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Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden’s Aides Show How Not to Deal with China

19 Friday Mar 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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Alaska, Antony J. Blinken, Asia-Pacific, Barack Obama, Biden, China, Donald Trump, global norms, globalism, Hong Kong, human rights, Indo-Pacific, international law, Jake Sullivan, liberal global order, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Reinhold Niebuhr, sanctions, Serenity Prayer, South China Sea, Taiwan, tariffs, tech, Trade, Uighurs, United Nations, Yang Jiechi

You knew (at least I did) that America’s top foreign policy officials were going to step in it when they led off their Alaska meeting yesterday with Chinese counterparts by describing U.S. policy toward the People’s Republic as first and foremost a globalist exercise in strengthening “the rules-based international order” rather than protecting and advancing Americas’ own specific national interests.

This emphasis on the part of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan simultaneously made clear that they had no clue on how to communicate effectively to the Chinese or about China’s own aims, and – as was worrisomely true for the Obama administration in which both served – unwittingly conveyed to Beijing that they were more concerned about dreaming up utopian global arrangements than about dealing with the United States’ own most pressing concerns in the here and now.

It’s true that, in his opening remarks at the public portion of yesterday’s event that Blinken initially refered to advancing “the interests of the United States.” But his focus didn’t stay there for long. He immediately pivoted to contending:

“That system is not an abstraction. It helps countries resolve differences peacefully, coordinate multilateral efforts effectively and participate in global commerce with the assurance that everyone is following the same rules. The alternative to a rules-based order is a world in which might makes right and winners take all, and that would be a far more violent and unstable world for all of us. Today, we’ll have an opportunity to discuss key priorities, both domestic and global, so that China can better understand our administration’s intentions and approach.”

Where, however, has been the evidence over…decades that China views the contemporary world as one in which peaceful resolution of differences is standard operating procedure, much less desirable? That multilateral efforts are worth coordinating effectively? That might shouldn’t make right and that China shouldn’t “take all” whenever it can?

Even more important, where is the evidence that China views what globalists like Blinken view as a system to be legitimate in the first place? Indeed, Yang Jiechi, who in real terms outranks China’s foreign minister as the country’s real foreign affairs czar, countered just a few minutes later by dismissing Blinken’s “so-called rules-based international order” as a selfish concoction of “a small number of countries.” He specifically attacked it for enabling the United States in particular to “excercise long-arm jurisdiction and suppression” and “overstretch the national security through the use of force or financial hegemony….”

Shortly afterwards, he added, “I don’t think the overwhelming majority of countries in the world would recognize…that the rules made by a small number of people would serve as the basis for the international order.”

Yang touted as a superior alternative “the United Nations-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law.” But of course, even if you swallow this Chinese line (and you shouldn’t), it’s been precisely that system’s universality, and resulting need to pretend the existence of an equally universal consensus on acceptable behavior and good faith on the part of all members, that’s resulted in its general uselessness.

Meanwhile, surely striking Beijing as both cynical and utterly hollow were Blinken’s efforts to justify U.S. criticisms of China’s human rights abuses as threats to “the rules-based order that maintains global stability. That’s why they’re not merely internal matters and why we feel an obligation to raise these issues here today.”

After all, whatever any decent person thinks of Beijing’s contemptible crackdown in Hong Kong, arguably genocidal campaigns against the Uighur minority, and brutally totalitarian system generally, what genuinely serious person could believe that the United States, or other democracies, had any intention or capability of halting these practices?

What might have made an actually useful, and credible, impression on the Chinese from a U.S. standpoint would have been blunt declarations that (a) Beijing’s saber-rattling toward (global semiconductor manufacturing leader) Taiwan and sealanes-jeopardizing expansionism in the South China Sea, and cyber-attacks were major threats to American security and prosperity that the United States would keep responding to with all means necessary; and (b) that Washington would continue using a full-range of tariffs and sanctions against predatory Chinese economic practices as long as they continued harming U.S. businesses and their employees. That is, Blinken and Sullivan should have emphasized Chinese actions that hurt and endanger Americans – and against which in the economic sphere, Donald Trump’s policies showed Washington could make a significant difference.

It’s possible that in the private sessions, President Biden’s emissaries will dispense with the grandstanding and zero in on the basics. (Although that shift would raise the question of why this approach was deemed unsuitable for the public.) But the Biden-ites weirdly advertised in advance that China’s economic abuses and the technology development threat it poses wouldn’t be U.S. priorities at any stage of the Alaska meetings.

In the mid-20th century, American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr popularized (although probably didn’t write) a devotion called the “Serenity Prayer” whose famous first lines read “God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the difference.” I’m hoping someone puts copies into Blinken’s and Sullivan’s briefcases for their flight back from Alaska.

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Im-Politic: Aftershocks

04 Wednesday Nov 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

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abortion, African Americans, America First, CCP Virus, China, climate change, coronavirus, COVID 19, Democrats, election 2020, election 2022, election interference, establishment Republicans, Green New Deal, Hispanics, Hong Kong, House of Representatives, human rights, Im-Politic, Immigration, Joe Biden, mail-in ballots, mail-in voting, Mainstream Media, nationalism, polls, Populism, recession, redistricting, regulations, Republicans, Senate, social issues, state legislatures, tariffs, Trade, traditional values, Trump, Uighurs, women, Wuhan virus

I’m calling this post “aftershocks” because, like those geological events, it’s still not clear whether the kind of political upheaval Americans are likely to see in the near future are simply the death rattles of the initial quake or signs of worse to come.

All the same, at the time of this writing, assuming that the final results of Election 2020 will see Democratic nominee Joe Biden win the Presidency, the Republicans keep the Senate, and the Democrats retain control of the House, the following observations and predictions seem reasonable.

