Im-Politic: Can I Oppose Politics in Sports but Favor Boycotting the China Olympics?

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arts, athletes, Beijing Olympics, boycotts, China, culture, foreign policy, human rights, Im-Politic, national anthem, Olympics, propaganda, protest, Sally Jenkins, society, sports

I’ve been struggling lately with two seemingly conflicting ideas that I support: Getting politics out of sports, and boycotting the upcoming winter Olympics in China. Maybe RealityChek readers can help me out.

I’ve laid out my arguments for making sports a politics-free arena in previous posts (see, e.g., here). I’ll amplify one in particular today:  Perhaps now more than ever, Americans need a domain in their cultural and social lives that’s reserved for purely mindless entertainment. Sports seems to be the best candidate, mainly because, unlike any of the arts, it has no substantial political tradition. And the main reason arguably is that music, literature, painting, etc can’t possibly avoid politics consistently if their works seek to make any statements about the human condition.

Of course, lots of art focuses on pleasing our senses and exploring new ways of doing so, and I don’t see how any reasonable person could object. And lots of art that seeks to comment on current issues is completely stupid and/or downright ignorant. But if you oppose the fundamental legitimacy of art that seeks to criticize or praise aspects of the human past, present, and future, or influence our ideas and mores, then you (logically, at least) need to oppose the appearance of much of what’s been the best and most important and most enlightening of human achievements for millennia. And you choke off the possibility of such works and their benefits being created going forward.

Sports, however, lack any such potential. They’re important for keeping us healthy. They can teach important lessons about leadership and cooperation among teammates, the value of hard work, and the like. In their organized forms, they of course should obey the law when it comes to providing equal opportunity. And who could seriously object if those who run professional leagues or sports on the college and university level want to precede society and the law in providing or expanding such equal opportunity to actual and prospective participants either on the playing field or in management, or in nudging society and the law along? And needless to say (I hope!), in their individual capacities, athletes and others in the world of organized sports have the right to express themselves on any issue or matte, political or not, and to engage in politics however actively they wish.

But I’ve also pointed out that today’s athletes or owners or commissioners are hardly lacking for channels and platforms for reaching enormous audiences with their views. As a result, there’s simply no need for them to inject their views into the actual playing or scheduling of athletic contests. Moreover, as I suggested at the start, keeping sporting events politics-free provides Americans with a chance to spend time together having plain old unadultered fun – which surely has major therapeutic effects.

Undoubtedly, some and even many Americans may object to any sphere of their national life being shielded from politics, and especially from the most pressing matters. That’s their right, too – and they can register their objections by staying away from the arenas and stadiums, and turning off their streaming services.

But what about common sports practices like playing the national anthem before contests, or asking politicians to engage in activities like throwing out the first ball or tossing the first coin? Aren’t those political acts? Not the way I see them. Instead, they’re expressions of national unity – which any successful nation or society needs to encourage at least from time to time. In other words, it shouldn’t be seen as too much to ask that spectators and athletes alike spend a few pre-game minutes respecting the flag – or even an elected President or Governor or Mayor of Member of Congress they can’t stand kicking off a contest.

And yet, as also mentioned above, I want the United States to totally boycott the China Olympics slated to start in Beijing on February 4. Partly I support a boycott (or postponing and moving the games) for moral reasons. I’m hardly a world class athlete myself, and so I can’t say that I have any real idea of how much training Olympians have gone through to win the honor of competing in such events. I can say, however, that their dedication to their craft seems especially admirable given how many participate in sports without mass followings, and therefore aren’t expecting to cash in big-time on competing at this level or even on winning. So I haven’t come to my position lightly.

At the same time, do many of these Olympians really relish the prospect of marching in an opening parade past a beaming Xi Jinping, under whose ever ambitious dictatorship China has persecuted and allegedly committed genocide against one of its minority groups, has turned Hong Kong from an outpost of freedom into little more than just another Communist satrap, and is subjecting the entire population of the People’s Republic to a surveillance programs threatening to snuff out what little is left of their private lives? I’d hope many Olympians would be positively ashamed to enhance this thug regime’s global standing.

Partly, I also support a boycott for U.S. foreign policy reasons. As I’ve argued repeatedly, Washington has too often responded to Chinese actions that endanger America’s national security or harm its economy or violate the human rights of the Chinese people with tariffs or sanction or export controls that are episodic and piecemeal in nature. And since the threat China poses is systemic in nature, they’ve by and large failed to protect American interests – much less improve conditions inside the People’s Republic.

It’s true that more sweeping, hard-hitting U.S. retaliation would entail major costs and risks – especially when it comes to countering China’s escalating aggression against Taiwan and elsewhere in its neighborhood. And an Olympic boycott could spur retaliation by Beijing against American businesses operating in China.

