(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why ‘Less Can be More’ in Trade with Germany – & Others

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Angela Merkel, currency manipulation, euro, Eurozone, Germany, mercantilism, non-tariff barriers, public investment, Trade, trade barriers, Trump, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This week’s first meeting – in Washington, D.C. – between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Trump is being billed as a confrontation between polar opposites due to apparently clashing positions on immigration, trade, alliances and international organizations, and contrasting personalities. Actually, notwithstanding the penchant of the mainstream media and bipartisan policy establishment for Trump hysteria-mongering, one of the divides between Mr. Trump and Ms. Merkel may actually be more fundamental than recognized. Growing trade tensions might be signaling that the two economies simply aren’t structured to trade with each other in mutually beneficial ways – at least not at current levels.

So far, the mounting trade row – which could already be the most serious since American ire at an allegedly undervalued deutschemark during the Nixon era – has produced a now-predictable policy debate. The Trump administration is accusing Germany’s powerful economy of unfairly benefiting from a euro that’s kept weak because of the economic problems of its partners in the eurozone. As a result, goes the American complaint, its goods enjoy major price advantages over their U.S. competition all over the world for reasons that have little to do with market forces.

Germany and its sympathizers counter that the country simply makes terrific products, especially advanced manufactures, and that its trade barriers are actually on the low side. Another argument raised in Germany’s defense – in part because of a strong inflation-phobia created by the disastrous experience of the 1920s and by the population’s natural frugality, Germans tend to be low spenders and high savers.

All of the pro-German positions have merit. And the Trump administration case is further complicated by Germany’s consistent calls for eurozone economic policies that would tend to strengthen the common currency.

Yet Germany’s free trade record is at the least open to dispute. Although its tariff levels are generally low, like most other U.S. trade partners, it uses a value-added tax that effectively raises the prices of foreign goods headed for its market and reduces the prices of its exports via the rebates they receive. Moreover, even before President Trump took office, the U.S. government repeatedly reported that non-tariff barriers maintained by Berlin “can be a difficult hurdle for companies wishing to enter the market and require close attention by U.S. exporters.” The country’s government procurement market appears to pose special problems. According to the American Commerce Department under former President Obama:

“Selling to German government entities is not an easy process. German government procurement is formally non-discriminatory and compliant with the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement and the European Community’s procurement directives. That said, it is a major challenge to compete head-to-head with major German or other EU suppliers who have established long-term ties with purchasing entities.”

Nonetheless, the more closely the German economy is examined, the less amenable to standard trade policy remedies it looks. For Germany has long decided to create a national economic and business model that seeks both to maximize net exports and depress consumption at home. Two examples should suffice to make the case.

First, although Germany’s is, as frequently noted, a high-cost, high-regulation country, upon adopting the euro, its government put into effect a series of policies that put its labor costs on a much slower growth path than those of the rest of the eurozone and the high income world as a whole (including the United States). As many critics of Germany have charged, the resulting wage repression has overpowered the euro-dollar exchange rate and in fact amounted to an “internal devaluation” that produced the same effects as currency manipulation.

Second, Germany has also limited its consumption levels in part through very low expenses on infrastructure and other public investments. Moreover, according to one former European Central Bank official, the country’s external orientation has been so pronounced that “private investment in Germany’s aging capital stock has been weakened by many German companies’ desire to invest abroad.”

Revealingly, some of the harshest attacks on these and similar German policies have come from the eurozone itself. In particular, members like Greece and other southerly countries have accused Berlin of conducting a mercantilist campaign to grow at their expense by flooding them with exports and denying them comparable opportunities to supply the German market.

Without taking sides in this dispute, it’s clear that because the eurozone is a currency union, its success arguably depends on members conducting both their domestic and foreign economic policies in mutually compatible ways. So in principle, Germany’s eurozone fellows have grounds for complaining about the totality of the German national model. (The reverse holds as well in principle.)

The United States also should be perfectly free to ask Germany to change its priorities. Unlike eurozone members, however, it has no legitimate claims to influence over this vital aspect of German sovereignty. Germans apparently have decided that their choices work for them, and are absolutely correct to insist that aside from the rules of the World Trade Organization or other international legal arrangements, they have no obligations to accede to foreign demands for reform. Berlin, moreover, has a point when it notes that the United States should look to domestic practices of its own that might be hampering its global competitiveness, rather than placing the burden of change on others.