First, whatever the outcome, President Trump’s campaign performance and likely vote percentages were still remarkable. In the middle of a re-spreading pandemic, a deep CCP Virus-led economic slump that’s left unemployment at still punishing levels, and, as mentioned before, unremitting hostility from the very beginning on the part of most and possibly all powerful private sector institutions in this country as well as much of Washington’s permanent government, he gave his opponents a monumental scare. If not for the virus, the President could well have won in a near landslide. And will be made clear below, this isn’t just “moral victory” talk.

Second, at the same time, the kinds of needlessly self-inflicted wounds I’ve also discussed seem to have cost him many important advantages of incumbency by combining with pandemic effects to alienate many independents and moderate Republicans who backed him four years ago.

Third, the stronger-than-generally expected Trump showing means that, all else equal, the prospects for a nationalist populist presidential candidate in 2024 look bright. After all, how difficult is it going to be for the Republican Party (whence this candidate is most likely to come) to find a standard-bearer (or six) who champions the basics of the Trump synthesis – major curbs on trade and immigration, low taxes and regulations but more a more generous economic and social safety net, a genuine America First-type foreign policy emphasizing amassing of national power in all its dimensions but using it very cautiously, and a fundamentally commonsense view on social issues (e.g., recognizing the broad support of substantial abortion rights but strongly resisting identify politics) – without regular involvement in Twitter fights with the likes of Rosie O’Donnell?

Fourth, these prospects that what might be called Trump-ism will outlast Mr. Trump means that any hopes for the establishment wing to recapture the Republican Party are worse than dead. Ironically, an outsized nail-in-the-coffin could be produced by the gains the President appears to have made with African Americans and especially Hispanics. After Utah Senator Mitt Romney’s defeat at the hands of Barack Obama in the 2012 presidential election, the Republican conventional wisdom seemed to be that the party needed to adopt markedly more tolerant positions on social issues like gay rights (less so on abortion), and on immigration to become competitive with major elements of the former President’s winning coalition – notably younger voters, women, and Hispanics. The main rationale was that these constituencies were becoming dominant in the U.S. population.

The establishment Republicans pushing this transformation got the raw demographics right – although the short run political impact of these changes was exaggerated, as the Trump victory in 2016 should have made clear. But it looks like they’ve gotten some of the political responses wrong, with immigration the outstanding example. However many Hispanic Americans overall may sympathize with more lenient stances toward newcomers, a notable percentage apparently valued Mr. Trump’s so-called traditional values and pro-business and pro free enterprise positions more highly.

If the current election returns hold, the results will put the GOP – and right-of-center politics in America as a whole – in a completely weird position. Because the party’s establishment wing still figures prominently in its Senate ranks, a wide, deep disconnect seems plausible between the only branch of the federal government still controlled by Republicans on the one hand, and the party’s Trumpist/populist base on the other – at least until the 2022 mid-term vote.

Fifth, as a result, predictions of divided government stemming from Election 2020’s results need some major qualifications. These establishment Senate Republicans could well have the numbers and the backbone to block a Biden administration’s ambitious plans on taxing and spending (including on climate change).

But will they continue supporting Trumpist/populist lines on trade and immigration? That’s much less certain, especially on the former front. Indeed, it’s all too easy to imagine many Senate Republicans acquiescing in the Democratic claims that, notably, the United States needs to “stand up to China,” but that the best strategy is to act in concert with allies – which, as I’ve explained repeatedly, is a recipe for paralysis and even backsliding, given how conflicted economically so many of these allies are. As suggested above, the reactions of the overwhelmingly Trumpist Republican base will be vital to follow.

One reason for optimism (from a populist standpoint) on China in particular – Senate Republican opposition to anything smacking of the Green New Deal should put the kibosh on any Biden/Democratic notions of granting China trade concessions in exchange for promises on climate change that would likely be completely phony. Similar (and similarly dubious) quid pro quos involving China’s repression of Hong Kong and its Uighur Muslim minority could well be off the table, too.

Sixth, their failure to flip the Senate, their apparently small losses in the House, and disappointments at the state level (where they seem likely to wind up remaining a minority party) means that the Democrats’ hoped for Blue Wave was a genuine mirage – and looks more doubtful in future national contests as well. For state governments are the ones that control the process of redrawing Congressional district lines in (very rough) accordance with the results of the latest national Census — like the one that’s winding up. So this is a huge lost opportunity for the Democrats, and a major source of relief for Republicans.

Meanwhile, on a symbolic but nonethless important level, the aforementioned better-than-anyone-had-a-right-to-expect Trump showing means that the desire of many Democrats, most progessives, and other establishmentarians to crush the President (and other Republicans), and therefore consign his brand of politics and policy to oblivion, have been sort of crushed themselves. So it’s an open question as to whether they’ll respond with even more vilification of the President and his supporters, or whether they’ll finally display some ability to learn and seriously address legitimate Trumper grievances.

Seventh, as for Trump Nation and its reaction to defeat, the (so far) closeness of the presidential vote is already aggravating the nation’s continued polarization for one particularly troubling reason: A Biden victory aided by the widespread use of mail-in voting inevitably will raise charges of tampering by Democratic state governments in places like Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. Call it domestic election interference, and the allegations will be just as angry as those of foreign interference that dogged the previous presidential election. As a result, I hope that all Americans of good will agree that, once the pandemic passes, maximizing in-person voting at a polling place needs to return as the norm.