But staying away from the games could bring worthwhile gains for U.S. interests, too. Especially if joined by other countries, it would deliver a powerful worldwide propaganda blow to a highly image-conscious regime and its claims of global support and even leadership. As a result, it would also weaken a crucial pillar of its legitimacy with a Chinese public whose culture is also highly face-conscious. Washington Post columnist Sally Jenkins has made a compelling argument that similar international condemnation helped bring down South Africa’s apartheid system decades ago.

China is unquestionably in a much stronger position. But national self-respect isn’t a trivial concern for America’s own security, either, and drawing a line at the Olympics seems particularly important at a time when Beijing is throwing its weight around in even the biggest American business circles more overtly and ostentatiously than ever. (See, e.g., here and here.)

But to return to the original question, a boycott would entail injecting politics into sports – which I’ve been opposing. Can I square the circle by claiming that China’s offenses are worse quantitatively and even qualitatively than any of those that have prompted the kind of on-the-field athletes’ protests that I’m against? Or that China is in a class by itself? Maybe. But what about the Arab and Muslim worlds, where an entire gender suffers systematic and often brutal persecution? So boycott any sporting events held there, too? I strongly suspect that treating human rights policy as the standard would make any truly or nearly universal Olympics impossible, especially if other countries began acting on whatever other foreign abuses they perceive. And maybe canning the games at this point is the way to go. But I’m personally not on board with that stance – yet.

The same problem appears to complicate the case that foreign policy considerations tip the balance in favor of a boycott. There’s certainly no shortage of conflicts between and among countries that could trigger any number of similar Olympics-ending boycotts. Which may just be too bad. Or maybe not. Indeed, if America urgently needs a politics-free zone periodically, doesn’t a tumultuous  world at large as well?

When it comes to a U.S. boycott of the Beijing Olympics, the answer may lie in our democratic system – and maybe it should. In other words, if, like me, the majority of Americans want a boycott badly enough, they’ll make their feelings known to their leaders, and there’s a good chance the politicians will follow suit. If the public doubts that a China Olympics these days is such a big and abhorrent deal, the athletes will go.

But yours truly will still be feeling pretty conflicted on the sports and politics question – and greatly appreciative for any advice on the way out of my conundrum. 

Following Up: The Democrats’ Trump/Ukraine/Impeachment Hypocrisy is Now Complete

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Adam Schiff, Alexander Vindman, Biden, Bill Taylor, Bob Mendendez, Democrats, Donald Trump, Eric Swalwell, Fiona Hill, Following Up, foreign policy, globalists, impeachment, Jeanne Shaheen, Mainstream Media, Marie Yovanovitch, Nancy Pelosi, national security, natural gas, Nordstream 2, Russia, Ukraine, Vladimir Putin

As known by RealityChek regulars, I’ve devoted two posts lately (here and here, and here) to the puzzling matter of President Biden’s policies toward the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline. The reason: For months during the last half of the Trump administration, any number of leading Democrats and globalist U.S. diplomats and other officials had justified the first effort to impeach the former President largely because he allegedly threatened key U.S. national security interests by hinging American military aid to Ukraine to its government’s cooperation in investigating charges against Mr. Biden (then a likely Democratic presidential candidate and therefore political rival) and his family.

Indeed, the first Article of Impeachment expressly stated that Trump “compromised” and “injured” national security for precisely this reason.

Mr. Biden never explicitly accused Trump of comprising American security by weakening ties to a supposedly crucial ally. But he certainly insinuated comission of this “high crime or misdemeanor” by charging that Trump “betrayed this nation.”

So I believed it was worth spotlighting that the Biden administration had for months been moving toward a decision that would both unquestionably endanger Ukraine and enrich Vladimir Putin’s Russia – whose apparent designs on Ukraine have prompted the United States (including the Trump administration) to provide it with various kinds of weapons and other military supplies to begin with. That decision: nixing significant sanctions on companies building the pipeline, which would transport Russian natural gas directly to Europe, in the process bypassing the previous transit route through Ukraine and enabling Russia to avoid the need to pay literally billions of dollars’ worth of tolls to its neighbor. And yesterday, the Biden administration made the move official.

For the record, I don’t consider Ukraine a vital or even important ally of the United States (for reasons explained, e.g., here). But Americans were told consistently during the first Trump impeachment hearings and actual proceedings that it was, making at least ironic a Democratic administration’s pursuit of a policy bound to enrich the country threatening Ukraine – and at Ukraine’s expense.

And at least as interesting, during the period that Mr. Biden has made his Nordstream intention clear, and since the final decision was announced, it’s become clear that most of the Democratic and diplomatic voices that touted Ukraine’s centraility to America’s own safety didn’t believe their own claims either. And ditto for the Mainstream Media news organizations that breathlessly reported and even endorsed them.