This German argument, however, is not dispositive. After all, if America’s national business and economic model emphasizes consumption and domestic-led growth rather than promoting net exports, that’s a choice that its own political system has been entitled to make. Moreover, it’s a choice that makes considerable sense for a big, continent-sized economy with great potential for more national self-sufficiency in a wide variety of goods and services. Germany has no more right to dictate U.S. preferences than vice versa.

The decisive difference between the two countries is that Germany has been happy with the pre-Trump status quo, and the United States has not. Washington of course has the right to press complaints about possible German violations of world trade law and other trade agreements. But it also needs to recognize that such conventional approaches are dwarfed by the breadth and depth of Germany’s approach to economics. Promoting German reform isn’t likely to work, either – given the above sovereignty concerns, and given the sheer difficulty facing even so powerful a country as the United States in urging domestic reform on another powerful country – especially one that views itself as a success.

So what to do?

First, in general terms, understand that, however legitimate Germany’s sovereign decisions, they create problems to which the United States is equally entitled to respond

Second, without continuing to hector or nag Germany, figure out the most effective response and act accordingly.

Third, depending on Germany’s counter-moves, decide what combination of unilateral carrots, sticks, and negotiations, might achieve progress (including some acceptable compromise), while preserving approximately current levels of trade.

But fourth, recognize along the way that Germany’s legitimate sovereign economic decisions simply may not permit bilateral trade to continue at those levels with acceptable results for the United States. If need be, then, revert to whatever unilateral strategy can preserve or enhance interests America has identified as its own priorities.

The new status quo would put the ball in Germany’s court, and grant it full scope to accommodate the United States if it’s dissatisfied, or make whatever other changes are needed to achieve whatever new objectives it chooses.

In other words, Washington should deal with Germany through an ongoing process of give and take, employing a variety of tactics and tools in flexible, agile ways. The aim would be to capitalize on its considerable leverage but also understand where it can and can’t hope to succeed at acceptable cost and risk. This approach clearly has a less impressive upside than efforts to produce grand bargains, or than more extensive international economic integration schemes — both of which can in theory maximize bilateral commerce. But its very modesty means that it’s less likely to risk angry misunderstandings and consequent major blow-ups, and more likely to result in trade and investment that’s sustainable not only economically, but politically, socially, and culturally.

President Trump can think of this new policy framework as the Less is More Strategy. And he should realize that its usefulness extends far beyond Germany.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Obama Couldn’t be Seeking New Trade Deals at a Worse Time

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China, currency, currency manipulation, euro, European Union, Eurozone, exchange rates, Federal Reserve, Japan, Obama, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, yen, {What's Left of) Our Economy

You know that expression, “Timing is everything”? If so, you’re a big step ahead of President Obama, his trade negotiators, and most of Congress. Because it’s becoming ever more screamingly obvious (except to them) that this is a terrible time to be seeking new foreign trade agreements, and that the timing won’t be anywhere near right for the foreseeable future.

As I’ve documented, the United States has been outperforming most of the rest of the world economy since it’s recovery began in mid-2009. All else equal, when fast-growing countries increase trade with slower growers, their imports from the laggards tend to rise faster than their exports to the these countries. As a result, the trade balances of the faster growers typically worsen, turning trade into a drag on their economies.

This reality alone would seem enough to kill the case for President Obama seeking new trade deals with a group of 11 other Pacific Rim countries (the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP) and with the European Union (EU). Even worse, the economies in these groups that are outgrowing America mostly have done so by racking up trade surpluses. So it’s unlikely that their own export-led economies will become growth engines for the United States.

If you look at exchange rates – the value of the dollar versus that of other foreign currencies – pursuing trade expansion, especially a la Obama and Congressional majorities, seems still more counterproductive. All else equal (I know that phrase could be getting tiresome, but it really is needed to underscore how single variables never explain economic trends entirely) once initial effects fade, a weak currency will improve a country’s trade balance (and growth) by lowering the prices of its goods and services versus those of competitors. A strong currency usually has the opposite effect. And nothing could be clearer from the data that the strong dollar points to a trade-inflicted hammering of America’s recovery if the president’s plans bear fruit.