Finally, for now – those polls. What a near-complete botch! And the general consensus that Biden held a strong national lead throughout, and comparable edges in key battleground states may indeed have depressed some Republican turnout. Just as important – a nation that genuinely values accountability will demand convincing explanations from the polling outfits concerned, and ignore their products until their methodologies are totally overhauled. Ditto for a Mainstream Media that put so much stock in their data, in part because so many big news organizations had teamed up with so many pollsters. P.S. – if some of these companies are fired outright, and/or heads roll (including those of some political reporters), so much the better.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Trusting Asian Allies to Help Contain China is Risky Business

22 Wednesday Jul 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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alliances, allies, Asia-Pacific, Aspen Institute, Cato Institute, China, East Asia-Pacific, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Jim Risch, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Republicans, South Korea, Taiwan, Ted Galen Carpenter, Trade, Trump

Some leading Republican Senators are slated to introduce legislation today intending to fill what they see as a big and dangerous gap in U.S. globalization and national security policy: the alleged lack of a comprehensive strategy to push China to conform with international norms on trade and related business policies and practices, and to make sure that the People’s Republic doesn’t replace the United States as the kingpin of the East Asia-Pacific region.

I haven’t seen the bill yet, but this Financial Times report gives what looks like a pretty complete summary – which comes from the horse’s mouth (Idaho Republican Senator Jim Risch, the lead sponsor and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee). Some of the economic proposals seem promising – although their focus seems to be China’s appalling human rights violations (about which the United States sadly can do little) as opposed to China’s economic predation (which Washington has considerable power to fight effectively).

As for the national security stuff – I really wish that Risch and his colleagues had consulted with Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute, one of America’s most trenchant foreign policy critics (and, full disclosure, a valued friend).

For in a new survey just posted by the Aspen Institute, Carpenter has made depressingly clear that one of the conditions most vitally needed nowadays for containing China’s growing military power and political influence in its back yard – reliable allies – simply doesn’t exist and isn’t likely to anytime soon.

Risch and Carpenter certainly agree on the importance of reliable allies, and apparently on their absence – although the former evidently and bizarrely believes that President Trump deserves at least part of the blame for the current unsatisfactory state of America’s regional security relationships. That take on the U.S. approach is bizarre because America (a) keeps running a growing risk of nuclear attack on the American homeland by stationing “tripwire” forces in South Korea largely because that wealthy country continues to skimp on its own defense; and (b) last I checked, America’s immense (and expensive) naval, air, and land deployments in the region were still fully intact.

And don’t just take my word for it: Carpenter lays out in painstaking detail how under President Trump the United States has actually clarified its rhetorical opposition to China’s territorial ambitions, stepped up its military operations in the Asia-Pacific region, and boosted military aid to Taiwan – which of course China views as nothing but a renegade province that it has every right to take back by force.

Regardless of what the United States is or isn’t doing, though, if U.S. alliances are going to be strengthened and oriented more explicitly against China, the allies themselves need to be at least as concerned about Beijing’s aims as Americans. That’s mainly, as Risch and his Senate colleagues note (along with yours truly over the years, as in the above linked 2014 RealityChek post), because China’s military buildup and modernization drive have eroded U.S. military superiority, and because if there’s anything worse than going to war without needed allies, it’s going to war with allies unlikely to help out once the shooting starts. And Carpenter revealed exactly how real that latter danger is by detailing just the latest instance of allied timidity:

“Washington is seeking backing from both its European and East Asian allies for a more hardline policy regarding China. The Trump administration exerted pressure for a strong, united response to Beijing’s imposition of a new national security law on Hong Kong. US officials wanted a joint statement condemning that measure and an agreement from the allies to impose some economic sanctions. However, the European Union collectively, and its leading members individually, flatly refused Washington’s request. With the exception of Australia, the reaction of the East Asian allies was no better. Japan declined to join the United States, Britain, Australia, and Canada in issuing a statement condemning the PRC’s [People’s Republic of China’s] actions in Hong Kong. South Korea seemed even more determined than Japan to avoid taking sides on the Hong Kong issue.”

And as the author rightly emphasizes, “Given the dearth of even diplomatic support from the allies for Washington’s Hong Kong proposal, there is even less chance that those countries will back a military containment policy against the PRC.”

A principal reason is money. Since the 1990s, America’s Asian allies (in particular, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) have profited hugely from setting up electronics assembly operations in China and selling the final products (made largely of their own parts, components, and materials, and put together with their production equipment) to the United States. Why on earth would they want to break up this highly lucrative marriage of their technology on the one hand, and China’s low labor costs and lavish subsidies on the other?

To be sure, as noted repeatedly on RealityChek, China has been moving up the technology ladder, and replacing Made-Elsewhere-in-Asia inputs with its own manufactures. But it’s a long way from totally supplanting its neighbors’ products.

It’s true that American multinational companies also are guilty of feeding and profiting handsomely from the Chinese beast. And it’s equally true that pre-Trump U.S. Presidents have helped create the problem by coddling allied fence-sitting. But at least the Trump administration’s trade policies are striving to disrupt these U.S. corporate supply chains, and its tariffs are threatening the profitability of foreign-owned multinationals’ export-focused China operations.  Japan has followed suit on decoupling to a limited extent, and India – which has moved closer to the United States lately for fear of China – is increasingly wary of its own, much less profitable, entanglement with the People’s Republic. But even Taiwan keeps eagerly investing in China and thereby increasing both its wealth and its military power.

Neither Carpenter nor I support the goal of beefing up U.S. military China containment efforts in the Asia-Pacific region (though not for the exactly the same reasons). In fact, we both favor major pullbacks. But we both agree that if containment is to be pursued, Washington needs to do a much better job of lining up its local ducks. Otherwise, it could find itself either losing another war in Asia, or winning a victory that’s pyrrhic at best.

P.S. One of Risch’s co-sponsors, Utah Republican Mitt Romney, has just revealed that he’s especially clueless on the potential of rallying the allies. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Ridiculous Myths About Trump’s China Trade Policies

28 Thursday May 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, election 2020, enforcement, exports, Hong Kong, imports, Phase One, Trade, trade war, Trump, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Time to scotch two myths that have come up recently about U.S.-China relations that are close to a class in themselves in terms of weirdness.