How do I know this? Because none of Trump’s main accusers along these lines seems to have had anything to day about Mr. Biden’s unmistakably anti-Ukraine decision. And my charge is easily verifiable. Just Google “Nordstream” and any of the following names: Alexander Vindman, Marie Yovanovitch, Fiona Hill, Bill Taylor, Nancy Pelosi, Adam Schiff, Eric Swalwell. In various roles, these folks were leading the charge to dump Trump because of his Ukraine record and the related claim that he was a ” Manchurian” candidate and then President who won the presidency by accepting Putin’s help during the campaign in return for doing the Russian dictator’s bidding.

And do you know what these Google searches come up with? Not a peep of protest about Mr. Biden’s Nordstream decision. Incidentally, some of these figures have been commenting some on Ukraine-related issues. Vindman, for example, co-authored a Washington Post op-ed piece in March urging the West as a whole to toughen its stance against Russia’s “blatant violations of human rights and unrestrained repression of opponents both at home and abroad.” He urged Germany “in particular [to] reconsider its business ties to Moscow — specifically the Nord Stream 2 natural-gas pipeline which is nearing completion” and the United States and the United Kingdom to strengthen existing Nordstream sanctions. But nothing about Biden indifference to the matter even though it was already becoming apparent – and certainly nothing since.

Three weeks later, after the President imposed sanctions on Russia for cyberattacks and election meddling, Schiff – the lead House impeachment manager in 2019 – noted that “While appropriate, sanctions alone will not be enough to deter Russia’s misbehavior. We must strengthen our own cyber defenses, take further action to condemn Russia’s human rights abuses, and, working in concert with our Allies and partners in Europe, deter further Russian military aggression.” But he said nothing about Nordstream at all.

At least as important, I can’t find a single instance of a Mainstream Media journalist even seeking the Nordstream views of either figure, or of their other impeachment-period Ukraine-philes.  

Some Democrats have condemned the Mr. Biden’s Nordstream decision – notably, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Bob Menendez of New Jersey and Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire. But although both voted to remove Trump from office in part because his Ukraine actions jeopardized national security (see here and here), neither mentioned taking any punitive measures against Mr. Biden even though in the long run his Nordstream decision could undermine Ukraine’s independence far more than Trump’s brief suspension of the arms aid.     

It’s true that the Ukraine national security charge wasn’t the only accusation leveled against Trump in 2019. He was also impeached for violating the law in holding up the military assistance Congress approved for the country.  But as pointed out in this post, nothing in the statute in question regards such presidential actions as impeachable. Certainly they’re far from the first course of action. Instead, the law specifically instructs Congressional plaintiffs to bring a lawsuit in a U.S. District Court.

As for the claim that Trump abused the power of the Presidency by launching an official investigation of a political opponent for purely political reasons, the revelations since of Hunter Biden’s activities in Ukraine during his father’s vice presidency show how premature – to put it kindly – that conclusion was.   

Aa a result, given the outsized role played by the Ukraine charge’s substance, the indifference shown this year to that country’s fate by Trump’s 2019 prosecutors strengthens the case that the first impeachment pretty thoroughly abused power itself.  The one silver lining (and it’s not negligible):  At least the Democrats and other Never Trumper globalists aren’t beating the Ukraine war drums for now.

Glad I Didn’t Say That! Biden Going Trump-y on North Korea, Too

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Biden, Donal d Trump, East Asia, foreign policy, geopolitics, Glad I Didn't Say That!, Kim Jong Un, national security, North Korea, nuclear weapons

“What has [President Trump] done? He’s legitimized North Korea. He’s talked about his good buddy, who’s a thug, a thug. And he talks about how we’re better off. And they have much more capable missiles, able to reach us territory much more easily than they ever did before.

– Presidential candidate Joe Biden, October 22, 2020

 

“The U.S. administration of President Joe Biden will build on a 2018 summit agreement with North Korea, White House Asia czar Kurt Campbell said Tuesday, extending overtures to Pyongyang after completing a months long policy review on the North.”

– Yonhap News Agency, May 19, 2021

 

(Sources: “Donald Trump & Joe Biden Final Presidential Debate Transcript 2020,” October 22, 2020 , Rev.com, Donald Trump & Joe Biden Final Presidential Debate Transcript 2020 – Rev & “U.S. will build on Singapore agreement with N. Korea: Campbell,” by Byun Duk-Kun, Yonhap News Agency, May 19, 2021, (LEAD) U.S. will build on Singapore agreement with N. Korea: Campbell | Yonhap News Agency (yna.co.kr) )

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Unanswerable Question Driving Biden’s China Policy

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Antony J. Blinken, Asia-Pacific, China, foreign policy, globalism, Indo-Pacific, liberal global order, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, rules-based global order, strategy, Taiwan, Xi JInPing

Two of the first maxims of strategy in world affairs (and probably in some other realms, too) are that (a) intentions and capabilities are fundamentally different and that (b) the former are much harder to gauge than the latter. These rules of the road in turn lead promptly to a key lesson: The greater the extent to which plans are based on intentions, the likelier they are to produce failure.  