Conveniently, the Federal Reserve tracks exchange rates for a group of countries with “major currencies” – which “circulate widely” outside their home countries. Even more conveniently, these include the yen (since Japan’s is by far the largest non-U.S. economy in the TPP), and the euro (since the eurozone includes the main countries negotiating the US-EU trade deal). What these Fed data show is that the dollar is just shy of near-12-year highs versus this basket of currencies whether you adjust for inflation or not.

Could the dollar weaken much against these currencies going forward? Sure – if you think that Japan and the EU will become world growth leaders in the foreseeable future. Given that both the Japanese and European counterparts of the Fed have been trying to juice those economies with Fed-type bond-buying programs, and given that the results have been even less impressive, that looks like a big stretch. And don’t forget – the eurozone will be strapped with major Greece-like debt problems for many years.  

Another major obstacle to sustained dollar weakening will undoubtedly be foreign currency manipulation.  Countries like TPP member Japan and China (will looks sure to join before too long) have long histories of artificially weakening their currencies to gain trade advantages when market forces aren’t getting that job done.  The president could have favored including in TPP an enforceable ban on this unusually effective form of protectionism, but he opposed such proposals.  As a result, both the TPP countries and members of the EU will be completely free to devalue their currencies at America’s expense whenever their growth rates need boosting.

Strangely – or not? – one of the main domestic beneficiaries of trade deal-related timing looks to be President Obama. When the U.S. economy starts suffering the consequences of these misguided agreements, his time in the White House will have come and gone.

Following Up: For Greece and Creditors, Minimalism = Realism

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Angela Merkel, austerity, bailouts, debt, EU Stability and Growth Pact, euro, European Central Bank, European Union, Eurozone, Following Up, France, Francois Hollande, Germany, Greece, International Monetary Fund, Russia, Syriza

Every new fact emerging from Greece and its plight seems weirder and weirder. Today, the day of the country’s referendum on its creditors’ proposals to handle its financial crisis, the Greek government started issuing “official projections” of the final results. Not that Greece covers multiple time-zones like the United States, but I’m sure glad Washington isn’t in that possibly elections-altering business.

As of this writing, the only (apparent) certainty about the Greece mess is that its population has rejected the latest bailout-for-austerity deal offered by the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Even Europe’s most important national leader, Germany’s Angela Merkel, doesn’t seem to know what comes next; before the polls closed, she announced that she’ll meet tomorrow with French President Francois Hollande for a “joint assessment of the situation.”

Europe’s immediate challenge is deciding what a “No” vote by Greece means for the future of the European Union and of the eurozone – since Greece appears to have decided to break the rules of these rules-based institutions. (Here it’s important to note that Greece has by no means been the first rule-breaker, and that two of the biggest outlaws – when it comes to the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact – have been Germany and France.) How the continent handles the Greek challenge will surely influence how other economically hurting, debt-strapped – and larger – members of its defining organizations will react.  Specifically, will Portugal and Spain and ultimately even Italy more actively wonder whether they are better off remaining within such arrangements or leaving?

In turn, these decisions have huge national security and geopolitical implications. However flawed they have or haven’t been, pan-European institutions have been major pillars of the free world’s strategy for turning the continent into a zone of peace following centuries of calamitous wars.  In a nuclear age, for the entire world’s sake, these conflicts simply could not be allowed to continue. It’s eminently arguable that these institutions were insufficiently democratic or badly structured from an economic standpoint, or simply that they sought too much too soon (or too little too late, depending on your viewpoint). But if they fall apart, recreating them will be excruciatingly difficult, and Europe will surely become a more, not less, combustible place.

Worse, this new instability would emerge just at a time of rising tensions between America and its European allies on the one hand, and Vladimir Putin’s Russia on the other. Indeed, it’s entirely possible that Greece’s Syriza party leaders are betting on precisely these dangers to produce greater flexibility by their creditors.

But as important as these threats are, it’s tough to imagine any of them being solved or even headed off for very long if Greece’s fundamental economic problems aren’t solved, and what’s painfully clear to me is that no one in charge anywhere has a realistic plan.

As I suggested last week, Greece lacks a viable national economy. And no bail-out programs or austerity policies, much less further can-kicking, do anything to change its fundamental predicament. It doesn’t produce enough goods and services at affordable prices to meet its own current (first world-level) desires. It doesn’t produce enough of anything that the rest of the world is willing to purchase from it that’s needed to fill the gap. And I haven’t seen any evidence that any Greek leaders or European leaders are even thinking in detail about these issues – which matter crucially these days because the world economy is growing so sluggishly.