Myth Number One: President Trump is clinging to the “Phase One” trade deal he signed in January because he thinks its continuation is crucial to his reelection.

No less than every single reason cited is wrong. First is the suggestion that it’s a lousy deal but that Trump needs it because it’s one of the only results of his China or overall trade record that can be called an “accomplishment” to any extent.

Actually, even leaving aside Mr. Trump’s record of significant success in disentangling the U.S. economy from China’s (which admittedly isn’t universally viewed as a plus), the trade deal is undoubtedly a major success on terms every American except agents of the multinational Offshoring Lobby should cheer. As I’ve explained, it not only committed China to buying an enormous amount of U.S. goods way above and beyond what its import patterns suggested. It also contained an ingenious enforcement system likely to hold China’s feet to the fire by leaving Beijing only the option of pulling out of the entire deal if it’s dissatisfied with any U.S.actions – including new American tariffs to punish China for treaty violations.

In sharp contrast to their predecessors under pre-Trump administrations, the President’s negotiators acted like they understood that China’s heavy dependence on exporting to the U.S. market would prevent Beijing from walking away – for fear of losing any remaining access. But because the United States needs China’s market much less, a U.S. withdrawal would be a supremely credible threat.

It’s true, as so many critics have charged, that China’s promises in the Phase One deal to cease or cut back on its wide-ranging predatory trade and related practices are pretty general. But the lopsided nature of the enforcement mechanism provides a great way to solve this problem. If Washington decides that Beijing isn’t living up to even vague promises, it can retaliate however harshly it wishes. The only legal option open to China is ending the entire agreement. None of the kinds of tit-for-tat retaliations that Beijing used so skillfully to spark domestic U.S. complaints about the President’s earlier tariffs are authorized. If China tries going down this road, it would likely face even stiffer U.S. tariffs.

Slightly more reasonable – but only slightly – have been observations that Mr. Trump urgently needs the extra Chinese purchases to sustain his claim of guiding the American economy to impressive levels of prosperity. Make no mistake: The export promises specified in Phase One represent valuable, production-based growth opportunities – the more so since 40 percent of those exports were specified to be manufactures, which add so much value to the American economy, as well as create so many family wage jobs.

But the economy – including the trade-sensitive manufacturing sector – was climbing out of a soft patch by the end of last year. Now that the CCP Virus has induced a prolonged national economic shutdown, any growth boost would of course be welcome, including from exports to China. But the downturn has been so gargantuan, and so heavily concentrated in the personal services sectors, that China trade has receded far into the background for the time being. Nor will it matter much to any substantial recovery – which will mainly require a rebound in those same personal services.

But couldn’t a collapse of the Phase One deal – for whatever reason – still threaten the President’s cherished goal of a strongly rising stock market? No, and because investors also appear aware of the trade deal’s marginality to the real economy for time being – and, it seems, especially keenly. In fact, their behavior as Sino-American tensions have risen recently for all sorts of reasons (the virus, China’s apparently impending further crackdown on Hong Kong) contrasts strikingly with their reactions to the trade war’s previous ups and downs. Then, they traded – often frantically – on the resulting headlines. Since the March bottom, though, it’s been a decidedly seller’s market.

Which leads to the second myth that should be headed for the circular file – that the Chinese know they have the upper hand on the President at least during this election year, and that they’re about to use an obscure clause in the deal to get them off the import hook. I’ve always doubted that anyone outside top Chinese leadership circles has any handle on what’s going on and being thought in Chinese leadership circles.

Luckily, howeve, there’s no need for entrails-reading. What matters most of all are Chinese actions. And the record shows that Beijing has never brought up the so-called force majeure clause (see Article 7.6 at the very end of the treaty text), which could enable China to suspend promised increases of imports due to extraordinary circumstances like the virus – which continues to take a heavy toll on its own economy. Indeed, at the recent meeting of China’s rubberstamp legislature, Premier Li Keqiang, second in command to China’s supremo Xi Jinping, explicitly affirmed China’s commitment to meet its Phase One obligations. 

Because that legislature has now passed the newly proposed Hong Kong crackdown law, Mr. Trump will face the challenge of developing a response. His options are wide-ranging, and predicting them seems a thankless task. What does seem certain is that his choices will be accompanied by a new round of bizarre China policy myths.   

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Closer U.S. Taiwan Ties Must Become a Two-Way Street

24 Sunday May 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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alliances, allies, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, East Asia-Pacific, foreign investment, Hong Kong, Huawei, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, South Korea, Taiwan, tech, Trade, Trump, TSMC, Wuhan virus

As if its CCP Virus coverup and planned crackdown on what’s left of Hong Kong’s freedoms weren’t bad enough, China has been escalating its aggressive words and deeds throughout its East Asia/Pacific neighborhood, and one major sign has been new pressure exerted on Taiwan – which Beijing views as a breakaway province that needs to end its rebellion immediately and join the Communist People’s Republic.

This more worrisome Chinese posture understandably has sparked calls for the United States to retaliate by demonstrating stronger support for Taiwan in various ways. This impulse also seems reasonable to me. But if the Trump administration speeds up its march down this road, it handles a closer relationship with Taiwan a lot better than its predecessors for decades had handled security alliance relationships with Japan and South Korea. Specifically, it’s crucial that Taiwan share much more of the burden of resisting China’s ambitions than has long been the case.

The latest alarm bells about China’s Taiwan policies have been set off by China’s words – or, more accurately, a missing word. Although the PRC (People’s Republic of China) has never renounced using force to achieve its longstanding aim “reunifying” China (as it defines the issue), its rhetorical positions toward the island have long fluctuated between the conciliatory and the blustery. But for 40 years, when Beijing mentioned of reunification, the word “peaceful” has always preceded it.