The difference between measuring intentions and capabilities and the resulting policy implications matters crucially these days. For the evidence keeps mounting that the Biden administration is relying more on gauging China’s intentions in formulating its approach to the People’s Republic (PRC) and less on the much sounder foundations of assessing Beijing’s wherewithal and, most important, how this capacity’s dangers to specific U.S. interests are evolving – including over Taiwan, the newest and scariest bilateral flashpoint.  . 

The reason for focusing on capabilities is no great mystery. Figuring out how strong or weak a country’s military and economy are entails dealing with matters that are readily measurable to begin with. Although dictatorships like China’s in particular often go to great lengths to present misleading economic data, and misinformation about the state of their armed forces, the PRC’s competitiveness can be judged pretty dependably by tracking its interactions with other economies – e.g., its export performance, its attractiveness as a magnet for foreign investment. And U.S. intelligence is good enough to determine roughly how many soldiers and weapons, and the quality of the latter, that China could bring to bear in various contingencies.

Even more obvious – and important – is the case for deciding on U.S. interests. For whatever a potential adversary’s overall capabilities, why should Americans care about those that can’t plausibly affect whatever goals and missions that the United States decides it values?

Identifying what China’s leaders want is a qualitatively different and more formidable challenge. Good intelligence can provide some valuable information, as can face-to-face dealings with Beijing’s representatives. But ultimately, measuring intentions is an exercise in mind-reading, and it’s rendered all the tougher because of the secretiveness of China’s political system and the cultural gaps dividing East Asian countries like China’s and their western counterparts like the United States.

Which is exactly why the Biden administration’s strategy toward the PRC is so troubling. A heavy emphasis on intentions is clear from at least two of its features.

The first is its obsession with playing word games to define how it wants the relationship with China to develop, which in turn faithfully reflects the globalist position that achieving various types of relationships with allies, adversaries, and countries in between should be a high foreign policy priority. As I’ve written previously, that’s a great way to substitute form for substance, and to rationalize failure to achieve or preserve particular valued objectives in the here and now for the sake of payoffs stemming from a sense of mutual obligation that could be entirely unilateral and imaginary, over a time frame that tends to keep lengthening. Think of it this way – it’s easy to avoid rocking the boat if you don’t care who owns or controls the vessel.

The Biden administration, however, has taken relationship fetishizing to a whole new level. How else could one reasonably characterize all the time and effort it’s devoted to terming U.S. dealings with Beijing as a “competition,” or an “extreme competition,” or “a steep competition,” or a “stiff competition” (see here for the last two) or a relationship that will be, in Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken’s words, “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, adversarial when it must be.”

Why do the Biden-ites think anyone cares or should care? In particular, why do they think China cares or should care? Do they have any evidence of much thinking in Beijing along these lines? Or that any Chinese definition of a desirable relationship relationship would be remotely acceptable to the United States?

If anything, the President’s declaration that Chinese dictator Xi Jinping “is deadly earnest on [China] becoming the most significant, consequential nation in the world. He and others, autocrats, think that democracy can’t compete in the 21st century” can only mean he thinks that win-win ties are the last things on Beijing’s mind. Unless Mr. Biden believes that Xi is just interested in purely verbal bragging rights?

The second feature of Biden foreign policy that reveals a potentially dangerous emphasis on intentions is the refusal of the President and his top aides to define U.S. interests with any specificity – or even to speak concretely about the very idea of purely U.S. interests.

Their rhetoric is peppered with phrases like Mr. Biden’s claim that during his first phone call with Xi, “I made absolutely clear that I will defend American interests across the board.” But you’ll search in vain for meaningful elaborations beyond “I also told President Xi that we’ll maintain a strong military presence in the Indo-Pacific, just as we do with NATO in Europe — not to start a conflict, but to prevent one” – which of course refers to American commitments that have been in place for decades, not to anything new, much less that reflects concerns heightened for any reason.

What you will find – ad nauseam – are statements like Blinken’s declaration that the United States is “committed to leading with diplomacy to advance the interests of the United States and to strengthen the rules-based international order. “That system is not an abstraction. It helps countries resolve differences peacefully, coordinate multilateral efforts effectively, and participate in global commerce with the assurance that everyone is following the same rules. The alternative to a rules-based order is a world in which might makes right and winners take all, and that would be a far more violent and unstable world for all of us.”

Blinken of course might be entirely right on the merits. But it was more than a little interesting that the Chinese response to his remarks – which took place at that confrontational bilateral March meeting in Anchorage, Alaska – emphasized that the rules-based order is nothing more than a system selfishly “advocated by a small number of countries”; that “The United States itself does not represent international public opinion, and neither does the Western world;” and no doubt most important, “the United States does not have the qualification to say that it wants to speak to China from a position of strength.”