The closest I’ve seen to any micro-economic and structural thinking about Greece’s future is the idea that the country could ride a tourism boom back to respectable growth if either (a) the Germans and other wealthier Europeans would simply spend more of their incomes on Greek vacations; or (b) a currency devaluation following an exit from the euro made Greek vacations an irresistible bargain for the entire world.

Leaving aside the lunacy of believing that tourism and the overwhelmingly lousy jobs it creates can sustain Europe-style living standards, how many Europeans and others are likely to flock to Greece for the foreseeable future? By all accounts, many of its neighbors’ populations are thoroughly fed up with Greece’s perceived insolence, and its likely near-term future of economic turbulence doesn’t look like a formula for filling hotel rooms.

So I see no reason to change my view that most of Greece is headed for at least years of third world living standards no matter how the next few weeks and months turn out. It’s true that no one “owes Greece a living,” especially given the spendthrift choices made by its leaders and accepted with varying degrees of enthusiasm by so many of its people. Similarly, it’s true that no one forced the Greeks to borrow all the money that private sector European lenders foolishly provided. But it’s also true that both European financiers and the pensioners and other clients whose funds they invested in Greece, have gotten off pretty easy for their reckless choices, with the continent’s taxpayers and the governments they underwrite absorbing many of these losses.

As a result, maybe at least some of the intertwined political and emotional obstacles to genuinely constructive Greece policies could be cleared away with two measures. First, European authorities in particular should offer Greece some honesty. Second, that country’s financial enablers should be required to help fund purely humanitarian programs aimed at helping those Greeks who are suffering through no fault of their own.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Despite Marriage Equality Ruling, it’s Still the Economy….

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China, debt, euro, Eurozone, Financial Crisis, gay marriage, Great Recession, Greece, Lehman Brothers, LGBT, marriage equality, Obergefell vs Hodges, political correctness, Puerto Rico, punditocracy, recovery, stock market bubble, Supreme Court, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For the last two days I’ve been commenting on social issues – kind of a departure from my usual focus on economics and foreign policy, but worth doing as I saw it because the Supreme Court’s marriage equality raised so many issues that are both intrinsically interesting to me, and that bear importantly on the nature of our American society and political community. Over the last twenty-four hours, though, have come reminders – in the form of the (seemingly) climaxing Greece crisis and the deflation of China’s stock market bubble – that if the country doesn’t get its economics and finances right, none of that’s going to matter much.

Not that you would have gotten any sense of that from the major TV and cable talk shows yesterday. I saw every one of them except for CNN’s version, and I don’t believe the words “Greece” or “China” were even uttered. The Court’s Obamacare ruling got a fair amount of air time – but not because it will crucially impact a huge and growing share of our economy. Instead, the focus was on the decision as one sign of what a terrific week the president enjoyed, and what a pickle this (supposedly) creates for Republicans.

As the Beltway-centric punditocracy saw it, the mega-story was marriage equality – which should make clear that its worldview is grossly distorted by its cloistered collective life inside a media (and connected academic-arts-entertainment) bubble in which gays are robustly represented. After all, though the Obergefell vs Hodges ruling was a major social and cultural landmark for Americans, and will dramatically affect LGBT citizens, the latter comprise less than four percent of the U.S. population according to the best estimates. So it’s time to curb at least some of the euphoria touched off by Obergefell outside the LGBT community.

As for the alarm bells that have been ringing: First, many Americans who aren’t straight won’t choose marriage in the first place, much less child rearing. What of worries that the decision will set off an explosion of other kinds of nontraditional marriages, and foster the kind of child abuse strongly linked with polygamy? That very danger will naturally create a firewall against such units adopting or having test-tube kids that simply can’t be justified for LGBT couples and the loving, responsible parenting so many have been providing (and that we’re not seeing from too many traditionally married couples).