Last Friday, though, China’s second most important leader dropped the “peaceful” – and did it at a major forum: the annual meeting of the country’s rubberstamp parliament.

So it seems clear that the China cloud over Taiwan has darkened. But U.S. steps to bolster Taiwan’s security will greatly underperform – and may actually increase the dangers posed to America by China itself – unless Washington starts demanding in return that Taiwan stop its longstanding practice of investing massively in manufacturing in China, including in high tech sectors.

Indeed, as of 2018, according to this report, the total value of Taiwanese investment in China hit $180 billion – ten times the value of Taiwan’s investment in the United States. The annual amounts have been going down, but mainly because of the Trump administration’s tariffs on China, which have made it much more difficult for any factories in China – Chinese or foreign-owned – to earn fat profits by exporting major shares of their output to the United States. Even so, such investment had reached massive proportions. Indeed, in 2017. China still attracted nearly 45 percent of all Taiwan’s outbound foreign direct investment. Moreover, so much of this investment has come in technology sectors that fears have emerged of the island hollowing out its own innovation sector – which has been so vital to Taiwan’s spectacular economic development. And of course, Taiwanese companies like contract semiconductor manufacturing giant TSMC have been major suppliers of microchips and other high tech products to Chinese tech companies like Huawei, the global leader in advanced telecommunications.

It’s important to recognize that Taiwan is hardly the only U.S. ally that’s promoted China’s economic – and therefore technological and military – development. It’s not even the biggest. (That dubious honor goes to Hong Kong, but most of this Chinese “Special Administrative Region’s” direct investment flows to China seem to be concentrated in lower-tech, labor-intensive sectors without significant national security implications.) Moreover, the United States remains complicit itself.

But even though his administration doesn’t use the word, decoupling from China does appear to be a major goal of President Trump’s. There’s certainly been a lot of it. I’m not big at all on the United States embarking on a full-fledged campaign to mobilize East Asia/Pacific countries to out-compete China for influence in the  region. Indeed, I’ve argued that disentangling the United States from China economically is vital to ensure American security and prosperity on its own merits. But if President Trump does want to go the full-court anti-China press route, what’s the point if supposed American allies aren’t all-in on decoupling asd  as well?

Im-Politic: In Case You Still Doubt It’s a China Virus

13 Friday Mar 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

≈ 5 Comments

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China, China virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, elites, globlalism, Hong Kong, Im-Politic, Iran, Italy, pandemics, Taiwan, The Epoch Times, Trump

Yesterday’s RealityChek post explained why Americans looking for current domestic scapegoats for the sluggish China Virus outbreak response are barking up the wrong tree. But despite the predictable criticisms from globalism- and political correctness-happy elites and the Mainstream Media journalists who follow their cues, the search for foreign scapegoats is absolutely legitimate – primarily because one country above all has unmistakably earned the title: China.

Skeptical? Then check out this editorial from The Epoch Times. As it compellingly demonstrates, “Where Ties With Communist China Are Close, the Coronavirus Follows.”

More specifically, although the editorial writers note that numerous drivers lie behind COVID19’s spread, “the heaviest-hit regions outside China all share a common thread: close or lucrative relations with the communist regime in Beijing.”

One reason I found the editorial especially important was its explanation for the virus’ concentration in Italy. Some convincing explanations for high levels of Italian mortality rates have come out, but I’ve yet to run across any material on why China Virus became so common in Italy to begin with. The Epoch Times spotlights some major reasons:

“Italy, the most heavily affected country outside China as of March 10, was the first (and only) G-7 [“Group of 7” – an official organization of the world’s seven biggest economies] nation to sign onto the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also known as One Belt, One Road). In an attempt to prop up its weakening economy, Italy has also sought to capture the Chinese market for selling its luxury goods….

“Italy also has signed scores of sister-city agreements with China, with the cities of Milan, Venice, and Bergamo included among them. These are the areas hardest-hit by the virus.”

China ties also seem largely responsible for the coronavirus’ outsize impact on Iran:

“The Iranian regime has had a comprehensive strategic partnership with China since 2016, and its ties with Beijing began years before that. In violation of international sanctions, Iran has imported embargoed materials from China, while continuing to sell oil to the PRC. The Islamic Republic allowed flights in and out of four major Chinese cities until the end of February.”

And reinforcing the case for a vital Iran-China connection is this Wall Street Journal piece. It reports that the Iranian city of Qom, which Iran’s government calls the country’s COVID19 starting point, has been the site of numerous infrastructure projects built by Chinese engineers and technicians as part of that Belt and Road program.

As the Times notes, even South Korea’s government – whose comprehensive and seemingly testing program has garnered widespread global praise – seems to have set itself up for China Virus troubles “for refusing to ban Chinese tourists at large and instead only barring entry for those who recently traveled to Hubei Province, the epicenter of the epidemic in China.”

Don’t forget, moreover, that one big reason surely has concerned South Korea’s long surging economic relations with China – which assembles lots of high-value manufactured goods containing numerous South Korean parts and components. The same goes for Japan, another coronavirus hotspot.

The Epoch Times‘ conclusion is also borne out by the experiences of two other places with extensive economic relations with China that seem to have the disease contained: Hong Kong and Taiwan. (And I don’t mean to suggest that the latter isn’t a “country.”)

The city, located right next to another China Virus epicenter, Guangdong Province, has basically shut its border with the People’s Republic. Taiwan “began to board planes and assess passengers on Dec. 31, 2019, after Wuhan authorities first confirmed the outbreak. In early February, Taiwan banned entry to foreign nationals who have traveled to the PRC.”

Of course, now that the virus has spread far beyond China, government authorities need to focus on more domestically focused strategies – although plugging remaining foreign travel gaps, as President Trump approved in his otherwise unsuccessful Wednesday night Oval Office address, can certainly be justified in many circumstances.