In other words, as the Chinese see it, whatever Washington’s view of “right,” what matters is that it lacks the might to create or maintain it over China’s objections – which evidently are legion.

None of this is to say that specifying concrete interests is a guarantee of foreign policy success. But how else can that goal be achieved without setting out objectives considered vital to the nation’s security and prosperity, communicating them abroad in no uncertain terms, and ensuring that enough power is available to prevail when they’re threatened whether Americans guess correctly about potential adversaries’ intentions or not?

And these questions have moved to the forefront lately because Sino-American tensions are rising steadily over Taiwan – the world’s new leader in semiconductor manufacturing technology, which near neighbor China views as a renegade province. Worries are understandably rising that Washington and Beijing might stumble into a conflict that neither truly seeks. If the Biden administration could straighten out its own thinking about Taiwan and other U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region, the odds of such an unnecessary catastrophe could at least be considerably reduced.    

 

Making News: Foreign Policy Overreach Post Re-Published by The National Interest

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Biden, defense budget, foreign policy, globalism, Lippmann Gap, Making News, national security, strategy, The National Interest

I’m pleased to announce that last Friday’s post about a major potential flaw in President Biden’s globalist foreign policy plans – and threat to U.S. national security – was re-published yesterday (with permission!) by The National Interest. I’d have put up this notice yesterday, but its appearance this soon caught me off guard.

All the same, click here in case you missed it, or if you’d like to see it in slightly modified form. I’d also be curious to know whether readers prefer the less personal and conversational style in this new version, or the original.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Im-Politic: A Trifecta (& Not in a Good Way) for the Washington Post

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alliances, allies, benefits, contract workers, education, foreign policy, geopolitics, globalism, globalization, Jobs, Mainstream Media, manufacturing, media bias, MSM, national security, NATO, North Atlantic Treat Organization, remote learning, reopening, schools, teachers, teachers unions, temporary jobs, Trade, wages, Washington Post, Zoom

At 11:30 yesterday morning, when I sat down for my typical Sunday brunch at home (where else these days?), I had no idea what I’d blog about today. At 11:35, after perusing the Washington Post Outlook section, I had no fewer than three ideas, each of which focused on an article simultaneously whacko and emblematic of key Mainstream Media and broader establishment biases. Ultimately, I decided that they were all so inane and representative that a single post briefly examining each would suffice to get the message across.

First catching my eye was a proposal by Seton Hall University political scientist Sara Bjerg Moller that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) “reorienting” its focus to add countering the rise of China to its list of missions, and even designating it the top priority. One obvious retort is that the European members of this alliance binding America’s own national security to that of the continent is that during the Cold War, when they readily acknowledged the threat posed by the old Soviet Union, these European members collectively never even mustered the will to provide adequately for their own defense even when they became wealthy enough to create such militaries.

They preferred to free ride on the United States instead – which perversely enabled this behavior by sticking hundreds of thousands of its own troops – and their dependents – in harm’s way, smack in the middle of the likeliest Soviet invasion roots. The idea was that since these units couldn’t possibly match the conventional armes of their Soviets and their East European satellite states, once the shooting started, their vulnerability and indeed impending destruction would leave a U.S. President no real choice but to use nuclear weapons to save them. The odds that the conflict would escalate to the all-out nuclear exchange level that would endanger the Soviet homeland itself was suppsed to keep Moscow at bay to begin with. (And if you think this sounds exactly like the U.S. “tripwire” strategy for defending South Korea that I just wrote about here, you’re absolutely right.)

As with the Korea approach, Washington’s NATO Europe strategy needlessly exposes the continental United States to the risk of nuclear attack because wealthy allies skimp on their own defense spending, but that’s not the main problem with Moller’s article. After all, if the Europeans never mobilized enough resources to prevail over a Soviet threat located right on their doorstep – and a Russian threat that presumably still exists today, since the alliance didn’t disband once Communism fell – why would they answer a call to arms against a danger that’s half a world away from them. And even if they agreed with the United States on the imperative of containing Beijing, why wouldn’t they simply repeat their free-riding strategy, which arguably would allow them once more to reap all the benefits of America’s efforts without incurring any of the costs or risks?

But weirdest of all, the author herself admits that Europe remains far from a new anti-China European mindset. In her own words:

“Regrettably, as with Russia [today], Europe is divided over how to deal with China. Many European allies are wary of picking sides in the struggle for influence between the United States and its Asian rival. Some, like Germany, even appear outright resentful at the suggestion that they must choose. German Chancellor Angela Merkel rushed last year to conclude the E.U.-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment — even though the incoming U.S. national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, had strongly signaled that Europe should wait till Biden’s inauguration.”