Nor do I see any threat to freedom of religion or conscience. If you didn’t approve of non-traditional marriage before the Court ruled, you’re just as free to disapprove today, and to express this disapproval. Your place of worship is just as free to preach against it, as will religious and other private schools. Businesses that oppose it will continue to be free to refuse to provide goods or services that would require them to participate or be present at weddings or other ceremonies or events they abhor. But they will rightly be required to serve LGBT customers at their place of business – including public officials who issue marriage licenses. If your faith now prevents you from signing forms that authorize LGBT couples to wed, you’re in the wrong job.

I can sympathize with marriage equality critics who are uncomfortable with the idea that LGBT Americans will assume a higher profile in the nation’s daily life, and who resent being labeled (often wrongly) as homophobes and, more broadly, “haters.” But ironically, they’re also sounding like the lefty political correctness types who favor turning offended sensibilities into a major criterion for limiting speech and other forms of free expression – or actual behavior. That’s the road to pervasive censorship and social controls that are thoroughly and dangerously un-American. Like the PC crowd, marriage equality critics are simply going to have to toughen their skins. In particular, if you want to air your views in public, rough pushback is often the price you pay. P.S. If you have real faith in your convictions, it shouldn’t be such a big deal.

Meanwhile, the future of the world’s biggest currency area – the Eurozone – is completely up in the air over the Greece crisis, and most of the world’s major private sector financial institutions (including America’s) are exposed directly or indirectly. Moreover, in the world’s second largest national economy, one of the most mammoth stock market bubbles in recent history is deflating – and the emerging Chinese stock bust could burst other immense bubbles Beijing’s economic policies have helped inflate.

Not that I’m predicting imminent apocalypse, or even a new Lehman Brothers moment, from either development (or even combined with the distinct possibility of a debt default by Puerto Rico). But when I think of how further national and global financial instability could affect an already under-performing, heavily indebted U.S. economy, and compare that with the fallout from the marriage equality decision, it seems clear that everyone should start leaving Obergefell in the rear-view mirror.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Mixed Bagful of August Trade Figures

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China, euro, Eurozone, free trade agreements, hi-tech, Korea, manufacturing, Mexico, oil, recovery, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade policy, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The August monthly U.S. trade figures released by the Census Bureau this morning presented a mixed picture. The combined U.S. goods and services trade deficit edged down from July’s level, exports hit an all-time high, and the manufacturing and China shortfalls retreated from their record monthly levels. Yet the headline trade gap and many key individual deficits are up on a yearly basis — meaning that America’s trade flows continue to slow both the already weak recovery and job creation on net.

The overall U.S. trade deficit dipped by 0.52 percent in August, from a downwardly revised $40.32 billion to $40.11 billion. This fourth straight monthly improvement included not only a record U.S. export total but a new record for petroleum exports. Year on year, however, the situation was considerably different.

Despite the monthly decrease, the overall deficit is now up 4.21 percent on a January-August basis over last year’s total – from $321.68 billion to $335.22 billion. The U.S. manufacturing deficit and its China goods trade shortfall also declined from the record levels they hit in July – $67.33 billion and $30.86 billion, respectively. But their decreases (2.16 percent and 12.22 percent respectively), too, were inadequate to prevent both rising year-to-date and threatening to set new annual records.

The January-August manufacturing trade gap is 10.89 percent higher than last year’s comparable figure, when the full year deficit hit the existing record of $646.77 billion. Manufactures exports are up only 1.02 percent year-to-date, while imports have risen by 4.45 percent – more than four times faster.

Similarly, the January-August China goods deficit is 4.08 percent higher than last year’s comparable figure, when the full-year deficit hit the existing record of $318.71 billion. U.S. merchandise exports to the still-rapidly growing Chinese economy have increased by 6.22 percent on a year-to-date basis, but the import flow is so much greater in absolute terms that its 4.64 January-August growth was enough to push the deficit up.

The August goods and services export figure of $198.46 billion represented the nation’s second straight all-time monthly best, topping July’s previous record of $198.03 billion by 0.22 percent. Imports rose in August on month, too, but only by 0.01 percent, to $238.57 billion.

On a January-to-August basis, overall U.S. exports have increased by 3.22 percent – to just under $1.557 trillion. Imports during this period have risen by 3.40 percent, to just over $1.892 trillion.