Moreover, China’s primo role in not only the coronavirus outbreak but the previous Bird Flu and ongoing Asian Swine Flu episodes indicates that there’s something about China that makes it particularly (if not uniquely) plague-prone. As a result, further curbs on commerce with the PRC seem imperative even leaving aside (as no one should) Beijing’s recent threat to cut off shipments of vital medicines and their chemical ingredients to the United States. In other words, keeping the focus on China’s responsibility will help American leaders keep and intensify their focus on desirable, broader economic decoupling.

And China’s disgraceful effort to place blame for the virus on the United States amounts to a major additional reason to spotlight the above transnational coronavirus links.

“Blame games” in politics and policy are often condemned, and surely they’re often wrongheaded or overdone. But they also serve the valuable purpose of clarifying thought, accurately identifying problems, and – as suggested above – speeding the discovery of effective solutions. That’s why The Epoch Times editorial gives me more reason than ever to keep calling the coronavirus the China Virus – and why the same should go for all Americans.    

Following Up: More Reasons for the NBA to Get Woke on China

27 Friday Dec 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

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basketball, China, Following Up, Hong Kong, human rights, India, Japan, LawfareBlog.com, National Basketball Association, NBA, Nikkei Asian Review, sports, Uighurs, Victor Cha

Earlier this month, I published a piece on The American Conservative website scolding the National Basketball Association (NBA) and some of its star players and coaches for too often knuckling under to Chinese human rights-related pressure for fear of getting shut out of the People’s Republic’s vast and rapidly growing market. I justified my call for a more outspoken China stance by this normally politically outspoken league by noting that China wasn’t the only big foreign market capable of adding to the league’s already healthy profits and thus to the players’ and coaches’ already titanic salaries. And I observed that in fact, U.S. pro basketball has enough leverage with China to lead a global sports world push for better behavior from Beijing, especially when it comes to Hong Kong and the country’s Uighur Muslim minority.

That’s largely why it’s been great to see these arguments being reinforced lately both by some new NBA-related business developments and by a leading authority on Asian affairs.

On the business front, a recent report from Japan’s Nikkei Asian Review (NAR) observes that the league is indeed continuing full steam ahead with its efforts to win fans and rake in bucks in Japan and India. The former, not so incidentally, is the world’s third largest single national economy (after the United States and China). The latter has a population so huge and still growing so fast that it’s soon expected to surpass China as the world’s biggest.

According to NAR, this fall the NBA played its first games in Japan (exhibitions) in 16 years and the stands were packed. Moreover, the publication cites one estimate claiming explosive recent growth in subscriptions for the streaming service authorized to carry league games.

Further, the NBA’s popularity in Japan looks set to keep surging for the foreseeable future. For next year’s summer Olympics will be held in Tokyo, and the U.S. and other foreign teams slated to compete will contains dozens of NBA stars. And in 2023, Japan will be one of the co-hosts (along with other big Asian countries the Philippines and Indonesia) of the basketball World Cup.

But perhaps the biggest boost to the NBA’s popularity has been Washington Wizards rookie Rui Hachimura. Hachimura isn’t the first Japan-born player to appear in an NBA game. But so far he looks to be the best by far, and could boost the league’s Japanese fan base in ways reminiscent of Yao Ming’s impact in China.

As for India, the league opened its first office in that population giant in 2017, and although its athletes don’t seem NBA- (or major college-) ready yet, but its fans could identify with Vivek Ranadive, Indian-born owner of the Sacramento Kings. And the Kings played the Indiana Pacers in Mumbai this fall shortly before the Japan exhibition games.

Meanwhile, my claim that the NBA possesses ample clout to confront China successfully on human rights issues was seconded recently by Victor Cha, a Georgetown University political scientist and former National Security Council Asia specialist under George W. Bush’s administration. In a December 8 post for the Lawfare blog, Cha wrote:

“China may continue to ban broadcasts of [certain NBA] games, but how long before Chinese people express frustration? It’s not like there is an alternative to NBA stars like Lebron James or Steph Curry for youth on a Chinese basketball team to worship. China’s punishment may be costly in the short term, but in the long run, the demand signal from Chinese consumers will remain strong. And if the Beijing authorities are seen to be standing in the way, the Chinese Communist Party may be doing more harm than good to its own domestic standing. Moreover, the attention brought to the Chinese over the NBA ban could make the Chinese people aware of alternative narratives of the events in Hong Kong beyond the official media’s framing of the protests as criminal, thuggish and unjustified behavior.”

And I would strongly second Cha’s broader conclusion that “China’s predatory liberalism is an affront to the liberal international order, and the NBA, whether intended or not, is now a part of this struggle. Its actions going forward will set precedents, hopefully positive, for governments, companies, and individuals both inside and outside of China.”

Making News: A New China (and Basketball!) Op-Ed, and Back on CNBC Today!

03 Tuesday Dec 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

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China, CNBC, European Union, Hong Kong, human rights, Making News, National Basketball Association, NBA, The American Conservative, Trade, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that a new op-ed article of mine was posted last night.  Appearing on the website of The American Conservative, it explains why the National Basketball Association and its often politically outspoken players and coaches can easily afford to lead a global campaign to press China to clean up at least some of its human right act in Hong Kong and elsewhere.  Click here to read.