Don’t get me wrong: It would be great if the Europeans were ready and willing to stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States against China. But they’re not today, and a heavy burden of proof rests with those arguing that this common front is even remotely possible for the foreseeable future, much less that the United States should spend much time trying to create one. So I’ve got to think that this article was run simply because the relentlessly globalist and therefore alliance-fetishizing Washington Post believes that wishing for (and hyping the prospects of) something can make it so.

The second item is actually a pair of Outlook articles this morning. Their theme – and I could scarcely believe my eyes: Everyone’s overlooking all the advantages that remote learning can create! In other words, for months, national dismay has been growing that conducting classes by Zoom etc at all educational levels has been at best completely inadequate and at worst could permanently scar both the educational attainment and the psyches of the a generation of American students. As warned by none other than President Biden:

“Today, an entire generation of young people is on the brink of being set back up to a year or more in their learning. We are already seeing rising mental health concerns due in part to isolation. Educational disparities that have always existed grow wider each day that our schools remain closed and remote learning isn’t the same for every student.” 

But it’s also clear that the President is loathe to antagonize politically powerful teachers’ unions, which have acted determined to keep schools closed unless a wildly ambitious – not to mention medically unnecessary – set of demands have been met. Largely as a result, all the evidence indicates that a large share of American students still aren’t back in class in person full time (although the hesitation of many parents is partly responsible, too).

It’s just as clear, though, that the Post as an institution, like the rest of the Mainstream Media, is wildly enthusiastic about Mr. Biden. So even though the editorial board has upbraided the unions for their foot-dragging, the Outlook section is run by a different staff and, call me paranoid, I can’t help but suspect that yeserday’s two pieces – by an “author and educator in Boston” and a college professor – aren’t part of an effort to pave the ground for a school re-closing if the CCP Virus shows signs of a comeback.

After all, the articles were dominated by claims to the effect that one author’s Zooming this semester is “light-years better than the last;” that his teaching is “radically improved” since then;  that “if remote learning has been good for one thing, it has closed that gap between authoritative teacher and abiding student”; and presumably best of all, “I used to invest a lot of importance in arbitrary deadlines and make-or-break exams to establish high academic standards. These days, I’ve let go of many of my old notions about penalties for late or missing work.”

It would be one thing – and indeed noteworthy – if these alleged developments were broadly, or increasingly, representative of the American educational scene today.  But the Outlook editors provided no such insights, and if these reported experiences have been exceptions to the rule – as the evidence overwhelmingly concludes – what else could they been trying to accomplish by airing them but soft-pedaling the harm resulting from mass remote teaching?   

The third Outlook item that set me off today was an article by a Washington University (St. Louis) sociologist that included a challenge to the claim that “Manufacturing jobs are the ‘good’ jobs.” The reason? “Unlike in the past, typical pay for these workers is now below the national average” and “the rise of temporary and contract work is a factor….” Moreover, “Not all [such jobs] were offshored or automated, it turns out. Many were just reclassified — downgraded into worse jobs.”

Sure, author Jake Rosenfeld didn’t devote a lot of space to the subject. But he definitely should have devoted more, because what he omitted was critical. For example, it’s true that overall private sector average hourly wages now exceed those for manufacturing, whether you’re talking about the total workforce or just the production/non-supervisory workforce.

But the changeover is pretty recent. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, for the former, it came in 2019; for the latter, in 2006. Moreover, a 2018 Economic Policy Institute study found that although manufacturing’s wage premium (its edge over the rest of the private sector) indeed eroded between the mid-1980s and 2017, the benefits premium actually increased. That’s a finding hard to square with the idea that temporary workers are increasingly dominating manufacturing payrolls.

Further, the idea that offshoring in particular has nothing to do with what growing popularity temps have had with manufacturers can’t withstand serious scrutiny. Or does Rosenfeld believe that super-low-wage pressure from countries like China is unrelated to U.S. workers’ declining bargaining power even when production and jobs aren’t actually sent overseas?

At the same time, efforts to downplay U.S. trade policy’s effects on manufacturing are incredibly convenient for a news organization that, like so many of its peers, enthusiastically backed the pre-Trump administration trade decisions that decimated U.S.-based manufacturing and its employees for decades – and still does.

Despite the expression, “Three strikes, you’re out,” I’m not going to stop reading the Post Outlook section or the rest of the paper. Both are just too influential. But no one should assume that the number of whiffs in yesterday’s paper was limited to three, or that other editions in recent years have been much better. And I do find myself wondering just how many strikes per day I’m going to give this once venerable publication.

Glad I Didn’t Say That! Quickest Foreign Policy Study Ever?

Tags

Biden administration, foreign policy, Glad I Didn't Say That!, Kamala Harris, Mainstream Media, Politico, The Washington Post

“Harris gets a crash course on foreign policy.”

– Politico, February 26, 2010

 

“Kamala Harris is playing an unusually large role in shaping Biden’s

foreign policy.”

