Mailer.

The seminar probably took place sometime in 1974, and one of my fellow students asked Mailer why he hadn’t turned out anything about the Watergate scandal. I had been wondering this myself, since Mailer’s world renown by then stemmed both from his novels and from his forays into the “new journalism” that was emerging in that era, in which gifted writers tried to employ some key techniques from fiction (especially their keen insights into human nature and their considerable descriptive and narrative skills) ito shed light on the events of the day. On top of turning out numerous important non-fiction works, Mailer had also run (unsuccessfully) for Mayor of New York City in 1969. So he was by no means shy about sounding off on headline subjects, and I’m sure I wasn’t the only one of his fans anxious to hear about the Nixon-centric drama.

But his answer was disarmingly simple. He decided to give Watergate a pass because he couldn’t think of anything distinctive and important to say.

And that’s an (admittedly roundabout) way of explaining why today’s post won’t be about any aspect of President Trump’s contraction of the CCP Virus. At the very least, events are moving so quickly that it’s hard to know the score. Instead, I’m focusing on foreign policy, and in particular two major, under-reported developments in U.S.-Asia relations that are underscoring the return of Cold War-like challenges across the Pacific, but that should be teaching American policymakers very different lessons.

I’ve already dealt to some extent with the first here on RealityChek: The U.S.’ loss of global leadership in the manufacture of cutting-edge semiconductors to companies in South Korea and especially Taiwan. In a journal article scheduled for publication this week, I’ll be laying out the key the technical details and some of the main policy implications. But in brief it amplifies my argument that the location of the world’s most advanced producers of the vital building blocks of modern economies and militaries right at China’s doorstep means that the defense of Taiwan in particular has now become a vital U.S. national security interest that requires the kinds of military forces and strategies (including a threat to use nuclear weapons) employed to protect major treaty allies like Japan and Western Europe both during the Cold War decades and since.

After all, those Cold War commitments – which exposed the United States to the risk of Soviet and to a lesser extent Chinese nuclear attack – were reasonably justified by the belief that Japan and Western Europe were centers of industrial and technogical power and potential that could create decisive advantages for the communist powers if they gained control or access to their assets. The importance of advanced semiconductors today means that Taiwan now belongs in the same category.

As I detail in the upcoming article, Washington has rightly been building closer diplomatic and military ties to Taiwan in response (though I also argue that it’s ultimately far more important for the United States to restore its semiconductor leadership ASAP). But this fall, an article in an official journal of the U.S. Army argued for taking a net step that, however logical, would be nothing less than momentous – and comparably sobering. In the words of Marine Corps Captain Walker D. Mills,

“The United States needs to recognize that its conventional deterrence against [Chinese military] action to reunify Taiwan may not continue to hold without a change in force posture. Deterrence should always be prioritized over open conflict between peer or near-peer states because of the exorbitant cost of a war between them. If the United States wants to maintain credible conventional deterrence against a [Chinese military] attack on Taiwan, it needs to consider basing troops in Taiwan.”

To his credit, Mills goes on to make explicit that such troops would in part be performing the kind of “tripwire” function that similar units in South Korea serve – ensuring that aggression against an ally ensures the start of a wider war involving all of America’s formidable military capabilities. The benefit, as always, would be to prevent such aggression in the first place by threatening consequences the attacker would (presumably) find prohibitive.

Where Mills (like U.S. strategists for decades) should have been much more explicit was in explaining that because the threatened major conflict could easily entail nuclear weapons use, and since China now in particular, has ample capability to strike the U.S. homeland, the deployment of tripwire forces can result in the nuclear destruction of any number of American cities.

So this course of action would greatly increase at least theoretical dangers to all Americans. But what’s the alternative? Letting Beijing acquire knowhow that could eventually prove just as dangerous? As my upcoming article demonstrates, the blame for this agonizing dilemma belongs squarely on generations of U.S. policymakers, who watched blithely as this dimension of the nation’s technological predominance slipped away. And hopefully, as I just stated, this predominance can be recreated – and dangerous new U.S. commitments to Taiwan’s security won’t become permanent.

But that superiority won’t come back for years. Therefore, it seems to me that, as nuclear deterrence provided for Western Europe and Japan succeeded in creating the best of both possible worlds for the United States, this strategy could well work for protecting Taiwan for essentially the same reasons.

I’ll just insist on one proviso: At some point before it becomes a fait accompli, this decision should be run by the American people – as has never been the case.

Unfortunately, as I’ve also pointed out, Taiwan has become so important to the United States that even an America First-inclined U.S. President will have to look the other way at its longstanding trade protectionism and predation in order to maintain close ties – just as it winked at German, Japanese mercantilism in particular during the Cold War. But that kind of linkage needn’t apply to other countries in East Asia (and elsewhere in the world), who lack the kinds of assets Taiwan possesses, and in that vein, I hope the Trump administration (and a Biden presidency, if the former Vice President wins in November) won’t let strategic considerations prevent a thoroughgoing probe of Vietnam’s possible exchange rate manipulation and one other trade offense.

The former concern, of course, stems from the effects of countries’ sometime practice of keeping the value of their currencies artificially low. An under-valued currency just as artificially lowers the prices of a manipulator’s goods and services in markets all over the world vis-a-vis their U.S.-origin counterparts, and therefore makes the latter less competitive for reasons having nothing do with free markets.

The argument against the investigation (which I’ve so far seen only on Twitter, but by folks who are thoughtful and well-informed) is that in an economic conflict with China, the United States needs all the friends it can get. In addition, these critics point out, if tariffs are placed on Vietnamese goods, then companies thinking of leaving China because of the Trump levies on hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of Beijing’s exports will face greater difficulties exiting, since Vietnam is such a promising alternative for so many products.

What these arguments overlook, however, is that, as a neighbor of increasingly aggressive China, and a country that’s struggled for centuries to prevent Chinese domination, Vietnam has plenty of powerful reasons of its own to help with any anti-China efforts initiated by the United States So it’s highly likely that Vietnam will keep cooperating with American diplomacy and other policies regardless of what the United States does on the trade front.

Moreover, Vietnam lacks Taiwan-style leverage over and value to the United States because it’s not a world-class producer of anything. So there’s no need for Washington to grin and bear Vietnamese trade abuses that may be harming the U.S. domestic economy.

And finally, although it’s great that Vietnam has been a prime option for companies thinking of moving factories and jobs out of China, it would be even better for Americans if those companies seeking low-cost production sites moved to Mexico or Central America, since greater economic opportunity for those Western Hemisphere countries will be so helpful to the United States on the immigration and drugs fronts.

Mark Twain is reputed (possibly incorrectly) to have said that “History doesn’t repeat itself but it often rhymes.” That is, it holds important lessons, but discovering them can be challenging, and both American security and prosperity are about to depend heavily on U.S. leaders getting them right.