Also, I’m scheduled to return to CNBC this afternoon to discuss all the fast-breaking developments in U.S. trade policy across the board – including with China and the European Union.  The segment is slated to begin at 2 PM EST and, as usual, if you can’t tune in (or if you’re dying to see it again), I’ll be posting a link to the streaming video as soon as one’s available.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

 

 

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Signing the Hong Kong Democracy Bill Should be a No-Brainer for Trump

24 Sunday Nov 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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China, Congress, democracy, Hong Kong, Hong Kong protests, human rights, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, sanctions, trade deal, trade talks, Xi JInPing

Full disclosure: I don’t believe that promoting human rights and democracy abroad should be a high priority for U.S. foreign policymakers. (My most detailed explanation comes in this late-1994 article in FOREIGN POLICY magazine, which is available on-line here and here.) All the same, there’s no doubt in my mind that President Trump would be making a big political and substantive mistake if he, as he’s (very obliquely, to be sure) hinted that he might veto the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 just passed overwhelmingly by both the House and Senate.

Don’t get me wrong: I’m under no illusion that the legislation will do anything in the foreseeable future to promote human rights and democracy in Hong Kong – and you shouldn’t be, either. In fact, there’s every reason to believe that it’s a classic example of political virtue-signaling. For example, even the sponsors of the bill don’t seem to believe that any plausible official American words or deeds can affect the fate either of Hong Kong generally or of the huge numbers of protesters who have been challenging China’s determination to keep eating away at the special freedoms enjoyed by its residents since its hand over by the United Kingdom to Beijing in 1997.

If they did, you’d think that they’d have included in the bill some economic sanctions against the Chinese economy. But not only are such provisions entirely missing. The only measures resembling economic sanctions or potential sanctions are directed against the economy of Hong Kong – in the form of requirements that the various ways in which U.S. policies and other laws that treat Hong Kong differently from China (based on the assumption that this “Special Autonomous Region,” as Beijing calls it) really still is autonomous – remain justified by the facts on the ground in Hong Kong.

The bill does contain some sanctions instructions directed at China – but not at any sectors of its economy. Instead, they’re to be applied against “foreign persons” determined to be “knowingly responsible” for any “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in Hong Kong.”

To which the only serious response is “So what?” The Hong Kong officials who give the specific orders to the police to fire tear gas or crack some heads or shoot rubber bullets into crowds are nothing more than tools of the dictators in Beijing. Concentrating punishment on them amounts – knowingly – to punishing the little fish and letting the prize catches get away. And P.S. – they’re as easily replaceable and interchangeable as any ordinary functionary.

Unless you can think of many U.S. politicians in either party who would back imposing sanctions on Chinese kingpin Xi Jinping or any of his senior cronies? Fat chance – assuming you could even locate any of their assets vulnerable to America’s reach. After all, how many American elected officials genuinely doubt that China’s top leaders are ultimately responsible for the harsh repression of the Hong Kong protests – or for the extradition law that triggered this uprising?

Nonetheless, the politics alone argue compellingly for presidential signing of the Hong Kong measure. It attracted nearly unanimous support on Capitol Hill, so a veto override is likely. And although the President won’t win much praise for enacting the bill into law, he’ll generate a hail of brickbats for any opposition.

And for what? As I argued in the article cited at the beginning, human rights interests generally should take a back seat in U.S. foreign policy for any number of reasons, but chiefly because other interests are usually more important for America’s security or prosperity (since foreign governments’ human rights practices as are almost completely incapable of undermining these objectives). Moreover, American actions can sometimes backfire, and it’s far from far-fetched to worry that a Trump approval of the Hong Kong bill and more frequent and stronger expressions of official outrage will only further convince China’s dictators (and much of the nationalistic Chinese public) that the unrest in Hong Kong stems from foreign meddling, not legitimate concerns.

Yet U.S.-China relations these days are so bad that it’s difficult to imagine a Trump signature on the Hong Kong legislation significantly worsening them. It’s possible that Beijing could retaliate with still higher tariffs or other curbs on American exports, especially farm products, but China remains much more vulnerable to U.S. economic pressure than vice versa. Nor is the President likely to suffer much politically from such measures during the upcoming election year, since nearly all of his political opponents have spoken out much more emphatically against China’s record in Hong Kong than he has. As for “outside agitator” claims – the Chinese are already making them, including against the United States.

Which leaves us with the one stated presidential reason for considering a veto of the Hong Kong bill – that an obstacle could be created to reaching a trade deal. The problem here is that a trade deal that serves U.S. interests (as opposed to a cosmetic deal that, e.g., results in increased American exports to China in exchange for American tariff reductions with no commitments from Beijing to end its most important predatory trade practices) simply isn’t possible. As I’ve written repeatedly, even a complete Chinese cave-in on paper to every demand the administration has ever made can’t possibly be verified adequately – because the Chinese government is so big and so secretive.

In fact, if there’s any relationship between trade policy and Hong Kong policy, it surely works the other way: More human rights pressure from Mr. Trump would be added to the economic pressure that’s already making Xi’s life hard enough. And whatever throws the Chinese off balance by definition helps the United States. For it would force Beijing to spend more time putting out fires and playing defense generally across the board, and leaves less time for pursuing offensive economic and geopolitical goals that undermine American interests.

As I’ve always seen it, claims that these interests (properly defined, of course) and ideals are always ultimately compatible are among the most fatuous made by practitioners, scholars, and historians of American foreign policy. But especially for a country with America’s range of geopolitical and economic choice (by dint of its high degree of built-in security and economic self-sufficiency, and potential for even more), there’s also no question that the United States can afford to promote its admirable values on a regular basis.

Hong Kongers’ struggle for more freedom and democracy represents one such case, meaning that a Trump-ian failure to sign the Hong Kong bill would call into question not only his support for these ideals, but his pragmatic instincts as well.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Now What in the U.S.-China Trade War?

15 Tuesday Oct 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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agriculture, allies, China, decoupling, Democrats, election 2020, forced technology transfer, Hong Kong, Huawei, impeachment, intellectual property theft, National Basketball Association, Phase One, Steven Mnuchin, subsidies, supply chains, Taiwan, tariffs, Trade, trade talks, Uighurs, verification, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This is the second working day since the United States and China reached what the Trump administration is calling a “Phase One” trade deal with Beijing last Friday, and the questions surrounding the agreement still far outweigh what’s known. That alone should tell you that towering obstacles continue blocking any confident assessment of where the President’s so-called trade war stands, much less where the conflict is likely to go. Even so, here are some observations I hope are useful.  (Teaser:  One major point concerns tonight’s Democratic presidential candidates debate.)