– The Washington Post, March 8, 2021 Politico, February 26, 2010

 

(Sources: “Harris gets a crash course on foreign policy,” by Eugene Daniels and Natasha Bertrand, Politico, February 26, 2021, Harris gets a crash course on foreign policy – POLITICO and “Kamala Harris is playing an unusually large role in shaping Biden’s foreign policy,” by Olivier Knox, The Washington Post, March 8, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/08/daily-202-kamala-harris-is-playing-an-unusually-large-role-shaping-bidens-foreign-policy/)

Glad I Didn’t Say That! A Progressive Democrat’s Middle East Muddle

Tags

Biden administration, Democrats, foreign policy, Glad I Didn't Say That!, Middle East, progressives, Ro Khanna

Rep. Ro Khanna “is among the Democrats who dislike President

Biden’s Middle East strategy, as his administration signals the region

is no longer the priority it was for President Obama and his

predecessors.”

– Axios.com, March 5, 2021

 

“Khanna…backed Sen. Bernie Sanders for president and has worked

with Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) to enact a non-interventionist foreign

policy.”

– Axios.com, March 5, 2021

 

(Source: “Ro Khanna wary of Biden approach on Middle East.” Axios.com, March 5, 2021, Ro Khanna criticizes Biden on Syria, MBS, accuses president of quitting Middle East – Axios )

Im-Politic: Advice Biden Should Reject, but Probably Won’t

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Alibaba, Andrew Ross Sorking, Biden, Biden administration, China, foreign policy, globalism, globalists, health security, Henry Kissinger, Im-Politic, Jamie Dimon, Joseph C. Tsai, JPMorgan Chase, multilateralism, nationalism, The New York Times, Tony Blair

All Americans of good will should hope for the Biden administration’s success. In fact, on a trouble-shadowed Inauguration Day, it seems especially appropriate to create and nurture the brightest feel-good glow possible.

Nonetheless, it’s also vital to keep something else in mind: Powerful forces are acting more determined than ever to convince the public that the new President should double down on the same major policy blunders that ensured the elites’ own power and wealth, but that dangerously weakened U.S. security and prosperity. For good measure, of course, these decisions brought hardship, despair, and (as demonstrated by the country’s deep polarization), bitterness to tens of millions of Americans. And there’s every reason to believe they have a willing audience.

And before you dismiss those thoughts as the sour grapes of a Trump policy supporter, I hope you’ll read this column from Monday by The New York Times‘ Andrew Ross Sorkin, who the paper seems to be enabling to settle into a role of out-and-out establishment mouthpiece.

According to Sorkin, “a provocative memo [is] being circulated among policymakers on both sides of the aisle and the Biden transition team ahead of his inauguration.”

Continues Sorkin, “It is even more notable for who wrote it….an under-the-radar group of global boldfaced names that act as a private advisory committee to JPMorgan Chase. Among others, they include Tony Blair, the former British prime minister; Condoleezza Rice and Henry Kissinger, two former secretaries of state; Robert Gates, the former secretary of defense; Alex Gorsky, chief executive of Johnson & Johnson; Bernard Arnault, chairman of LVMH; and Joseph C. Tsai, executive vice chairman of Alibaba.”

These globalist A-listers “typically [meet] once a year in a far-flung location with JPMorgan’s chief, Jamie Dimon.” Their discussions “are usually kept private. But given the precarious state of the world during a pandemic and change in leadership in Washington, the group put its views on paper in hopes of persuading policymakers to address what it sees as the most pressing priorities.”

Sorkin at least has the…honesty?…to describe their musings as “ a manifesto of sorts calling for a reset, a return to the pre-Trump days. It seeks to turn back the clock to a time when being called a globalist wasn’t an epithet….”

And although he adds that it “acknowledges the failures of globalism and seeks to correct them,” the group’s intentions (which readers need to take on face value, since the full document itself isn’t reproduced), justify deep skepticism for several reasons, starting with its make-up.

After all, it’s one thing to include a former foreign leader (the United Kingdom’s Tony Blair) and the head of a foreign multinational company (French-owned luxury goods maker LVMH). There’s no reason to believe that they have any special concern for America’s security and well-being, but at least they come from allied democracies.

But Joseph C. Tsai, a bigwig at Alibaba? JP Morgan’s Dimon is of course free to seek his advice on various matters, too, but maybe a senior executive from a Chinese entity that by definition is ultimately controlled by China’s hostile thug dictatorship could have been included out of the group’s effort to provide advice to an American President?

So not that other members of the group (like Kissinger for much of his post-government career) don’t have long records as China apologists and lobbyists for companies hungry to do business with and therefore curry favor with Beijing.

But Tsai’s involvement casts in an especially suspicious – and suspiciously defeatist – light the recommendation that “The best outcome for U.S.-China relations is likely managed competition — an accommodation that avoids military conflict while allowing for limited cooperation. It is impractical to think that supply chains and manufacturing can be moved simply, affordably or comprehensively out of China.”