Consistent with the recent pattern, the monthly narrowing of the trade deficit was dominated by a dramatically improved U.S. performance in energy trade. Between July and August, the combined U.S. trade deficit narrowed by $212m.. But the petroleum deficit – sparked by record monthly exports of just under $14.14 billion – improved by $1.376 billion. The non-oil goods deficit – which is heavily influenced by U.S. trade deals and other trade policies – worsened by $958 million, to $45.13 billion.

One other bright spot in the August trade report: The volatile U.S. deficit in high-tech goods nosedived by nearly 35 percent month-on-month, as U.S. exports rose and imports fell. Further, on a January-to-August basis, this deficit is down 3.06 percent.

America’s merchandise trade deficits with leading trade partners all fell between July and August with the exception of the Mexico shortfall – which rose 1.82 percent to $4.43 billion. The goods trade gap with new free trade partner Korea sank by more than 28 percent, to $1.785 billion, on rising exports and falling imports. But on a monthly basis, this deficit has still surged by 123.40 percent since the bilateral trade agreement came into force in March, 2012.

Surprisingly, the U.S. goods deficit with the troubled Eurozone sank on month by 12.23 percent even though the euro has weakened dramatically versus the dollar recently. Year-to-date, however, this deficit has worsened by 15 percent.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Case for Obama’s Trade Agenda Crumbles Ever Faster

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euro, Eurozone, growth, Japan, Jobs, Obama, TPP, Trade, trade agreements, Trade Deficits, TTIP, yen, {What's Left of) Our Economy

In one very real sense, it’s a crying shame that President Obama’s trade agenda is so completely stalled both at the negotiating table and in Congress. Of course, it’s true historically that trade policy critics have always tried playing for time, believing that the longer international trade negotiations took and the longer Congressional votes were delayed, the better the chances of derailing deals for good. The latter view, further, has been strongly supported by a record showing that when Presidents and Congressional leaders decide the time is ripe for a trade vote, it’s because they’ve (rightly) grown confident of victory.

But if the president’s proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreements were completed and submitted by now, along with a request for fast track negotiating authority, they’d all face an information environment in which the case for such deals is looking weaker than ever.

Just look at what’s happening on the international currency front. Japan is the biggest economy by far included in the TPP (China is out for the time being), and the value of the yen has declined so much lately versus the U.S. dollar that the exchange rate is at a 6-year low. Since Japan is one of the world’s most protectionist economies wherever its currency stands, arguments for TPP’s U.S. export-boosting potential will be difficult to make with a straight face.

The euro, the currency of most of America’s prospective partners in the trans-Atlantic trade deal, is doing better than the yen lately – but not by much. Earlier this month, it hit a one-year low versus the dollar, is a bit stronger this week, but could be heading lower soon with the European Central Bank committed to ever looser monetary policies to stave off recession in the Eurozone.

Meanwhile, another pounding has just been taken by the idea that America urgently needs to secure new trade deals to speed up its sluggish recovery because the vast majority of the world’s consumers live outside its borders. I’ve already reported on World Bank and International Labor Organization data showing that the vast majority of these consumers earn far too little to become robust net importers of U.S. goods and services any time soon.

But as made clear in new, equally authoritative research summarized by The Economist, consumption power in 15 developing countries designated as emerging markets will take much longer to even begin approaching U.S. levels than once believed. According to the magazine, additional World Bank findings strongly indicate that the progress made by these developing countries in closing the income gap has now shifted into reverse. Third world growth rates recently have slowed so that the expected catch-up date with the United States has been moved back from the roughly 30 years that appeared justified before the global financial crisis broke out in 2008 to roughly 50 years. And if China is excluded, the catch-up date now looks to be 115 years off.

In fact, however, the implications of this delayed catch-up are even worse for the U.S. economy than The Economist seems to realize. For the slowdown in emerging market economic growth and the income lag it indicates means that if these countries are to reverse their fortunes again, their economies will need to become even more export-oriented than they already are. And since there’s no reason to think that Japan and the Eurozone will become more open to anyone else’s products and services with their economies stagnant as they were in better times, emerging market exporters will need to target the United States more intensively than ever. For the United States, that would mean even higher trade deficits, slower growth and hiring, and more national debt.

The U.S. interests favoring more trade deals are so powerful and wealthy that, no matter what the facts say, it’s surely still a mistake for critics to start saying “Bring ‘em on.” But unless global economic trends change quickly, their prospects will depend more on lobbying clout, as opposed to the merits, than ever.