First, the absence of any written statements or documents from the U.S. side describing or even summarizing what’s actually in the agreement justifies big doubts that anything deserving the term “deal” has been reached at all. Further reinforcing legitimate skepticism is China’s long record of broken promises on trade.

Second, especially strong skepticism is warranted about U.S. claims that any meaningful progress has been made on the so-called structural issues focused on from the very beginning by the Trump administration. For it as I’ve long argued, China’s government is so vast and secretive, and leaves such scanty written records of key decisions, that it will simply be impossible for the United States to monitor and enforce even the most promising Chinese commitments on intellectual property theft, technology extortion, discriminatory Chinese government procurement, and Beijing subsidies that shaft U.S.-owned and other foreign businesses vis-a-vis their Chinese rivals.

Third, even if China currently means to keep its alleged promises to binge buy American agricultural products, any number of external events could upset the apple cart. They include the Hong Kong picture becoming uglier (its becoming prettier can’t be totally ruled out, but seems highly unlikely); new Chinese crackdowns on other protests that may emerge (especially among the Uighur Muslim population) or revelations of new Chinese atrocities against the Uighurs or other minorities or other protesters; more attempted Chinese bullying of high-profile U.S. businesses like the National Basketball Association; a major flare-up of tensions over Taiwan or China’s aggressive moves in the South China Sea; a step forward in the Huawei case that increases the chances that the CFO daughter of the founder of this Chinese telecommunications giant will be extradited to the United States from Canada for sanctions-busting; and Chinese moves that persuade Washington that Beijing has no intention of keeping its perceived agriculture or other promises.

Moreover, the longer China takes to ramp up its buys from American farmers, the greater the potential for these kinds of shocks to bring this “Phase One” agreement crashing down.

Fourth, the less impressive the “mini-deal” keeps looking, the more convincing my view that its apparent modesty reflects President Trump’s belief that his domestic political position has weakened significantly – both because of the new impeachment threat and signs of an economic slowdown.

It’s true that Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has suggested that if the deal hasn’t been finalized by December 15, the Trump administration will go ahead with a previously vowed 15 percent increase on $156 billion worth of levies on Chinese imports. But that’s anything but a concrete threat. In addition, it’s important to note this report suggesting (the specifics are really sloppily described) that China wants the sequencing to work in the opposite way:  First, tariffs get rolled back (or frozen in place?), then the agriculture buys begin. 

Moreover, no one in the administration has said anything about reversing its Phase One-related decision to suspend a big tariff increase (to up to a formidable 30 percent on some products) previously announced to begin on October 15. So even though U.S. duties on some $360 billion worth of Chinese goods would still remain in place if China blows Mr. Trump off, there’s a real chance that Beijing won’t incur any further punishment – doubtless because the President believes that tariffs above and beyond current levels and coverage could panic investors again and further soften economic growth.

Some kind of blow-up in Hong Kong or elsewhere could yet change Mr. Trump’s calculations. But the more important point so far is that events, not the President, are now in charge of the trade talks track of his China policy.

Fifth, at the same time, none of the above means that the United States is devoid of leverage versus China and in particular the kind of clout that can keep advancing its economic as well as closely related technology and national security interests, and this is where a second, arguably more important, track of the Trump China policies needs to be remembered. As I’ve written, the President has sought not only to end the threat of China’s economic predation by forcing Chinese policy changes through tariff pressure. Although he rarely speaks of it, he’s also been trying to repel Chinese threats to U.S. security and prosperity through a series of unilateral measures aimed at decoupling the United States from China economically.

By crimping trade, investment, and technology flows, these decoupling steps are reducing America’s vulnerability to China by significantly reducing the access to the U.S. market so crucial to the success of China’s advanced industries; by shrinking the footprint of China’s state-controlled economy in America’s largely free market system; and by cutting off a Chinese tech sector that could be become highly dangerous from critical supplies of U.S. components.

Decoupling has also been advanced by those tariffs so far imposed on $360 billion worth of Chinese products (amounting to nearly 86 percent of all goods imports from China last year). They haven’t done much to achieve their stated aim of improving China’s behavior, but they have decreased China’s importance to the U.S. economy by prompting an exodus of global manufacturing supply chains out of the People’s Republic.

Further, the Trump decoupling campaign has also helped awaken many foreign governments to the China tech and broader economic threat – though because so many other countries (including major American treaty allies), were profiting so handsomely from the pre-Trump globalization status quo, progress on this front has been uneven and disappointing. (See here for why Germany, for example is so conflicted.) 

Sixth and finally, one major set of actors in this drama, though, hasn’t been very woke on China issues:  most of the Democratic presidential candidates. Sure, many have supported a policy of “doing something” on China (though rarely involving tariffs – or any other concrete measures). But so far, none seems to view China’s multi-dimensional challenge to America as a major concern – and all the top-tier contenders and most others now support impeaching the President. 

Consequently, they could greatly strengthen not only Mr. Trump’s position, but the American position, with firm declarations in tonight’s debate that China will stay squarely in Washington’s cross-hairs if they win the White House, and that therefore there’s no point in stonewalling in hopes of easier post-2020 U.S. policies. Not that any confidence looks well founded that any of them will.        

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Current Thoughts on Trade

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Alastair Winter

Chief Economist at Daniel Stewart & Co - Trying to make sense of Global Markets, Macroeconomics & Politics

Smaulgld

Real Estate + Economics + Gold + Silver

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