If anything’s impractical, and indeed a spectacularly proven failure, it’s their stated belief that (in Sorkin’s words), U.S. interests can adequately be served by “a return to engaging with China, especially on climate issues and global health, while acknowledging the ‘significant challenge’ the country poses.” This soothing formula is exactly what’s led to the U.S. economic and technology policies that led directly to the rise of the Chinese threat.

The group’s perspectives on the CCP Virus and what it’s taught us about global supply chains and public health security and the like is no more impressive: “The near-total absence of American leadership, coupled with the nationalist approach of too many countries, have come at the expense of a strategically coherent, international response to the pandemic.”

Of course, it’s precisely because so many countries responded nationalistically to the virus – ostensibly when a globalist perspective was needed most – in particular blocking the export of crucial healthcare goods to ensure that their own supplies would be sufficient, that the United States can’t afford to be an exception, and needs to achieve self-sufficiency.

As for the group’s notion (as explained in the words of member Robert Gates, a former U.S. defense secretary) that “international cooperation and engagement on the international front and the relationships with our allies, …serves America’s self-interest,” it simply doesn’t suffice in bromide form any more. Now’s the time to explain exactly why this stance amounts to something more than what it turned into under the last few pre-Trump Presidents – a formula for needlessly risking nuclear war by coddling wealthy but militarily free-riding allies, and winning international friends and influencing people by giving away huge chunks of the U.S. economy’s productive heart.

Perhaps most revealing of all – both of the group’s cynicism and possibly Sorkin’s – was Dimon’s statement to the latter that “The first thing businesses should do is separate their company’s interests from what’s in the interest of the country.” This from a finance sector that has worked tirelessly for decades to push the offshoring of American manufacturing, with all the national security dangers and economic ruin it’s produced – as Sorkin conspicuously failed to point out.

Sorkin’s contention that “the message the group is advancing is common sense” makes clear that he’ll be an eager collaborator. And that probably goes for much of the rest of the establishment-idolizing and Never Trumper Mainstream Media. Fortunately for these elites, but worrisomely for the American people, everything known about Mr. Biden’s career is telling us that he will be, too.

Note: Eagle-eye readers may notice that I just called the new President “Mr. Biden” rather than “Biden.” That’s because he’s the new President, and therefore, at least in my view, deserves to be identified in a manner as distinctive as the authority of his office when the name is being used as a noun. By the same token, Donald Trump will be called “Trump” – a designation I’ve used for all other individuals I’ve written about in RealityChek, except when referring to them for the first time in a particular article.

But I’ll still restrict myself to using the family name when it functions as an adjective (e.g., “Biden administration,” “Biden policy”).

Truth to tell, I’ve had some ongoing trouble figuring out how to treat former Presidents. The tentative solution I’ve come up with is using that last-name-only form when they’re recent (e.g., “Obama”) and tending (not entirely consistently, I’m sure) to use their full names more frequently the further back in time we travel. (E.g., “former President Richard Nixon” or “former President Ulysses S Grant.”)

Even in such instances, though, I’ve struggled to be consistent without being overly pedantic with the exceptionally well known Presidents (like Washington and Lincoln). And when it comes to “Bush” and “Johnson” and “Roosevelt” and “Adams” I’ve needed to make clear whether I’m talking about George H.W. or George W.; Lyndon Baines or Andrew; Franklin D. or Theodore; and John or John Quincy, respectively.

And another complication: Sometimes, the temptations of stylistic diversity have led me to refer to former Presidents by their first and last names (e.g., “Barack Obama,” “Bill Clinton”). I’m sure these temptations will continue, but I just wanted to let you know that I’m trying to be as consistent as possible. Kapische?

Glad I Didn’t Say That! How Trump Is & Isn’t to Blame for the China and Russia Threats

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America First, China, Dan Balz, foreign policy, Glad I Didn't Say That!, globalism, Russia, The Washington Post, Trump

President Trump has “emboldened adversaries such as China and Russia.”

– Dan Balz, The Washington Post, July 26, 2020

Starting after the Cold War “As the world changed, the role of the United States changed, too. Other nations rose to power. China’s economic prowess gave it standing it had lacked, and then [Xi Jinping] turned his country in a sharply anti-democratic direction. Russia under Putin became a global nemesis.”

– Dan Balz, The Washington Post, July 26, 2020

(Source: “America’s global standing is at a low point. The pandemic made it worse,” by Dan Balz, The Washington Post, July 26, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/reckoning-america-world-standing-low-point/?hpid=hp_hp-banner-main_reckoning-7p%3Ahomepage%2Fstory-ans&itid=hp_hp-banner-main_reckoning-7p%3Ahomepage%2Fstory-ans).